Alexander 3 Russian-French alliance. Historical reference. Cultural relations of allied countries

For a long time, it consolidated friendly relations between Germany and Russia. He preferred to see Austria-Hungary, Russia's most dangerous rival in the Balkans, as his main ally.

To avoid diplomatic isolation, Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Girs began negotiations with the government of Sadi Carnot. The union of an authoritarian empire and a democratic republic, which amazed all of Europe, was formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention on August 18, 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in the event of an attack by Germany or Austria-Hungary on Russia or by Italy and Germany on France. The alliance was subsequently confirmed by the Russian-French Naval Convention of 1912.

No less important than the military and cultural was the economic dimension of the Franco-Russian Union. Loans placed in France, both state and municipal, banking and industrial, were of great importance for the development of the Russian economy. In addition to loans, the participation of French capital in Russian joint-stock enterprises also played a great role. At the beginning of the 20th century, about a quarter of all French investments outside France were in Russia.

Notes

Links

Documents on the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance (1891-1893)
Nikolai Troitsky Russian-French alliance // Russia in the 19th century. Lecture course. M., 1997.
V. I. Bovykin. French capital in Russian joint-stock enterprises on the eve of October

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See what the “Franco-Russian Union” is in other dictionaries:

FRANCO RUSSIAN UNION, see RUSSIAN FRENCH UNION. Source: Encyclopedia Fatherland ... Russian history

Military political union of France and Russia, operating from the beginning. 90s 19th century until 1917. It developed in conditions of outgrowing pre-monopoly. capitalism into imperialism, when imperialism arose in Europe. coalition. Strengthening Germ. empires... ... Soviet historical encyclopedia

See Russian-French Union. * * * FRANCO RUSSIAN UNION FRANCO RUSSIAN UNION, see Russian-French Union (see RUSSIAN FRENCH UNION) ... encyclopedic Dictionary

An alliance concluded between France and Russia in the early 1890s. in contrast to the Triple Alliance (q.v.) and together with this latter protected the system of European balance during the last decade of the 19th century. Apart from such temporary... Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron

Military-political alliance of Russia and France since the early 1890s. until 1917. See Russian-French Union ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

See Russian-French Union... Diplomatic Dictionary

The Pont Alexandre III in Paris was founded by Nicholas II himself. The Franco-Russian alliance was a military-political alliance between Russia and France, which was the main vector of the foreign policy of the two states in 1891-1917 and preceded the creation of the Triple Entente.... ... Wikipedia

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- “The Alliance of the Three Emperors” is a set of agreements between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, concluded in 1873, 1881 and 1884. Contents 1 First treaty of 1873 2 Second treaty of 1881 and 1884 ... Wikipedia

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Books

Napoleon and Alexander I Franco-Russian Alliance during the First Empire Book 3 Breaking the Franco-Russian Alliance, A. Vandal. The three-volume work of the famous French historian Albert Vandal (1853–1910) is dedicated to the Napoleonic period in the history of France and talks about the foreign policy of Napoleon Bonaparte ,…

This report is devoted to the reasons that led to the conclusion of the military-political alliance between Russia and France at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries, as well as the consequences of this alliance for Russia.

It should be noted that, according to a number of researchers, the alliance between Russia and France was dictated not only by the common military-strategic interests of both powers, but also by the presence of a threat from common enemies. In addition, there was a strong economic basis for the alliance of the two powers.

Since the 70s, Russia has been in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. It was from then on that the share of French capital in the Russian economy gradually began to increase. For 1869-1887 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French.

French financiers very productively used the deterioration of Russian-German relations. In 1888, the first Russian loan bonds in the amount of 500 million francs were issued on the Paris Exchange, followed by loans in 1889, 1890 and 1891. French capital in a short time became the main creditor of tsarism.

Thus, already in the early 90s, the foundation of Russia’s financial dependence on France was laid. The economic prerequisites of the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who came to Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order with French military factories for the production of 500 thousand rifles for the Russian army.

The cultural prerequisites for the alliance between Russia and France were long-standing and strong. No other European country had such a powerful cultural impact on Russia as France. The names of F. Voltaire and J.J. Rousseau, A. Saint-Simon and C. Fourier, V. Hugo and O. Balzac, J. Cuvier and P.S. Laplace, J.L. David and O. Rodin, J. Wiese and C. Gounod were known to every educated Russian. In France they always knew less about Russian culture than in Russia about French culture. But since the 80s, the French, more than ever before, have become familiar with Russian cultural values. Publishing houses are emerging that specialize in reproducing masterpieces of Russian literature - the works of L.N. Tolstoy and F.M. Dostoevsky, I.A. Goncharova and M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, not to mention I.S. Turgenev, who lived in France for a long time and became one of the favorite writers for the French.

It should be emphasized that by that time allied relations with Germany, the power closest to Russia in terms of internal political position, were experiencing a crisis. After the Berlin Congress of 1878 A war began between Germany and Russia - first a newspaper war, and then a customs war. If the newspaper war could not be taken seriously, then another, the customs war, immediately had serious consequences. Germany by that time was the most important market for raw materials from Russia (in 1879 it absorbed 30% of Russian exports). Meanwhile, the global agrarian crisis of the 70s intensified the struggle for markets for food and raw materials. In conditions of crisis, the German Junkers demanded to protect them from foreign competition. Bismarck heeded the demands and in January 1879 established an almost complete ban on the import of Russian cattle (under the guise of a quarantine measure against the outbreak of an epizootic in the Astrakhan province), and then raised customs duties on bread, which hit the interests of Russian landowners even more painfully than his “veterinary " measures.

At the same time, Russian industrialists obtained from their government the collection of increased (and, moreover, in gold) duties on German industrial goods in order to stop the economic expansion of Germany and not allow it, as M.N. wrote about it. Katkov in 1879, “to place Russia in the same relationship to Germany as Turkey and Egypt are in relation to England and France.” As a result, relations between Russia and Germany deteriorated as they had never been since the Seven Years' War.

In addition to the above economic measures, Germany set a course for rapprochement with Austria-Hungary. It was beneficial for Germany to maintain a constant and strong counterweight to Russia in the Balkans in the person of Austria-Hungary. Otherwise, if the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had perished (from a war from without or from a revolution from within), national Slavic states would have emerged from under its ruins, which logically would have been oriented toward Slavic Russia. In this case, Russia could excessively (from Germany’s point of view) strengthen its international position. Bismarck did not want to allow such a turn of events.

In the context of growing rapprochement between Russia and France, an alliance was advocated in both countries by advocates of an active offensive policy against Germany. In France, as long as it maintained a defensive position towards Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. Now, when France recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 and the question of revenge arose on the agenda of French foreign policy, the course towards an alliance with Russia sharply prevailed among its leaders (including President S. Carnot and Prime Minister C. Freycinet).

In addition, wide (politically very different) circles of the Russian public were interested in the Russian-French alliance, which took into account the entire set of mutually beneficial prerequisites for this alliance. A “French” party began to take shape in society, in the government, and even at the royal court. Its herald was the famous “white general” M.D. Skobelev.

On February 17 (5th according to the Russian calendar) in Paris, Skobelev, at his own risk, made a speech to Serbian students - a speech that went around the European press and plunged the diplomatic circles of Russia and Germany into confusion. “Not a single victory of General Skobelev made such a noise in Europe as his speech in Paris,” the Kievlyanin newspaper reasonably noted at the time. Russian Ambassador to France Prince N.A. Orlov was so shocked by this speech that he reported to Giers that Skobelev was “openly posing as Garibaldi.” What was the “white general” talking about so loudly? He branded official Russia for becoming a victim of “foreign influences” and losing track of who is its friend and who is its enemy. “If you want me to name you this enemy, so dangerous for Russia and for the Slavs,<...>“I’ll tell you his name,” thundered Skobelev. - This is the author of the “onslaught on the East” - he is familiar to all of you - this is Germany. I repeat to you and ask you not to forget this: the enemy is Germany. The struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons is inevitable. She’s even very close!”

In Germany and France, as well as in Austria-Hungary, Skobelev’s speech became the political topic of the day for a long time. The impression it made was all the stronger because it was perceived as inspiration “from above.” “What Skobelev, a general in active service, the most famous of the Russian military figures of that time, says, not authorized by anyone, solely on his own behalf, no one believed this either in France or in Germany,” E.V. rightly concluded. Tarle. Skobelev suddenly died four months after this speech. But the “French” party in the Russian “top” continued to gain strength. It was composed of the Tsar’s spiritual shepherd K.P. Pobedonostsev, head of government N.P. Ignatiev and his replacement D.A. Tolstoy, Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev, the most authoritative of the generals (soon to become field marshal) I.V. Gurko, one of the most influential Russian publicists, publisher, literary critic of the conservative-protective views of M.N. Katkov. In January 1887, the Tsar already said this to Giers about the national antipathies of Russians towards Germany: “Before I thought that it was only Katkov, but now I am convinced that it is all of Russia.”

True, the “German” party was also strong at the court and in the Russian government: Foreign Minister N.K. Girs, his closest assistant and future successor V.N. Lamzdorf, Minister of War P.S. Vannovsky, ambassadors to Germany P.A. Saburov and Pavel Shuvalov. The court support of this party was the wife of the Tsar's brother Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna (nee Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin). On the one hand, she influenced the Tsar’s family in favor of Germany, and on the other hand, she assisted the German government, informing it about the plans of Alexander III and about Russian affairs. In terms of influence on the tsar and the government, as well as in the energy, persistence and “caliber” of its members, the “German” party was inferior to the “French” one, but a number of objective factors that hindered Russian-French rapprochement were in favor of the first.

The first of these was the geographical factor of remoteness. A military alliance required operational relations, and such between countries located at opposite ends of Europe seemed very difficult at the end of the 19th century, when there was no radio, no air, or even motor transport, and telegraph and telephone communications were just being improved. However, this factor also promised obvious benefits to the Russian-French alliance, since it contained the threat of a war on two fronts, which was mortal for Germany.

This shows why the Russian-French alliance took shape, although steadily, but slowly and difficultly. It was preceded by a number of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries.

In the summer of 1890, the first practical step towards an alliance was taken on both sides. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Empire N.N. Obruchev invited (of course, with the highest sanction) the Deputy Chief of the French General Staff, R. Boisdeffre, to the maneuvers of the Russian troops. Negotiations between Obruchev and Boisdeffre, although they were not formalized by any agreement, showed the interest of the military leadership of both sides in the union treaty.

The following year, 1891, the opposing side gave a new impetus to the formation of the Russian-French bloc, advertising the renewal of the Triple Alliance (the military-political bloc of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). In response, France and Russia are taking a second practical step towards rapprochement. On July 13 (25), 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive demonstration of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat, standing, with his head uncovered, humbly listened to the revolutionary anthem of France “Marseillaise”, for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a “state crime”.

Following the visit of the squadron, a new round of diplomatic negotiations took place, the result of which was a kind of consultative pact between Russia and France, signed by two foreign ministers - N.K. Girsa and A. Ribot. Under this pact, the parties pledged, in the event of a threat of attack on one of them, to agree on joint measures that could be taken “immediately and simultaneously.” “The former revolutionary embraces the future” - this is how V.O. assessed the events of 1891. Klyuchevsky. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu called 1891 the “Kronstadt year.” Indeed, the royal reception given to the French sailors in Kronstadt became, as it were, the event of the year with far-reaching consequences. The newspaper “St. Petersburg Vedomosti” stated with satisfaction: “The two powers, bound by natural friendship, have such formidable force of bayonets that the Triple Alliance must stop involuntarily in thought.” But the German attorney B. Bülow, in a report to Reich Chancellor L. Caprivi, assessed the Kronstadt meeting as “a very important factor that weighs heavily on the scales against the renewed Triple Alliance.”

The New Year brought with it a new step in the creation of the Russian-French alliance. R. Boisdeffre, who by that time headed the General Staff of France, was again invited to the military maneuvers of the Russian army. On August 5 (17), 1892 in St. Petersburg, he and General N.N. Obruchev signed the agreed text of the military convention, which actually meant an agreement between Russia and France on an alliance. These are the main terms of the convention.

If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will attack Germany, and if Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, then France will move against Germany.

In the event of the mobilization of troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its powers, Russia and France will immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.

France undertakes to field 1,300 thousand soldiers against Germany, Russia - from 700 to 800 thousand. “These troops,” the convention said, “will be fully and quickly put into action so that Germany will have to fight in both the East and the West at once.” "

The Convention was to come into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Giers deliberately (in the interests of Germany) delayed the performance, citing the fact that his illness prevented him from studying the details with due care.

In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew numerically from 2 million 800 thousand to 4 million 300 thousand people. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit. True, the king was still cautious. He requested lists of those admirals who spoke French well and those who spoke poorly. From the second list, the king ordered to choose the worst speaker of French. This turned out to be Vice Admiral F.K. Avelan. He was sent at the head of the squadron to France, “so that he would talk less there.”

France gave the Russian sailors such an enthusiastic reception that Alexander III left all doubts. He ordered Giers to speed up the presentation of the Russian-French convention and approved it on December 14. Then the exchange of letters provided for by diplomatic protocol between St. Petersburg and Paris took place, and on December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894) the convention officially came into force. The Russian-French alliance was formalized.

The balance of power between them largely depended on which side England, the most economically developed power of the world at that time, would take. The ruling circles of England still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of “brilliant isolation.” But the growing Anglo-German antagonism due to colonial claims against each other forced England to increasingly lean towards the Russian-French bloc.

Text: Ivan Igolkin

Bismarck, as far as possible, tried to maintain close relations with Russia and prevent its rapprochement with France. However, at the end of the 80s, Russian-German economic contradictions intensified. The reason for this was the longest and deepest in the 19th century. economic crisis associated with the fall of first agricultural and then industrial prices. It started in the 70s and continued until the mid-90s. Contemporaries called it the “Great Depression” (in the future this name will be transferred to the crisis of the early 30s of the 20th century, which was even more catastrophic in its consequences). This crisis has forced most European countries

abandon the free trade policy that they pursued in the 60-70s, reducing customs duties several times compared to the previous period. Believing that the fall in prices is due to cheap imports, most European countries have taken the path of customs protectionism, i.e. introduction of high customs duties on imported goods. Naturally, such a policy hit the main trading partners especially painfully, which in the last third of the 19th century. Germany and Russia were for each other.

In the context of the economic crisis, the German government tried to put pressure on Russia to get it to reduce duties on German goods. In 1887, German banks, on the direct orders of Bismarck, refused a loan to the Russian government, which systematically resorted to foreign loans to finance government spending. This forced Russia to turn to France for help. In 1888, the largest Parisian banks first provided her with a loan guaranteed by the French government. This deal was followed by new ones, and by 1914, Russia's public debt to French investors reached 10 billion francs. At the same time, French direct investment in the Russian economy also increased - from 200 million francs. in 1888 to 2.2 billion francs. in 1914.

Thus began a historical turn in relations between both states. They were divided by deep political and ideological differences. Russia was an autocratic monarchy, France a democratic republic. In Russia, people were thrown into prison for republican propaganda, including singing “La Marseillaise,” and in France, “Marseillaise” began in the early 1980s. became the national anthem. What decisively contributed to their rapprochement was the sense of threat posed by the powers united in the Triple Alliance.

Germany's refusal in 1890 to extend the “reinsurance” treaty, as well as rumors about Great Britain joining the Triple Alliance, accelerated the process of Russian-French rapprochement. In 1891 in Paris, Russia and France entered into an agreement on mutual consultations in the event of a “threat to universal peace.” And just a year later, on August 5 (17), 1892, representatives of the Russian and French general staffs of the army signed a military convention, according to which they pledged to provide each other with military assistance in the event of an attack on one of them by Germany. Moreover, the number of troops that Russia and France were supposed to field was even determined - 1.3 million and from 700 to 800 thousand, respectively. The military convention came into force as a result of the exchange of official letters between the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Affairs of Russia and the French ambassador in St. Petersburg December 15 (27), 1893 - December 23, 1893 (January 4, 1894).

The creation of the Russian-French alliance finally led to Russia's exit from the international isolation in which it had chronically remained after the collapse of the Vienna system, since the Crimean War. The hopes she placed in the Alliance of the Three Emperors were not justified, as was clearly demonstrated by the Congress of Berlin and in particular the formation of the Triple Alliance, which was hostile to her.

The difficult task of overcoming Russia's international isolation fell to the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girsa. He had vast experience in practical work, accumulated over many years of diplomatic service. In addition, he was a flexible and tactful person who managed to win the complete trust of both Alexander II and Alexander III, who considered themselves the most competent in all matters of foreign policy. Contemporaries argued that Gire was more suitable than anyone else for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs under these monarchs. The minister proceeded from the conviction that Russia’s main partners in the international arena are Germany and Austria-Hungary. In particular, he valued good relations with Germany. The aggravation of contradictions with Germany and Austria-Hungary forced him to turn his attention to France. But even during negotiations with the French, Gire did not give up hope for improving relations with Germany. He regarded the ultimately reached agreement with France as nothing more than a “marriage of convenience” that met not so much the sympathies of the government as the interests of the state.

V.N., who replaced Girs as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Lamsdorf treated the political legacy of his predecessor with care. He was a staunch supporter of the Russian-French alliance, but viewed this alliance not at all as a measure aimed at preparing for war with Germany, but as a guarantee, a guarantee of maintaining good, partnership relations with it. Therefore, Lamsdorf in the 90s resisted the attempts of the French government to give a more mandatory, official character to the cooperation of the general staffs of the armies of both states. He called on them “to be content with those excellent, documentarily uncompromising relations that now exist between France and Russia.”

The creation of the Russian-French alliance contributed to the stabilization of the international situation. The balance in the forces of the main powers, which had previously emerged as a result of national wars, has become stable. The presence of two pro-

The opposing military alliances uniting the largest and most powerful states in Europe made any attempt to upset the existing balance of power extremely risky. It is no coincidence that the largest states henceforth for 20 years refrained not only from using military force in Europe, but even from the threat of using it.

In fact, by the end of the 19th century. A new, fairly stable system of international relations had emerged, characterized by such features as the balance of power of the main powers, the presence of generally recognized borders between European states and secured by international treaties, and the existence of two military-political groupings opposing each other. The latter was in fact an innovation that distinguished the new system of international relations from both the Westphalian and Vienna systems. An important loss compared to previous times was that, despite individual attempts (such as the convening of the Berlin Congress and a number of international conferences, which will be discussed below), the “European concert” was never restored. Probably because the new system had neither a specific place nor time of birth, it, unlike the Westphalian and Vienna systems, remained without a generally recognized name.

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. peace, at least in Europe, seemed as strong and unshakable as ever. States found the opportunity to resolve even long-standing and painful contradictions through compromises. In particular, Lamsdorf pursued a balanced policy in the Balkans. He did not abandon Russia’s traditional role as patron and protector of Turkish Christians. At the same time, in the interests of peace, he supported the power of the Sultan and advocated the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to his efforts, in April-May 1897, Russia and Austria-Hungary signed an agreement on Balkan affairs, which condemned “any aggressive intention on the Balkan Peninsula,” no matter who it came from.

But the international order that emerged towards the end of the 19th century was not without serious flaws. Like any stable order, it was based on the balance of power of the main powers and the authority of treaties between states. But brute military force still played a significantly larger role than law. Following the example of Bismarck's Germany, it was in military force that the European powers saw the main guarantee of security and protection of their interests. The fact that in Europe at the end of the 19th century. peace reigned, it was not explained so much

their sincere desire for peace, as well as their greatest caution, fueled by the conviction of the aggressive intentions of their neighbors. Therefore, during the last third of the 19th century. the main powers created military alliances and built up armaments. It is noteworthy that both the Triple Alliance and the Russian-French Alliance were of a defensive nature, i.e. they provided for joint actions of their participants only to repel aggression.

The peace in Europe, although it seemed strong, was in fact quite fragile. In any case, the threshold of military danger was low and tended to constantly decrease. This was evidenced by changes in German military strategy at the end of the 19th century. Bismarck took into account the vulnerability of the geographical position of a united Germany, which bordered the largest and strongest states in Europe in the west and east: France and Russia. Considering a war on two fronts disastrous for Germany and trying to avoid it, he advocated maintaining good neighborly relations at least With one of them, Russia. After Bismarck retired in 1890, General Leo von Caprivi was appointed chancellor. He was convinced that a clash between Germany and Russia was inevitable, and called for preparations for a war on two fronts.

The creation of the Russian-French alliance did not cool the ardor of German politicians and military personnel for long. The Army General Staff prepared a plan for the “lightning-fast” defeat of France and Russia, which allegedly guaranteed Germany’s victory even in the event of a war on two fronts. After the chief of the general staff, it was called the “Schlieffen plan.” And in 1898, the German Reichstag adopted a naval construction program, the implementation of which was supposed to turn Germany into the largest maritime power in the world. Of course, these actions of Germany did not at all contribute to either its reconciliation with France or the strengthening of confidence in it on the part of Russia and Great Britain.

Such a fragile world was saved for a long time only by the fact that at the end of the 19th century. major conflicts and crises occurred far beyond Europe and were associated with the colonial division of the world.

Questions:

\. How did the balance of power in the main European states change after the end of the era of national wars?

2. What goals did Germany pursue in the field of foreign policy immediately after the Franco-Prussian War?

3. What are the causes of the Eastern Crisis and the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878?

4. Why was the Triple Alliance formed?

5. What tasks faced the Russian-French alliance?

Literature:

Main:

History of Russian foreign policy. Second half of the 19th century. M., 1997. Ch. 5 and 7.

History of diplomacy. M., 1963. T. 2. Ch. 3-5, 8.

Additional:

Klyuchnikov Yu.V., Sabanin A. International politics of modern times in treaties, notes and declarations. Part I. From the French Revolution to the Imperialist War. M., 1925 (Documents No. 215, 218, 221, 230, 244, 255, 257, 258).

Yerusalimsky A.S. Bismarck: diplomacy and militarism. M., 1968. P. 172-184 (“From the Austro-German Alliance to the Triple Alliance”).

Kinyapina N.S. The Balkans and Straits in Russian foreign policy at the end of the 19th century (1878-1898). M., 1994.

The Eastern Question in Russian Foreign Policy. (End of the 18th - beginning of the 20th century). M., 1978.

Skazkin S.D. The end of the Austro-Russian-German alliance. Research on the history of Russian-German and Russian-Austrian relations in connection with the Eastern Question in the 80s of the 19th century. M., 1974.

Manfred A.Z. Formation of the Russian-French alliance. M., 1975. Ch. 7 and 8.

Chubinsky V. Bismarck. St. Petersburg, 1997. Ch. VIII, IX.

The alliance between Russia and France was dictated not only by the common military-strategic interests of both powers, but also by the presence of a threat from common enemies. By that time /348/ there was already a strong economic basis for the union. Since the 70s, Russia has been in dire need of free capital to invest in industry and railway construction; France, on the contrary, did not find a sufficient number of objects for its own investment and actively exported its capital abroad. It was from then on that the share of French capital in the Russian economy gradually began to increase. For 1869-1887 17 foreign enterprises were founded in Russia, 9 of them French.

French financiers very productively used the deterioration of Russian-German relations. Parisian banks bought up Russian valuables thrown onto the German money market. In 1888, the first Russian loan bonds in the amount of 500 million francs were issued on the Paris Exchange, followed by loans in 1889 (for 700 million and 1200 million francs), 1890 and 1891. French capital in a short time became the main creditor of tsarism. Thus, already in the early 90s, the foundation of Russia’s financial dependence on France was laid. The economic prerequisites of the union also had a special military-technical aspect. Already in 1888, the brother of Alexander III, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who came to Paris on an unofficial visit, managed to place a mutually beneficial order with French military factories for the production of 500 thousand rifles for the Russian army.

The cultural prerequisites for the alliance between Russia and France were long-standing and strong. No other country had such a powerful cultural impact on Russia as France. The names of F. Voltaire and J.J. Rousseau, A. Saint-Simon and C. Fourier, V. Hugo and O. Balzac, J. Cuvier and P.S. Laplace, J.L. David and O. Rodin, J. Wiese and C. Gounod were known to every educated Russian. In France they always knew less about Russian culture than in Russia about French culture. But since the 80s, the French, more than ever before, have become familiar with Russian cultural values. Publishing houses are emerging that specialize in reproducing masterpieces of Russian literature - the works of L.N. Tolstoy and F.M. Dostoevsky, I.A. Goncharova and M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, not to mention I.S. Turgenev, who lived in France for a long time and became one of the favorite writers for the French. M. de Vaupoe's book “The Russian Novel,” published in 1886, became not only a scientific and literary, but also a social event in France.

In the context of growing rapprochement between Russia and France, an alliance was advocated in both countries by advocates of an active offensive policy against Germany. In France, as long as it maintained a defensive position towards Germany, an alliance with Russia was not a burning need. Now, when France recovered from the consequences of the defeat of 1870 /349/ and the question of revenge arose on the order of the day for French foreign policy, the course towards an alliance sharply prevailed among its leaders (including President S. Carnot and Prime Minister C. Freycinet) with Russia.

In Russia, meanwhile, the government was being pushed towards an alliance with France by the landowners and bourgeoisie, who were hurt by Germany’s economic sanctions and therefore advocated a turn of the domestic economy from German to French loans. In addition, wide (politically very different) circles of the Russian public were interested in the Russian-French alliance, which took into account the entire set of mutually beneficial prerequisites for this alliance. A “French” party began to take shape in society, in the government, and even at the royal court. Its herald was the famous “white general” M.D. Skobelev.

On February 17 (5th according to the Russian calendar) in Paris, Skobelev, at his own risk, made a “daredevil” speech to Serbian students - a speech that went around the European press and plunged the diplomatic circles of Russia and Germany into confusion. “Not a single victory of General Skobelev made such a noise in Europe as his speech in Paris,” the Kievlyanin newspaper reasonably noted at the time. Russian Ambassador to France Prince N.A. Orlov (son of the chief of gendarmes A.F. Orlov) was so shocked by this speech that he reported to Giers that Skobelev was “openly posing as Garibaldi.” What was the “white general” talking about so loudly? He branded official Russia for becoming a victim of “foreign influences” and losing track of who is its friend and who is its enemy. “If you want me to name you this enemy, so dangerous for Russia and for the Slavs, I will name him for you,” thundered Skobelev. - This is the author of the “onslaught on the East” - he is familiar to all of you - this is Germany. I repeat to you and ask you not to forget this: the enemy is Germany. The struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons is inevitable. She’s even very close!”

In Germany and France, as well as in Austria-Hungary, Skobelev’s speech became the political topic of the day for a long time. The impression it made was all the stronger because it was perceived as inspiration “from above.” “What Skobelev, a general in active service, the most famous of the Russian military figures of that time, says, not authorized by anyone, solely on his own behalf, no one believed this either in France or in Germany,” E.V. rightly concluded. Tarle. Skobelev suddenly died four months after this speech. But the “French” party in the Russian “top” continued to gain strength. It was composed of the Tsar’s spiritual shepherd K.P. Pobedonostsev, head of government N.P. Ignatiev and his replacement D.A. Tolstoy, /350/ Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev, the most authoritative of the generals (soon to become field marshal) I.V. Gurko, the most influential of the press handlers M.N. Katkov. In January 1887, the Tsar already said this to Giers about the national antipathies of Russians towards Germany: “Before I thought that it was only Katkov, but now I am convinced that it is all of Russia.”

True, the “German” party was also strong at the court and in the Russian government: Foreign Minister N.K. Gire, his closest assistant and future successor V.N. Lamzdorf, Minister of War P.S. Vannovsky, ambassadors to Germany P.A. Saburov and Pavel Shuvalov. The court support of this party was the wife of the Tsar's brother Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna (nee Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin). On the one hand, she influenced the Tsar’s family in favor of Germany, and on the other hand, she assisted the German government, informing it about the plans of Alexander III and about Russian affairs. In terms of influence on the tsar and the government, as well as in terms of energy, persistence and “caliber” of its members, the “German” party was inferior to the “French” one, but a number of factors were in favor of the first objective factors that hindered Russian-French rapprochement.

What hampered the union between Russia and France more were differences in their state and political systems. In the eyes of such a reactionary as Alexander III, the alliance of tsarist autocracy with republican democracy looked almost unnatural, especially since it oriented Russia against the German Empire, led by the Hohenzollern dynasty, which was traditionally friendly and even related to tsarism. It was on this monarchical mindset of the autocrat that the “German” party built its policy. Gire directly said in September 1887 to the German chargé d'affaires at the court of Alexander III (future chancellor) B. von Bülow: “I give you my head that never, never will Emperor Alexander raise his hand against Emperor Wilhelm, nor against him / 351/ son, nor against his grandson.” At the same time, Gire was sincerely surprised: “How can these French be so stupid as to imagine that Emperor Alexander will go with all sorts of Clemenceau against his uncle! This alliance could only terrify the emperor, who would not pull chestnuts out of the fire in favor of the Commune.”

This shows why the Russian-French alliance took shape, although steadily, but slowly and difficultly. It was preceded by a number of preliminary steps towards rapprochement between the two countries - mutual steps, but more active on the part of France.

In the spring of 1890, after Germany refused to renew the Russian-German “reinsurance” agreement, the French authorities skillfully took advantage of the difficult situation for Russia. To win the favor of Alexander III, on May 29, 1890, they arrested a large group (27 people) of Russian political emigrants in Paris. At the same time, the French police did not disdain the services of a provocateur. Agent of the St. Petersburg secret police since 1883 A.M. Haeckelmann (aka Landesen, Petrovsky, Baer and General von Harting), with the knowledge of the Paris police authorities and, apparently, for a certain bribe, staged preparations for the assassination attempt on Alexander III in the French capital: he himself delivered bombs to the apartment of the “terrorists”, aimed at told the police and escaped safely. The arrested victims of his provocation were put on trial and (except for three women, acquitted with purely French gallantry) sentenced to imprisonment. Alexander III, having learned about this, exclaimed: “Finally there is a government in France!”

This situation looked especially piquant because the French government was headed at that time by Charles Louis Freycinet - the same Freycinet who was the head of the French government in 1880, when it refused to hand over Narodnaya Volya member L.N. to tsarism. Hartmann, accused of preparing a terrorist act against Alexander II. Now Freycinet, as it were, atoned to Alexander III for the long-standing sin of the affront inflicted on his father.

The police action of 1890 in Paris paved the way for political rapprochement between the governments of Russia and France. In the summer of the same year, the first practical a step towards union. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Empire N.N. Obruchev invited (of course, with the highest sanction) the deputy /352/ chief of the French general staff, R. Boisdefra, to the maneuvers of the Russian troops. Negotiations between Obruchev and Boisdeffre, although they were not formalized by any agreement, showed the interest of the military leadership of both sides in the union treaty.

The following year, 1891, the opposing side gave a new impetus to the formation of the Russian-French bloc, advertising the resumption of the Triple Alliance. In response, France and Russia are taking a second practical step towards rapprochement. On July 13 (25), 1891, a French military squadron came to Kronstadt on an official visit. Her visit was an impressive demonstration of Franco-Russian friendship. The squadron was met by Alexander III himself. The Russian autocrat, standing, with his head uncovered, humbly listened to the revolutionary anthem of France “Marseillaise”, for the performance of which in Russia itself people were punished as a “state crime”.

If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will attack /353/ Germany, and if Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, then France will move against Germany.

The Convention was to come into force after its ratification by the Emperor of Russia and the President of France. The ministers of foreign affairs were supposed to prepare and submit its text for ratification. However, Gire deliberately (in the interests of Germany) delayed the presentation, citing the fact that his illness prevented him from studying the details with due care. The French government, beyond his expectations, helped him: it became entangled in the fall of 1892 in a grandiose Panamanian scam.

The fact is that an international joint-stock company created in France in 1879 for the construction of the Panama Canal under the chairmanship of Ferdinand Lesseps (the same one who built the Suez Canal in 1859-1869) went bankrupt as a result of theft and bribery of many prominent officials , including three former prime ministers. A number of these individuals, hopelessly compromised, were brought to trial. A ministerial leapfrog has begun in France. Giers and Lamsdorf gloated, anticipating the reaction of Alexander III. “The Sovereign,” we read in Lamzdorf’s diary, “will have the opportunity to see how dangerous and imprudent it is to become too closely associated with states without a permanent government, which France currently is.”

The Tsar really did not rush Giers to study the convention, but then the German government, for which Giers worked so hard, upset his whole game. In the spring of 1893, Germany began another customs war against Russia, and on August 3, its Reichstag adopted a new military law, according to which the German armed forces grew numerically from 2 million 800 thousand to 4 million 300 thousand people. Having received detailed information about this from the French General Staff, Alexander III became angry and defiantly took a new step towards rapprochement with France, namely, he sent a Russian military squadron to Toulon on a return visit. True, the king was still cautious. He requested /354/ lists of those admirals who spoke French well and those who spoke poorly. From the second list, the king ordered to choose the worst speaker of French. This turned out to be Vice Admiral F.K. Avelan. He was sent at the head of the squadron to France, “so that he would talk less there.”

Like the Triple Alliance, the Russian-French alliance was created outwardly as a defensive one. In essence, both of them harbored an aggressive beginning as rivals in the struggle for the division and redistribution of spheres of influence, sources of raw materials, markets on the road to European and world war. The 1894 alliance between Russia and France basically completed the regrouping of forces that took place in Europe after the Berlin Congress of 1878. F. Engels defined the results of the development of international relations in 1879-1894: “The major military powers of the continent were divided into two large ones, camps threatening each other: Russia and France on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other.” The balance of power between them largely depended on which side England, the most economically developed power of the world at that time, would take. The ruling circles of England still preferred to remain outside the blocs, continuing the policy of “brilliant isolation.” But the growing Anglo-German antagonism due to colonial claims against each other forced England to increasingly lean towards the Russian-French bloc.

Historiographical information. The historiography of this topic is relatively small. Unlike previous and subsequent years, Russian foreign policy 1879-1894. historians were of little interest, with the exception of such a central plot in this topic as the Russian-French alliance.

Russian pre-revolutionary historiography and at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. traditionally continued to highlight the eastern question from all issues of domestic foreign policy, although over time it faded further into the background. Even the Russian-French alliance did not become the subject of special research for Russian historians until 1917.

In Soviet historiography, all aspects of the foreign policy of tsarism 1879-1894. were considered one way or another. /355/ E.V. Tarle, and later F.A. Rothstein reviewed them in his consolidated works on the history of European diplomacy at the end of the 19th century. In 1928, the 1st volume of S.D.’s major work was published. Skazkin about the “Union of 3 Emperors” 1881-1887. (Volume 2 was not written). Based on archival data, previously unstudied by anyone, Skazkin revealed the reasons for the emergence and collapse of this union and all aspects of its activities as the last attempt of the three most reactionary monarchies of Europe to maintain at least benevolent neutrality between them - an attempt doomed to failure due to aggravation their mutually hegemonic claims, mainly in the Balkans. An equally thorough work on the Russian-French alliance of 1894 appeared only in 1975. Here, the process of gradual rapprochement between Russia and France 20 years before the signing of the union treaty between them was explored in all its complexity, everything was examined in detail - economic, political, military, cultural are the prerequisites for the union and its significance is shown on a large scale. No comparison with the works of S.D. Skazkin and A.Z. Manfred cannot stand the work on the same topics by V.M. Khvostov, overly politicized and declarative.

In the West (primarily in France), the literature on the Russian-French alliance of 1894 is immeasurably richer. R. Giraud examined the economic prerequisites of the union, E. Daudet, J. Michon, W. Langer and others - its diplomatic and military essence, and from different positions: Michon, for example, developed an untenable, although widespread in English and German literature, version that the Russian-French alliance “emerged from the Eastern question.”

Other subjects of Russian foreign policy 1879-1894. in foreign historiography are poorly covered. But Western historians have written a number of excellent generalizing works on the history of international relations of the late 19th century, which examine the foreign policy of Tsarist Russia in a pan-European context.

Notes

1. The text of Skobelev’s speech and the introductory article to it E. Published in Tarle: Red Archive. 1928 T. 2. P. 215-220.

2. See: Manfred A.3. Formation of the Russian-French alliance. M., 1975. P. 226 (based on archival documents).

3. Alexander III was William I's nephew, and William II was his uncle.

4. Quote. by: Manfred A.Z. Decree. Op. P. 227. J. Clemenceau was then the leader of the bourgeois radicals in France.

5. Haeckelmann-Landesen was rewarded very generously by Alexander III in gratitude for his service in 1890. The provocateur became (under the name von Harting) the head of the Russian secret police abroad with the rank of general and a high salary.

6. M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, in his essays “Abroad,” bitterly ironized how, once in Paris, he heard the singing of “Marseillaise” right on the street: “I myself, of course, did not sing - but how could I not suffer for my presence! »

7. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states (1856-1917). P. 281.

8. Since then, the very term “Panama” has become a common noun to refer to particularly large scams.

9. See, for example: Zhikharev S.A. Russian policy in the Eastern Question. M., 1896. T. 1-2; Goryainov S.M. Bosphorus and Dardanelles. St. Petersburg, 1907.

10. See: Tarle E.V. Europe in the era of imperialism. 1871-1919. M., 1927; Rotshtein F.A. International relations at the end of the 19th century. M.; L., 1960.

11. See: Skazkin S.D. The end of the Austro-Russian-German alliance. M., 1928. T. 1 (2nd ed. - M., 1974).

12. See: Manfred A.Z. Formation of the Russian-French alliance. M., 1975.

13. See: Khvostov V.M. Franco-Russian alliance and its historical significance. M., 1955; History of diplomacy. 2nd ed. M., 1963. T. 2. Ch. 5, 8 (author of the volume - V.M. Khvostov).

14. See: Girault R. Emprunts russes et investissements francais en Russie. 1887-1914. P., 1973.

15. See: Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe. M., 1947. T. 2.; Taylor A. The struggle for dominance in Europe (1848-1918). M., 1958; Renouvin P. La paix armee el la grande guerre (1871-1919). P., 1939. The review and analytical article by F. Engels “Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism” (Marx K., Engels F. Works. 2nd ed. T. 22) retains great scientific significance.

Culture

The 19th century was truly the golden age of culture in Russia. M.V.’s prediction came true – completely and clearly. Lomonosov, who argued in 1747,

What can Platonov's own

And the quick-witted Newtons

Russian land to give birth!

The main reason for the steep rise in Russian culture in the 19th century. there was a growing process of replacing feudalism with capitalism in all (economic, social, political, spiritual) components of both systems. This process was developing latently even before the abolition of serfdom. The reform of 1861 liberated and accelerated it. As a result, the pace of Russia's national development has increased, and the country's life (cultural, in particular) has become more eventful than ever before. A number of factors derived from the replacement of feudalism with capitalism contributed to cultural progress unprecedented in Russia.

Firstly, they grew immeasurably faster than before in the 19th century. (especially in the post-reform decades) productive forces, and with their growth, the mobility of the population increased: the multimillion-dollar mass of peasants moved from village to city, to factories and factories, to the construction of railways, etc. All this entailed major changes in the spiritual life of the people: the need for knowledge and educated people for public service, education, industry, and trade increased; The demand for books, magazines, newspapers, cultural shows and entertainment expanded.

Secondly, Russia’s transition from feudalism to capitalism was accompanied by the accelerated formation of Slavic nations on its territory and the annexation of foreign border regions, which were thereby also drawn into the all-Russian course of history. This stimulated the rapid growth of national self-awareness of the peoples of Russia, which revived the development of national culture and imparted special integrity, ideological maturity and meaningfulness to cultural values. The creative activity of the people's “lower classes” was manifested in the fact that their representatives rose through all obstacles to the heights of national and world culture. The serfs were the poet T.G. Shevchenko, painters O.A. Kiprensky and V.A. Tropinin, actors M.S. Shchepkin and P.S. Mochalov, actresses P.I. Zhemchugov and E.S. Semenova, /357/ architects A.N. Voronikhin and P.I. Argunov, mechanics father and son Cherepanov, composer A.L. Gurilev.

Thirdly, the liberation movement against serfdom and autocracy served as a powerful lever for cultural upsurge. Throughout the century it grew both in depth and breadth, and as it grew, it had a stronger impact on the spiritual life of the country. The democratic camp represented by its thinkers, politicians, artists from A.N. Radishchev to G.V. Plekhanov contributed to the development of science, literature, and art from the standpoint of historical progress, humanism, high ideology and nationality.

Finally, they contributed to the progress of Russian culture in the 19th century. its connections with Western countries, mutual contacts and exchange of cultural achievements. In the West at that time, economic and social relations were more developed than in Russia. Compared to Russia, the general level of Western European culture, which was then represented by such giants of social thought as G.F., was also higher. Hegel, A. Saint-Simon, C. Fourier, G. Spencer, K. Marx; such luminaries of science as P.S. Laplace, A. Humboldt, M. Faraday, C. Darwin, L. Pasteur; such literary geniuses as I.V. Goethe, D. Byron, C. Dickens, O. Balzac, V. Hugo, G. Heine; such luminaries of art as L. Beethoven, D. Verdi, F. Goya, N. Paganini, O. Rodin. Therefore, communication with the West had a beneficial effect on the development of Russian culture.

At the same time, in Russia in the 19th century. Factors that hampered the development of national culture remained: serfdom, which limited the possibilities of education, and tsarist absolutism, which deliberately made it difficult for the common people to access knowledge. Russian culture developed in difficult conditions of confrontation between both objective and subjective factors, some of which promoted and others hindered its progress.

I. Letter from the Russian Ambassador in Paris Morenheim to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribot

G. Minister,

During my recent stay in St. Petersburg, where I was summoned by order of my august monarch, the Emperor was pleased to provide me with special instructions, set out in the enclosed copy of a letter sent to me by His Excellency Mr. Giers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which His Majesty was pleased to order me to inform the government of the republic.

In pursuance of this highest command, I undertake to bring this document to the attention of your Excellency, in the firm hope that its contents, previously agreed upon and jointly formulated by our two Cabinets, will find the full approval of the French Government and that you, Mr. Minister, will deign, in accordance with the desire expressed by Mr. Giers, to honor me with an answer testifying to the complete agreement happily established for the future between our two governments.

The further development which these two agreed and jointly established points not only admit of, but which should constitute their natural and necessary complement, may become the subject of confidential and strictly personal negotiations and exchanges of views at the moment at which it is found opportune by one or another cabinet , and where they consider it possible for themselves to begin them at the right time.

Placing myself at your Excellency's complete disposal on this occasion, I am happy to take this opportunity to ask you to accept the assurances of my deepest respect.

Morenheim

Lamadorf V. N. Diary (1891‑1892), M.‑L. "Academia". 1934, pp. 176-177.

II. Letter from Russian Foreign Minister Giers to Russian Ambassador in Paris Morenheim

St. Petersburg, 9/21August 1891G.

The situation created in Europe, owing to the open renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less probable accession of Great Britain to the political goals pursued by this alliance, gave rise, during the recent stay here of M. de Laboulaye, to an exchange of opinions between the French ambassador and myself in order to establish a position which, under present conditions, in the event of certain circumstances arising, would be most expedient for both our governments, which, while remaining outside of any union, nevertheless sincerely desire to create the most effective guarantees for the preservation of peace. Thus, we came to the formulation of the following two points:

2) In the event that the world were truly in danger, and especially in the event that one of the two parties were under threat of attack, both parties agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which will be imperative in the event of the occurrence of the said events for both governments.

Having reported to the Emperor about these negotiations, as well as the text of the final formulations adopted, I have the honor to now inform you that His Majesty has deigned to fully approve the stated principles of the agreement and agree to their acceptance by both governments.

In informing you of this highest will, I ask you to bring this to the attention of the French government and notify me of the decisions on which, for its part, it will decide. Accept, etc.

Gears

Lamadorf, pp. 171-172.

III. Letter from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribot to the Russian Ambassador in Paris Morenheim

You have deigned, by order of your government, to inform me of the text of the letter from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, which contains special instructions with which His Majesty Emperor Alexander decided to provide you as a result of the latest exchange of opinions between Mr. Giers and the Ambassador of the French Republic in St. Petersburg, caused by the pan-European situation. Your Excellency was instructed to express at the same time the hope that the contents of this document, previously agreed upon between the two cabinets and formulated jointly, would meet with the full approval of the French government. I hasten to thank Your Excellency for this message. The government [of the republic] can assess the situation created in Europe due to the circumstances under which the renewal of the Triple Alliance took place only in the same way as the imperial government does, and together with it considers that the moment has come to determine the position, given the current situation and upon the occurrence of certain events, the most appropriate for both governments, equally striving to provide guarantees for the preservation of peace, consisting in maintaining a balance of power in Europe. I am happy, therefore, to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Republic fully adheres to the two points which are the subject of Mr. Giers' communication and which are formulated as follows:

1) In order to determine and establish the cordial consent that unites them, and desiring jointly to contribute to the maintenance of peace, which is the object of their most sincere desires, the two Governments declare that they will consult among themselves on every question capable of threatening the general peace.

2) In the event that the world were truly in danger, and especially in the event that one of the two parties were under threat of attack, both parties agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which will be necessary in the event of the occurrence of the said events for both governments.

I place myself, however, at your disposal to discuss all issues that, given the current general political situation, will attract the special attention of both governments.

On the other hand, the Imperial Government, like us, is undoubtedly aware of how important it would be to instruct special delegates, who should be appointed as soon as possible, to practically study the measures that must be opposed to the events provided for in the second clause of the agreement.

In requesting that the response of the French Government be brought to the attention of the Imperial Government, I consider it my duty to note how valuable it was to me to be able to assist, to the best of my ability, in the consolidation of the agreement which has always been the subject of our common efforts. Accept, etc.

A. Ribot

Lamadorf, pp. 177-178.

IV. Draft military convention of August 5/17, 1892

Inspired by the same desire to preserve peace, France and Russia, with the sole purpose of preparing for the demands of a defensive war caused by an attack by the troops of the Triple Alliance against one of them, agreed on the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all the troops she can command to attack Germany.

If Russia were attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France would use all the troops it could to attack Germany. (Original French draft: "If France or Russia should be attacked by the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")¹*

2. In the event of the mobilization of troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its constituent powers, France and Russia, immediately upon receipt of news of this, without waiting for any prior agreement, will immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces and move them as close as possible to their borders.

(Original French draft: "In the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or Germany alone...")

3. The active armies to be used against Germany will be 1,300,000 men on the French side, and from 700,000 to 800,000 on the Russian side. These troops will be fully and quickly brought into action, so that Germany will have to fight in both the east and the west at once.

4. The General Staffs of both countries will constantly communicate with each other in order to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the measures provided for above.

They will communicate to each other in peacetime all information regarding the armies of the Triple Alliance that is known to them, or will be known to them. The ways and means of intercourse during war will be studied and provided for in advance.

5. Neither France nor Russia will conclude a separate peace.

6. This Convention will be in force for the same period as the Triple Alliance.

7. All points listed above will be kept in the strictest confidence.

SIGNED:

Adjutant General, Chief of the General Staff Obruchev,

division general, assistant chief of the General Staff Boisdeffre.

A. M. Zayonchkovsky, Russia's preparation for world war in international terms. Ed. People's Commissar of Military and Marine Affairs. M. 1926, pp. 343‑344 (French text); Lamadorf, p. 388 (Russian translation).

V. Letter from Russian Foreign Minister Giers to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg Montebello

Very secret.

Having studied, by order of the highest order, the draft military convention drawn up by the Russian and French general staffs in August 1892, and having presented my considerations to the Emperor, I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency that the text of this agreement, as it was, was approved in principle by His Majesty and signed gen.-ad. Obruchev and division general Boisdeffre, can now be considered as finally accepted in its present form. Both general staffs will thus have the opportunity to periodically come to agreement and mutually exchange useful information.

VI. Letter from the Ambassador of France in St. Petersburg Montebello to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Giers

I have received a letter that Your Excellency deigned to address to me on December 15/27, 1893 and with which you inform me that, by the highest order, having studied the draft military convention drawn up by the Russian and French general staffs, and having reported to the emperor all your considerations, you considered it their duty to notify me that this agreement, in the form in which it was approved in principle by His Majesty and as it was signed in August 1892 by the respective representatives of the parties authorized for this purpose by the governments: - General-ad. Obruchev and Divisional General Boisdeffre, can henceforth be considered as finally accepted.

I hastened to notify my government about this decision, and I am authorized to inform Your Excellency with a request to bring this decision to the attention of H.V. Emperor, that the President of the Republic and the French Government also consider the above-mentioned military convention, the text of which is approved by both parties, as subject to implementation. By virtue of this agreement, both general staffs will now have the opportunity to periodically come to agreement and mutually exchange useful information.

Montebello.

Note :

¹* Words in brackets are included in the text of the convention by V. N. Lamadorf.

AVPR. Documents diplomatiques. L "Alliance franco-russe, 1918, p. 129. Paris