Where is the Khalkhin Gol River located? Khalkhin Gol: a forgotten war
“I look at my I-16 with love. Thank you, my dear “donkey”! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter. Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took enemy bullets upon yourself. Thanks to your creator Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov!”
Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP
Brief history of events
On March 1, 1932, the “independent” state of Manchukuo appeared on the territory of Manchuria, created by the Japanese as one of the springboards for a future invasion of Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia. After the unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung Army on Lake Khasan, it was from here that it was decided to launch another strike.
The formal reason for the outbreak of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between the states along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Japanese military began to lay a railway line directed to the USSR border. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in an area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, naturally, was unacceptable for the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese. Mongolia refused to satisfy the demands of Manchukuo. The Soviet Union, which concluded a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic on March 12, 1936, declared that it would “defend the borders of Mongolia as its own.” Neither side was going to compromise. The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire “disputed” territory up to Khalkhin Gol; the Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun.
Composition of forces
At the beginning of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th Special Corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. The fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16 as of May 1939. All the “donkeys,” which were far from being the newest, belonged to the already outdated type 5 and did not have armored backs. The level of combat readiness of the fighters was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16s and 9 I-15bis could take off. The regiment's personnel consisted of inexperienced pilots who mainly knew only piloting techniques; They were not trained in either group combat or shooting. Discipline was seriously lame; due to poor living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters asking to be sent to the Union. The Japanese fighter force, numbering 20 vehicles Nakajima Ki.27(two squadrons), were equipped with experienced pilots, many of the Japanese had experience fighting in China. This balance of forces was not slow to affect the results of the first battles.
Air battles
The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was a liaison R-5Sh, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s. One "donkey", which broke away from the group and rushed to attack, was instantly shot down (pilot I.T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle. At this time, the Soviet Union began to pull up forces in the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), included 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the situation in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s to Manchuria (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai). On May 27, the very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16 of the 22nd IAP took place. Near Lake Buin Nur, a battle between six “donkeys” and nine Ki.27s took place. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s were shot down, three were seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.
If even the I-16, which was close in its characteristics to the Japanese fighter, suffered huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that there was no point in flying the I-15bis pilots at all. Actually, that’s almost what happened. Our pilots, accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, were surprised to discover during battles with the Japanese that they no longer had an advantage in this characteristic (the maneuverability of the Ki.27 was no worse). So, on May 28, the I-15bis flight of the 70th IAP was completely destroyed in battle, all the pilots were killed. On the same day, in a battle between nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP and the 18th Ki-27, six of our aircraft were lost in the air, another was shot down on the ground after an emergency landing, five pilots were killed, one was wounded. The Japanese once again escaped without losses. When it became clear to the Soviet leadership that it would not be possible to seize air supremacy with the existing forces, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive in the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three Douglas transport aircraft - the most experienced pilots and technicians, many of whom had visited Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their group, but were unable to achieve a numerical advantage.
Over time, Soviet pilots began to fight more confidently, and the loss ratios began to improve in our direction. The “transitional moment” can be considered June 22, 1939, when the largest air battle between Japanese and Soviet fighters took place. 18 combat-ready Ki-27s of the 24th Sentai took off to intercept a group of Soviet fighters. From the Red Army Air Force, 105 aircraft took off (56 I-16 and 49 I-15bis). However, they attacked in two waves, and some of the Soviet aircraft did not participate in the battle at all. The Japanese estimate their irretrievable losses at seven aircraft, the Red Army Air Force lost seventeen aircraft (14 I-15bis and 3 I-16), of which thirteen aircraft and eleven pilots were lost in the air. Four I-15bis were set on fire on the ground during landing, but their pilots escaped. Despite the fact that the losses of the Red Army Air Force significantly exceeded the losses of the Japanese, the battlefield remained with the Soviet pilots: the Japanese were forced to retreat.
It is noticeable that the units that fought on Polikarpov’s biplanes suffered significantly more than those armed with the I-16: the obsolescence of the I-15bis made itself felt. Already at the end of July, these aircraft were withdrawn from the first line units (a number of them remained in the air defense of airfields), and new I-153 biplanes with retractable landing gear and a more powerful M-62 engine arrived in their place. Among other new products of the Soviet aircraft industry that were “noted” at Khalkhin Gol, mention should be made of the I-16P (I-16 type 17) - cannon versions of the widely used I-16 type 10, as well as “donkey” variants with M-62 engines. The first such vehicles were obtained by upgrading the I-16 type 10 in the field (the engines were taken from stocks for the I-153); subsequently, factory versions began to arrive, called I-16 type 18... Meanwhile, Japanese troops, under pressure from Soviet-Mongolian forces, began to retreat. On August 20, a decisive offensive operation began to encircle and destroy the Kwantung Army group east of the Khalkhin Gol River. By this day, the strength of the Soviet aviation group had reached its maximum. In the August battles, Japanese aircraft tried in vain to seize the initiative, but they failed. Strikes on Soviet airfields also did not bring the desired results. The air units of the imperial aviation were losing equipment and pilots.
This difficult situation was particularly affected by the impossibility of quickly restoring the fleet of Ki-27 fighters: the Nakajima plant could produce only one aircraft per day. As a result, the Japanese had to use the 9th Sentai, armed with outdated biplanes, in battles Kawasaki Ki.10. On September 2, 1939, these fighters first appeared in the skies of Khalkhin Gol and immediately began to suffer significant losses. Soon, the defeated Japanese requested a truce. On September 15, an agreement was signed between the USSR, Mongolian People's Republic and Japan to cease hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. Before this, the Kwantung Army aviation attempted to launch large-scale attacks on Soviet airfields. Their idea failed: as a result, the attackers suffered greater losses than the attacked. The repulse of the Japanese raid on September 15, during which ten Japanese planes were shot down against six Soviet ones (one I-16 and five I-153), can be considered the last air battle in the skies over Khalkhin Gol.
The number of serviceable fighters is given in parentheses, if known.
| Period | I-15bis | I-153 | I-16 | I-16P |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.05-31.05 | 13 (1) | - | 5 (1) | - |
| 1.06-30.06 | 31 (2) | - | 17 (2) | - |
| 1.07-31.07 | 16 (1) | 2 (1) | 41 (2) | - |
| 1.08-31.08 | 5 (1) | 11 (4) | 37 (16) | 2 (0) |
| 1.09-16.09 | - | 9 (1) | 5 (1) | 2 (0) |
| Total | 65 (5) | 22 (6) | 105 (22) | 4 (0) |
Non-combat losses are given in parentheses.
Enemy fighters
As mentioned above, the main Japanese fighter in the conflict area was the army Ki-27 (aka “type 97”, Soviet name - I-97) from Nakajima. At first, Soviet pilots mistook it for a Mitsubishi A5M, which debuted in China. The mistake was eventually revealed: this happened after the arrival of war veterans in China to the theater of operations. As A.V. Vorozheikin recalled, at the end of June, Corporal Smushkevich, Colonel Lakeev, Major Kravchenko and some other pilots studied the wreckage of a Japanese fighter and discovered the absence of struts on the chassis, characteristic of a Mitsubishi product.
In its structure, the Ki-27 is very similar to the A5M, but its engine power is lower. However, due to better aerodynamics and lower weight, it is superior in basic characteristics (except range) to its “brother” from the Imperial Navy Air Force. The armament remained the same: two rifle-caliber machine guns. Both existing modifications of the “type 97” were used at Khalkhin Gol: Ki-27-Ko(other name options: Ki-27a, Ki-27-I) and Ki-27-Otsu(Ki-27b, Ki-27-II). The latest version was distinguished by a “lantern” with all-round visibility, a redesigned oil cooler, as well as the ability to install underwing fuel tanks and a suspension of small-caliber bombs. The Type-97 was superior in its characteristics to both the I-15bis and the I-153. With the I-16 the situation was somewhat more complicated. Horizontal
The maneuverability of the Ki-27 was better than that of any version of the donkey. In addition, I-16s with M-25 engines were inferior to the Japanese fighter in terms of climb speed and altitude, but had better weapons and armor protection. “Donkeys” also had a more durable design and could reach higher speeds in a dive. An important advantage of the Ki-27 was its high stability, which partly compensated for the low second weight of the salvo when firing. Even after the arrival of the I-16 Type 18 fighters, superior to the Ki-27 in speed and climb rate, the Japanese fighters remained dangerous opponents. The shortcomings of the aircraft were compensated by the merits of their pilots: according to the recollections of Soviet veterans who managed to fight in Spain, the Japanese were superior to the Italians in experience, and the Germans in aggressiveness. From the interrogation of the captured Japanese pilot Miajimo:
“It’s best to fight with the I-15 on horizontal and vertical turns, with the I-16 it’s the same. He believes that the I-16 fighter is more dangerous, explaining this by the speed and maneuverability of the I-16.
When an I-16 attacks head-on, the I-97 goes up followed by a ranversman. When I-16 attacks I-97 from above, I-97 goes into a turn.
The pilot states that Japanese pilots do not like front attacks, they are afraid of damage to the engine, and consider it best to attack the I-16 from above from behind. As a rule, exiting a battle with a corkscrew is not used.”
Another Japanese fighter that fought at Khalkhin Gol was the Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane. In general terms, it was an analogue of the Soviet I-15bis and by 1939 it was irrevocably outdated. Here is a description of one of the first battles between the I-16 and the Ki-10:
Captured Ki-10-II, tested at the Air Force Research Institute
“On one of the first days of autumn, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Cheremukhin, deputy commander of the 22nd IAP, flew out on a combat patrol. Soon he noticed that a group of Japanese planes appeared from across the river. Cheremukhin, giving a sign to his wingmen, turned his I-16 towards the enemy. This was not the first battle for him, and he thoroughly studied the appearance of the main Japanese fighter Ki-27. But this time the Soviet pilots encountered completely different machines. The elegant, sharp-nosed biplanes vividly reminded the deputy commander of the old Polikarpov I-3, on which he once began his career as a combat pilot. The ensuing “aerial carousel” immediately showed that the Japanese fighters were superior to the “donkeys” in turns, noticeably inferior to them in speed and rate of climb. Our pilots quickly figured out that it was better to start hitting biplanes from long distances, and, without getting involved in close combat, leave to repeat the attack on the vertical. Soon Cheremukhin managed to get behind one of the Japanese and fire a targeted burst. A stream of white steam escaped from the fuselage of the enemy aircraft. “The radiator is broken,” the senior lieutenant noted to himself and sharply released the gas so as not to overshoot the enemy. At random, the Japanese pilot was either confused or wounded, but he did not even try to maneuver to get out of the fire, but continued to “pull” in a straight line while descending, leaving a long plume of steam behind him. Taking careful aim once again, Cheremukhin fired a long burst at the engine of the damaged car. Instead of steam, thick black smoke poured out of the “Japanese”, and it, increasing its dive angle, crashed almost vertically into the ground.”
Interestingly, according to Japanese data, only one Ki-10 was lost during the conflict.
| Camouflage schemes | |
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Nakajima Ki-27-Ko st. Sergeant Kashida, 2nd Chutai, 59th Fighter Sentai |
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Nakajima Ki-27-Otsu commander of the 2nd Chutai of the 11th Fighter Sentai |
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Against bombers
The Japanese bombers used in the conflict area gave the Soviet aviation leadership another reason for thought: the speed of any of them (not counting the light reconnaissance aircraft and the Ki-36 bomber) exceeded that of the biplane fighters of the Red Army Air Force. Thus, the situation characteristic of the war in Spain was repeated: the I-16 became the main means of intercepting bombers. The main medium bomber in the theater of operations was the aircraft Mitsubishi Ki.21(according to the Japanese classification it was considered heavy). The Mitsubishi product had a very good speed of 432 km/h, which, however, did not exceed the I-16 type 10. Considering the low level of security characteristic of Japanese aircraft of that time, the Ki-21, in theory, was supposed to become an easy target for the donkeys, but only six aircraft were lost during the conflict. Another common Japanese attack aircraft at Khalkhin Gol was a single-engine Mitsubishi Ki.30 with a fixed landing gear with a maximum speed of 430 km/h. It was he who suffered the greatest losses among Japanese bombers during the conflict. Another Japanese aircraft, a single-engine reconnaissance aircraft, should be noted Mitsubishi Ki.15-Ko Karigane. Thanks to good aerodynamics (despite the non-retractable landing gear) and light design, this aircraft could reach a maximum speed of 481 km/h, which made it difficult to reach even for the I-16 with M-62 engines. However, seven aircraft of this type were still shot down. The next modification of the reconnaissance aircraft, Ki-15-Otsu, reached 510 km/h, but it did not arrive in time for the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
The use of unguided rockets
From August 20 to 31, a flight of missile-carrying fighters took part in the hostilities, which included five I-16s (flight commander Captain N. Zvonarev, pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko), armed with installations RS-82. On August 20, 1939, at 16:00, the pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched the RS from a distance of about a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy aircraft were shot down. The success was due to the fact that the Japanese flew in close formation and at a constant speed. In addition, the surprise factor was at work. The Japanese did not understand who was attacking them (they attributed their losses to the actions of Soviet anti-aircraft gunners). In total, the missile carrier flight took part in 14 battles, shooting down 13 Japanese aircraft without losses. The Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their equipment, came to the conclusion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters.| Camouflage schemes | |
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I-16 type 5 commander of the 2nd squadron of the 70th IAP Art. Lt. M. P. Noga, autumn 1938. The blue star instead of a number on the vertical tail was obviously the emblem of the command vehicle. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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The author of the second drawing is Andrey Yurgenson. |
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I-16 type 10 of the 70th IAP. The green protective color was applied in the field over the factory silver-gray paint. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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I-16 type 10 of one of the Soviet aviation formations. The color of the propeller spinner and rudder tip is indicated tentatively. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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I-16 type 10 Vitta Skobarikhin. 22nd IAP, Tamtsag-Bulak airfield, summer 1939. |
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| I-16 type 10 | I-16 type 17 | I-16 type 18 | Kawasaki Ki.10-II | Nakajima Ki.27 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manufacturer country | USSR | USSR USSRJapan | Japan | ||
| 1938 | 1938 | 1939 | 1935 (1937**) | 1937 | |
| Wingspan, m | 9.00 | 9.00 | 9.0010.02/n. d.* | 11.31||
| 6.07 | 6.076.07 | 7.55 | 7.53|||
| Height, m | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.253.00 | 3.25 | |
| Wing area, m2 | 14.54 | 14.5414.54 | 23.00 18.56|||
| Engine | M-25VM-25V | M-62 Kawasaki Ha-9-IIb"Army Type 97" | |||
| Power, hp | 750 | 750 | 800 | 850 | 710 |
| Aircraft weight, kg. | |||||
| - empty | 1327 | 14261434 | 1360 | 1110||
| - takeoff | 1716 1810 18301740 | 1790 | |||
| Speed, km/h | |||||
| - near the ground | 398 | 385 | 413 n. d.n. d. | ||
| 425 | 461400 | 470||||
| Rate of climb, m/min | 882688 | 1034 | n. d. | 920||
| Practical ceiling, m | 8470 | 8240 | 9300 | 11150 | 10000|
| Range, km | 525 | 417485 | 1100 627|||
| Turn time, s | 16-18 | 17-18 | 17 | n. d. | 8 |
| Armament | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 20-mm ShVAK cannons, 2 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 7.7 mm synchronized machine guns "type 89" | |
| Pilot's name | Subdivision | Number of victories on I-16 (personal + group) | Notes|
|---|---|---|---|
| Rakhov V. G. | 22nd IAP | 8+6 | - |
| Vorozheikin A.V. | 22nd IAP | 6+13 | Flew on I-16P |
| Kravchenko G. P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Commander of the 22nd IAP since July 1939 |
| Trubachenko V. P. | 22nd IAP | 5 | Squadron commander I-16P |
| Krasnoyurchenko I. I. | n. d. | 5 | Flew on I-16P |
| Smirnov B. A. | n. d. | 4 | - |
| Skobarikhin V. F. | 22nd IAP | 2+6 | - |
| Zvonarev N. I. | 22nd IAP | 2+5 | Flew I-16 with RO-82 |
| Antonenko A.K.* | n. d. | 0+6 | - |
| Glazykin N. G. | 22nd IAP | 1 | Commander of the 22nd IAP, died 06/22/1939 |
Information sources Kondratyev V. Khalkhin-Gol: War in the air. - M.: “Technicians - Youth”, 2002. Stepanov A. Air war on Khalkhin Gol. // “Corner of the Sky” Astakhova E. Kawasaki Ki-10 fighter. // “Planes of the World” No. 03 (23), 2000. Kondratiev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M., 2008. Mikhail Maslov. Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153 aces. Osprey Publishing, 2010.
In Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River, starting in the spring and ending in the fall of 1939, there were battles between Japan and Japan. In the spring of 1939, the Japanese government sent numerous troops to Mongolian territory in order to ensure the creation of a new border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, so that the new border strip would run along the Khalkhin Gol River. Soviet troops were sent to help friendly Mongolia and, uniting with Mongolian military units, prepared to repel the aggressor. After the invasion of Mongolian soil, the Japanese immediately met powerful resistance from Soviet troops and by the end of May were forced to retreat to Chinese territory.
The next attack by Japanese troops was more prepared and massive. Heavy equipment, guns and planes were sent to the border, and the number of soldiers already numbered about 40 thousand people. The strategic goal of the Japanese was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Khalkhin Gol River, which he commanded, and to occupy important heights and bridgeheads for future offensives. The Soviet-Mongolian group was almost three times inferior to the Japanese troops, but bravely entered into battle with enemy forces. Having first achieved strategic results and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese intended to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops, but during stubborn fighting for three days, they were defeated and were forced to retreat again.
But the Japanese army did not calm down and in August began to prepare a new, even more powerful offensive, bringing additional reserves to Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet troops were also actively strengthening, about 500 tanks appeared, a fighter brigade, a large number of guns and the number of personnel was already almost 60 thousand soldiers. G.K. Zhukov was appointed corps commander and prepared to launch a counterattack against Japanese formations, carefully camouflaging himself and spreading false information that Soviet troops would only be ready to attack by winter. And Japanese troops planned to launch another attack at the end of August.
But the Soviet troops, unexpectedly for the enemy, unleashed all their power on August 20 and, having pushed the Japanese 12 km, brought in tank troops and entrenched themselves at important heights. The central, southern and northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as planned, pinned down the enemy with constant attacks and by August 23, they captured the main Japanese forces in a tight ring. And by the end of August, the Japanese were fragmented into small units and completely destroyed.
As early as half of September, the Japanese invaders tried to take revenge, breaking through Khalkhin Gol several times both by land and by air, but the skillful actions of the Soviet troops constantly forced them to retreat, suffering heavy losses. Ultimately, the aggressive Japanese government was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, which was signed on September 15.
Victory in this conflict was very important for the USSR, security guarantees appeared in the east of the country, and in the future it was because of this battle that the Japanese did not dare to help the Germans in the war against the Soviet Union.
The international situation in that pre-war period was characterized, on the one hand, by acute imperialist contradictions within the countries of the capitalist world, and on the other, by their general hostility towards the Land of the Soviets, the world's first socialist state.
Imperialism sought to resolve these contradictions through military, violent means. Moreover, the main trend in the policy of the most aggressive states - Germany and Japan - was the desire to combine efforts to attack the USSR from two sides, that is, to impose a war on two fronts on the Soviet Union.
This trend intensified even more and acquired a certain direction in connection with the conclusion of the “Anti-Comintern Pact” in 1936 and the formation of a military-political bloc of fascist states, which included Germany, Italy and Japan. The creation of such a military-political coalition with the distribution of spheres of action of its participants was aimed at inciting hotbeds of war in Europe and Asia.
In 1938, the Nazi army captured Austria, occupied Czechoslovakia, and in April 1939, Hitler approved the Weiss plan, which provided for an attack on Poland before September 1, 1939. In the East, the Japanese army invaded China, occupied the entire territory of Manchuria, creating here the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by the last emperor of the Ping dynasty, Henry Pu Yi. The Japanese invaders established a military-police regime in it. Manchuria was turned into a springboard for aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China.
The first step of aggression was the Japanese invasion in July 1938 on Soviet territory near Lake. Hassan. This unremarkable border strip of land, cut by hills and river valleys, became the site of heated battles. Soviet troops won an important victory here in stubborn battles. However, the Japanese aggressors did not calm down. They began to prepare for a larger-scale military action, and not only for the purpose of revenge.
In the fall of 1938, the General Staff of the Japanese Army developed a war plan against the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR, which provided for the seizure of the Mongolian People's Republic and the capture of Soviet Primorye.
The Japanese General Staff planned to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway and tear the Far East away from the rest of the Soviet Union. According to one of the officers of the Japanese General Staff, the main strategic plan of the Japanese command under this plan was to concentrate the main military forces in Eastern Manchuria and direct them against the Soviet Far East. The Kwantung Army was supposed to capture Ussuriysk, Vladivostok, and then Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk.
The Japanese had long been hatching plans to capture Mongolia. They believed that mastering the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic would give them major strategic benefits. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, General Itagaki, said that Mongolia “is very important from the point of view of the Japanese-Manchu influence of today, because it is the defensive flank of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting Soviet territories in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia is united with Japan and Manchukuo, then the Soviet territories in the Far East will be in a very difficult situation and it will be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without much military effort. Therefore, the goal of the army should be to extend Japanese-Manchu rule to Outer Mongolia by any means necessary." In short, Japanese strategists believed that by breaking through Mongolia and reaching Lake Baikal, they would thereby jeopardize the entire Soviet Far East.
The Japanese imperialists were also attracted by the riches of Mongolia - coal, iron, cattle, as well as a huge territory that was larger than England, France and Germany combined. The Japanese had been preparing for the campaign against Mongolia for a long time. They have repeatedly staged provocations on its borders.
Japanese troops organized all kinds of sabotage in the areas bordering the USSR. In 1936-1938. On the border of the USSR and Manchuria captured by the Japanese, 230 violations were recorded, of which 35 were major military clashes. An alarming situation developed in the Turiy Rog area and near the lake. Khanka, in the Poltava and Grodekovsky fortified areas, on the river. Amur near the cities of Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk.
In Manchuria, on the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese created 11 fortified areas and placed strong military garrisons in settlements along the state borders; they built and improved highways. The main group of the Kwantung Army was concentrated in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria. By the summer of 1939, its number here had been increased to 350 thousand people; the group had more than a thousand artillery pieces, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft.
All these facts convincingly indicated that Japan was intensively preparing for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR.
Given the tension of the situation and the threat of a military attack, the governments of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic took measures of a diplomatic and military nature. Back on March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed. It said: “The governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People’s Republic undertake, in the event of a military attack on one of the contracting parties, to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance.” In accordance with this agreement, units of the Red Army were sent to Mongolia, from which the 57th Special Corps was formed.
The Soviet government later officially declared that “the border of the Mongolian People’s Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance agreement concluded between us, we will defend as resolutely as our own.”
For these purposes, effective measures were taken to reliably protect the Far Eastern borders of our country and our allied Mongolia. In particular, it was decided to increase the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. By order of the USSR NCO dated September 4, 1938, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla were promptly subordinated to the commanders of the individual armies."
By the summer of 1939, the Soviet troops in the Far East included the 1st Separate Red Banner Army under the command of 2nd Rank Army Commander G. M. Stern, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army of Corps Commander I. S. Konev, the Transbaikal Military District (commander corps commander F.N. Remizov). These associations reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. The operational subordination of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army was the Pacific Fleet, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army was the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, and the Transbaikal Military District was the 57th Special Corps, stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.
Much work was carried out to strengthen the engineering borders and increase the combat capabilities of the troops. The construction of many defensive areas in the most threatened areas was completed. A new operational formation was created from aviation units and formations - the 2nd Air Army. Rifle and cavalry formations included tank battalions and mechanized regiments. Territorial divisions were transferred to personnel status.
Along with these important defense measures, significant work was carried out to further develop the economy in the regions of the Far East. From Transbaikalia to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the construction of factories began and military camps were created.
Thanks to the efforts of young people who came from all over the country, a new industrial center of the Far East - Komsomolsk-on-Amur - grew up. A large number of demobilized soldiers left for permanent residence in various regions of the Far East. All these measures, as the further course of events showed, were extremely necessary and timely.
Preparing an aggressive action against the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese command chose the eastern protrusion of the republic in the area of the river as the target of attack. Khalkhin Gol. Mastering this area would give the Japanese a number of advantages. The Khalkhin Gol River, 100-130 m wide and 2-3 m deep, has steep slopes, is swampy in many places, and in some places was difficult to access for military equipment. A few kilometers east of it stretches a ridge of heights towering over the area. Along with this, there are many sand pits in the river valley. The river flows into Khalkhin Gol here. Khaylastyn-Gol, cutting the area of upcoming hostilities into two parts, which was disadvantageous for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.
On the Manchu side, two railways came close to this area, and the nearest railway supply station for Soviet and Mongolian troops was 650 km away. Steppe and deserted area east of the river. Khalkhin Gol was guarded only by separate border patrols; the outposts were located 20-30 km from the state border.
All this, of course, was taken into account by the Japanese. Before the military events in May 1939, the Japanese military command brought about 38 thousand troops, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft to the combat area. Soviet-Mongolian troops defending east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, on a front 75 km away, consisted of 12.5 thousand soldiers, 186 tanks, 266 armored vehicles and 82 aircraft. In terms of the number of personnel and aviation, the enemy was three times larger than the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. But it should be noted that the Soviet and Mongolian soldiers were well prepared. The Mongolian People's Army had artillery, tanks, and aviation. She had good command of the combat equipment she had. The main branch of the army's troops was cavalry, mobile and seasoned. Mongolian cyrics are proven warriors. They were ready to defend the independence of their homeland with all their might. The army is a strong support of the Mongolian People's Republic, but its main and main support is friendship with the great Soviet Union. And this gave the soldiers strength and confidence in victory.
After careful preparation, the Japanese command began to implement their plans. Using their favorite technique - provocation, the Japanese aggressors declared foreign territory to be theirs. On May 11, 1939, Japanese units unexpectedly attacked the outposts of the Mongolian People's Army east of the river. Khalkhin Gol in the lake area. Buir-Nur. The Mongol warriors were forced to retreat to the river. The fighting lasted here for ten days, but it did not bring any success to the Japanese.
The Soviet command guessed the enemy's plan. It was clear that this was not at all about the seizure of any piece of territory. The Japanese aggressors covered their desire to turn Mongolia into a springboard for an attack on the USSR by shouting about the correction of borders. The Soviet command quickly came to the aid of the Mongolian Republic, ordering the transfer of troops to the Khalkhin Gol area.
After the treacherous attack of the Japanese invaders on the Mongolia, the Soviet government took urgent measures to strengthen the leadership of troops in the area where hostilities began. In early June, the Deputy Commander of the Belorussian Military District for Cavalry, Divisional Commander G.K. Zhukov, was sent there with the task of understanding the situation on the spot and taking urgent measures. Having assessed the situation as a whole, he came to the conclusion that “with the forces that the 57th Special Corps in the Mongolian People’s Republic had at its disposal, it would be impossible to stop the Japanese military adventure...”. The Soviet High Command immediately decided to strengthen the corps. G.K. Zhukov was appointed its commander.
Soon, fresh units and units began to arrive to help the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. New fighters (Chaika and I-16) with experienced Soviet pilots, among whom were 21 Heroes of the Soviet Union, were received to strengthen the aviation group.
On June 20, the commander of the Kwantung Army ordered the offensive of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. On June 30, the commander of the Japanese 23rd Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, in turn ordered the troops to go on the offensive.
The plan of the Japanese command boiled down to the following: going on the offensive throughout the entire area, pinning down the Soviet units from the front, and then using a strike group to bypass the left flank of the defense and cross the river. Khalkhin Gol, occupy the dominant heights of Bain-Tsagan in this area and strike in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian units. Giving the order to attack, Kamatsubara boastfully added that he himself was moving with the main forces to Mount Bain-Tsagan, where he would be after its occupation.
The Japanese command hoped to complete this offensive operation as quickly as possible in order to complete all military operations within the Mongolian People's Republic before the onset of autumn.
Under these conditions, the Soviet command was forced to urgently take a number of measures to prevent the expansion of hostilities. One of them was the restructuring of the organizational structure of troop leadership in the Far Eastern theater of military operations, the other was an increase in their combat and numerical strength. On July 5, the Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to form a new body for the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces in Chita, subordinating to it all the troops stationed at that time in the Far East. In accordance with this, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to create a front-line group of troops headed by the commander - Army Commander of the 2nd Rank G. M. Stern (member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar N. I. Biryukov, Chief of Staff - Divisional Commander M. A. Kuznetsov). The Military Council and the headquarters of the created group were entrusted with the tasks of uniting and directing the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East, directing their operational activities, providing material support for troops both in peacetime and in wartime, etc. The commander of the front group reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. The improvement of control bodies in the Far Eastern theater of operations ended in mid-July 1939 with the transformation of the 57th Special Corps, located in the Mongolian People's Republic, into the 1st Army Group under the command of the division commander (from July 31, corps commander) G. K. Zhukov, with its subordination directly to the commander front group of troops in the Far East.
The reorganization of the command and control bodies of Soviet troops in the Far East contributed to the successful solution of the tasks of defeating Japanese troops in the Khalkhin Gol region and suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialist Japan against the USSR and the Mongolia. The newly created departments of the front-line and army groups of forces continued to function for almost a year after the end of hostilities.
On the night of July 3, Japanese troops went on the offensive. Having crossed the river Khalkhin Gol, they developed a strike in the direction of Mount Bayin-Tsagan. The battle lasted three days, in which about 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 guns and several hundred aircraft took part on both sides. Part of the Japanese group moved to the left bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol. Mount Bayin-Tsagan was occupied.
Our command sent motorized mechanized units to this area: the 11th tank brigade of the brigade commander, M.P. Yakovlev, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of Colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky. By 7 p.m. On July 3, the enemy was attacked from three sides. The battle continued at night and all day on July 4th. All attempts by the Japanese to launch a counterattack and transfer new units across the river were repulsed. By the morning of July 5, the Japanese, retreating, rushed to the crossing, covering the slopes of the mountain with thousands of corpses.
Soviet and Mongolian soldiers and commanders, showing courage and heroism, selflessly repelled enemy attacks and dealt crushing blows to the enemy. As a result, the strike force of the Japanese invaders, pressed against the river, was completely defeated. The enemy lost almost all the tanks, a significant part of the artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand soldiers and officers. On July 8, the Japanese tried to take revenge for this defeat by going on the attack. After a four-day bloody battle, the Japanese troops, having lost another 5.5 thousand people killed and wounded, were forced to retreat. Our soldiers rightly called the defeat of the Japanese the Bain-Tsagan massacre.
G.K. Zhukov, who directly led the operation of the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan, recalled: “Thousands of corpses, a mass of dead horses, many crushed and broken guns, mortars, machine guns and vehicles covered Mount Bain-Tsagan.”
Already the first battles on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic showed that the attempt of the Japanese militarists to achieve their political and military goals was failing. And despite this, they still hoped to change the course of events in their favor. The Japanese command planned to conduct a “general offensive” at the end of August 1939. This major military action was timed to coincide with the impending attack of Nazi Germany on Poland, about which Japan, an ally of Germany, was informed.
Within a month, the Japanese command urgently transferred new units and formations to the battle area. On August 10, 1939, the 6th Army was formed from them, led by General Ogisu Rippo. This army, located on an area of 70 km along the front and 20 km in depth, consisted of 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks, and more than 300 aircraft.
The Soviet command was forced to take appropriate measures to strengthen its troops. In addition, the Soviet government decided to provide large amounts of military assistance to the MPR. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered about 57 thousand people in their ranks, they were armed with 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2,255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.
On July 15, 1939, the 1st Army Group was formed (Military Council: group commander, corps commander G.K. Zhukov, member of the Military Council, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev, chief of staff, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov). The Mongolian troops operating in the battle area were led by Marshal X. Choibalsan, and Yu. Tsedenbal, now the General Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic, carried out a lot of work in the troops.
The Soviet-Mongolian command carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. The military council of the army group paid great attention to the organization and conduct of party-political work, directing it primarily to improving the moral and combat qualities of soldiers.
Much work was done to organize the rear. Thousands of vehicles from the supply station, located, as already mentioned, at a distance of 650 km, delivered in an exceptionally short time to the Soviet-Mongolian troops 18 thousand tons of artillery ammunition, 6500 tons of ammunition for aviation, 15 thousand tons of various fuels and lubricants, 7 thousand tons of fuel, 4 thousand tons of food.
Much attention was paid to organizing interaction between Soviet troops and the Mongolian People's Army.
During the May battles, troops were controlled from a joint command post. Before the August offensive, Mongolian commanders were familiarized with the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops. An interaction plan was developed. During the offensive, it was envisaged that there would be representatives of the MNA at the command post of the 1st Army Group, and representatives of the Red Army at the CD of the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions.
The plan of the Soviet-Mongolian command was based on the idea: having tied down the forces of the Japanese troops from the front, launch a preemptive bilateral strike on the flanks in the general direction of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, and then encircle and destroy the enemy between the river. Khalkhin Gol and the state border.
To implement this plan, three groups of troops were created. The main blow was delivered by the southern group of Colonel M.I. Potapov, consisting of two divisions, tank, motorized armored brigades and several tank battalions, and the auxiliary one was delivered by the northern group led by Colonel I.V. Shevnikov. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was tasked with pinning down the enemy from the front.
Preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest secrecy with extensive use of operational disguise and disinformation. The unit commanders were brought up to date only 3-4 days before the operation, and the soldiers - on the night of August 20, on the eve of the offensive. During the preparation, measures were taken to create an impression on the enemy about the intended wintering of our units: stakes were driven in, wire barriers were built, and false demands were broadcast over the radio for the sending of stakes, wire, and winter uniforms. Moreover, orders were transmitted using a code known to the Japanese.
The Japanese command expected to launch a “general offensive” on August 24, 1939. Having anticipated the enemy by four days, the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the morning of August 20, Sunday, launched a decisive offensive.
More than 150 bombers and powerful artillery attacked the enemy’s battle formations and artillery positions. About 100 Soviet fighters provided protection from enemy air strikes for part of the strike forces of the Soviet-Mongolian forces concentrated in the initial areas for the offensive.
After powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours. 45 minutes, Soviet tankers went on the attack. Following them, Soviet-Mongolian infantry and cavalry units rushed towards the enemy along the entire front.
The air and artillery strike of the Soviet-Mongolian troops turned out to be so powerful and sudden that the enemy was morally and physically suppressed. For an hour and a half, the enemy artillery did not fire a single shot, and the aircraft did not make a single sortie.
While the troops of the central sector pinned down the main forces of the aggressor with frontal attacks, the southern and northern strike groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops broke through the enemy defenses on the flanks and quickly began to encircle the enemy in deep envelopment. Gradually the enemy began to come to his senses and put up stubborn resistance. The Japanese command sent a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft against the Soviet-Mongolian forces. Under their cover, infantry and cavalry increasingly began to launch counterattacks. A fierce battle broke out along the entire front.
Despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, by the end of the first day serious success had been achieved on the outer flanks of the southern and northern groups, where cavalry formations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated units of the Japanese-Manchu cavalry and captured the designated lines along the state border.
Having assessed the current situation, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov decided to commit all reserve forces to the battle in the northern direction. The mobile group under the command of Colonel I.P. Alekseenko, going on the offensive, reached Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo by the end of August 23 and the next day entered into fire contact with units of the southern group. Japanese troops were completely surrounded.
Attempts by the Japanese command to break through the encirclement from the outside with attacks from fresh reserves were unsuccessful. Having suffered heavy losses, the enemy relief group was forced to retreat.
The Soviet-Mongolian command began the systematic destruction of the encircled Japanese troops. Ceremoniously, with the outer front of the encirclement, which consisted mainly of motorized armored, cavalry, aviation and partly rifle troops, who went over to the defense along the border, an internal front was formed from rifle units, inflicting converging attacks on the enemy
blows.
Finding themselves in a cauldron, the Japanese troops desperately resisted, but on August 31, the last pockets of enemy defense were eliminated. After the complete defeat of their ground force, the Japanese command attempted to defeat Soviet aviation. However, this plan also failed. During the first half of September 1939, Soviet pilots conducted a series of air battles in which 71 enemy aircraft were destroyed. A large group of the Kwantung Army ceased to exist. On September 16, the Japanese government was forced to admit the defeat of its troops and asked for a cessation of hostilities. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 660 aircraft, and a significant amount of military equipment. The trophies of the Soviet-Mongolian troops included 12 thousand rifles, 200 guns, about 400 machine guns, and more than 100 vehicles. The Khalkhingol "cauldron" shook the Kwantung Army to its core. Its entire command was forced to resign. The army commander, General Ueda, and the army chief of staff, General Mosigan, were removed. The far-reaching plans of the Japanese aggressors collapsed and failed.
Fighting on the river Khalkhin Gol had a serious influence on the development of military art. They were an example of close cooperation between the armies of two states - the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. The joint command demonstrated the ability to clearly and consistently solve complex operational and strategic tasks.
If we evaluate the military operations at Khalkhin Gol from the point of view of their significance for the further development of Soviet military art, then first of all it should be noted that in terms of scale and nature it was for that time the largest operation of modern armies armed with the latest military equipment.
At Khalkhin Gol, quite modern tanks and aircraft were used on a mass scale for the first time. In some battles, the number of vehicles numbered in the hundreds, and at decisive moments of the battle up to 300 aircraft took to the air.
An analysis of the design, preparation and implementation of the August operation by the Soviet-Mongolian command shows that, despite the extremely difficult conditions, effective results were achieved:
In a short time, the encirclement and complete destruction of a large enemy group was prepared, successfully carried out and completed.
The forms and methods of the operation deserve special attention. The creation of an external and internal front to eliminate the encircled enemy was a new contribution to the further development of military art. The successful solution to such an important problem as the encirclement and destruction of the enemy was achieved not by numerical superiority, but thanks to the high level of military art of commanders of all levels and good combat training of the troops. The tactical skill of Soviet and Mongolian soldiers was quite high; operational thought was capable of providing brilliant examples of plan development and its implementation. At Khalkhin Gol, an operation was carried out to encircle and completely exterminate the enemy, which was always considered the most difficult.
The defeat of the Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol confirmed basically the correctness of the views existing in Soviet military theory on the conduct of offensive operations, and in particular the deep operation. The August operation showed that its successful implementation is inextricably linked with skillful maneuvering of troops, the use of counterattacks, and the conquest of air superiority , isolating the combat area from suitable enemy reserves and disrupting its communications. At the same time, the experience of Khalkhin Gol made it possible to draw conclusions about the need to increase the density of artillery and to further improve military equipment and offensive combat tactics.
Of great interest is the experience of organizing the management of the entire course of the operation, clarity and purposefulness in the work of the headquarters. The Soviet-Mongolian command managed to organize strong interaction between all types of troops during preparation and during the operation. At the same time, highly mobile armored units were used with maximum effect, operating in operational and tactical cooperation with cavalry and rifle divisions with the support of aviation and artillery and playing a decisive role in the implementation of the command’s plan.
The battles at Khalkhin Gol once again confirmed the growing role of reserves in the war and their timely and skillful use at decisive moments of hostilities. The introduction of mobile reserves, carried out by the commander of the army group G. K. Zhukov, made it possible to significantly speed up the complete encirclement of the enemy.
More than 17 thousand soldiers, commanders and political workers were awarded government awards, 70 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them the commander of the army group G. K. Zhukov; pilots Ya. V. Smushkevich, G. P. Kravchenko and S. I. Gritsevets became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union. 878 cyrics, Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers were awarded Mongolian orders and medals. 9 Mongolian soldiers were awarded the highest award of the Mongolian People's Republic - the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. 24 particularly distinguished formations and units were awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner
The implementation of logistical support for troops with all types of military equipment, weapons, ammunition and other material and technical means was very instructive. Despite the considerable distance from the main bases, the rear forces were able to not only supply the troops with everything they needed by the beginning of the decisive battles, but also create the necessary reserves.
The experience of military art in the victory at Khalkhin Gol had a significant impact on the development of Soviet military art. It was and is being carefully studied. The influence of the victory at Khalkhin Gol is included in all history textbooks.
The operation to encircle and destroy the Japanese 6th Army was, in essence, a classic operation. It was the prototype of the grandiose Stalingrad, Iasi-Kishinev and other operations brilliantly carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.
The victory of Soviet and Mongolian troops at Khalkhin Gol thwarted the aggressive plans of the Japanese militarists against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union.
That is why Western historiography suppresses and distorts the military events at Khalkhin Gol in 1939. The name “Khalkin Gol” is not in Western literature; instead, the term “incident at Nomon Khan” (named after the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side, is used to show off your military strength. Western historiographers claim that this was an isolated military action, a terrifying operation, allegedly imposed on the Japanese by the Soviet Union. Of course, such falsifications are designed to mislead people who are not particularly knowledgeable in history, to fabricate a false idea of the real causes of the military conflict caused by the Japanese aggressors. But such fakes are not accepted even in Japan itself. Japanese progressive historians claim that from a military point of view, the events at Khalkhin Gol are Japan's largest military defeat, and that the defeat of the Kwantung Army in the Khalkhin Gol area taught Japanese generals to respect the power of the Soviet Union.
The victory at Khalkhin Gol demonstrated the military cooperation of the armies, their high military art, and the strength of the Soviet-Mongolian friendship.
Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhyn Gol - “Khalkha River”, Chinese) is a river in Mongolia and China.
The river is famous for the battles of the Red Army against Japan in April-September 1939
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area. In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end. On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended with the victory of the USSR. In 1939, tensions on the border increased. On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied. On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border. During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank. On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely thanks to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin. The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions. Although there were no clashes on the ground in June, an air war broke out in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft. The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union who had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal. At the beginning of June N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov was appointed G.K. Zhukov . Soon after arriving in June 1939 in the area of military conflict, G.K. Zhukov, he proposed his plan of combat operations: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G.K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to gather in the conflict area - the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order. Brigade commander M.A., who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Bogdanov. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry. To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the Far Eastern Army, Commander G.M., arrived from Chita to the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. Stern. Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft. In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft. In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207, Japan - 162 aircraft. Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counter-offensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So as a result of the battle on June 22
, which became widely known in Japan (During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft. At the same time - on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol - on June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers . July. The offensive of the Japanese group By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front. On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobasi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Ban Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Ban-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them. Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, into battle from the march, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov. Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Ban Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and at certain moments there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles. On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike group under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete the task assigned to it. The group of Japanese troops on Mount Ban Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Ban Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Ban Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Ban Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost. These events became known as the “Ban-Tsagan Massacre.” The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river. However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of the conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.
July August. Preparation for the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops The 57th Special Corps was deployed into the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G. K. Zhukov, division commissar M. S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov. New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed. On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned. Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored. From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead. On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20. Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard the crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District under the command of the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment, Major A. Bulyga. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom children of Japanese intelligence officers were identified. During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter: “You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.” As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, opposing it was a Japanese group - specially formed by imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army under the command of General Ryuhe Ogisu (n.), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China. General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Ban Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned. During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, an operational plan was carefully developed and strictly followed.
tactical deception of the enemy. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed to disinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days. During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle. The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan. The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.
August. Strike by Soviet troops. Defeat the enemy
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks. The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G. K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighter jets shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft. In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed piece by piece.
In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks (the commander’s closest reserve was the Mongolian armored brigade - located in Tamtsak-
Bulak 120 kilometers from the front). Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death. The Red Army captured about 200 guns, 100 vehicles, 400 machine guns and 12 thousand rifles as trophies. The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce. Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the Khalkhin Gol River area, which came into force the next day. The conflict ended in 1942, in May, with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese - based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats in the Soviet-
on the German front, then a rather difficult situation arose. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Ponese. But it only lasted until 1945.
It is generally accepted that the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan’s non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States. In Japan, the defeat, and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro, and subsequently to the triumph of the so-called “maritime party”, which defended the idea of expansion towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. which inevitably led to a clash with America. The new Japanese government signed an armistice agreement with the USSR on September 15, 1939, and on April 13, 1941, concluded a Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, which triggered the United States' entry into World War II. "Golden Star"
At the height of the conflict, on August 1, 1939, the highest award of the USSR was established - the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (the title existed since 1934, but heroes did not receive insignia). The fate of the winners
Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District. The commander of the aviation of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and the commander of the Far Eastern Army, G. M. Stern, were awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. " After the end of the conflict, Ya. V. Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, G. M. Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both military leaders were arrested and executed a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954. The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, and ended the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general. According to researchers who consider the military abilities of G.K. Zhukov to be overrated (B.V. Sokolov, Viktor Suvorov, etc.), it was he who played a key role in developing the operation plan, but there is no evidence of this version. Feklenko N.V. .
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