Hitler's campaign plan for 1942. Plans of Hitler's military command. Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition

Education anti-Hitler coalition

The rapprochement between England and the USA began during the period "Battles of England" when Churchill convincingly begged Roosevelt to strengthen them with destroyers

March 11, 1941 US Congress passed Lend-Lease Law , which marked the abandonment "politics of isolationism" .

Lend-Lease– a system for the United States to loan or lease weapons, ammunition, strategic raw materials, food, and other allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The first transaction was the transfer 50 obsolete American destroyers in exchange for the lease of British territories on the Atlantic coast of North America. In the future, all US aid to the allies will be provided for gold or in exchange for the lease of territories.

After Germany’s attack on the USSR, Lend-Lease began to spread to our country, due to which the country received assistance not only with weapons, but also with food, shoes, things, etc.

It would be wrong to belittle the importance of this assistance for our country, even though its volume compared to domestic production was only 4 % . But to attribute it to decisive importance for the course of the war on the eastern front, as some Western historiographers do, is completely unlawful.

The final formation of the anti-Hitler coalition received after the United States entered the war and the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, during which the Soviet army regained its prestige, lost during the Soviet-Finnish War.

January 1, 1942 26 states signed in Washington United Nations Declaration , in which they pledged to use all their military and economic resources against the countries of the fascist bloc, and not to conclude a separate peace or truce with the enemy.

The Soviet side immediately began to insist at the opening of the “second front” in Europe, which would have eased its position, but an attempt to land troops in Northern France in August 1942 failed, forcing the Allies to begin more thorough preparations for this operation.

Until then, the main theaters of military operations for our allies remained Africa, Asia And Pacific Ocean .

Meanwhile, the main events 1942 deployed on the Soviet-German front, where after failures con. 1941 – beginning 1942 Hitler was preparing a new large-scale offensive.

a) Hitler’s plans and Stalin’s miscalculations

Planning offensive actions on summer 1942 , Although Hitler still had superiority in men and weapons, he no longer had the ability to conduct a simultaneous offensive in all strategic directions, as was the case in 1941

Therefore, the main forces were concentrated in the army group "South" , which were supposed to take over the industrial Donetsk basin , bread Kuban , oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and master Stalingrad to cut off oil-bearing fields for Moscow trade route along the Volga (plan "Blau" ).

Hitler spoke:

“If I don’t get the oil from Maikop and Grozny, then I will be forced to end this war.”

The capture of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, according to the Germans, was supposed to finally change the course of the entire war, and not just the situation on the eastern front.

Ribbentrop said:

“When Russia's oil sources are exhausted, Russia will be brought to its knees. Then the English... will bow down to save what remains of the tormented empire.
America is a big bluff..."

The capture of the Caucasus should also have prompted Russia's historical rival in the region to enter the war. Turkey .

After completing these tasks, which put the USSR in a critical situation, a new attack on Moscow and Leningrad was planned.

Meanwhile Stalin was confident that the Germans would repeat the attack on Moscow, and ordered the main forces to be concentrated in the Moscow direction.
Neither the reports from our intelligence about the planned German attack in the South-Eastern direction, nor the opinion of the members of Headquarters could convince him.

Zhukov wrote:

“J.V. Stalin assumed that the Nazis, without taking Moscow, would not abandon their main group to capture the Caucasus and the south of the country.
He said that such a move would lead the German forces to excessively stretch the front, which the high command would not agree to.”

b) order No. 227

In May 1942 German and allied Italian, Hungarian and Romanian troops began offensive on the Crimean front .

4th of July , after 250-day defense , Soviet troops were forced to leave Sevastopol .

Further takeover Rostov-on-Don led to loss Donbass and opened the way to the Caucasus and Stalingrad .

Hitler had to decide which direction should become the main one and where to direct his main forces. But he turned out to be too self-confident and undertook to solve both problems at the same time.

Chief of the General Staff Halder wrote bitterly about this character trait of Hitler:

“The always observed underestimation of the enemy’s capabilities gradually takes on grotesque forms and becomes dangerous.”

The attack on Stalingrad was so successful that July 13 Hitler withdrew from this direction 4th Tank Army and transferred it to the aid of the 1st Tank Army in the Caucasus.
This was a mistake. The pressure on Stalingrad eased and Moscow managed to establish an organized defense there.

Having understood this, through 2 weeks Hitler returns the 4th Panzer Army to Stalingrad, but it was unable to radically change the situation, and the weakened Caucasian group failed to capture the oil-bearing areas of Grozny.

Hitler did not want to understand that the German army no longer had the strength to conduct two major operations at the same time, and he took out all his anger on the generals, replacing them at the most inopportune moment.
The commander of the troops in the Caucasus direction, Field Marshal, was removed Sheet and Chief of the General Staff Halder , sent to the Dachau concentration camp, where he remained until liberated by the Americans.

The German offensive led to an overextension of the southern front.
The German headquarters was especially concerned about Don flank , covered by the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians, who militarily have not proven themselves to be the best. In the event of the collapse of this flank, the German Stalingrad group would not only be surrounded, but also cut off from the Caucasian group.

But Hitler did not want to listen to the arguments of his generals, who proposed to withdraw troops from Stalingrad. He brought more and more divisions into battle, demanding to capture the city and cut the Volga transport artery, vital for the USSR.

Meanwhile, the position of the Soviet units was critical.
The loss of rich industrial and agricultural areas had a serious impact on the supply of the army; the power of German tank wedges tore apart our defenses, creating huge gaps.

The front was held together only by the desperate resistance of ordinary soldiers, who German tanks had to be met with Molotov cocktails. Especially in these battles, Marine Corps soldiers, nicknamed by the Germans, proved themselves "black death" .

Stalin needed to justify his own miscalculations, which led to a new retreat after the winter offensive, which he did July 28, 1942 V Order No. 227 , which went down in history under the name "No step back!" .

In it, Stalin characterized the catastrophic nature of the current situation, but he declared the main reasons for this to be indiscipline, cowardice and alarmism of soldiers and officers:

“The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it, loses faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army for putting our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, and itself flowing to the east "

The order ordered the shooting of anyone who retreated without permission or left their positions. In the rear of the Soviet units were placed punitive barrage detachments , who, without warning, opened fire on anyone suspected of fleeing their positions.

This inhumane order did not stop the retreat, but many participants in the war believe that it largely made it possible to delay the enemy’s advance and prepare the defense of Stalingrad.

c) “Battle of Stalingrad”

August 23, 1942 , with the crossing of the Don by German tank units, began battle for Stalingrad . Massive raids began on the city, turning it into ruins.

After the Germans reached the Volga from the north and south of Stalingrad, the city itself became the main target. In continuous battles for every block and house, the entire September and October .

Changed hands more than once Mamaev kurgan , the soldiers of the tractor plant repeatedly took up arms and cleared the factory territory of the Germans, after which they returned to the machines.

A heroic page in the chronicle Battle of Stalingrad has entered "Pavlov's House" , which within 59 days defended by a group of guards led by a sergeant Pavlov .

On Paulus's map this house was marked as a fortress.
During the assault on this house alone, the Germans lost as many soldiers as they lost during the capture of some large European cities, but they were never able to take it.

One of the direct participants in the battles of Stalingrad, Wehrmacht officer G. Welz in his notes he wrote:

“In the central sector there have been battles for days on end with the aim of breaking into the city from the west. But the resistance of the Stalingraders was stubborn, incredibly stubborn.
The battle is not even for the streets, not for the neighborhoods. Every basement, every step is defended. The whole day there is a battle for a single stairwell. Hand grenades fly from room to room. It seems that we have already captured this floor, it is firmly in our hands, but no, the enemy received reinforcements on the burning roofs, and close combat broke out again. Yes, Stalingrad is devouring German soldiers! Every meter costs lives. More and more battalions are thrown into battle, and the very next day only a platoon remains of them.
Slowly, very slowly, the divisions are moving forward through the ruins and piles of rubble.”

But the Soviet units also suffered huge losses.
According to average statistics, a person died every 20 seconds in Stalingrad, and the average life expectancy of a soldier was less than a day.

In November, ice shackled the Volga, cutting off the city’s defenders from the right bank and leaving them without ammunition and food. Of the 7 districts, the Germans captured 6 - only Kirovsky district remained ours.

The population remaining by Stalin's will (Stalin said that the army does not protect empty cities) found itself in a terrible situation.

Hiding in basements, wells, etc., being on the front line, they existed without any food, under constant fire.
Even in Pavlov’s “house,” in addition to soldiers, there were also civilians, and during the fighting, one girl was even born.

When they talk about the torment of the besieged Leningraders, for some reason they forget that they received at least some grams of bread and lived in their houses, while the Stalingraders did not even have this for 6 months.

In November Hitler was already celebrating the victory and in his speech he told the Germans:

“I wanted to reach the Volga at one specific point, at one specific city. By chance, this city bears the name of Stalin himself.
But that’s not why I wanted to go there. The city could have a completely different name. I went there because it is a very important point.
Through it, 30 million tons of cargo were transported, of which almost 9 million tons of oil. Wheat flocked there from Ukraine and Kuban to be sent to the north. Manganese ore was delivered there. There was a giant transshipment center there. It was this one that I wanted to take, and – you know, we don’t need much – we took it! Only a few very insignificant points remained unoccupied.”

d) Operation Uranus

And in this situation the city survived, and Headquarters developed a counteroffensive plan "Uranus" .

Goal of the plan: with the forces of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts, strike the flanks of the German army group “South” and, having broken through them, unite, encircling the Stalingrad German group.

The operation has begun November 19 and already November 23 near 330 thousand The Germans were in the bag - the final stage of their destruction began.

Paulus did not dare to begin a breakthrough operation without Hitler's permission while it was still possible.

Hitler demanded to resist to the last, promising help.
But all attempts by the Germans to arrange supplies for their encircled troops by air were thwarted by our aviation and the tank crews of General Badanova , who carried out a raid behind enemy lines and destroyed a large airfield and over 300 German aircraft .

Attempts by the Germans to break through to help the encircled were thwarted by attacks by Soviet units on the flank of the advancing German units.

January 8, 1943 The Soviet command, in order to avoid unnecessary casualties, invited Paulus to surrender, but he refused.

January 10 Soviet units unleashed a barrage of artillery and aviation fire on the encircled Germans.

To strengthen Paulus's resolve to continue his resistance, Hitler assigned him rank of field marshal , but the surrounded units no longer believed in Hitler’s genius and did not want to die for him.

February 2 the surrounded units capitulated: they surrendered into captivity 24 generals led by Paulus himself and about 113 thousand soldiers and officers .

e) the results and significance of the victory at Stalingrad

The effect of the destruction of German troops at Stalingrad was stunning - the Germans lost about 25 % his army in the east.

This victory of the USSR undermined the morale of German soldiers (a 3-day mourning period was declared in Germany), raised the prestige of the Soviet army and instilled hope for the conquered peoples.

In addition, there was a threat of encirclement of German troops in the Caucasus, which forced them to begin withdrawing.

German historian Tippelskirch in his history of World War II he admitted:

“Although within the framework of the war as a whole, events in North Africa are given a more prominent place than the Battle of Stalingrad, the catastrophe at Stalingrad shocked the German army and the German people more, because it turned out to be more sensitive for them.
Something incomprehensible happened there... - the death of an army surrounded by the enemy.”

In an effort to build on the success of Stalingrad, the Red Army went on the offensive on all fronts.

During the winter of 1942-43. managed to finally remove the threats to Moscow, break the ring around Leningrad, connecting the besieged city with the mainland, and liberate Kursk.

By the spring of 1943 active hostilities ceased.
By this time, Soviet units had occupied convenient bridgeheads and had built up enough forces for new offensive operations

Essay

USSR during the Great Patriotic War

Completed by: student of group AF 11-11 Matveev A.V.

Head: Gryaznukhin A. G.

Krasnoyarsk 2011

In 1941 the Second World War has entered a new phase. By this time, Nazi Germany and its allies had captured virtually all of Europe. In connection with the destruction of Polish statehood, a joint Soviet-German border was established. In 1940, the Fascist leadership developed the Barbarossa plan, the goal of which was the lightning defeat of the Soviet armed forces and the occupation of the European part Soviet Union. Further plans included the complete destruction of the USSR. To do this, 153 German divisions and 37 divisions of its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary) were concentrated in the eastern direction. They were supposed to strike in three directions: central (Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow), northwestern (Baltic states - Leningrad) and southern (Ukraine with access to Black Sea coast). A lightning campaign was planned to capture the European part of the USSR before the fall of 1941.

SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT

Start of the war

The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began at dawn on June 22, 1941. With widespread air bombing of the largest industrial and strategic centers, as well as the offensive of the ground forces of Germany and its allies along the entire European border of the USSR (over 4.5 thousand km) During the first few days, German troops advanced tens and hundreds of kilometers. In the central direction at the beginning of July 1941, all of Belarus was captured and German troops reached the approaches to Smolensk. In the northwestern direction, the Baltic states were occupied; Leningrad was blocked on September 9. In the south, Moldova and Right Bank Ukraine are occupied. Thus, by the autumn of 1941, Hitler’s plan to seize the vast territory of the European part of the USSR was carried out.

Immediately after the German attack, the Soviet government carried out major military-political and economic measures to repel aggression. On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created. On July 10, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, and G.K. Zhukov. By a directive of June 29, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks set the entire country the task of mobilizing all forces and means to fight the enemy. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was created, concentrating all power in the country. The military doctrine was radically revised, the task was put forward to organize strategic defense, wear down and stop the advance of the fascist troops.

At the end of June - the first half of July 1941, large defensive border battles unfolded (defense Brest Fortress and etc.). From July 16 to August 15, the defense of Smolensk continued in the central direction. In the northwestern direction, the German plan to capture Leningrad failed. In the south, the defense of Kyiv was carried out until September 1941, and Odessa until October. The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer - autumn of 1941 thwarted Hitler's plan lightning war. At the same time, the seizure by the fascist command by the fall of 1941 of the vast territory of the USSR with its most important industrial centers and grain regions was a serious loss for the Soviet government.

Moscow Battle

At the end of September - beginning of October 1941, the German Operation Typhoon began, aimed at capturing Moscow. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through in the central direction on October 5-6. Bryansk and Vyazma fell. The second line near Mozhaisk delayed the German offensive for several days. On October 10, G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front. On October 19, a state of siege was introduced in the capital. In bloody battles, the Red Army managed to stop the enemy - the October stage of Hitler’s offensive on Moscow ended. The three-week respite was used by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense of the capital, mobilize the population into the militia, accumulate military equipment and, first of all, aviation. On November 6, a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Deputies was held, dedicated to the anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 7, a traditional parade of units of the Moscow garrison took place on Red Square. For the first time, other military units also took part in it, including militias who left straight from the parade to the front. These events contributed to the patriotic upsurge of the people and strengthened their faith in victory.

The second stage of the Nazis' offensive on Moscow began on November 15, 1941. At the cost of huge losses, they managed to reach the approaches to Moscow in late November - early December, enveloping it in a semicircle in the north in the Dmitrov area (Moscow-Volga canal), in the south - near Tula. At this point the German offensive fizzled out. The defensive battles of the Red Army, in which many soldiers and militias died, were accompanied by the accumulation of forces at the expense of Siberian divisions, aviation and other military equipment. On December 5-6, a counteroffensive of the Red Army began, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back 100-250 km from Moscow. Kalinin, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga, and other cities and towns were liberated. Hitler's plan for a lightning war was thwarted.

In the winter of 1942, units of the Red Army carried out an offensive on other fronts. However, breaking the blockade of Leningrad failed. In the south, the Kerch Peninsula and Feodosia were liberated from the Nazis. The victory near Moscow in conditions of the enemy’s military-technical superiority was the result of the heroic efforts of the Soviet people.

Summer-autumn campaign of 1942

The fascist leadership in the summer of 1942 relied on the seizure of the oil regions of southern Russia and the industrial Donbass. JV Stalin made a new strategic mistake in assessing the military situation, in determining the direction of the enemy’s main attack, and in underestimating his forces and reserves. In connection with this, his order for the Red Army to advance simultaneously on several fronts led to serious defeats near Kharkov and in the Crimea. Kerch and Sevastopol were lost. At the end of June 1942, a general German offensive unfolded. Fascist troops, during stubborn battles, reached Voronezh, the upper reaches of the Don and captured Donbass. Then they broke through our defenses between the Northern Donets and the Don. This made it possible for Hitler's command to solve the main strategic task of the summer campaign of 1942 and launch a broad offensive in two directions: to the Caucasus and to the east - to the Volga.

In the Caucasus direction at the end of July 1942, a strong enemy group crossed the Don. As a result, Rostov, Stavropol and Novorossiysk were captured. Stubborn fighting took place in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range, where specially trained enemy alpine riflemen operated in the mountains. Despite the successes achieved in the Caucasus, the fascist command was never able to resolve its main task- break through to Transcaucasia to seize the oil reserves of Baku. By the end of September, the offensive of fascist troops in the Caucasus was stopped.

An equally difficult situation for the Soviet command arose in the eastern direction. To cover it, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. In connection with the current critical situation, Order No. 227 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was issued, which stated: “To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time our Motherland.” At the end of July 1942, the enemy under the command of General von Paulus struck a powerful blow on the Stalingrad front. However, despite the significant superiority in forces, within a month the fascist troops managed to advance only 60-80 km and with great difficulty reached the distant defensive lines of Stalingrad. In August they reached the Volga and intensified their offensive.

From the first days of September began heroic defense Stalingrad, which lasted virtually until the end of 1942. Its significance during the Great Patriotic War is enormous. During the struggle for the city, Soviet troops under the command of generals V.I. Chuikov and M.S. Shumilov in September - November 1942 repelled up to 700 enemy attacks and passed all tests with honor. Thousands of Soviet patriots showed themselves heroically in the battles for the city. As a result, enemy troops suffered colossal losses in the battles for Stalingrad. Every month of the battle, about 250 thousand new Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, the bulk of military equipment, were sent here. By mid-November 1942, the Nazi troops, having lost more than 180 thousand people killed and 50 thousand wounded, were forced to stop the offensive.

During the summer-autumn campaign, the Nazis managed to occupy a huge part of the European part of the USSR, where about 15% of the population lived, 30% of gross output was produced, and more than 45% of the cultivated area was located. However it was Pyrrhic victory. The Red Army exhausted and bled the fascist hordes. The Germans lost up to 1 million soldiers and officers, more than 20 thousand guns, over 1,500 tanks. The enemy was stopped. The resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to create favorable conditions for their transition to a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad area.

Battle of Stalingrad

Even during the fierce battles, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to develop a plan for a grandiose offensive operation designed to encircle and defeat the main forces of the Nazi troops operating directly near Stalingrad. G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky made a great contribution to the preparation of this operation, called “Uranus”. To accomplish this task, three new fronts were created: Southwestern (N.F. Vatutin), Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (A.I. Eremenko). In total, the offensive group included more than 1 million people, 13 thousand guns and mortars, about 1000 tanks, and 1500 aircraft. November 19, 1942 The offensive of the Southwestern and Don Fronts began. A day later, the Stalingrad Front advanced. The offensive was unexpected for the Germans. It developed at lightning speed and successfully. November 23, 1942 A historic meeting and unification of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts took place. As a result, the German group at Stalingrad (330 thousand soldiers and officers under the command of General von Paulus) was surrounded.

Hitler's command could not come to terms with the current situation. They formed Army Group "Don" consisting of 30 divisions. It was supposed to strike at Stalingrad, break through the outer front of the encirclement and connect with the 6th Army of von Paulus. However, an attempt made in mid-December to carry out this task ended in a new major defeat for German and Italian forces. By the end of December, having defeated this group, Soviet troops reached the Kotelnikovo area and began an attack on Rostov. This made it possible to begin the final destruction of the encircled German troops. M January 10 to February 2, 1943. They were finally liquidated.

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad led to a widespread offensive by the Red Army on all fronts: in January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken; in February - the North Caucasus was liberated; in February - March - in the central (Moscow) direction the front line moved back by 130-160 km. As a result of the autumn-winter campaign of 1942/43, the military power of Nazi Germany was significantly undermined.

Battle of Kursk

In the central direction, after successful actions in the spring of 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge was formed on the front line. Hitler's command, wanting to regain the strategic initiative, developed Operation Citadel to break through and encircle the Red Army in the Kursk region. Unlike 1942, the Soviet command guessed the enemy's intentions and created a deeply echeloned defense in advance.

The Battle of Kursk is the largest battle of the Second World War. About 900 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks (including the latest models - Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand guns), more than 2 thousand aircraft took part in it from Germany; on the Soviet side - more than 1 million people, 3,400 tanks, and about 3 thousand aircraft. In the Battle of Kursk the commanders were: Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, Generals N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky. Strategic reserves were created under the command of General I. S. Konev, since the plan of the Soviet command provided for a transition from defense to further offensive. July 5, 1943 A massive offensive of German troops began. After tank battles unprecedented in world history (the battle of the village of Prokhorovka, etc.) on July 12, the enemy was stopped. The counter-offensive of the Red Army began.

As a result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk in August 1943, Soviet troops captured Orel and Belgorod. In honor of this victory, a salute of 12 artillery salvoes was fired in Moscow. Continuing the offensive, Soviet troops dealt a crushing blow to the Nazis during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. In September, Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated, in October the Dnieper was crossed, and in November Kyiv was liberated.

End of the war

In 1944-1945 The Soviet Union achieved economic, military-strategic and political superiority over the enemy. Work Soviet people steadily provided for the needs of the front. The strategic initiative completely passed to the Red Army. The level of planning and implementation of major military operations has increased.

In 1944, relying on the successes achieved earlier, the Red Army carried out a number of major operations that assured the liberation of the territory of our Motherland.

In January, the siege of Leningrad, which lasted 900 days, was finally lifted. The northwestern part of the USSR territory was liberated.

In January, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation was carried out, in the development of which Soviet troops liberated Right Bank Ukraine and the southern regions of the USSR (Crimea, Kherson, Odessa, etc.).

In the summer of 1944, the Red Army carried out one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War, Bagration. Belarus was completely liberated. This victory opened the way to advance into Poland, the Baltic states and East Prussia. In mid-August 1944, Soviet troops in the western direction reached the border with Germany.

At the end of August, the Iasi-Kishinev operation began, as a result of which Moldova was liberated. The opportunity was created for the withdrawal of Romania from the war.

These largest operations of 1944 were accompanied by the liberation of other territories of the Soviet Union - the Karelian Isthmus and the Arctic.

The victories of the Soviet troops in 1944 helped the peoples of Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascism. In these countries, pro-German regimes were overthrown, and patriotic forces came to power. Created back in 1943, on the territory of the USSR, the Polish Army acted on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. The process of restoring Polish statehood began.

The year 1944 was decisive in ensuring victory over fascism. On the Eastern Front, Germany lost a huge amount of military equipment, more than 1.5 million soldiers and officers, its military-economic potential was completely undermined.

MAIN BATTLES Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) Battle of the Dnieper - a series of interconnected strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, carried out in the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.

Battle of Stalingrad By mid-summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. The German command includes Stalingrad in the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea). Germany's goal was to take possession of an industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil necessary for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to implement this plan in just a week with the help of Paulus's 6th Field Army. It included 13 divisions, numbering about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. On the USSR side, German forces were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty was also that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered July 17, when, near the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German Army. Throughout the second half of the summer there were fierce battles near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aircraft began to systematically bomb the city. The battles on the ground also did not subside. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked both day and night. By mid-September german army broke through to the city center, fighting took place right in the streets. The Nazis intensified their attack. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, and German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingrad residents was unparalleled. The Germans conquered many European countries. Sometimes they only needed 2-3 weeks to capture the entire country. In Stalingrad the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

The beginning of autumn and mid-November passed in battles. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was too early to declare the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed at the height of the fighting, on September 12. The development of the offensive operation “Uranus” was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to gather the required number of troops.

Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and seven were defeated. During the week of November 23, Soviet efforts were aimed at strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to lift this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), but it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled group of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, Soviet troops moved on to destroy the enemy, which became the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy group was eliminated, which is considered the end date of the battle. 2

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in the Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad is difficult to overestimate. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. She intensified the fight against fascists in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis countries (Hitler's coalition). A crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries has arrived.

Kursk Bulge In the spring of 1943, relative calm established on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment using the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Much work has been done to strengthen Soviet army. Design bureaus improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing is after Stalingrad

Stalin and the Headquarters initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky were able to predict the place and time of the future Wehrmacht offensive. The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having gathered together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the bulge of the front line, which had formed in the Kursk region. With victory in this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2 thousand tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy’s attack with an offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, to meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them out and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank strike of the entire war on the Red Army formations. Methodically breaking down the defenses, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.

The Battle of Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, it was developed and approved in April 1943 military operation codenamed "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of fascist German troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

On July 12, 1943, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops consisting of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, on the positions of the 6th and 7th On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the guard armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (north) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results. Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River .

The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st Division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks waged active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" covering the left flank "expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile).

By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction.

On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy grouping (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender on in this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and the 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st SS Leibstandarte Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades. At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed. By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The Battle of the Dnieper by Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kyiv, as well as creating strong bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed the Wotan defense plan. It provided for the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the line Narva - Pskov - Gomel and further along the Dnieper.

This line was supposed, according to the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of defenders of the Dnieper part of the “Eastern Wall” in Ukraine were parts of Army Group “South” (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K.K. Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin), Steppe (General I.S. Konev), Southwestern (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General F.) acted against them. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the Battle of the Dnieper is shown in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Airplanes 2850 2000

The Battle of the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), units of the Red Army liberated Donbass and Left Bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The Battle of the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbass operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), who managed to break through the German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, responded to this success in a timely manner and, having regrouped his forces, threw the main attack units of the front into the breakthrough. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough to 100 km in width and 60 km in depth, forcing the Germans to begin withdrawing troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.

At the beginning of September, the Red Army’s offensive unfolded throughout Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began to withdraw its troops beyond the Dnieper. Pursuing the retreating troops, the advanced units of the Red Army approached the Dnieper on a 750-kilometer stretch from Loev to Zaporozhye and immediately began crossing this water barrier. By the end of September, in this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The German leadership's plans for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were thwarted. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was waged to expand and retain bridgeheads. At the same time, reserves were being pulled up, bridges were built, and forces were built up for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. At this stage, the Red Army carried out two strategic operations: the Lower Dnieper and Kyiv.

The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. During the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blocked the Crimean Peninsula and captured the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye (450 km in length and up to 100 km in depth). However, their attempts to break out from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by the fierce resistance of German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Lower Dnieper operation was distinguished by large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (approximately half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).

The Kiev operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with the battles north and south of Kyiv for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kyiv from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the advance of troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P. S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kyiv, which was liberated on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile units liberated Zhitomir on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in this area, Manstein failed to recapture Kyiv (see Kiev operation).

By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Wall in Ukraine had been broken through almost its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kyiv to Pripyat and from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give its troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces at the “winter line” under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealistic. The Battle of the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid crossing of such a wide water barrier with fierce resistance from large enemy forces. According to the German General von Buttlar, during this offensive “the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it has not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment.” The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall is evidenced by the fact that 2,438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of total number awarded this title for the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the fight on the bridgeheads exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable ones - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kyiv defensive operation), about 1.2 thousand aircraft (without the Kyiv defensive operation).

In the summer of 1942, Hitler planned to again seize the initiative on the Soviet-German front with the goal of destroying the vital sources of Soviet power, the most important military-economic centers. The strategic goals of the summer campaign of 1942 were the conquest of the fertile southern lands of Russia (bread), the acquisition of coal in the Donbass and the oil of the Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey from a neutral into an ally, and the blocking of the Iranian and Volga Lend-Lease routes. Initially, the invasion of the grandiose region between the Black and Caspian Seas was called "Siegfried", but as the plan was developed and detailed, it became known as "Blau" ("Blue").

To achieve these goals, it was planned to involve, in addition to the German armed forces, the armed forces of the Allies as much as possible.

The plan for the summer campaign of the German army on the Soviet-German front was set out in OKW Directive No. 41 of 04/05/1942. (Appendix 2.1)

The main task set by Hitler, while maintaining the position in the central sector, was to take Leningrad in the north and establish contacts on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus. This task was planned to be accomplished by dividing it into several stages, taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.

First of all, all available forces were concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, in order to then capture oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.

The capture of Leningrad was postponed until a change in the situation around the city or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose created the appropriate opportunities.

The primary task of the ground forces and aviation after the end of the thaw period was to stabilize and strengthen the entire Eastern Front and rear areas with the task of freeing up as many forces as possible for the main operation, while at the same time being able to repel the enemy’s attack with small forces on other fronts. For this purpose it was planned to carry out offensive operations limited scope, concentrating the offensive assets of ground forces and air forces to achieve rapid and decisive successes with superior forces.

Before the start of the main offensive in the south, it was planned to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol to clear the entire Crimea from Soviet troops, providing routes for the supply of allied troops, ammunition and fuel through the ports of Crimea. Block Soviet Navy in the ports of the Caucasus. Destroy the Barvenkovsky bridgehead of Soviet troops, wedged on both sides of Izyum.

The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, to the south of it, as well as to the west and north of the river. Don.

Due to the scale of the operation, the grouping of fascist German troops and their allies had to be built up gradually, and therefore, it was proposed to split the operation into a series of successive but interconnected strikes, complementary to each other and distributed in time from north to south in such a way , so that in each of these attacks, as many forces as possible of both the ground army and, especially, aviation, are concentrated in decisive directions.

Having assessed the resilience of the Soviet troops during battles in encirclement, Hitler proposed making deep breakthroughs of mechanized units in order to encircle and tightly block the Soviet troops with approaching infantry units. The plan also required that tank and motorized troops provide direct assistance to the German infantry by striking in the rear of the pincered enemy with the aim of completely destroying him.

The main operation was to begin with an enveloping offensive from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh towards the Moscow defense line. The purpose of this breakthrough was to capture the city of Voronezh, and to hide from the Soviet command the true direction of the main attack on the Caucasus (the distance from Voronezh to Moscow is 512 km, Saratov - 511 km, Stalingrad - 582 km, Krasnodar - 847 km).

At the second stage of the plan, part of the infantry divisions advancing behind the tank and motorized formations was supposed to immediately equip a powerful defensive line from the initial offensive area in the Orel area in the direction of Voronezh, and the mechanized formations were supposed to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the river. Don to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough approximately from the Kharkov area to the east. With this, the enemy hoped to encircle and defeat Soviet troops in the Voronezh direction, reach the Don in the section from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva (40 km south of Pavlovsk) to the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front and seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. Of the two groupings of tank and motorized forces intended for enveloping maneuver, the northern one should be stronger than the southern one.

At the third stage of this operation, the forces striking down the Don River were supposed to unite in the Stalingrad area with the forces advancing from the Taganrog, Artemovsk area between the lower reaches of the Don River and Voroshilovgrad through the Seversky Donets River to the east. The plan was to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to heavy weapons so that it would lose its importance as a center of military industry and a communications hub.

To continue the operations planned for the subsequent period, it was planned to either capture undamaged bridges in Rostov itself, or firmly capture bridgeheads south of the Don River.

Before the start of the offensive, the Taganrog group was planned to be reinforced with tanks and motorized units in order to prevent the majority of the Soviet troops defending north of the Don River from leaving the river to the south.

The directive required not only to protect the northeastern flank of the advancing troops, but also to immediately begin equipping positions on the Don River, creating a powerful anti-tank defense and preparing defensive positions for the winter and providing them with all the necessary means for this.

To occupy positions on the front being created along the Don River, which would increase as operations unfolded, it was planned to allocate allied formations in order to use the released German divisions as a mobile reserve behind the front line on the Don River.

The directive provided for the distribution of allied forces in such a way that the Hungarians would be located in the northernmost sectors, then the Italians, and the Romanians furthest to the southeast. Since the Hungarians and Romanians were bitterly hostile, the Italian army was stationed between them.

Hitler assumed that the Soviet troops would be encircled and destroyed north of the Don and, therefore, after overcoming the Don line, he demanded that the troops advance beyond the Don to the south as quickly as possible, since this was forced by the short duration of the favorable time of year. Thus, Hitler’s strategists were preparing to create a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops in a vast area that was extremely inconvenient for their defense. And then on the waterless, scorched by the southern sun, smooth as a table, steppe expanses would be dominated by enemy tank and aviation fists.

To carry out an offensive in the Caucasus, already on April 22, 1942, an order was issued from the head of the armament department of the ground army and the head of replenishment on the creation of a command of Army Group “A” with a combat readiness headquarters by 20.5.42. Field Marshal List was appointed commander of the army group. Lieutenant General von Greifenberg was appointed chief of staff of the army group, and colonel of the general staff von Gildenfeldt was appointed first officer of the general staff. During formation, for camouflage purposes, the headquarters is called “Anton Headquarters.”

Operation planning and preparatory work they are carried out by Army Group "South", the corresponding instructions and orders are transmitted to the future command of Army Group "A" during their development at the headquarters of Army Group "South".

On May 23, the working headquarters arrives in Poltava and, under the code name “Azov Coastal Headquarters,” is placed under the command of the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, whose headquarters had previously led military operations on the entire southern sector of the eastern front and was also located in Poltava.

On June 1, Hitler leaves for Poltava, accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel. The commander-in-chief of Army Group "South", the chief of staff of Army Group "South" and the army commanders takes part in the discussion of the situation at the front by the chief of the "Azov Coastal Headquarters". An order is issued about the tasks of the command during operations and preparation for them. Over time, the “Azov coastal headquarters” became involved in the affairs of the armies that later came under his command.

10.6.42 The operational department of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces issues an order on the command of Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol, according to which all ground forces operating in Crimea are commanded by the commander of 42AK, subordinate, after the transfer of command, to the “Coastal Headquarters Azov”. On July 11, an order was issued on the procedure for introducing troops arriving in the second place into battle for the 11th and 17th armies, and on July 5, the operational department of the General Staff reported on the procedure for transferring troops from Crimea to areas 17A and 1TA. First of all, the infantry of the 73rd and 125th Infantry should be transferred, secondly the infantry of the 9th Infantry, and thirdly the infantry of the security division. To guard the Crimea region, one German division each is left in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the third battalion of the 204th tank regiment 22 tank division, and a sufficient number of Romanian connections.

On July 5 at 14.45, the “Azov coastal headquarters” received by telephone the final order to assume command from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces. On July 7, the “Azov coastal headquarters” at 0.00 in encrypted form takes over command of 11A, 17A, with the Witersheim group (57TK), 1TA, Romanian formations, and the Italian 8th Army (upon its arrival in the unloading area) subordinate to it.

In total, by June 28, 1942, on the Soviet-German front, the enemy had 11 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups, which included 230 divisions and 16 brigades - 5,655 thousand people, more than 49 thousand guns and mortars, 3, 7 thousand tanks and assault guns. These forces were supported from the air by aviation from three air fleets, the Vostok aviation group, as well as aviation from Finland and Romania, which had about 3.2 thousand combat aircraft.

The largest grouping of Wehrmacht forces - Army Group South, which made up 37 percent of infantry and cavalry and 53 percent of tank and motorized formations, was deployed by the last ten days of June 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It consisted of 97 divisions, of which 76 were infantry, 10 tank, 8 motorized and 3 cavalry. (History of the Second World War vol. 5, p. 145)

As a result of the measures taken to strategically deploy troops for the summer offensive of 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the total number of armies in Army Group South increased to eight; In addition, the 3rd Romanian Army followed in marching order to Ukraine.

The enemy held the operational-strategic initiative in his hands. Under the circumstances, this was an extremely great advantage, providing the Nazi command with freedom to choose the direction of attack and the opportunity to create a decisive superiority of forces and means in this direction.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army recognized the possibility of a summer offensive by the German army in the south, but believed that the enemy, who held a large group of his troops in close proximity to Moscow, would most likely deliver the main blow not towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but to the flank of the central grouping of the Red Army with the goal of capturing Moscow and the central industrial region, therefore Headquarters continued to strengthen the central section of the front and strengthen the Bryansk Front, the bulk of whose troops were grouped on the right wing, covering the direction to Moscow through Tula.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief had no doubt that the main task of the Wehrmacht remained the same - the capture of Moscow. Taking this into account, the General Staff in July 1942 analyzed the general operational-strategic situation and events on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. It was necessary to decide which of the two directions - to the Caucasus or to Stalingrad - was the main one. The distribution of troops and materiel, the use of strategic reserves, forms of interaction between fronts, the nature of preparatory measures, and much more depended on this decision.

The General Staff took into account that the Caucasus direction was connected for the enemy with the need to overcome a powerful mountain barrier with a relatively poorly developed network of convenient roads. Breaking through our defenses in the mountains required large available forces, and in the future a significant replenishment of troops with people and equipment. The enemy's main strike weapon - numerous tanks - could only roam the fields of the Kuban, and in mountainous conditions they lost a significant share of their combat capabilities. The position of Hitler's troops in the Caucasus would be seriously complicated by the fact that their flank and rear, under favorable conditions, could be threatened by our Stalingrad front and troops concentrated in the area south of Voronezh.

In general, the General Staff considered it unlikely that Hitler’s troops would deploy their main operations in the Caucasus. According to General Staff estimates, the Stalingrad direction was more promising for the enemy. Here the terrain was conducive to the conduct of extensive combat operations by all types of troops, and up to the Volga there were no major water barriers, except the Don. With the enemy's access to the Volga, the position of the Soviet fronts would become very difficult, and the country would be cut off from sources of oil in the Caucasus. The lines through which the Allies supplied us through Iran would also be disrupted. (Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, Voenizdat 1981, vol. 1, p. 87)

Taking this into account, the bulk of the strategic reserves were located in the western and also in the southwestern direction, which subsequently allowed the Headquarters to use them where the Nazi command delivered the main blow. Hitler's intelligence was unable to reveal either the number of reserves of the Soviet Supreme High Command or their location.

Due to an underestimation of the southern direction, Headquarters reserves were not stationed there - the main means of influencing strategic leadership on the course of important operations. Options for action by Soviet troops in case of a sudden change in the situation were not worked out. In turn, underestimating the role of the southern direction led to tolerance for the mistakes of the command of the Southwestern and partly the Southern fronts.

As a result of the unsuccessful actions of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts during the May offensive in the Kharkov direction, the situation and balance of forces in the south changed sharply in favor of the enemy. Having eliminated the Barvenkovsky ledge, German troops significantly improved their operational position and took advantageous starting positions for a further offensive in the eastern direction. (diagram of Operation Wilhelm and Frederick 1)

Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, gained a foothold by mid-June at the line of Belgorod, Kupyansk, Krasny Liman and put themselves in order. Having gone on the defensive, they did not have time to properly gain a foothold on new lines. The reserves available in the southwestern direction were used up.

Hitler's inner circle, including leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not help but draw certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" war that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the Battle of Moscow cost the Nazis particularly large losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that Nazi Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of its army decreased. A certificate from the OKW operational leadership headquarters dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the inability to fully ensure their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. P. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.

For all their arrogance, Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, while continuing to remain confident in the superiority of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

What goals did the Nazis set for themselves in 1942, or more precisely, in the spring and summer of this year, when they planned to launch a new offensive? Despite all the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took direct part in it.

Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel General Walter Warlimont, former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to disaster on the Volga. In his book “At the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, writes: “Even during the period of greatest tension in the struggle to repel the offensive of Soviet troops, the confidence of the German armed forces did not weaken for a minute that in the East they would again be able to seize the initiative, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. It is necessary to reach the oil fields, as well as Iran and Iraq... Of course, in addition, he will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad" ( Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942 the plan for the summer campaign in general outline was ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “For the spring and summer, the Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan. Its goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow... An offensive with the delivery of destructive strikes in certain areas" ( Ibid. S. 241.).

It is noteworthy that Warlimont’s statements in both cases include the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the plan of the campaign, it was initially planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available capabilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to significantly change their outlines. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. P. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the scope of the real strategy. But there was more likely something else going on here. Hitler's policy, adventurous in its essence, could not be built on the basis of deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all, on the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult for Hitler's generals. Warlimont writes the following on this matter: “Halder... for a long time studied the question of whether we in the East should finally go on the defensive, since a repeated offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a break and the American threat increases, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and will never be able to regain it into our own hands. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).

So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began fighting on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubt that a second front would not be opened at least in 1942. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR for some people looked completely different than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity on this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command was faced with the question of what form to continue the war in: offensive or defensive. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of our chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. The year was 1942 last year, in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in the offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a front 3 thousand kilometers long to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that along most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. P. 126.).

The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to General Halder, were foreseen in the winter of 1941/42. “At that time, the strategic plan was to stabilize the front for the winter and prepare an offensive in the summer of 1942 with the goal of capturing the Caucasus and cutting off the Russians from oil and disrupt their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941 spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an “offensive operation against the Caucasus” ( Right there.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler prohibited the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at any cost to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among Hitler's generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed an offensive on the northern section of the Soviet-German front with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also favored resuming the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended launching the main attack on Moscow with the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to capture the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, the operation to capture Leningrad was planned to be postponed until the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat the Soviet troops here in successive operations piecemeal. Thus, although Hitler’s strategists first began to show hesitation when planning the 1942 campaign, nevertheless, as before, the highest military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a common point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for deploying troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.

Warlimont paints a picture of the meeting this way: “No one raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who had previously repeatedly spoken out both against the strange echelon introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).

Colonel General Jodl from the OKB, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler’s operational plans, a few weeks after the mentioned meeting, told his loyal General Staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Scherff, whom Hitler appointed commissioner for writing military history that Operation Siegfried ( After the winter defeat of 1941/42, Hitler became wary of assigning big names to plans for military operations and crossed out the original code name “Siegfried” on April 5. On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was replaced by "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name might become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of strength of Army Group Center and Army Group North, there would be great risk if the Russians launched a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side would have enough strength and courage for this; they believed that with the start of the German offensive on the southern sector of the front, the Russians would automatically begin transferring troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).

Jodl instructed his deputy and the responsible officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to formalize the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler, in the form of an OKB directive. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to the formulation of “tasks”, without binding the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the “project” on April 4 by General Jodl, stated that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his “historiographer” wrote: “The Fuhrer significantly revised draft Directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself... First of all, he restated that part of the draft that talks about the main operation.” The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and lengthiness, a confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, unclear formulations of the most significant issues and a thorough explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).

It is not difficult to notice that former Hitler generals are in every possible way dissociating themselves from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they were for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the quotes provided. The Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals to counter Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility before the “Führer,” which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden dissatisfaction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Halder, did not change anything. His supposedly inherent independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to claim that at that time they were offered to send the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, was supposed to be of auxiliary importance in securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is not difficult to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler’s plan. It is not for nothing that in his diary, regarding the meeting at Wehrmacht headquarters on March 28, 1942, Halder writes the following meaningful phrase: “The outcome of the war is being decided in the East” ( Galder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. T. 3, book. 2. P. 220.).

All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by German generals who stood for the continuation of an aggressive and adventurist war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and clarified this plan and made the final decision regarding the choice of direction of offensive operations. Most of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis even after the defeat of Germany in the Second World War. Thus, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward his own plan for continuing the war in relation to the situation in 1942.

“Without going into speculation,” he writes, “it would obviously be appropriate here to talk about the prospects that could still bring about a generous reconciliation with France. These prospects must have acquired special significance if we take into account that Germany was now dealing with two major naval powers. If a destructive strike were delivered against sea communications and the enemy fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using large number submarines and all suitable aviation formations, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's assessments - to at least greatly delay the landing of the Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy to achieve superiority in air over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on allied imports by sea, obviously long time would be deprived as a result of the transfer of the main efforts to the maritime and air war in the Atlantic there are opportunities to conduct large-scale operations, especially if it were possible to attract the Japanese to jointly wage war, at least at sea" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that combat power The Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined by supplies from the Western allies. In addition, the switch of funds to create a more powerful submarine fleet of Nazi Germany inevitably had to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the Allied actions in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, the “magnanimous reconciliation” with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly identified the main theater of war than he did. But they also did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe awaiting them.

The plan of the Wehrmacht command for 1942 was most fully set out in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: persistent attempts to implement it determined the enemy’s actions on the Soviet-German front until the late autumn and early winter of 1942.

Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that, while preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy did not at all abandon the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. In general form, this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to completely destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. pp. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same thing on April 3, 1942 in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he said, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deep as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and English help will be ineffective, since new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of contact with outside world. They lost their best soldiers and equipment, and now they are just improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 34.).

It should be noted that some authors in Germany are trying to retroactively narrow the objectives of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. Thus, the former Nazi general Mellenthin writes: “In the summer offensive of 1942, our armies in the south had as their task the defeat of the troops of Marshal Timoshenko and the liquidation of the enemy in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent attack on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943" ( Mellentin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. P. 142.).

The absurdity of such statements is refuted by Hitler’s generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “When planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended first of all to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions would, of course, be of great importance if the German army were able to cross the Volga in the area of ​​​​Stalingrad and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if Caucasian oil were used to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would greatly increase. This was Hitler's line of thinking. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or another route" ( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. P. 153.).

An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with an unfounded narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clearly evident from its text, the Wehrmacht troops, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections.” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of certain representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the Battle of the Volga. At the same time, we must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.

The final military-political goals of the aggressive war of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable to even the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to a certain inconsistency in the document under consideration and the vagueness of the statement in it of the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In general form (without specifying a time frame), it sets out the intentions to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to support the northeastern flank of the strike group of German troops, should be equipped “taking into account their possible use in winter conditions.” The capture of the Lower Volga and Caucasus region, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful group of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to turn large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for carrying out this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 41.).

Thus, the main objective The enemy's offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the “blitzkrieg” strategy. This is why Directive No. 41 does not establish chronological framework completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, and take possession of the southern regions of the USSR, rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasus directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task on the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful implementation “in the first place” of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. This strategic plan of the enemy very much reflected the urgent need of Nazi Germany for fuel.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler said that if he did not receive the oil of Maykop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See Paulus' testimony to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg Trials, M., 1954. T. 1. P. 378; see also: Military history. magazine 1960. No. 2. P. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a subtle calculation that was closer to its goal than is generally believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart B. G. Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).

The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.

Enemy troops in the central sector of the front were deeply wedged into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, Hitler’s troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern group of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less strength here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don region, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. It was also of certain importance that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to those indicated above, other important goals: according to the enemy’s plans, this would bring Nazi troops to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers on armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of connections with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Finally, the Nazis hoped that if the planned offensive was successfully carried out, they would open their way to the Middle East.

In preparation for the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In the search for the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, on Hitler’s instructions, visited the capitals of Germany’s European allies, who were supposed to allocate “all available forces” for the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to obtain a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N.I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. P. 347.). "Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limiting himself only to the demand that the contingents of the Allied troops be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, although in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany but were at enmity with each other, must be separated from each other at a considerable distance, introducing in between there are Italian formations. All these troops were entrusted with defensive tasks, for the fulfillment of which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).

Among the activities of the Nazi command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the plan for the fictitious operation “Kremlin” occupied not the least place. Its goal is to disinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the summer campaign of 1942.

Operation Kremlin was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of Army Group Center. In the “Order for the Attack on Moscow,” signed on May 29 by Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Kluge and Chief of Staff General Wöhler, the troops of Army Group Center were tasked with: “Defeat enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, firmly seize the territory around Moscow, encircling the city, and thereby depriving the enemy of the opportunity to operationally use this area" ( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. P. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations (“Kremlin” and “Blau”) coincided in time.

The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan for Operation Kremlin became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick was a success for the enemy.

By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan for the next stage of the war. It became obvious that it was impossible to continue the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was allowed to perform the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was confirmed in this position.), wrote in his memoirs that the winter offensive in April 1942 stalled due to the lack of the necessary forces and means to continue it. The front troops received orders to go on the defensive.

From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active action. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to recapture the strategic initiative. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.

In what direction will the enemy's new major offensive begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to define as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to take place. At the same time, we all understood perfectly well that the results of the summer campaign of 1942 would largely depend further development the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole" ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. P. 203.).

Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. P. 112.).

On March 23, state security agencies reported the same to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. This way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( Right there.).

However, the intelligence data was not fully taken into account. Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest group of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I well know, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. P. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed.. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. P. 64.). It later became clear that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be the active strategic defense of Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary material resources, followed by a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in mid-March in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After this, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly believed that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not conduct offensive actions on a large scale. Stalin, who had little understanding of the art of war, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of the summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma group, which held an extensive bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( Right there. P. 65.).

At the end of March, Headquarters again discussed the issue of the strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan presented by the command of the South-Western direction for conducting a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of directions: in some - in order to improve the operational situation, in others - for forestalling the enemy in launching offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to conduct private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lgov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.”

How to evaluate the fact that such an authoritative military figure as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country’s highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on an issue on the correct solution of which so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many, not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the last war, can rightly blame its leadership for failing to prove to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the negative consequences of the decision to defend itself and attack at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, conducting private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of effort. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed firsthand that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, a refusal to carry out offensive operations, such as Kharkov, would have saved the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would have allowed We need to switch to active offensive actions much earlier and once again take the initiative into our own hands.

Miscalculations made by the Headquarters and the General Staff when planning military operations for the summer of 1942 were taken into account later, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of the military operations on the Kursk Bulge" ( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of the historical battle // Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. P. 75.).

Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted the study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it requires further in-depth research. It should also be taken into account general position that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. P. 207.).

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the country's rear, which supported its struggle, had forces and means, if not sufficient in all respects, then in the main to prevent a new deep penetration of Hitler's troops into vital areas of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people became more confident in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the surprise factor, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all areas of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war acquired an increasingly prominent role. Its first year was a serious exam for the entire command and political staff, the majority of whom acquired both hardening and the skill that is given only by practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved and the abilities and talents of those who led the military operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral power of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which in difficult conditions thwarted the plan for a “blitzkrieg” war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm of their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most appropriate use of available forces and means acquired special importance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue an aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the peculiarities of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against Nazi Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of the armed struggle depended on making the right strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-Soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that depending on the development of events at the front they could be used both in the southwestern and western directions ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. P. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.

Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad and the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was determined by the desire to bring the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil as close as possible. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this and the decision taken by Headquarters was erroneous.

The ability to solve practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Supreme Command Headquarters gradually, as experience in warfare accumulated.