Destroyer Captain Saken (1909) and his sisterships. "Enlarged type" of the Nikolaev plant ("Lieutenant Shestakov", "Lieutenant Zadarenny", "Captain Saken", "Captain-Lieutenant Baranov") V. Yu. Usov

DM1967> So, we have a description for the 75 mm Kane gun:

I will continue myself. Here full text(from here http://forum.ship1.ru/index.php?topic=46.0)
Initially, 75mm/50 guns were mounted on Kane machines on a central pin. The compressor was hydraulic and rolled away with the barrel; spring knurl. Lifting mechanism with toothed arch. The rotary mechanism, through shafts and gears, engaged with a gear ring attached to a pin base.
In 1896-1898. At OSZ they created a Meller system machine. It weighed almost half as much as the old one due to the lightweight and simplified design: the horizontal guidance mechanism was abolished, and the gun was rotated by the gunner's shoulder. The lifting mechanism had a gear arc. To reduce the weight of the recoil devices, a hydropneumatic knurl was introduced and the recoil length was doubled.
For deck installations of Bayan class cruisers (8 pieces each), Kars class and Buryat class gunboats and destroyers, the Metal Plant created a 75mm/50 machine on the central pin mod. 1906 with a central compressor, stationary during retraction. Spring knurl. The lifting mechanism is screw. The turning mechanism had a cylindrical gear coupled with a circular shoulder strap. At the same time, the Metal Plant also produced 75mm/50 side-mounted machines mod. 1906 on the front pin for casemate installations of Bayan class cruisers (12 pieces each). Their design was similar to the machines on the central pin, with the exception of the design of the stand, the horizontal guidance mechanism, etc. The horizontal guidance angle allowed by the cruiser port is 100°.
A modernized version of the Metal Plant machine mod. 1906 received the name of the machine mod. 1908
With the outbreak of the First World War, the fleet urgently needed anti-aircraft guns. To do this, they decided to convert Meller's 75mm/50 anti-aircraft guns. The choice was not accidental; all other machines had a spring knurl, which was extremely inconvenient for anti-aircraft shooting. The body of the gun was rotated 180° around its axis (the recoil devices were above the barrel). The first converted anti-aircraft machines were delivered in the fall of 1914.
By July 1916, 80 anti-aircraft installations were ordered and manufactured on Meller machines with a vertical guidance angle of up to +50°. Of these, 40 were sent to the Baltic Fleet, 19 to the Black Sea Fleet, and 12 installations were transferred to the Land Department.
The Obukhov plant received an order for 41 Meller installations with a vertical guidance angle of up to +70°. In July 1916, 4 units were manufactured and transferred to the Baltic Fleet.
Later the elevation angle was increased to +75°. The Meller anti-aircraft gun was in production until the end of the 1920s. Its modifications received the designation arr. 1926 and arr. 1928. According to ballistic data, the 75mm/50 anti-aircraft gun was significantly superior to the 76mm Lander gun.

So we have:
1) Machine of the Kane system. (The compressor is hydraulic, rolled back together with the barrel; the knurl is spring-loaded. The lifting mechanism has a gear arc. The turning mechanism, through shafts and gears, engages with a toothed shoulder strap attached to the pin base). There is this picture:

and this is a photo from the Finns:

Let's say it's him.

2) Miller system machine (the horizontal guidance mechanism was abolished, and the gun was rotated by the gunner’s shoulder. The lifting mechanism had a gear arc.). This is the easiest way:

3)A machine from the Obukhov plant (model 1911?).

Looking at the table from Shirokorad, the weight of the installation on the Kane machine is about 4000 kg, on the Miller machine - 1720, on the metal plant machine - 4420 kg and on the Obukhovsky machine - 2555. Purely visually, it seems to me that this machine is closer in weight to Quesne than to Miller. But nevertheless...

6-8) Next come the anti-aircraft versions of the Miller machine (the body of the gun was rotated 180° around its axis (the recoil devices were above the barrel).)
We have:
Initial view

Sample '26:

and, apparently, 28 (although maybe also 26):

There is also this anti-aircraft machine, which, according to the design description, does not fit Miller’s version:

Well, here’s a diagram relating to the Profintern as of ’26.

Material from Wikipedia - the free encyclopedia

"Captain Saken"
Mine cruiser "Captain Saken" in the South Bay of Sevastopol
Service:	Russia, Russia
Vessel class and type	Mine cruiser
Home port	Sevastopol
Construction has started	May 9, 1886
Launched	April 30, 1889
Commissioned	1889
Removed from the fleet	December 22, 1909
Main characteristics
Displacement	742 tons
Length	69.4 m
Width	7.3 m
Draft	3.1 m
Booking	Deck - 13 mm
Engines	2 vertical triple expansion steam engines, 3 fire tube boilers
Power	2341 l. With. (1.7 MW)
Mover	2
Travel speed	18.3 knots (33.9 km/h)
Crew	7 officers, 120 sailors
Armament
Artillery	6 × 1 - 47 mm guns, 4 × 1 - 37 mm guns
Mine and torpedo weapons	3 × 381 mm NTA

As a result of numerous alterations, cabins for officers and separately for the commander were installed in the stern of the cruiser instead of a superstructure. The tank superstructure was replaced with a carapace deck. The location of the officers' cabins (in the aft part of the living deck) was approved only in November 1887. In addition, changes were made to the design of the “Captain Saken” in order to correct the shortcomings identified during the tests of the “Lieutenant Ilyin”. The medium and low pressure cylinders were equipped with jackets, and the coal pits were equipped with pipes for measuring the temperature of the coal. Steam lifts were removed to remove ash and slag from the furnaces. As a result of all the alterations, the ship's displacement when fully loaded turned out to be a quarter heavier than the design.

Armament was limited to six 47 mm and four 37 mm guns. After identifying a large overload, they decided not to install rotary mine devices. Of the five mine vehicles, two onboard ones turned out to be very inconvenient for loading and were subsequently removed.

Repeatedly renewed sea trials showed that the power of the mechanisms at 223 rpm did not exceed 2341 hp. Instead of the expected 21 knot speed, the ship achieved only 18.3 knots.

Service history

Despite the ship's shortcomings, the Black Sea Fleet, up to late XIX centuries, which did not receive a single cruiser, used the “Captain Saken” as a messenger and reconnaissance ship.

On August 25, 1899, radio communication between warships was established in Sevastopol for the first time in world history. The transmitting and receiving devices were placed on the battleships "George the Victorious" and "Three Saints", and the transmitter was placed on the mine cruiser "Captain Saken".

During the Sevastopol uprising of 1905, the mine cruiser remained under the command of Vice Admiral Chukhnin and, together with the government squadron, fired at the rebel ships.

On April 8, 1907, it was renamed the port ship "Bombory". Never took part in hostilities. Removed from the lists on December 22, 1909.

Commanders

• 1893-xxxx - captain 2nd rank Danilevsky, Mikhail Alexandrovich
• 1895-xxxx - captain 2nd rank Rogul, Evgeniy Petrovich
• 1898-1899 - captain 2nd rank Brusilov, Lev Alekseevich
• 1905-xxxx - captain 2nd rank Akimov, Sergei Nikolaevich
• 1906-xxxx - captain 2nd rank Shelting, Vladimir Vladimirovich
• 1911-xxxx - wing-adjutant captain 2nd rank Pogulyaev, Sergei Sergeevich
• Captain 2nd Rank Makalinsky, Alexey Alexandrovich
• 1920 - captain 2nd rank Ostolopov, Alexey Alekseevich

Served on a ship

• Vishnevsky, Iliodor Petrovich - in 1892 appointed senior ship mechanic.

Sources

Type "Lieutenant Ilyin" Type "Kazar" Type "Abrek"

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Excerpt characterizing Captain Saken (mine cruiser)

The princess said nothing, and suddenly her short, whiskered sponge began to tremble; Prince Andrei, standing up and shrugging his shoulders, walked around the room.
Pierre looked in surprise and naively through his glasses, first at him, then at the princess, and stirred, as if he, too, wanted to get up, but was again thinking about it.
“What does it matter to me that Monsieur Pierre is here,” the little princess suddenly said, and her pretty face suddenly blossomed into a tearful grimace. “I’ve been wanting to tell you for a long time, Andre: why did you change so much towards me?” What I did to you? You're going to the army, you don't feel sorry for me. For what?
- Lise! - Prince Andrey just said; but in this word there was a request, a threat, and, most importantly, an assurance that she herself would repent of her words; but she continued hastily:
“You treat me like I’m sick or like a child.” I see everything. Were you like this six months ago?
“Lise, I ask you to stop,” said Prince Andrei even more expressively.
Pierre, who became more and more agitated during this conversation, stood up and approached the princess. He seemed unable to bear the sight of tears and was ready to cry himself.
- Calm down, princess. It seems like this to you, because I assure you, I myself experienced... why... because... No, excuse me, a stranger is superfluous here... No, calm down... Goodbye...
Prince Andrei stopped him by the hand.
- No, wait, Pierre. The princess is so kind that she will not want to deprive me of the pleasure of spending the evening with you.
“No, he only thinks about himself,” said the princess, unable to hold back her angry tears.
“Lise,” said Prince Andrei dryly, raising his tone to the degree that shows that patience is exhausted.
Suddenly the angry, squirrel-like expression of the princess’s beautiful face was replaced by an attractive and compassion-arousing expression of fear; She glanced from under her beautiful eyes at her husband, and on her face appeared that timid and confessing expression that appears on a dog, quickly but weakly waving its lowered tail.
- Mon Dieu, mon Dieu! [My God, my God!] - said the princess and, picking up the fold of her dress with one hand, she walked up to her husband and kissed him on the forehead.
“Bonsoir, Lise, [Good night, Liza,”] said Prince Andrei, getting up and politely, like a stranger, kissing his hand.

The friends were silent. Neither one nor the other began to speak. Pierre glanced at Prince Andrei, Prince Andrei rubbed his forehead with his small hand.
“Let’s go have dinner,” he said with a sigh, getting up and heading to the door.
They entered the elegantly, newly, richly decorated dining room. Everything, from napkins to silver, earthenware and crystal, bore that special imprint of novelty that happens in the household of young spouses. In the middle of dinner, Prince Andrei leaned on his elbow and, like a man who has had something on his heart for a long time and suddenly decides to speak out, with an expression of nervous irritation in which Pierre had never seen his friend before, he began to say:
– Never, never get married, my friend; Here's my advice to you: don't get married until you tell yourself that you did everything you could, and until you stop loving the woman you chose, until you see her clearly; otherwise you will make a cruel and irreparable mistake. Marry an old man, good for nothing... Otherwise, everything that is good and lofty in you will be lost. Everything will be spent on little things. Yes Yes Yes! Don't look at me with such surprise. If you expect something from yourself in the future, then at every step you will feel that everything is over for you, everything is closed except for the living room, where you will stand on the same level as a court lackey and an idiot... So what!...
He waved his hand energetically.
Pierre took off his glasses, causing his face to change, showing even more kindness, and looked at his friend in surprise.
“My wife,” continued Prince Andrei, “is a wonderful woman.” This is one of those rare women with whom you can be at peace with your honor; but, my God, what I wouldn’t give now not to be married! I’m telling you this alone and first, because I love you.
Prince Andrei, saying this, looked even less like than before that Bolkonsky, who was lounging in Anna Pavlovna’s chair and, squinting through his teeth, spoke French phrases. His dry face kept trembling with the nervous animation of every muscle; the eyes, in which the fire of life had previously seemed extinguished, now shone with a radiant, bright shine. It was clear that the more lifeless he seemed in ordinary times, the more energetic he was in these moments of almost painful irritation.
“You don’t understand why I’m saying this,” he continued. – After all, this is a whole life story. You say Bonaparte and his career,” he said, although Pierre did not talk about Bonaparte. – You say Bonaparte; but Bonaparte, when he worked, walked step by step towards his goal, he was free, he had nothing but his goal - and he achieved it. But tie yourself to a woman, and like a shackled convict, you lose all freedom. And everything that you have in you of hope and strength, everything only weighs you down and torments you with remorse. Living rooms, gossip, balls, vanity, insignificance - this is a vicious circle from which I cannot escape. I'm going to war now, greatest war, which has only happened, but I don’t know anything and I’m no good for anything. “Je suis tres aimable et tres caustique, [I am very sweet and very eater,” continued Prince Andrei, “and Anna Pavlovna listens to me.” And this stupid society, without which my wife and these women cannot live... If only you could know what it is toutes les femmes distinguees [all these women of good society] and women in general! My father is right. Selfishness, vanity, stupidity, insignificance in everything - these are women when they show everything as they are. If you look at them in the light, it seems that there is something, but nothing, nothing, nothing! Yes, don’t get married, my soul, don’t get married,” Prince Andrei finished.
“It’s funny to me,” said Pierre, “that you consider yourself incapable, that your life is a spoiled life.” You have everything, everything is ahead. And you…
He didn’t say you, but his tone already showed how highly he valued his friend and how much he expected from him in the future.
“How can he say that!” thought Pierre. Pierre considered Prince Andrei a model of all perfections precisely because Prince Andrei highest degree combined all those qualities that Pierre did not have and which can most closely be expressed by the concept of willpower. Pierre was always amazed at Prince Andrei's ability to calmly deal with all kinds of people, his extraordinary memory, erudition (he read everything, knew everything, had an idea about everything) and most of all his ability to work and study. If Pierre was often struck by Andrei’s lack of ability for dreamy philosophizing (to which Pierre was especially prone), then in this he saw not a disadvantage, but a strength.
In the best, most friendly and simple relationships, flattery or praise is necessary, just as greasing is necessary for the wheels to keep them moving.

MYSTERY PROJECT - "CAPTAIN SAKEN"

The dubious reforms of that time (naval qualifications, humiliation of engineers) and unbridled authoritarianism of management led to the fact that even ships conceived as the same type turned out to be different. This is what happened with “Captain Saken”. The idea of ​​naming the ship was noble - in memory of the Black Sea hero of the war with Turkey of 1787-1788. Then, on May 30, 1788, in the Bug estuary, the commander of double-boat No. 2, captain 2nd rank R. Saken, cut off from his 11 Turkish ships, having managed to send part of the crew on the boat, blew up his ship along with the Turkish ones grappling with him to board galleys. The intention to give the reviving Black Sea Fleet a ship of a new class was timely, and the desire to build ships of the same type was reasonable. But the conceit and arrogance of the Russian bureaucracy was too great. It did not want to realize the specifics of destroyer shipbuilding. culture of mine-carrying engineering, which, together with the production of torpedoes, reached the level of precision instrument making. Such a level in Russia remained unattainable. It is quite possible to compare it with what the country has achieved in the automotive industry today in comparison with the world level.

Nevertheless, having long ago and successfully mastered the items of everyday European luxury, the bureaucracy believed that the specifics of destroyer shipbuilding could not pose any difficulties, and therefore, having undertaken the experience of building the first mine cruiser of their own, it was decided, without waiting for results, to immediately build a second one. No one dared to advise I.A. Shestakov should come to his senses and look around. Representative of the MTK under him in 1883-1886. was the “gray horse” of the bureaucracy, Major General Octavius ​​Pelzig, not designated in anything in history, and in 1886-1888. equally convenient is Admiral Oskar Karlovich Kremer (1829-1910). The hero of the sinking in 1868 of the best of the Russian frigate "Alexander Nevsky", this indifferent "phlegmatic Finn" to everything, who happily served time in 1888-1896. also in the position of head of the General Medical School, he was the personification of that deep stagnation and paralysis of thought that reigned supreme in the fleet during the period of I.A.’s activity. Shestakova.

However, before inviting these two employees to the positions, the admiral offered I.F. to become the chairman of the MTK. Likhachev. But he, knowing about the complete voicelessness and powerlessness of this position projected under the new order, refused the flattering appointment. And then I.A. Shestakov in August 1883, with a light heart, gave effect to I.F. Likhachev's resignation letter. The manager did not need an admiral who was independently thinking and had a strong heart for the fleet; he did not heed (or did not have time to listen to the arguments due to his unexpected death on November 21, 1888 in Sevastopol) program work I.F. Likhachev “Service of the General Staff in the Fleet”, published by the magazine “Russian Shipping” in 1888. Therefore, the established even before I.A. Shestakova, the vicious order of domestic shipbuilding. About him in the work of I.F. Likhachev (p. 55) said in the following words: “If she (the state treasury - P.M.) reads or hears that a cruiser was launched in England, which was tested at 20 knots, it would be nice for us to have at least one of the same. Draw up a project in the technical committee!"

As a result of continuous redrawings and clarifications, the project was based on ideas that had also been redrawn more than once and had become outdated English projects“following the model,” as I.F. wrote. Likhachev, "some Ajax, Warspite or others, turn out to be doubly late." And this lag can be so significant that due to the change in tactical views and requirements, ships built “on the model” may not only not meet the new requirements, but even completely contradict them. With this intolerable situation, the admiral recalled, in England, when submitting estimates for 1887-1888 to parliament, it was proposed to establish a “department of information,” or essentially a naval general staff, as the highest scientifically organized world Center for planning and mobilization of the fleet and shipbuilding. "Will we be left behind as usual?" - asked the admiral. After all, it was so important, without waiting for the example of the British, to get ahead of them “by the advantage that a more modern organization and better utilization of one’s forces can give.” In this way it was possible, at least in part, to compensate for the existing and, apparently, the admiral recognized, the impending lag in technology for a long time (p. 57).

As is known, there were no changes in the MGSH in Russia in the 19th century. was not created. And “Captain Saken” had to go through the entire thorny path of design and construction described by the admiral, which, as it turned out, was especially complicated by the working conditions in the south of Russia. A big mystery remains the fact that, having apparently lost interest in the project, I.A. Shestakov entrusted the order to reproduce it in Nikolaev to a purely economic institution - the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply (GUKiS). Having received the project in its most general form from MTK, it subsequently decided its fate. This is how the wound up I.A. was embodied. Shestakov created an even more bureaucratic “order” than before. In the famous two-volume review of the activities of maritime administration in Russia in the first twenty years of the prosperous reign of Emperor Alexander Nikolaevich 1855-1880", (Privy Councilor K.A. Mann, St. Petersburg, 1880, part 2, pp. 907, 984) it was sadly noted, that in the last reign “in all departments and offices there was a most complex and intricate procedure for office work”, that “in estimates, in bookkeeping and in reporting there was confusion and ambiguity, partly due to the system itself, partly due to a lack of understanding of the matter, negligence or routine”, that “ secrecy was observed in office work,” because of which “information was considered a state secret, which, on the contrary, should have been disclosed for the benefit of the service” (p. 908).

Not in all cases was it possible to figure out what share of the harm and delays in the construction of the ship was caused by the multiple authorities supervising it: the emperor, the admiral general, the manager, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the GUKiS, the port authorities, the shipyard authorities. In the Black Sea, the influence of the Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports, who had largely autonomous power in the theater, was added. To all these factors that influenced the fate of the project was added its special insecurity caused by the long absence of the manager I.A., unprecedented in the Russian fleet, in St. Petersburg. Shestakov, who, on the spring voyage of 1886 of the Voluntary Fleet steamer "Moscow", went on an inspection trip to Far East. On the same ship, the admiral sailed to San Francisco and only in the fall, via America, he arrived in the Black Sea.

Before leaving, did he himself manage to give instructions on reworking the design of the second mine cruiser, was this done by him during the trip, or was the initiative taken by the head of the GMSH, N.M., who replaced him? Chikhachev (1830-1917) and Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas (in 1882-1890) Vice Admiral A.A. Peshchurov (7-1891), but significant uncertainty was introduced into the project. The initiative could have come from the Baltic Shipyard in 1883 - it reached an important milestone in ship engineering - the machines manufactured by the plant for the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" allowed it, however, with an incomplete load, to reach 17 knots of speed. This triumph of the plant was evidenced by the picture that M.I. Kazi then presented MTK. On it the cruiser is depicted with a flag signal raised about this speed on September 30, 1883, in response to a question from the imperial yacht "Derzhava" escorted by the cruiser (on the way from Copenhagen).

The plant was rightly proud of the success achieved, but one cannot help but recall that the same 17-knot speed in the USA on sailing-steam cruisers of the Wampanoa type was achieved in 1864. And the same Vladimir Monomakh, at full load, had to be content with a more modest speed 15.4 knots. The plant, however, avoided the scandalous failure that befell the Berd plant, which had previously had a high reputation. His machines installed on the battleship "Peter the Great" had to be replaced by sending the ship to England in 1881. Having paid almost a million rubles and left the Byrd machines to the British, during tests in 1882 in England, the speed was increased to 14.26 knots instead of the previous 10 knots. But other people’s lessons are poorly learned and M.I. Kazi - on his own initiative or at the suggestion of I.A. Shestakova - in 1884, forgetting about the specifics of destroyer shipbuilding, undertook a more than dubious “economic” experiment. On the new destroyer "Kotlin" built by the plant, the plant fitted (on two shafts) two machines (from the same Berd plant!), taken from the destroyers of 1877-1878. "Thrush" and "Canary". As explained by M.I. Kazi wanted to “determine through experience to what extent it is possible to use at least part of the capital spent in 1877-1878 on the construction of 100 destroyers,” which, by his own admission, were now considered “almost unsuitable” for combat purposes. As one would expect, the “old rickety machines”, as a result of long and painful tests, were able to develop only 15 knots of speed, which was hopelessly far from the 18-20 knots achieved by foreign-built destroyers.

And now, with the same lightweight approach to the problem, a new experiment was undertaken. It began with a request addressed to the MTK on March 27, 1886.

GUKiS regarding a set of drawings and specifications for the mine cruiser "Lieutenant Ilyin". Developed by the plant, they, in accordance with the new procedure, were submitted to GUKiS, which accompanied them for consideration by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. A conclusion was expected from MTK on whether it was possible to give the Baltic Plant an order to build a mine cruiser according to these drawings and at the same time transmit these drawings and specifications in copies to the Chief Commander of the Fleet and the ports of the Black and Caspian Seas for guidance in the construction of the mine cruiser "Captain Saken" in Nikolaev. .

The ship was listed on January 18, 1886, slightly behind the Lieutenant Ilyin (October 15, 1885) and, obviously, was intended to be completely of the same type. But the expected uniformity was not achieved. Some intrigue intervened in the matter, in which, as one must understand, the interests of MTK, GUKiS, the Baltic Shipyard, the Chief Commander, I.A. Shestakov and even, perhaps, the Emperor himself, collided. The chief commander, by virtue of the powers given to him, could himself, following the project, place an order for vehicles abroad, but M.I. Kazi expressed his readiness to manufacture and install on a new ship in Nikolaev a set of mechanisms based on the English model within 14-16 months using the forces of his plant. The proposal at GUKiS was apparently considered economical and the ship’s design began to be redesigned. Without changing the contours of the hull and only equipping it with an even more threatening-looking ram pin, they began to reshape the internal layout to accommodate the Baltic Plant vehicle and cylindrical-type fire tube boilers instead of locomotive ones.

This replacement constitutes one of the mysteries surrounding the ship. The firm of Hawthorne, Leslie and Co. continued to enjoy a high reputation, and ordering them new engines with Belleville water-tube boilers already in use could (by stipulating contractual requirements accordingly) provide the ship with the coveted 22-knot speed. But the path chosen was much more tortuous and inexplicable. Locomotive boilers were replaced by water-tube and fire-tube boilers. The replacement, apparently, did not occur immediately, and only on January 21, 1887, when it became clear that the new boilers were 25.5 tons heavier, attempts were made to unload the stern from the superstructures. MTK magazine No. 12 decided to eliminate them and lower the entire side by 3 feet, that is, almost 1 meter.

These changes, as usual, were followed by new ones. The ship seems to have been designed anew, both in Nikolaev and St. Petersburg. The Baltic Plant developed designs and layouts of machines and boilers in accordance with its own vision of the project, the Chief Commander proposed his own improvements, such as a particularly threatening form of ram stem, MTK occasionally approved the solutions he liked.

The position of Captain R.Yu, appointed as the builder of the Black Sea mine cruiser, was unenviable. Tirnstein (1841-?). Being a “local” ship engineer (since January 1886, as a junior builder in the Nikolaev port), he, contrary to the established customs of shipbuilding, was not the author of the project and had to master it as the work progressed. Due to the same customs, he was assigned the then combined duties of chief builder and chief technologist. Under these conditions, with a multitude of authorities commanding and unceremoniously disposing of him, he could not with full conviction be the owner of the project. His position as a builder turned out to be equally difficult.

The conditions for building the ship at the Nikolaev Admiralty were strikingly different from those in which the Lieutenant Ilyin was built at the private Baltic Shipyard. A patriarchal picture of the economy with chaotically scattered buildings, half of which were occupied by long-served, but carefully, like Plyushkin, preserved old ship junk, the predominant use manual labor, reflected a study published in 1909. "Shipbuilding and shipyards in Russia and abroad." In it, the authors paid tribute to the fact that in these almost rural conditions, the shipyard still managed, by holding the ship on the stocks for 2 years or even less, to cope with the construction of the ship in a five-year period. To complete the picture, it remains to add the constant turnover of labor due to seasonal fluctuations in agriculture south of Russia, and, accordingly, her insufficient qualifications.

The extraordinary fate of the ship, which had barely begun construction, was manifested both in its accelerated laying and in its close connection with the construction of six large seaworthy gunboats that began on the Black Sea on an emergency order from the emperor.

This decision indicated that when comparing two similar-sized ships of different classes, the choice was made in favor of the undoubtedly more versatile and artillery-powerful long-distance ships. This meant a rejection of the recent torpedo euphoria. Accordingly, the attitude towards the type of mine cruiser had to change. The new ships were a mixed type of artillery and mine boats, which, with a displacement increased to 1200 tons, had reinforced artillery armament of two 8-dm and one 6-dm guns (not counting small ones), light (10-mm) deck armor and two mines apparatus. It was expected (although the contracts were not fulfilled) that the speed could be up to 15 knots. It was decided to build such boats (in the beginning 900-ton "Sivuch" type) in the Black Sea under the influence of "misunderstandings on the Afghan issue" in relations with England. A commission convened in the spring of 1885 by imperial order, chaired by the Commander of the Odessa Military District, decided that for successful defense Black Sea coast in case of an invasion by the English fleet, it is necessary to urgently build six gunboats, and in addition six Poti-class destroyers and 20 steam barges. These “add-on” ships, due to the weakening of tension that had occurred, soon somehow imperceptibly disappeared.

The construction of gunboats proceeded at a pace unprecedented in the Admiralty; already on November 22, 1885, the intended builder of three Nikolaev boats (three more were to be built in Sevastopol) Captain R.Yu. Tirnstein (1841-?) presented the authorities with a list of orders for steel for these ships, and preparation of slipways began.

At the same time, having the hull drawings ready and having placed an order for materials, we began work on the “Captain Saken”. But very soon it was discovered that the gunboats, due to their status as an imperial order, were given an advantage in everything over the Saken. Apparently, the cooling of I.A. also had an effect. Shestakov to destroyer ships, his absence in the capital due to a business trip to the Far East and, of course, “savings”. There is no other way to explain the fact that instead of having its own mortgage board, as was the case at the Baltic Shipyard with "Lieutenant Ilyin", "Captain Saken" was included in the general text of a single (unprecedented case in the Russian fleet!) board made for three boats of the Nikolaev Admiralty . The mine cruiser was "pulled" towards the gunboats. Strictly speaking, this was a very sensible step by the treasury, which could now prepare one instead of four nameplates for the honorary participants in the laying ceremony. But the mine cruiser, due to the uniqueness of its type and its separation from gunboats (in Sevastopol they also made a single board for three ships), still had the right to count on its own board.

Preserved in the Central Military Museum in St. Petersburg, two mortgage boards measuring 12.4x7.2 cm are made of silver and have an engraved inscription on the front side: Kanonersky 3 push. 2 screws boats at 1500 ind. forces "Zaporozhets", "Donets", "Chernomorets" and the Mine Cruiser "Captain Sa-ken" in 3500 ind. With. Laid down at the Nikolaev Admiralty on May 9, 1886 in the presence of Their Imperial Majesties the Sovereign Emperor and Empress." On the reverse side it was written: "Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas, Vice Admiral A.A. Peschurov, Captain over the Nikolaev port, Rear Admiral V.I. Popov, Boat Builder: Ship. Eng. Headquarters-Ka-Pitan Berg, Builder of the Minnago Cruiser: Ship. Eng. Captain Tirnstein."

The documents of the Russian State Administration of the Navy say that “For cutting inscriptions on both sides on 19 silver and 5 copper tablets,” engraver M. Efimov presented an invoice for 84 rubles. silver For cutting 12 silver boards on both sides, seal carver A. Zishman was to receive 36 rubles. Another 36 rubles. cost 6 cases covered with velvet and 24 rubles. - 24 locks for them. Following the royal family, Vice Admiral N.M., the temporary manager of the Naval Ministry, also received his souvenir in memory of the laying of May 10 (as stated in the accompanying letter). Chikhachev (1830-1917).

The laying of "Captain Saken", out of favor to the emperor, "attached to the laying of gunboats, turned out to be the only event connecting them. Satisfied with the stewardship of his Black Sea bureaucracy, the emperor and his family left Nikolaev, and the two "structures" (as it was customary to call the builders at the time of construction ships) - gunboats and a mine cruiser went their separate ways to their assigned problems. Overshadowed by the status of the imperial order and generously provided with foreign supplies, under the watchful eye of superiors of all ranks, the gunboats began to quickly advance in their readiness.

Having started construction in March-April 1886, by the end of May, well-cast stems, delivered from Germany, began to be attached to the bottom and side structures that had grown on the stocks on the gunboats. But the boat mechanisms made in England turned out to be of poor quality.

More than a dozen outfits had to be completed at the request of the representative of the Napier plant, Kledgoria, who recognized the marriage of his compatriots. Flaws English work The mooring tests were also delayed, when after checking the ejectors and cleaning the smoke pipes, it was necessary to dismantle the pipelines that showed cracks.

The insufficient quality of work was also evident at “Captain Sakeie”, where the builder had to work even more often and with even greater expenditures of time and energy to eliminate the defects made by the artisans. Many had to be altered and corrected upon delivery of the ship. This whole situation created particular difficulties for the Baltic Plant, which was carrying out its first experience of large-scale work in complete isolation from its own production base, which found itself thousands of miles away. Due to all the abundance unfavorable factors, in the days when the boats began their sea trials (or rather, tests for contract power), the “Captain Saken” was just being prepared for launching. It took place on April 30, 1889.

By this time, the ship had completed the painful process of redesign with the integration of new machines and boilers produced by the Baltic Shipyard into the previous hull and at the same time redesigning the external appearance. After repeated changes in the stern, instead of a finished superstructure, deckhouses for officers and, separately, for the commander, were established. The tank superstructure was replaced with a streamlined, flat roof above the deck, following the example of the first destroyers. Only in November 1887 did the MTK magazine No. 162 approve the location of the officers' cabins. This was the last of the journal resolutions of the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the project. All other questions according to the proposals of the builder and M.I. Qazis were decided on the spot by the authority of the Chief Commander. In particular, the mistakes of the Lieutenant Ilyin project were corrected. The medium and low pressure cylinders were equipped with jackets, and the coal pits were equipped with pipes for measuring the temperature of the coal. Ineffective steam lifts for removing ash and slag from furnaces were abandoned.

Armament was limited to six 47 mm and four 37 mm guns. Of the five mine vehicles, two are airborne. They turned out to be very inconvenient for loading and by 1900 they had to be removed. They did not dare install rotary devices when a large overload was detected. As a result of the outfitting work, which lasted throughout 1888 and continued (due to the delay of materials and products for the mechanisms) as early as 1889, the displacement of the ship when fully loaded reached 742 tons. During repeatedly renewed tests at sea, the power of the mechanisms at 223 rpm min, did not exceed 2341 hp. Instead of the expected 21-kt speed, we had to be content with only 18.3 kt. These results can be explained by some significant miscalculations of the Baltic Shipyard in the design and manufacture of machines and boilers, as well as by the overload that occurred, against the design displacement of 525-600 tons.

Apparently, the mistake that had already been made in the manufacture of boilers for “Lieutenant Ilyin” was repeated. Therefore, lengthening the chimneys did not bring results. Only a special historical and technical study can help to fully clarify the truth, but it is difficult to imagine that now anyone could take on this work. In the meantime, we can only guess which of the information found in the literature can be considered true. The choice today remains extensive.

In the publication "Military fleets and naval reference book for 1892." (VKAM, St. Petersburg, 1892). The “Captain Saken” had a mechanical power of 3400 hp. and speed 17 knots. But in the editions of the “Ship List” for 1898 and 1904 they returned to the original figures: 2341 hp. and 18.3 knots. In the secret annex to the “List” of 1901, they were not present, but the speed “on the last voyage” in 1901 was indicated as only 14.3 knots. The total coal reserve was 143 tons, the cruising range was 10 knots at a speed of 1580 miles. The given speed characteristics and their obvious inconsistency are another mystery of “Captain Saken”. It is natural to want to compare the quality of the ship’s engines with the English machines that turned out to be not entirely impeccable, but still confirmed their contractual capabilities, while the gunboats were being built at the same time as the Saken.

But it was not customary to ask such questions at that time. The authors of the “Report on the Maritime Department 1884-1890” also diplomatically bypassed it. (St. Petersburg, 1891), which for the mine cruisers "Lieutenant Ilyin" and "Captain Saken" resulted in a speed of 18.29 knots, and for the "Kazarsky" built later in Germany - 21.05 knots. The cost of building these ships (with weapons) is also indicative: the first 1,079,793 rubles, the second 1,045,720 rubles. and the third only 488,230 rubles. There is no answer to these anomalies in the Collection brief information according to the maritime department" (1908), nor in modern history Baltic plant. The special work of Lieutenant M.A. also spoke very reservedly about mine cruisers. Beklemishev (1858-?) “Special mine vessels” (St. Petersburg, 1898), no mention was made of any of their advantages.

There was no place in the remarkable completeness of information given in the book of tables “Types of Destroyers”. It has yet to be supplemented with the same information about mine cruisers as a result of archival “excavations.” But the result, alas, can be summed up today. The author of the book, who graduated from the mine class in 1886 and from the Naval Academy in 1890, with all his undeniable mine enthusiasm, obviously could not recognize these ships as the flagships of the domestic mine fleet. The verdict on the creative activity of Admiral I.A. Shestakov, who, among his other actions, managed to discredit the idea of ​​a domestic mine cruiser, remains in history the lieutenant’s confession that both ships “are similar in size, only the cruiser “Captain Saken” was heavy, overloaded more than “Lieutenant Ilyin” and has the speed is 17 knots, while "Lieutenant Ilyin" goes up to 19".

But the fleet in the Black Sea, until the end of the 19th century. who had not received a single cruiser, found in “Captain Saken” a completely suitable purpose - to play the role of a messenger and reconnaissance ship for the squadron.

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Computer game differs from reality in that there are no irreversible consequences. It's not scary to die when you have a few more lives left. It's not scary to lose a fight, because you can start the next one at any moment.

In a real war there is no such possibility. If you die, then for real. If the battle is lost, it means that your country will definitely lose something. Captain Saken lived long before the invention of computers, and therefore he knew that the battle at the mouth of the Southern Bug would be his last. The more respect his feat evokes.

Despite his German surname, Saken was not one of the foreigners who came to Russia “to catch happiness and rank.” His father was a nobleman from Estland, which became part of the Russian Empire back in Peter's time.

Like many famous Russian sailors, Saken studied at the St. Petersburg Naval Corps. After finishing his studies, he served in the Baltic Fleet.

The young officer gained his first combat experience during the Archipelago Expedition under the leadership of Admiral Spiridov. Saken did not see the Battle of Chesme, but he took part in the less famous Battle of Patras.

Saken was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet shortly before the start of the Russian-Turkish War of 1787–1791. At that time, Turkey demanded the return of Crimea, which shortly before it had given to Russia under the Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty. After Bulgakov, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, refused this, the war began again.

There were few knowledgeable officers in the young Black Sea Fleet, so captain of the second rank Saken soon received a good appointment. He was supposed to command a flotilla of small ships in the Dnieper-Bug estuary.

The year was 1788. Active fighting. The main desire of the Turks was to ruin Kherson, where ships for Black Sea Fleet. The goal of the Russians was to prevent this and take the Ochakov fortress - the main enemy stronghold in this territory.

Saken was already known at that time as a brave and experienced officer with a difficult character, and when Suvorov demanded that a small ship be sent to him, our captain was sent to him on double boat No. 2 (that’s what small sailing and rowing ships were called).

In Kinburn, the only boat-boat turned out to be completely useless. Saken asked the authorities through Suvorov to send reinforcements, but received only a refusal.

Soon a Turkish fleet appeared at the Dnieper-Bug estuary. On the morning of May 20, Saken received an order to arrive at his squadron, quickly equipped the ship and set off that same day. The captain was glad that after a long period of inactivity he would again participate in battles.

Saken's exit from Kinburn did not go unnoticed. His ship seemed like easy prey to the enemy. When the captain moved five miles from the city, the Turks chased him. The advantage on the enemy’s side was enormous: thirty ships against one double boat. But Saken still hoped to break away from his pursuers and go to Kherson.

Work was underway on the Russian ship: the sails were quickly set, the sailors rowed desperately, but after four hours of pursuit it became clear that it was impossible to escape. Half of the enemy ships fell behind on the way, but there was still nothing to hope for. The mast on the ship was knocked down by a Turkish cannonball. This forced the already heavy and clumsy boat-boat to greatly slow down.

By the time the Turks surrounded the boat-boat, the skiff had managed to move forward a full two miles. From a distance, the sailors saw Saken's ship make a turn. A shot rang out from the Russian unicorn cannon. This caused brief confusion among the enemy, then two galleys grappled with the double boat for boarding.

Saken managed to go down with the match to the cruise chamber, where the gunpowder was stored. There was a strong explosion. He destroyed both double boat No. 2 and four Turkish galleys.

Suvorov had no news about Saken for a long time. He was informed that at the mouth of the Bug, where the captain and his Turkish pursuers had gone, a column of smoke from the explosion was visible. It seemed strange to everyone that the enemy was not celebrating their victory. This was explained when the sailor Timofeev and his comrades reached their own and told about the feat of their commander.

On the ninth day after the death of Saken, almost the entire mast and other fragments of the double boat were caught in the Bug. By autumn, three anchors and a unicorn were raised from the river.

Catherine II, having learned about the captain’s feat, took care of his relatives: she gave land to her father and granted ranks to her brothers.

The name of Saken is written in gold letters on the wall of the Naval Cathedral in Kronstadt. As long as this temple stands, the captain, for whom honor was more valuable than life, will be remembered.

Maria Pronchenko

In 1755, a son, Johann-Reingold von der Osten-Sacken, was born into the family of a poor Russian captain (with a strangely “non-Russian” surname at first glance) Christoph-Adolph von der Osten-Sacken and Marina-Justina, née von Lipgart. He is also Christian Ivanovich Osten-Sacken, as he is still listed “in the pantheon of glory” of the Russian fleet. Just as in the history of the life and feat of our previous hero, Lieutenant Ilyin (), in the description of the life of Osten-Sacken there are also very few reliably known, “accurate” facts. We can start with the fact that, as in the case of Ilyin, the Fatherland does not know the exact date of birth of the person who brought him fame.

It is known that, despite coming from a very famous family with a “long” history, Christophe-Adolphe’s family was large (6 children), but not rich. It is no coincidence that, like for Ilyin, the road to prestigious regiments turned out to be “not for them,” and it was as a result of this that Johann-Reingold (as well as his three brothers, judging by some sources) did not continue his father’s “land” career, but ended up in the Naval Gentry Cadet Corps, where he entered in 1766. In March 1772, Corporal Reingold received the rank of midshipman and was appointed to the crew of the battleship Chesma, named after the victory of the Russian fleet, which he owes in large part to the Lieutenant Ilyin we mentioned.

From the author: In the history of Osten-Sacken there are many insufficiently reliable dates and numbers. The author takes on faith the most reliable in his opinion. More or less detailed literary sources dedicated to our hero are:

1. Monograph, authored by P.I. Belavenets, “Captain 2nd Rank Johann-Rheingold von der Osten-Sacken, better known as Captain Sacken.” - St. Petersburg: Printing house of the Maritime Ministry in the Main Admiralty, 1907. - 36 p.
2. Essay “Under the walls of Ochakov. The feat of captain Saken" Yu.S. Kryuchkova from Nikolaev.

On May 8 (19), 1772, the Fourth Archipelago Squadron left Revel under the flag of Rear Admiral V.Ya. Chichagova. On August 15 (26), the squadron arrived in Livorno, where Chichagov transferred command and departed for Russia. "Chesma" (and Osten-Sacken, respectively) took part in the Battle of Patras on October 26, 1772. Having suffered virtually no losses (on the Chesma, according to one source, one officer was killed, another officer and five sailors were wounded), the Russian squadron of 2 battleships, 2 frigates and 3 auxiliary ships burned 7 Turkish frigates and 8 shebeks . Another frigate sank the day after the battle. After such a defeat, the Turks did not bother the Russian fleet in the Archipelago until the very end of the war.

In August 1774, the battleship Chesma left the Archipelago and went to Port Mahon for repairs. In August 1775 - the transition to the Baltic, ending on October 9 (20) in Revel.

In the Baltic, Osten-Sacken was transferred to the frigate Maria, where he served until 1786.

In 1777 he received the rank of lieutenant, in 1784 - captain-lieutenant.

In 1786, Osten-Sacken was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. In 1787 he received the rank of captain of the 2nd rank. He served as captain of a galley and cargo ship on the Dnieper Estuary, advisor to the quartermaster expedition of the Black Sea Admiralty Board and commander of a detachment of fin ships on the Estuary (I.A.: Such strange name immediately brings to mind images of “war seals”, but it only means small port craft, barges, boats, and dinghies of the Russian sailing fleet).

In August 1787, he was sent by Prince Potemkin with a detachment of 600 people to Poland to harvest timber and build ships, from where he brought 18 armed boats and longboats to Kherson.

Kryuchkov’s essay states that in 1787 Osten-Sacken was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class, for 18 naval campaigns. But in Sudravsky's list the author of this material Osten-Sacken (in any possible variations of the surname and first name) was not found. Neither in 1787, nor in earlier years. Although, perhaps this was an error when publishing the list? There were different lists...

In the same August 1787, another Russian-Turkish war began. In 1788, Captain 2nd Rank Osten-Sacken was appointed commander of the new double boat No. 2 in the rowing flotilla of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen.

There are serious discrepancies in the sources regarding the technical data of the vessel. Let's give one of the versions. Length - 22 meters, armament: 2x1-pound unicorns, 1x12-pounder and 4x4-pounder cannons, 4 falconets. Crew – 52 people. There are reports of 20-21 pairs of oars, but 42 oars for 52 people seems a bit excessive! And who will shoot, control the sails, command? Maybe 20 oars rather than pairs?

In the first days of May, a small detachment of Russian ships consisting of double-boat No. 2 under the command of Osten-Sacken and two gunboats was sent to Kinburn to maintain contact between the flotilla command and the corps of A.V. Suvorov. Then the ships went to Ochakov to monitor the entrance to the estuary, because the appearance of the Turkish fleet was expected. Turkish ships appeared on May 18 and soon light Turkish ships began to enter the estuary. Saken, who had retreated to Kinburn, received Suvorov’s order to retreat in the direction of Glubokaya Pristan in order to warn the command of the Liman flotilla about the appearance of the Turks. Saken sent both gunboats with a report, but he himself decided, with the consent of Suvorov, to stay and determine the composition of the Turkish forces.

And these forces turned out to be very “not weak”. By May 20, 13 Turkish battleships, 15 frigates and about 50 small vessels had gathered near Ochakov. Saken received a report from Suvorov and an order to urgently leave Kinburn (I.A.: According to descriptions of some other sources, Osten-Saken’s double-boat patrolled the entrance to the estuary and was driven by approaching Turkish ships into the mouth of the Bug, but the version with the report is more common and seems more probable). Meanwhile, the Turkish fleet entered the estuary, as a result of which Saken’s ship had to break through to its own, bypassing the Turkish detachments.

At about 10 o'clock in the morning on May 20, double boat No. 2 left Kinburn towards the mouth of the Dnieper. But it was impossible to escape unnoticed. The Turks rushed at the lone Russian ship (I.A.: The number of Turkish ships seriously differs in different sources. 11 and 13 and even 30 Turkish ships are mentioned, but the fact remains the ABSOLUTE superiority of the Turks in strength).

The maneuvers did not lead to anything, it was not possible to break away, and at about 6 o’clock in the evening the Turks approached and opened fire. The balance of forces left no chance for a successful outcome, so Osten-Sacken put 9 crew members in the boat that he had on the boat. A letter from Suvorov from Nassau-Siegen and the stern flag of the double boat were also transferred to the boat. Subsequently, this boat managed to escape under the shore, because... The Turks concentrated all their attention on Osten-Sacken's ship, trying to capture it. About a year ago, at the very beginning of the war, the battleship Mary Magdalene, under the command of an Englishman in the Russian service, Tisdel, was caught in a storm, during which it lost its bowsprit, all its masts and rudder. Then, after 5 days of drift, the ship washed straight into the Bosphorus, where it surrendered to the Turks. At the beginning of October 1787, near Gadzhibey, they also managed to take a Russian floating battery under the command of captain 2nd rank Verevkin, although after fierce resistance, it ran aground with more than half of its artillery knocked out and ammunition expended. So the desire of the Turks to get another trophy was quite understandable (I.A.: IT’S A VERY Pity that for the memoirs of Tizdel, who surrendered his ship without a fight, in the Sea Collection, which is very respected by the author, there was more space than for all the references to the exploits of the lieutenant Ilyin and Captain Saken. These memoirs were published in 1863, vol. 68, no. 10, in the volume of 116 pages!).

The details of the last stage of the persecution are not precisely known. Various sources, depending on the degree of their “optimism” and exaltation, differ in numbers. The fact remains that the Russian sailors preferred death to captivity and blew up their own ship along with the Turkish galleys that went to board. The number of Turkish galleys varies from 2 to 4, while the most “optimistic” sources add up to 3 Turkish galleys disabled during the artillery battle. They write that Osten-Sacken “personally entered the cruise chamber with a torch in his hand.” Who could see this? And it’s not the small details that matter. Some sources mention that a few days later Saken’s body was discovered, “identified only by the Order of St. George in his buttonhole” (I.A.: Not to mention the author has already mentioned minor inaccuracies about the order itself).

In a report to Empress Catherine II about Saken’s feat, Potemkin emphasized that “the fearlessness with which he fought and his heroic death showed the Turks what kind of enemies they had.”

The Empress also remained partial to the feat. It was not customary at that time to give orders posthumously. Osten-Sacken did not have a wife or children.

For Sakena's heroic and selfless deed, Catherine II awarded his relatives pensions and gave them an estate near Mitava. In the church of the Naval Cadet Corps, where he studied, a marble plaque was installed in memory of the former student.

By order of Catherine, a lithograph about the last battle of Captain Osten-Sacken was also created and replicated.

To the list of numerous navigational landmarks modern Ukraine The Saken leading sign is also included. It is located at Cape Saken, protruding into the waters of the Dnieper-Bug estuary from the territory of the Ochakovsky district of the neighboring Nikolaev region. This sign indicates the turning point from the seventh to the eighth leg of the Dnieper-Bug Estuary Canal. It is located on the slope of an extensive ravine. Initially, the cape was called Sarykalsky. This name had a Turkic origin and translated means “yellow clay” (“sary” - yellow, “killi” - clay). After the renaming of the cape, which occurred on the 100th anniversary of the feat, the Saken directional sign allows ships built in Nikolaev and Kherson to pass through safe estuary canals.

On November 15, 2013, a memorial sign was erected on Cape Saken by the initiative group, and on the outskirts of the village of Dmitrievka, on the high bank, a worship cross was erected, which was consecrated by the rector of the local Orthodox church.

From the author: Digging slightly away from the main topic of the article, let us mention that Johann-Reinhold Osten-Sacken was not the first Russian (yes, a Russian sailor, despite his specific national origin and surname!) sailor who accomplished such a feat, preferring death in battle to surrender. On July 10, 1737, a boat armed with 4 three-pound cannons, transporting a mortar from Genichesk to Azov, was attacked by a Turkish squadron consisting of 1 battleship and 30 galleys. When it became clear that it would not be possible to escape, the commander of the boat (more precisely, a detachment of the boat and 10 large boats, but the boats had previously been released for independent sailing with the wounded on board), captain 2nd rank Peter Defremeri, threw the boat ashore and released the entire crew , and then fired at the Turks from all 4 cannons and blew up the boat and the Turks who went to board. Another sailor of the Russian fleet with a “non-Russian surname.” In fact, his name was Pierre de Fremery and he clearly did not come to serve in Russia from France “to pursue happiness and rank.” It turns out that it was de Fremery and Osten-Sacken who laid down the tradition of the Russian fleet, expressed in the motto “I’m dying, but I’m not giving up!”...

100 years have passed since the death of Captain 2nd Rank Osten-Sacken. Russian fleet was reborn after another (alas!) period of devastation.

On May 9, 1886, the mine cruiser “Captain Saken” was laid down in Nikolaev, which should have been (theoretically) completely identical to the first Russian mine cruiser “Lieutenant Ilyin”. “Features of national shipbuilding,” which the author mentioned a little in the material dedicated to Lieutenant Ilyin, were fully reflected in in this case. In particular, being “of the same type,” these ships turned out to be very different. In the fight against the overweight of the ship, its builders went even further than in the case of “Lieutenant Ilyin”. As a result, the ship's performance characteristics still fell.

Performance characteristics of the mine cruiser "Captain Saken".

Displacement 742 tons (design - 610 tons).

Power -2341 hp

Speed ​​– 18.3 knots (on tests).

Reservation – deck, 13 mm.

Armament - 3 fixed TA, 381 mm, 6x1-47mm and 4x1-37 mm guns.

Crew - 7 officers, 120 sailors.

On April 30, 1889, the ship was launched. It took three years to build instead of a year for Ilyin! And one more “nuance” that seems unique to the Russian fleet. The fact is that each ship was “relying” on a mortgage board. This is a fairly ancient world tradition, which has become such in Russia, it seems, since the 18th century. A plate with the name and information about the ship is placed in some place on the ship (usually a special “pocket” in the first section of the ship).

As a matter of fact, the “keeling of a ship” is often not the beginning of its construction, but rather the date of the “official” placement of this sign (often with the invitation of the most “high” persons) in the structure of the ship. Copies of such tablets, very often precious ones, are distributed to honored guests invited to the laying of the ship. So, they obviously saved money on “Captain Saken”. He did not receive such a plaque; a single plaque was made for three gunboats, which were being built simultaneously with the mine cruiser. They also added “Captain Saken” to this sign.

Preserved in the Central Military Museum in St. Petersburg, two mortgage boards measuring 12.4x7.2 cm are made of silver and have an engraved inscription on the front side: Kanonersky 3 push. 2 screws boats at 1500 ind. forces "Zaporozhets", "Donets", "Chernomorets" and the Mine Cruiser "Captain Saken" in 3500 ind. With. Laid down at the Nikolaev Admiralty on May 9, 1886 in the presence of Their Imperial Majesties the Sovereign Emperor and Empress." On the reverse side it was written: "Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas, Vice Admiral A.A. Peschurov, Captain over the Nikolaev port, Rear Admiral V.I. Popov, Boat Builder: Ship. Eng. Headquarters-Ka-Pitan Berg, Builder of the Minnago Cruiser: Ship. Eng. Captain Tirnstein."

But it’s not some kind of boat!

An orgy of redesigns, alterations and corrections led to the acceptance into the fleet of a ship that did not have the slightest combat value, but for “crazy money”! The cost of “Captain Saken” was 1,045,720 rubles! For comparison, the cruiser “Varyag” cost about 6 million rubles, the battleships of the “Borodino” series - 13 -14.5 million rubles. But the characteristics of the ships are incomparable!!! The famous Novik-class destroyers, the best destroyers in the world at the beginning of the First World War, cost about 2 million rubles!

“Captain Saken” was clearly unable to carry out any tasks assigned to destroyers and counter-destroyers. With “dreams” of 21-22 knots, he gave a speed of 18.3 knots in tests, but in reality he could not go faster than 17; the speed recorded in 1901 was a dismal 14.5 knots.

True, taking into account the fact that until the beginning of the 20th century the Black Sea Fleet did not have cruisers in principle, even at such speed, “Captain Saken”, which was included in the Practical Squadron of the Black Sea on May 30, 1890, was the only ship that could carry out reconnaissance missions. and messenger functions for the squadron.

One interesting and important date is associated with the service of “Captain Saken”. On August 25, 1899, radio communication between warships was established in Sevastopol for the first time in history. It was on the “Captain Saken” that the transmitting radio equipment was installed, while the receivers were on the battleships “George the Victorious” and “Three Saints”.

The mine cruiser did not participate in a single battle with the enemy, but it had to shoot at its own people. During the uprising in the Black Sea Fleet in 1905, "Captain Saken" remained under the command of Vice Admiral Chukhnin. There is information that he took part in the shelling of the rebel ships (I.A.: “Specific details” were not found by the author).

On April 8, 1907, the ship was renamed the port ship Bombory. December 22, 1909 - excluded from the lists of the fleet.

There are also inaccuracies in the “history” of the mine cruiser. Anyone can see the page dedicated to the ship on Wikipedia. The attentive reader will certainly be surprised by the list of ship captains, which includes S.S., Pogulyaev in 1911 and A.A. Ostolopov in 1920! It is clear that in the indicated years the named officers could not possibly have been the captains of THIS “Captain Saken”.

The fact is that “Captain Saken,” just like “Lieutenant Ilyin,” was not alone!

As part of the shipbuilding program 1903-1923. It was planned to build 4 destroyers of the same type with a displacement of 350 tons for the Black Sea. However, the experience of the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese War immediately showed the weakness of such small ships. Already in 1904, it was decided to build ships of larger displacement. The basis was taken to design not a destroyer, but a mine cruiser of the “Horseman” type with a displacement of 570 tons.

As a result, in 1906, 4 mine cruisers (as they were classified until 1907, then they were called destroyers) of the “Lieutenant Shestakov” type were laid down.

“The Hero of Our Romance” was laid down on September 16, 1906 at the Naval shipyard. And he was named “Lieutenant Pushchin.” But in March 1907, the ship's name was changed to Captain Saken. It was at this moment that the previous “Captain Sacken” was being withdrawn from the fleet, and the 120th anniversary of Osten-Sacken’s feat was about to be celebrated. A 350-ton destroyer was named after Lieutenant Pushchin...

In September 1907, the ship was launched, and on October 13, 1909, the destroyer, which managed to change both its name and type in the classification of ships during construction, entered service.

And this ship did not escape the epidemic of redesigns and rebuilds. The result is also “long-term construction” and outright weakness in comparison with the Novik-class destroyers that began to enter service before the First World War.

Performance characteristics of the destroyer "Captain Saken".

Displacement 802 tons.
Armament 1 - 120/45, 5 - 75/50, 4 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 40 barrage mines
After 1909, 2 - 120/45, 4 - 75/50, 2 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 40 barrage mines
After 1914, 2 - 120/45, 2 - 47 mm anti-aircraft guns, 2 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 50 barrage mines
No reservation
Mechanisms 2 vertical triple expansion steam engines 7100 hp. Nikolaev plant, 4 Norman boilers, 2 propellers
Maximum test speed 24.78 knots Cruising range 1944 miles. Crew: 5 officers and 89 sailors

During the First World War, he participated in raid operations on enemy communications, carried out blockade service off the coast of Turkey, fired at coastal fortifications and port facilities, covered raiding and mine-laying operations of other naval forces, landed reconnaissance and sabotage groups and escorted transports with troops of the Caucasian Front. . In January 1915, together with other ships, he sank the Turkish steamship Georgius and 3 sailing ships in Sinop.

The hull and mechanisms underwent major repairs in 1915.

On December 16, 1917 it became part of the Red Black Sea Fleet. Since March 1918, it was stored in the Sevastopol military port. On May 1, 1918, it was captured by German troops and on October 12, 1918, under the letter "R 04", included in the German Navy on the Black Sea, and on November 24, 1918, captured by the Anglo-French interventionists and soon taken to the port of Izmir on the Sea of ​​Marmara.
Since October 1920, it was part of the White Guard naval forces of the South of Russia. On November 14, 1920, he was taken away by Wrangel during the evacuation from Sevastopol to Istanbul and then to Bizerte, where on December 29, 1920 he was interned by the French authorities.

On October 29, 1924, it was recognized by the French government as the property of the USSR, but due to the complexity of the international situation it was not returned; in the late 20s it was sold by Rudmetalltorg to a private company for scrapping and in the early 30s it was dismantled in France for metal.

It is about to be 230 years since the feat accomplished by Osten-Sacken. And for almost 100 years in the history of the country and the navy there is no place for the name Johann-Rheingold von der Osten Saken (Christian Ivanovich Osten-Saken)!

Maybe there are not enough ships...

Maybe such names as Admiral Chabanenko and Vice Admiral Zhukov are more important for the country than Captain Saken and Lieutenant Ilyin (although a minesweeper was still “found” for the latter)...

Perhaps, unlike Ilyin, there were no fellow countrymen who were able to push through the corresponding decision...

The latter is very likely. The surname Osten-Sakenov, which gave birth to more than one well-deserved celebrity, has disappeared from the history of the country. Mitava, where Catherine II allocated land for the hero’s relatives, is no longer “Russia.” And the Dnieper-Bug estuary, where the feat was accomplished, too. And the former possessions of the extensive Osten-Sacken family - mainly Belarus and the Baltic states. You can find photos online of the picturesque ruins of the count's castle Osten-Sackenow on the border of the villages of Nemeshayevo and Mirotskoye in the Kyiv region.

As they say, “sic transit gloria mundi”...