Khalkhin Gol: a forgotten war. July fights

Colonel Konstantin Vladimirovich Yakovlev and I flew from Moscow to Mongolia, and to the sound of the Tu-153 turbines, he recalled Bain-Tsagan, the crossing that made it possible to bring our units to this shore.

The wooden bridge, he said, had to be built in one night on May 28. We reached the river after a long march. They quickly organized the delivery of logs and telegraph poles from the warehouse in Tamtsak-Bulak and began preparing the bridge. Assembly began already at dusk. Many had to go deep into the water, and from the strong cooling they shivered, the current knocked them off their feet...

The colonel would fall silent, wait for us to write down what he was saying, then continue.

By dawn the bridge was ready. And suddenly the rumble of planes was heard. Enemy bombers were flying from the east. The first group turned towards our bridge, and the growing whistle of bombs and explosions were heard. At the same time, machine gun fire was heard from the dunes.

We rushed to cross. It was more difficult to do this along the bridge - it was taken at gunpoint by the enemy. Most had to swim or wade across. On the shore they quickly turned to battle. And they immediately met with enemy infantry. Hand-to-hand fighting began. We defended our bridge with difficulty. I must say that we were unexpectedly lucky - a group of Mongolian soldiers with a machine gun joined us. They turned out to be among the border guards retreating in battle.

A fierce battle raged all night - bullets whistled, grenades exploded, flares flashed.

Yes, yes,” the Mongolian veteran of the battles at Bain-Tsagan S. Tugszhargal confirmed a few days later, “those machine gunners helped us a lot then... The day before, the Japanese set the steppe on fire. The soldiers fought the fire all night. The heat and unbearable stuffiness, bombings and continuous attacks by the Japanese completely exhausted us. The sand dunes on both sides of the river were covered with the corpses of the dead. This is where the machine guns supported us. Their fire, like a scythe, felled the first ranks of the enemy marching at full speed into the last, as he assumed - it really turned out to be the last for many Japanese - attack of the enemy. Taking advantage of his confusion, we stood up and rushed forward. As a result, we took more comfortable positions behind the crest of the hills.

After that,” he continues, “the enemy was no longer able to knock us out, although he launched several desperate attacks. Having let the Japanese get closer, we threw grenades at them, and machine gunners from the flanks mowed down the advancing chains with fire. Who were they, these machine gunners? From which part? So it remained unknown. Are they alive? Did they die? I don’t know... We wouldn’t have survived without them then...

The battle at Bayin-Tsagan continued. And the commander of the group, corps commander Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, made an unheard-of decision for that time - to transfer motorized mechanized and tank units hundreds of kilometers into the battle area and send them to attack without infantry.

And then something incredible, unprecedented happened. The tank brigade under the command of Mikhail Pavlovich Yakovlev and the motorized rifle regiment of Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky, after a multi-day march, immediately rush to the attack. A fierce battle broke out in the Bayin Tsagan area. Tanks went against tanks. There were up to four hundred of them on both sides. Up to three hundred guns and several hundred aircraft took part in the battle. Cannonade could be heard hundreds of kilometers away. At night there was a huge glow over the steppe...

Unable to withstand the onslaught of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, the enemy retreated in disarray. Enemy soldiers and officers threw themselves straight into the Khalkhin Gol River. Many drowned immediately. “There was terrible confusion,” one Japanese officer later wrote in his diary. “The horses ran away, dragging the limbs of the guns behind them, the vehicles rushed in different directions. The entire personnel lost heart.”

Thus, the Japanese strike force, pressed against the river, was completely defeated on July 3-5. The enemy lost almost all the tanks, a significant part of the artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand people. On July 8, the Japanese, having regrouped their forces, repeated the attack, but this time, after a four-day bloody battle, having lost more than 5 thousand killed and wounded, they were forced to retreat.

The defeat of the Japanese troops made a depressing impression in the empire. Here is a short entry from the diary of a Japanese politician of that time, an adviser to Emperor Kido: “The army is in confusion, everything is lost.”

It's quiet at the heights of Bayin Tsagan today. The last time we were there with Galina Mikhailovna Alyunina, the daughter of brigade commander Yakovlev, Hero of the Soviet Union, who died a heroic death.

We remember our father as kind and brave,” she said at the monument to the Yakovlev heroes. “He was a career military man, but he always seemed so peaceful and calm to us...

Brigade commander Mikhail Pavlovich Yakovlev was 36 years old during the battles on Bain-Tsagan. Yakovlev joined the party in 1924, in Soviet Army- seventeen years old. The 11th Tank Brigade was named after M.P. Yakovlev. He is forever included in the list of honorary Red Army soldiers of the brigade.

The commanders and cyrics of the Mongol army acted skillfully. The artillerymen helped Soviet soldiers destroy the enemy with well-aimed fire. The fame of the Heroes of the MPR, cavalryman Londongiin Dandara, political instructor Luvsandorzhiin Gelegbator, regiment commander Choin Dugarzhava, armored car driver Darzhagiin Hayankhyarve and many others spread far and wide.

I can’t help but mention something that is known throughout the republic legendary hero Khalkhin-Gola Tsendiine Olzvoe. Today you will definitely see his portrait in every room of Sukhbaatar - this is what the red corner is called in Mongolian military units. One of the first Olzvoy was awarded the title of Hero of the MPR.

There is a concrete hedgehog standing near Bain-Tsagan - it was erected by Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League members. The enemy has reached this point. They didn't let him through any further. There is also a tank from those times. Perhaps Konstantin Simonov, who worked for the front-line publication “Heroic Red Army,” wrote about him in those years:

If they told me to erect a monument to all those who died here in the desert, I would put a tank with empty eye sockets on a granite hewn wall.

The Yakovlev tank crews showed miracles of heroism. Here are some reports from the battlefield. The crew of Lieutenant A. A. Martynov destroyed five enemy guns. Major G.M. Mikhailov, at the head of a tank battalion, broke deep into the rear of the Japanese and, even wounded, led the unit until the task was completed. The tank crew of political instructor D.P. Viktorov performed an immortal feat; the brave tank crews knocked out ten enemy guns; even when the Japanese who came close set the tank on fire, the Soviet soldiers continued to fight until their last breath.

Mongolia does not forget the height of Bayin-Tsagan and its heroes. People from all aimags of the republic come here to the monuments. Revolutionary Youth League members and pioneers are walking through places of military glory. The poplar trees planted by their hands rustle with the young leaves of the poplar trees near the monument. The steppe wind is humming near the Stele of Glory.

The last time in the fall I wandered for a long time along a steppe river. There are fewer mosquitoes. Khalkhin Gol became shallow, it was possible to freely wade from one bank to the other. Large fish flashed like lightning in its bright water. Here, I knew, there were taimen.

While wading to the eastern bank of the river, I clearly imagined how Olzvoy and his fearless friends did in 1939, when he was tasked with bringing the “tongue”.

Where, crawling, where, bending down in the darkness, brave souls crossed the front line. We reached the enemy battery, which was spotted during the day. There was a sentry with a rifle near the guns, and the silhouettes of tents were gray in the distance. Confident armed men walked around.

We decided to start with the sentry. And the area, like everywhere else beyond Khalkhin Gol, is completely open, only in complete darkness can you get close to something or someone unnoticed.

But the Japanese seemed to want to be captured, approached the Mongolian scouts and for some reason lowered his rifle to the ground. He was immediately twisted on his arms and legs. There is a “language”, but it would be nice to get some binoculars. And Olzvoy makes a desperate decision - he puts on a Japanese helmet, takes his rifle and becomes a “sentinel” to the enemy guns... Tirelessly watching the tents, he takes a cigarette from his pocket and lights it. Having finished smoking, he silently approaches the first tent. Everybody sleeps. I went to the next one. There were no binoculars. From the third one could be heard talking - they were not sleeping there, but through the door one could clearly see an officer's tablet hanging and a leather case in which, of course, there should be binoculars.

Olzvoy again “took up his post” at the battery. And when everything became quiet around him, he entered the tent, took the tablet, took the binoculars out of the case, and poured dung into it.

Silently and unnoticed, the group of scouts returned to their location.

In the morning, the regiment commander expressed gratitude to them.

How come the Japanese will now shoot at us without binoculars, but they won’t see whether they hit or missed the target? Eh, Olzvoy?

“Nothing, comrade commander,” the scout answered to thunderous laughter, “I left a replacement for them, they’ll get by...

Real legends are told about Olzvoy. I heard that, returning from reconnaissance, together with his faithful friend, he encountered the Japanese driving in two cars. And so the two of them, having accepted an unequal battle, destroyed many enemy soldiers and took the rest prisoner. The next time Olzvoy held the height, which was stormed by an entire company of enemy soldiers.

Perhaps some things were exaggerated, but there is no doubt that Olzvoy was an outstanding intelligence officer. A monument to him was erected in the homeland of Tsendiin Olzvoy in the Kobdo aimak.

Soviet and Mongolian pilots showed high skill and dedication during the Baintsagan battles. In battles with the Japanese invaders, Witt Fedorovich Skobarikhin and Alexander Fedorovich Moshin successfully used an air ram. And Mikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin directed the burning plane towards enemy ground targets. Yuyukin's navigator was Nikolai Frantsevich Gastello. By order of the commander, he then jumped out of the burning plane with a parachute, as if in order to accomplish his immortal feat in 1941.

Already after the Great Patriotic War, talking with the famous marshal and four times Hero of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, K.M. Simonov noted that he had not seen air battles like the Khalkhingol one. Georgy Konstantinovich replied: “Do you think I saw it?”

It was at Khalkhin Gol that Sergei Gritsevets, Yakov Smushkevich and Grigory Kravchenko became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union. Sergei Ivanovich Gritsevets, while pursuing enemy planes, saw that the plane of his commander, pilot V.M. Zabaluev, was shot down and the commander was descending by parachute. Gritsevets landed on enemy territory, took Zabaluev into his single-seat fighter and flew to his airfield. Sergei Ivanovich fought in Spain. In total, they shot down 40 enemy aircraft. Kravchenko personally shot down five planes. Under his leadership, 18 enemy aircraft were destroyed. In one of the battles, Kravchenko was forced to land far from the airfield and only three days later he reached his own people.

For successful battles against the Japanese invaders in China, he was first awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He died in 1943, being the commander of the air forces of the 3rd Army. He was buried near the Kremlin wall. Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich also fought in Spain. The air forces of the Khalkingol group under his command ensured air supremacy during the offensive.

The first major air battle occurred on June 22. Almost a hundred Soviet fighters fought with 120 Japanese planes. The second major battle began on June 24, and again the Soviet pilots won. Then the battles in the sky continued constantly. From June 22 to June 26 alone, the Japanese lost 64 aircraft.

There wasn’t a day, said Khalkhin Gol veteran, now General Ivan Alekseevich Lakeev, without Japanese planes hovering over our positions. The commander kept saying: “Lead the battle.” How to lead? Radio was just coming into existence at that time. “Think, think,” the commander repeated. We came up with it. They drew a large circle on the ground, and on it a turning arrow. An arrow points where the enemy plane will appear from. The weather in Mongolia is most often clear, and pilots could clearly see our sign from the sky. Georgy Konstantinovich praised: “Well done.”

Generals Kravchenko Grigory Panteleevich and Lakeev Ivan Alekseevich, recalled in a conversation with me the cosmonaut pilot, head of the Cosmonaut Training Center, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, who flew 185 combat missions, Lieutenant General Georgy Timofeevich Beregovoi, taught us, young pilots, to fight German aces, using the lessons of Khalkhin Gol. I’ll say that science was very substantive. She helped us a lot. And I am still grateful to them for it...

“During July and August,” recalls Hero of the Soviet Union E.N. Stepanov, “major air battles continued. Soviet pilots firmly held the airspace above our ground forces, preventing Japanese bomber aircraft from bombing the positions of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. In turn, Japanese fighters tried unsuccessfully to keep their bombers operating. This led to heated air battles involving large air forces. For example, on September 15, 1939, on the last day of the war, there was an air battle in which 392 aircraft of both sides took part. The enemy showed exceptional resistance and perseverance, but Soviet aviation confidently walked towards victory in the skies of Mongolia.

From May 22 to August 19, Soviet pilots destroyed 355 enemy aircraft, of which 320 were shot down in air battles. In subsequent battles before the end of hostilities, the enemy lost another 290 aircraft, of which 270 were in air battles.

Japanese aviation, during its adventuristic invasion of the Mongolian People's Republic, suffered a severe defeat, losing 660 combat aircraft from the actions of Soviet aviation. During the difficult trials of 1939, Soviet pilots showed their boundless devotion to the cause of socialism and the ideas of proletarian internationalism, and showed inexhaustible courage in the fight against the enemy."

I first met Anton Dmitrievich Yakimenko, Lieutenant General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union, at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in Ulaanbaatar. He told reporters about his participation in the Khalkhingol battles.

On May 11, 1939, our fighter aviation regiment, which was located on the territory of the Soviet Union in Transbaikalia, was alerted. The event, generally speaking, is not new; our commander announced training alarms often, day and night. This time the alarm sounded at dawn. They immediately gathered, put the planes on alert, and checked their weapons. We sit and wait for further orders. Will there be a shutdown or not? And then two green rockets soared into the air. This is the order to take off!

I see well - we are flying south. We cross the Onon River and approach the Mongolian border. Border is a special concept for each of us, because we were brought up with respect for the inviolability of borders. Do I really think the commander made a mistake and is leading us to foreign territory? And he shook his wing - this is a conditional signal: “pull yourself up.” We pulled ourselves up, and he, as if saying goodbye to Soviet land and welcoming Mongolian land, made a beautiful aerial figure. We repeated... Soon we landed near the city of Choibalsan, then it was called Bayan-Tumen. We gathered in the dugout.

This is how the fighting began for us. The next day we moved to the Khalkhin Gol area, and our unit flew out for reconnaissance.

Of course, each of us wanted to see the enemy. Previously, we only took part in training battles. And so the three of us return from reconnaissance, walk over the lake, and I see: seventeen Japanese fighters are flying towards us. It’s as if I’ve photographed them with my eyes and I’m thinking, are we really going to miss them? And we were warned: when you return from reconnaissance, do not engage in battle. We need to bring aerial photography data. It is very important. But the enemy is before us. I jumped forward, the guys followed me, and we attacked this group. Our appearance was so unexpected for the Japanese that even after one of the enemy planes fell into the water, none of them noticed our attack in time. We realized it, but it was too late; we had already turned around and were leaving for our airfield.

This was our first fight. And I want to talk about a particularly memorable day - June 22, 1939. Such a coincidence with the first day of the Great Patriotic War... At dawn we were sitting on planes. At the signal from the rocket, our flight takes off, and I see an enemy reconnaissance plane over the airfield. Having gained altitude, we followed him. The plane was shot down, and almost immediately we saw a large group of enemy combat vehicles to the side.

The battle lasted a long time, 3 hours 30 minutes. As a result, 43 aircraft fell to the ground, 31 of them Japanese. As I see this battle now: bombers are coming, accompanied by a large group of fighters. Covered from above, below, from the sides - there is no way to break through. But the main target for fighters is a bomber with a combat payload. I'm trying to approach from the side, but it's impossible from above. I shoot down one fighter, then another. My fuel runs out, I land at the airfield and refuel. He got up and went on the attack again. By the end of the battle, the Japanese could not stand it and took to their heels.

From this air battle we drew a very important conclusion: the enemy is trying to take us by surprise at the airfields, when the planes are still on the ground, and launch an air strike to destroy the aircraft and flight personnel. However, the vigilance of the flight personnel and our observation posts thwarted this Japanese plan. And the air battles continued. They ended, as is known, with the defeat of enemy aircraft.

Shortly after this air battle, Marshal Khorlogin Choibalsan came to us. He talked with the pilots and was interested in Japanese tactics. The conversation was friendly and sincere.

When leaving, the marshal said that we were protecting the skies of Mongolia, and advised us to take care of the planes and, most importantly, take care of people, remember that we were dealing with a very cunning, treacherous enemy.

Our squadron emerged from the tests with honor. Five pilots - Chistyakov, Skobarikhin, Trubachenko, Grinev and me - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We fought well. They knew how to help each other, they knew their capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy.

At this meeting, I read poems by Mongolian poets about Khalkhin Gol. They have some special charm.

Above the sphinxes and pyramids, Obelisks rose into the sky, Clouds float silently, The forest quietly rustles with leaves, And the river absorbs Obelisks and clouds And shakes their reflections... In the boundless expanse of the steppe The border strip lies across the rivers and forests - Obelisks stand on guard! People, remember those soldiers!

This is what the famous Mongolian poet Sharavyn Surenzhav wrote about Khalkhin Gol.

So, at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese adventure was defeated. Widely advertised in advance to our own and Nazi correspondents, who, by the way, also arrived in Hailar, where the headquarters of the strike force of the Kwantung Army was located, the offensive completely floundered. Soon it became known that a new enemy offensive was being prepared. G.K. Zhukov the day before gave the order to withdraw from the first line of trenches. And at dawn the Japanese launched artillery bombardment into an empty area. And when we went on the attack, we met such resistance that we immediately rolled back with heavy losses. Zhukov’s former adjutant Mikhail Fedorovich Vorotnikov spoke about this in detail.

At the same time, a plan was actually developed to encircle and completely defeat the Japanese group.

“The commander attached great importance to the enemy’s misinformation,” recalled M.F. Vorotnikov. The Japanese were under the impression that our troops were preparing to spend the winter at Khalkhin Gol. Every day there were requests by telegraph for wire and stakes for winter fortifications; the airwaves were filled with negotiations about the preparation of sleigh trains and winter uniforms. These negotiations were conducted to create the illusion of reality, in a code that the Japanese knew for sure. They started putting up wire fences. Meanwhile, huge quantities of ammunition, equipment, fuel, and food were delivered to the front line.

The commanders of Soviet units showed up at the front line only in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers, tank crews - in combined arms uniform. Intensified reconnaissance of enemy positions was carried out. Only a narrow circle of people knew about the upcoming offensive...

And again I remember the meeting, the participants of which we were in the large hall of the Government Palace in Ulaanbaatar, where, on behalf of the veterans of Khalkhin Gol, a participant in the battles, the former commander of the cavalry division D. Nantaysuren, addressed the youth with instructions. He also talked about his life.

“I am a participant in two wars with Japanese militarists,” said Nyantaysuren. “In 1939, I, a young commander of a cavalry division, I had just graduated from the Tambov Cavalry School, had to fight with the Japanese aggressors who had invaded the territory of the MPR in the Khalkhin-Gol region, and a few years later to smash them on Chinese territory during the liberation campaign of the Soviet-Mongolian troops in 1945.

To this day, every episode of our joint military operations with our Soviet friends is stored in my memory; I am excited by the joy of the victory.

At the end of July, the cavalry division was transferred to the operational subordination of the first army group, commanded by corps commander G.K. Zhukov. At the headquarters of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, an operation was being prepared to encircle and destroy the Japanese troops that had invaded the Mongolia.

According to G.K. Zhukov’s plan, it was envisaged, having pinned down the enemy with actions from the front, to deliver powerful attacks on both flanks of the enemy group, encircle it and destroy it between Khalkhin Gol and the state border of the Mongolian People’s Republic. In accordance with this plan, three groups were created - southern, central and northern. The core of the central one was infantry and artillery, the flanks were tanks, armored vehicles, motorized infantry and Mongolian cavalry. Our cavalry division was part of the southern group.

On the morning of August 20, after powerful air and artillery preparation, the Soviet-Mongolian troops went on the offensive. Having broken through the enemy’s defensive positions, our division, together with other Soviet and Mongolian formations, Soviet tank units and artillery units, inflicting decisive powerful blows to the enemy, repeatedly repulsing his counter attacks and rapidly developing the offensive, reached the state border. This happened on the night of August 26th.

At the same time, the southern group of Soviet-Mongolian troops, breaking the furious resistance of the enemy and compressing the encirclement, completely blocked the Japanese. Enemy soldiers, finding themselves under heavy fire, tried to counterattack, and when they realized the hopelessness of the situation, they began to surrender. But they were taught not to give up under any circumstances. So, it's done.

http://www.usovski.ru/
12/23/2007

The Battle of Bayin-Tsagan is the last nail in the coffin of the military doctrine of Trotsky-Tukhachevsky

Part 1

The military conflict of the summer of 1939 between the MPR and Manchukuo, in which the USSR and the Empire of Japan acted as allies of the warring parties, brought the Soviet Union, except purely military victory, and also significant political preferences - in the summer of 1941, the Japanese army, having received a cruel lesson from Nomonhan, was forced to cede the palm to the fleet in solving strategic problems, forget about plans for a war with the USSR and agree with the southern direction of future Japanese aggression. This is all true. But there was one page left in the history of this incident, which Soviet (and Russian) historians tried to scroll through without delving into details - and this page is dedicated to the three-day battles for Mount Bain-Tsagan, battles that, although formally ended in our victory, but at the same time a time that completely crossed out all the fundamental postulates of tactics and strategy on which the Red Army was created and developed.

We will carefully study this page - in order to understand why an armored armada numbering almost half a thousand armored units, which, according to Soviet strategists, should crush enemy corps and armies, could not cope with a single enemy division, and, not only that, it could not cope - was half destroyed by this division.

Why, from the hot Mongolian steppes of July 1939, let us return twenty years ago, to Moscow, to the General Staff of the Red Army, where at that time the Soviet theory of the “Deep Operation” was created.

The name of the Soviet military theorist of the 20s, corps commander Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafilov, became known again to the general public in the 90s of the last century thanks to the efforts of the fugitive spy (and part-time “historian”) Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who sculpted his epochal opuses under the pseudonym “Victor” Suvorov". It was thanks to Mr. Rezun that the reading public heard about the theory of “deep operations”, developed in two books by the above-mentioned outstanding theorist - “The Scope of Operations of Modern Armies,” which was published in 1925, and “The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies,” which was published four years later. This theory was declared by Mr. Rezun to be an epoch-making discovery in the field of military sciences, its developer was appointed by this author as a military genius, and all similar theories developed abroad were recognized as a pathetic copy of the creation of a tragic death in the prime of life (July 12, 1931, Corps Commander V.K. Triandafillov died in a plane crash) by Soviet Moltke. In the opinion of the above-mentioned fugitive Stirlitz, the idea of ​​blitzkrieg developed by the German General Staff was an insignificant parody of the theory of “deep operation”, and Guderian, Manstein and Brauchitsch were, in the firm conviction of Mr. Rezun, nothing more than despicable plagiarists who stole this brilliant idea. Unfortunately, along with the military geniuses Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Yakir and Uborevich (and others like them) who were villainously shot in the basements of the Lubyanka, the Great Military Theory also sank into oblivion - which is why the catastrophe of June 1941 and all our other sorrows and misfortunes at the beginning of the war occurred.

Yes, undoubtedly, it’s damn tempting to recognize Russia as the birthplace of the idea lightning war. It’s nice to think that it was not seasoned military professionals - German generals - but our geniuses, former lieutenants and non-commissioned officers of the tsarist army, who found a brilliant way out of the hopeless positional impasse of the First World War. But, unfortunately, this will not be true - no matter how much we would like the opposite. And there is nothing worse than deceiving yourself...
The truth is that the theory of “deep operation” was developed by Triandafilov (and then, after the death of the latter, was gracefully appropriated by Tukhachevsky) in the general mainstream of the Trotskyist theory of “permanent revolution” and was, so to speak, its military-theoretical part. Initially, the theory of “deep operation” had the promise of the Trotskyist military school, and in fact came down to breaking through the positional front with monstrous material superiority and developing the operation in depth until supply possibilities were exhausted. In fact, the theory of “deep operation” was created to justify the possibility of defeating any European country in one, at most two consecutive operations, and its own main goal aimed at seizing territory - in which it was radically different from the theory of blitzkrieg, the main point of which was the defeat of the enemy army. This, by the way, is not surprising - the Germans developed the theory of blitzkrieg to transfer the solution of strategically intractable problems to the operational plane, while the “deep operation” served to “expand the basis of war” by “Sovietizing” the occupied territories and using their resources to successfully end the war.

While there was no war, the theory of “deep operation”, at the very least, served as the theoretical basis for the strategy (and operational art) of the Red Army. On its postulates, the army was built, the staffs of formations and units were formed, exercises were conducted (the most famous were the Kyiv 1935 and the Belarusian 1936), military equipment was ordered and command personnel were trained.

And then the war began. And not even a war, but a “military conflict” - in the distant Mongolian steppes on the border with Manchuria, near the hitherto unknown Khalkhin Gol river. From the point of view of the Soviet General Staff, this was an ideal opportunity to test in practice the theory of “deep operations” in, so to speak, laboratory conditions, without serious risk and with minimal losses.

The theory of “deep operation” required creating a serious superiority in forces over the enemy - this superiority was created (against 25 Japanese battalions we had 35, against their 1283 machine guns we had 2255, against their 135 field guns we fielded 220, against their 142 anti-tank and We had 286 battalion guns). The theory of “deep operation” required that large tank masses be concentrated in the direction of the main attack - these masses were concentrated (against 120 light Japanese tanks and armored cars we fielded 498 tanks and 346 armored vehicles). In general, everything was done - and the result?

As a result, we won. In two months of fighting, we killed 17,045 Japanese soldiers and officers, and wounded at least more than thirty thousand more, we captured almost all the heavy equipment of two Japanese divisions and two separate artillery regiments, we forever discouraged the Japanese from trying to break the Red Army and... we forever (as it seemed then) Bain-Tsagan’s theory of “deep operation” was buried in the sands.

And the 11th light tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. did this. Yakovleva.

On the night of July 3, General Kobayashi's strike force (23rd Infantry Division consisting of the 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments, 26th Infantry Regiment, two separate artillery divisions) began crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River in the area of ​​Mt. Bain-Tsagan and by eight o'clock in the morning, having completely crossed, captured this commanding height, after which, having gained a foothold, she sent reconnaissance patrols to the south. In order to reverse a very dangerous situation (the Japanese were threatening the supply of all Soviet-Mongolian troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol), the commander of the 1st Army Group, Komkor Zhukov, ordered his mobile reserve to strike the Japanese and throw them back across the river. At 9 o'clock in the morning, the 11th separate light tank brigade came into combat contact with the Japanese - and from that moment the Battle of Bain-Tsagan began.

What were the Japanese like when they broke through to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol? According to “Nomonhan. Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat 1939″, the 23rd Infantry Division (two of its infantry regiments crossed to the west bank) had about 12 thousand soldiers and officers, 17 37-mm Type 94 anti-tank guns, 36 75-mm field guns Type 38 cannons (a licensed Krupp gun, akin to our “three-inch”) and 12 100-mm howitzers (although it is unknown whether the Japanese transported them to the west bank), plus each infantry battalion had two 70-mm battalion howitzers howitzers. In addition, in separate divisions, the Japanese had four more batteries of anti-tank guns - in total, Kobayashi’s group could count on 33 anti-tank guns. I must say, not very much.

As of the morning of July 3, the 11th OLTB had 156 BT-5 light tanks. Together with the tankers, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade (154 armored vehicles BA-6, BA-10, FAI), the armored division of the 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division (18 armored vehicles BA-6), assigned as reinforcement to the 3rd battalion 11th tank brigade, and the armored division of the 8th Mongolian Cavalry Division (19 armored vehicles BA-6 and BA-10), which assisted the 2nd battalion of the above-mentioned brigade. Thus, against one slightly reinforced Japanese infantry division, which had thirty-three anti-tank guns, the Soviet-Mongolian units fielded about three hundred and forty armored units - in other words, for each Japanese anti-tank gun there were ten of our tanks and armored vehicles. The Japanese, however, also had various kinds of exotic devices in the role of “anti-tank weapons”, such as suicide bombers with mines on bamboo poles carefully painted by Soviet propaganda - but these delights had no real combat value.

If we put aside the whole heap of propaganda chaff that thickly covers the events at Bain-Tsagan, then we can sadly state an extremely unpleasant fact. The Soviet-Mongolian armored fist not only did not defeat the Japanese in the first few hours of the battle - but, in fact, was defeated by them. Yes, yes, it was destroyed, and only the help of the 149th and 24th rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and several separate artillery divisions that arrived later, helped correct the situation, which threatened to develop into a disaster.

The 11th OLTB, 7th MBB and two Mongolian armored divisions spent the whole day unsuccessfully attacking the Japanese who barely had time to dig in - and by the end of July 3, having lost more than half of their tanks and armored vehicles, they were forced to abandon the idea of ​​capturing Mount Bain-Tsagan. The 11th OLTB irretrievably lost 84 tanks that day, and the losses of the 7th motorized armored brigade and Mongolian armored divisions, according to Zhukov’s dull admission, “were even greater.” The Japanese, not only were not completely defeated by our tank ram - on the morning of July 4 they launched a counterattack - and this became the moment of truth.

Thus, the whole theory of “deep operation”, which assumed that a huge numerical superiority in forces and means in itself guarantees victory, went to hell! The Japanese have completely refuted the delights of the armchair strategists of the Trotskyist school! One infantry division, very poorly equipped with anti-tank defense equipment, hastily dug in in a foreign steppe, had very limited supplies of ammunition - putting up against the enemy’s tank armada the fortitude and determination to die, but not surrender - survived and held its positions. And 340 tanks and armored vehicles could not do anything with it!

Yes, by four o'clock in the morning on July 5, the Japanese resistance was finally broken. They left more than three thousand corpses on the slopes of Mount Bayin-Tsagan; most of the artillery of the 23rd division was destroyed by Soviet-Mongolian troops. Strength, as we know, breaks straw - but what is characteristic of this battle? The Japanese retreated to the eastern bank of the river, and, so that avid communist propagandists did not talk about this, they did it of their own free will. The possibilities of resistance were exhausted, the trick, as they say, failed - therefore, it was necessary to leave. No crowds of sad prisoners, no captured banners - the Japanese left only their fallen and their broken guns on the slopes of the mountain; They left, taking the wounded with them, yielding to the superior forces of the enemy, so that on the other side they could start all over again. Such a retreat is worth other victories!

This did not happen at all because our tankers turned out to be weaker in spirit than the enemy - with the strength of spirit, courage and determination of the guys of brigade commander Yakovlev, everything was in order, and the terrible losses of this brigade speak precisely of this. The defeat of our armored forces at Bain-Tsagan did not happen on July 3, 1939 - it happened much earlier, in November 1931, when the future Marshal Tukhachevsky became deputy people's commissar of defense for armaments, and when the theory of “deep operation”, somehow imperceptibly suddenly became the brainchild of Mikhail Nikolaevich, it was firmly established in Soviet military doctrine. And it is precisely this theory that the Red Army owes to the appearance in its ranks of huge numbers of T-26 and BT tanks with “cardboard” armor!

Soviet Union, straining all his strength, he built the tank hordes ordered by Marshal Tukhachevsky (by 1939, more than 11,000 T-26s and about 6,000 BTs were built) - which, according to the outstanding strategist, should fall on the enemy on M-Day and crush him with their mass. It was precisely according to this scenario, by the way, that the famous maneuvers of 1935 and 1936 were built - in them, colossal tank armadas appeared before the eyes of amazed foreign observers, breaking into the “enemy’s” defenses with extraordinary ease. The theory of “deep operation” seemed to have finally acquired flesh and blood, or rather, steel and fire - and, in the opinion of Trotskyist military leaders, there was no force in the world capable of withstanding the blow of these colossal tank masses.
The criterion of theory is practice. And the burnt tanks of Yakovlev’s brigade, better than hundreds of clever theoretical studies, showed the command of the Red Army that the “deep operation” was a myth, a carefully developed bluff, a dummy and nothing more. And there is no need to try to explain the terrible losses of our tankers by the fact that they were not supported by the infantry, which did not reach the battlefield in time - at the Kiev maneuvers of 1935, the 45th mechanized corps of A.N. Borisenko (as part of the 133rd mechanized brigade of Y.K. Evdokimov and the 134th mechanized brigade of S.I. Bogdanov) counterattacked the “blues”, who captured positions on the eastern bank of the Irpen River, in dense tank formations - doesn’t this remind you of anything?

Why the battle on July 3, 1939 was so catastrophic for the Soviet armored forces - we will tell you in the second part of this essay.

Being an instrument of permanent revolution, the theory of “deep operation” suffered from the same thing as the entire Trotskyist-Marxist ideology - isolation from life, scolding, dogmatism, and most importantly - the fallacy of the initial data.

Why did Soviet Russia miserably lose the Polish war? Why did Comrade Tukhachevsky’s “campaign on the Vistula” end in the almost complete extermination of the troops of the Western Front? Why did the Soviet government have to sign the disgusting Peace of Riga, which left half of Ukraine and half of Belarus under the heel of the Polish interventionists?

Because of fatal errors in basic planning.

Blinded by successes in Russia, the Bolsheviks extrapolated the experience of their struggle with the “internal” counter-revolution to the conflict with the newborn Poland - and they lost, they could not help but lose. Hoping for a “revolutionary explosion” among the poor layers of Polish society, Bolshevik leadership deliberately did not notice the national factor - which, to the deep regret of Messrs. Trotsky and Co., turned out to be much stronger than the class factor; moreover, it was the national factor, or, in other words, the national self-awareness of the Polish people, the threat to their national self-identity, the threat of losing their newly gained independence - that allowed Pilsudski to mobilize the hitherto fleeing Polish army and, hitting the flank of Tukhachevsky’s hordes approaching the Vistula, defeat the Western front, capturing more than a hundred thousand people as prisoners alone; The losses of the Red Army in heavy weapons and ammunition could not be counted at all.

But since ancient times, repeatedly attacking a rake has been considered a national sport in Russia; and the military theorists of the young Red Army, having set out to create a theory of the coming war, again repeated this maneuver - how could it be otherwise? After all, their supreme guru was the Great and Terrible Walker on the Vistula - Comrade Tukhachevsky!

This comrade was a well-known theorist of a future war and the revolutionary liberation of Europe and Asia from the “oppression of capital” - to whom other propagandists of the permanent revolution, such as Ilya Dubinsky (who in his book “Rising India” glorified the future campaign of the Red Army for the Hindu Kush) or Vitaly Primakov ( after serving as a military attache in Kabul, he burst out with the opus “Afghanistan on Fire”, in which he demanded the immediate introduction of a “limited contingent of Soviet troops” - note that this book was written in 1930!). Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideological basis of the theory of “deep operation” belonged entirely to Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky - behind whose left shoulder Lev Davydovich Trotsky’s beard loomed...

What were the ideas of Comrade Tukhachevsky in relation to the analysis of a future war?

Comrade Tukhachevsky did not bother himself with questions of the balance of forces, studying mobilization resources, analyzing the staffing structures of enemy divisions and corps - why? After all, the future war will not be a war of nations, but a war of classes! Therefore, there is no point in studying the equipment and weapons of the armies of neighboring countries - it will be enough to scatter several million leaflets over their territories - and victory is in your pocket! But of course! After all, “the working class of all countries, waging a fierce class struggle with their bourgeoisie, at the same time prevents the attack of the imperialists on our Soviet Union, consciously defending it as the shock brigade of the world proletariat... The defense of the working class of the capitalist countries of their international socialist fatherland, the farm laborers and the poor of the countryside - all this will create a broad base for the revolutionary insurrectionary movement in the rear of our enemies.”

Great! Therefore, in the opinion of Comrade Tukhachevsky, the Red Army will not have much need to prepare to fight the enemy seriously - after all, there is a world proletariat! It will be enough just to properly set up campaigning and propaganda - and it’s done! And it was precisely the issue of CORRECT organization of agitation and propaganda that Comrade Tukhachevsky devoted the lion’s share of his military theoretical works. “If we slowly and gradually infuse propaganda forces, their influence will be negligible. A simultaneous noisy infusion of a fresh revolutionary flow is necessary, capable of breaking apathy and spiritualizing the troops with the desire to fight and the desire for victory. But the movement of this flow must necessarily be put on rails. Slogans and theses must be developed in advance, with which the entire propaganda mass must join the troops with complete unanimity. Only under such conditions can successful propaganda be achieved. These attacks must be accompanied by the most intense campaigns - literary, poster and others. The organization of propaganda points at all stages, the widespread use of music, the widespread development of the poster system and the press, the establishment of theaters, etc. - all this can and should give brilliant results.”

Instead of developing questions of tactics - “the use of music and the widespread development of a poster system”; instead of creating the theory and practice of operational art - “the simultaneous noisy infusion of a fresh revolutionary flow”; instead of preparing a clear strategy, there is an ephemeral mirage of a “deep operation”; and these people were PREPARING FOR WAR!?

However, we must pay tribute to Comrade Tukhachevsky, who from 1931 to 1935 was the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments - in addition to posters and theses, ideological weapons, he still considered it necessary to arm the Red Army with tanks and guns, real weapons, so to speak. But how real?

What is the quintessence of the deep operation theory? Creation of absolute superiority over the enemy in forces and means over a fairly wide sector of the front, then a massive attack of tank masses with the support of artillery and infantry to the entire depth of the operational depth of the enemy front, and after it a continuous offensive until the accumulated resources of manpower and equipment are completely exhausted with the goal of capturing enemy territory as much as possible. In which (territory) the propagandists of Comrade Tukhachevsky will immediately begin to engage in “organizing propaganda points at all stages, the widespread use of music, the widespread development of the poster system and the press, the organization of theaters” - with the goal of the fastest possible “Sovietization” of the occupied territories in order to “expand the basis of the war.” Such a modus operandi required weapons with certain properties- which Comrade Tukhachevsky ordered from industry; Moreover, the COMBAT capabilities of this weapon were initially sacrificed for its MASSIVENESS - because the theory of “deep operation” did not at all require the tank to be able to successfully conduct a fire battle with an entrenched enemy. The theory of "deep operation" required the tank to REACH the enemy cities deep within its territory - where, welcomed by the revolutionary proletariat, it would be a living symbol of the freedom brought to the oppressed masses.

The tanks ordered by Comrade Tukhachevsky (for the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the date of birth of the T-26 is considered to be February 13, 1931, when the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR decided to adopt the Vickers E tank into service with the Red Army) were clearly divided, in accordance with English traditions, into “infantry” and "cruising". “Infantry” tanks (the English “Vickers six-ton”, which became our T-26, with a low-power engine of 90-120 horsepower), assigned to brigade-by-brigade rifle corps and battalion-by-battalion rifle divisions, were supposed to break into the enemy front along with the masses of infantry. “Cruising” (BT series tanks, the ancestor of which was the tank of the American designer Christie) were intended to enhance the blow and develop further success - for which they had powerful engines (American Liberty engines, licensed in the USSR, with a capacity of 500 horsepower) and a mixed type of propulsion - on wheels and tracks. Since the theory of “deep operation” developed by Triandafilov required the creation of maximum superiority over the enemy, these tanks were built in gigantic quantities. But were they an effective weapon against an enemy willing to fight?

These tanks WERE NOT such weapons.

The first anti-tank guns appeared already in 1918 - which Comrade Tukhachevsky could not help but know. He could not help but know that in the 20s and 30s anti-tank rifles became widely recognized in Europe. For example, the Swiss heavy self-loading repeating anti-tank rifle Soloturn S 18-100, which appeared in 1932, had excellent (relative to the reservation of Soviet tanks) armor penetration indicators - 40 mm armor was hit at a distance of 100 meters, an armor plate of 35 mm penetrated at a distance of 300 meters, and at five hundred meters a sheet of armor steel 27 mm thick made its way. Considering that the armor of both the T-26 and BT did not exceed 25 mm anywhere, their chance of surviving under the fire of these anti-tank rifles was zero. What about the Swiss! The Japanese 20-mm anti-tank rifle “Type 97,” which was part of the machine-gun companies of infantry battalions in pairs (a Japanese infantry division was required to have 72 anti-tank guns of this type) confidently penetrated thirty-millimeter tank armor from 100 meters. But we are only talking about anti-tank rifles! There is no need to talk about serious combat between T-26 and BT tanks and anti-tank guns - here, as they say, there are no options.

T-26 and BT tanks could operate successfully on the battlefield and in the depths of the enemy’s defense only in one single case - if the enemy army was demoralized in advance, even before the first shots were fired, and propagandized by Marxist agitators; only under this condition would the gigantic hordes of Soviet cardboard tanks have a chance of victory. AND NO OTHERWISE!

On July 3, 1939, one hundred and fifty-six BT-5 tanks of the Eleventh Light Tank Brigade launched an attack on the hastily dug-in Japanese, who had captured Mount Bain-Tsagan from the northwest an hour earlier. From the south, the 7th motorized armored brigade (154 armored vehicles) launched an attack on Mount Bain-Tsagan. We did not act alone - the attack of the Soviet armored fist was supported by two motorized armored divisions of the Mongolian cavalry (34 cannon armored vehicles BA-6 and BA-10).

And this attack, which was supposed to wipe out the Japanese division from the face of the earth, ended in failure!

The Japanese shot at our tanks from anti-tank guns, from anti-tank rifles, from battalion howitzers, from field guns - and did not retreat a single step! The Japanese did not run headlong towards the Khalkhin Gol crossings - they began to cold-bloodedly shoot our tanks, using everything they had at hand.

The Soviet-Mongolian armored group attacked the Japanese from all sides. The 2nd battalion of the 11th tank brigade and the armored division of the 8th Mongolian cavalry division operating jointly with it attacked the enemy from the west, the main forces of the 11th OLTB (its 1st and 3rd battalions and the armored division of the 6th Mongolian cavalry division ) were supposed to attack the Japanese from the north, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade was given the order to strike from the south. The 185th Heavy Artillery Regiment was supposed to support the advancing tanks with fire. We had an abundance of tanks and armored cars, but there was no infantry at all: the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which was supposed to support the actions of the tankers, did not show up to the battlefield, instead going to Lake Khukhu-Usu-Nur instead of Bain-Tsagan.

Turning around to attack, the 11th OLTB moved towards the enemy. The Japanese showed restraint and composure - for ten minutes their guns and anti-tank rifles were silent, allowing Soviet tanks to come within effective fire range. And when the BT-5 and BT-7 of Yakovlev’s brigade approached the Japanese trenches at 150-200 meters, they opened fire.

The leading battalion, Major Mikhailov, lost 15 tanks in the first few minutes of the battle. The sand curtain raised by the tanks camouflaged the positions of the Japanese anti-tank artillery better than any camouflage nets, and allowed it to shoot our tanks from cover, as if at a shooting range. The guns of our BT-5 and BT-7 turned out to be completely unsuitable for attacking an entrenched enemy - due to the flat firing trajectory and the absence of high-explosive fragmentation shells in the ammunition racks. Not wanting to remain on the battlefield as targets to be shot at, the tanks of the 11th Brigade retreated to their original positions.

The second attack of the Yakovlev brigade began at two o'clock in the afternoon, simultaneously with the 7th motorized armored brigade that struck from the south, and turned out to be slightly more successful than the first - the tankers managed to push the Japanese back from the northwestern slopes of Mount Bain-Tsagan to 500-700 meters, paying for this with the loss of more than 30 tanks. The 7th motorized armored brigade, having suffered heavy losses, did not achieve any results at all - and a third attack was scheduled for 19:00, with all the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian armored units from three directions.

As one would expect, this attack failed - having lost more than forty armored units, two armored brigades of Soviet troops and two armored divisions of the Mongols rolled back to their original positions. By the end of the day on July 3, more than a hundred columns of thick black smoke rose into the sunset sky of Khalkhin Gol - our damaged tanks and armored vehicles were burning...

The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, which looked great in pre-war parades, turned out to be completely useless for a real war, as well as cannon (not to mention machine-gun FAI and BA-20) armored vehicles. Poor observation devices, useless communications, imperfect sights, a meager assortment of cannon shells, the impossibility of normal observation of the battlefield, the absence of a full-fledged commander in the crew (the “commander” on our light tanks is simply a gun loader or gunner) - all this led to to the fact that, having suffered huge losses, the 11th OLTB and 7th MBB were unable to defeat the entrenched Japanese infantry. Plus, the actions of tanks and armored vehicles were not supported by infantry.

At dawn on the Fourth of July, the Japanese launched a counterattack against our tanks - and were scattered by cannon and machine-gun fire. But the very fact of this counterattack speaks volumes!

All day on the fourth of July and all night on the fifth, the Soviet-Mongolian troops pulled together from everywhere waged a continuous attack on the Japanese positions, and, taking advantage of a colossal superiority in manpower and equipment, by dawn on July 5, they forced the Japanese to leave Mount Bain-Tsagan and retreat to the eastern bank of the river Khalkhin Gol. There was nothing surprising or extra-heroic about this - taking advantage of their overwhelming superiority in artillery, the Soviet troops simply suppressed the defending Japanese with a mass of fire. The tanks, which, in the opinion of the command of the 1st Army Group, should have simply swept the enemy into the river with a dashing attack in a couple of hours on the morning of July 3 - for the next two days, with the infantry slowly advancing behind the barrage of fire, they played the role of assault guns, completely ignoring their tactical purpose, for the sake of which, at the expense of security, they were equipped with powerful motors. The expensive BT-5 and BT-7, thus, were forced to perform the task that the cheap T-26 could have handled quite well - in one day completely depreciating the many years of theoretical delights of the Soviet tank school. The dreams of the theorists of “deep operations” about deep breakthroughs of the enemy front and daring raids deep into its territory were shattered by the prose of life - it turned out that the BT series tanks are absolutely useless for modern warfare, and they cannot be thrown into the attack against infantry at least minimally equipped with anti-tank weapons - there is a very expensive method of suicide for tank crews, and nothing more.

The theory of “deep operation” died on the banks of the Khalkhin Gol River - unfortunately, too late; there was only one year and nine months left until June 22, 1941...

Bayin-Tsagan

Perhaps none of the events at Khalkhin Gol in May-September 1939 causes as much controversy as the battle for Mount Bayin-Tsagan on July 3-5. Then the 10,000-strong Japanese group managed to secretly cross Khalkhin Gol and begin moving towards the Soviet crossing, threatening to cut off Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river from the main forces.

The enemy was accidentally discovered and, before reaching the Soviet crossing, was forced to take a defensive position on Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having learned about what had happened, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov ordered the 11th brigade of brigade commander Yakovlev and a number of other armored units immediately and without infantry support (Fedyuninsky’s motorized rifles got lost in the steppe and reached the battlefield later) to attack the Japanese positions.

Soviet tanks and armored vehicles launched several attacks, but, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The second day of the battle came down to constant shelling of Japanese positions by Soviet armored vehicles, and the failure of the Japanese offensive on the east bank forced the Japanese command to begin a retreat.

Historians still argue how justified the introduction of Yakovlev’s brigade into battle from the march was. Zhukov himself wrote that he deliberately went for it... on the other hand, did the Soviet military leader have a different path? Then the Japanese could have continued moving towards the crossing and a disaster would have occurred.

The Japanese retreat is still a controversial point for Bain-Tsagan - whether it was a general flight or a systematic, organized retreat. The Soviet version depicted the defeat and death of Japanese troops who did not have time to complete the crossing. The Japanese side creates a picture of an organized retreat, pointing out that the bridge was blown up even when Soviet tanks burst onto it. By some miracle, under artillery fire and air strikes, the Japanese managed to cross to the opposite bank. But the regiment that remained in the cover was almost completely destroyed.

Bayin-Tsagan can hardly be called a decisive tactical victory for one of the sides. But in strategic terms, this is, of course, a victory for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

Firstly, the Japanese were forced to begin a retreat, suffering losses and failing to complete their main task - the destruction of the Soviet crossing. Moreover, not once during the conflict did the enemy again try to force Khalkhin Gol, and this was no longer physically possible. The only set of bridge equipment in the entire Kwantung Army was destroyed by the Japanese themselves during the withdrawal of troops from Bain Tsagan.

Next, Japanese troops could only conduct operations against Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, or wait for a political solution to the conflict. True, as you know, the enemy expected something completely different...

On May 25, 1939, the Japanese began to concentrate large forces in the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area from the 23rd Infantry Division and Manchurian cavalry, united in a consolidated detachment under the command of the commander of the 64th Infantry Regiment Yamagata.

By May 27, the Japanese brought the 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two battalions), a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division, the 8th Manchurian Cavalry Regiment, part of the 1st and 7th Cavalry Regiments to the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area and up to 40 aircraft.

At dawn on May 28, the Japanese-Manchus launched a surprise attack and, pushing back the Mongolian 15th Cavalry Regiment and the left-flank company of Bykov's detachment, deeply engulfed the left flank of all units located on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, threatening the crossing. The Mongol-Soviet units, poorly controlled, retreated in disarray to the Sandy Hills, 2–3 km northeast of the mouth of the Khaylastyn-Gol River, where they delayed the enemy’s advance.

At this time, the 149th Infantry Regiment, which arrived in vehicles from Tamtsak-Bulak, without waiting for the concentration of all forces, entered the battle on the move. Units of the 149th Regiment acted unorganized, without interaction with artillery. Control of the battle was poorly organized, and with the onset of darkness it was completely lost. The battle with separate groups lasted all night.

At dawn on May 29, contact was established with the command post of the 57th Special Corps, which at that time was located in Tamtsak-Bulak.

On the morning of May 29, the units, brought into order, resumed the offensive with the goal of pushing the enemy beyond the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. By 16:00 on May 29, the 149th Infantry Regiment reached Remizov Heights, but could not advance further.

At this time, observers reported that enemy convoys were approaching from the east. The head of the task force concluded that the enemy had brought in fresh forces and gave the order to withdraw to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. This order was approved by the commander of the 57th Special Corps. The units began to retreat to the west bank in a disorganized manner; when leaving the battle, no one controlled them. The corps command was not aware of the ongoing battle.

In operational report No. 014, the staff reporter reported that our units retreated to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River under enemy pressure, while the enemy, exhausted by the battles, leaving behind cover of snipers, himself hastily went abroad in those vehicles whose approach was detected by observers. Our reconnaissance was unable to reveal the enemy’s departure abroad until June 3, and only on June 3, reconnaissance of the 149th Infantry Regiment established that there was no enemy on the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic.

The very first air battles revealed the superiority of Japanese aviation. The first combat clash between Soviet fighter aircraft and enemy fighters occurred at 12:20 p.m. 22nd of May. On the Soviet side, three I-16 and two I-15 fighters took part in the battle, and on the Japanese side, five I-96 fighters. In this battle, one I-16 and, presumably, one Japanese fighter burned out.

On May 27, an I-16 squadron consisting of eight aircraft was in an ambush with the task of taking off and destroying an enemy air force when it appeared. In total, during this day the squadron made four alert sorties. During the first three flights there were no encounters with the enemy, but two pilots burned out the engines of their cars. During the fourth flight, the squadron commander's engine did not start. He ordered the pilots who started the engines to take off before him. The pilots took off and headed towards the front. The squadron commander, having started the engine, was the last to take off. Six I-16 fighters followed to the front one or two at a time, gaining altitude along the route to the front. At the front, these single aircraft, being at an altitude of 2000–2200 m, met with two flights of enemy fighters that were in formation. After the first attacks carried out by our planes, the battle turned into pursuit, since our planes, after the first attack, made coups and began to leave, and the enemy, being higher, pursued them to the airfield and even shot them after landing.

As a result, of the six crews that took off, two pilots were killed (including the squadron commander), one pilot was wounded, two pilots burned out their engines, and one pilot landed on the airfield with holes in the plane.

On the same day, May 27, the command of the 57th Special Corps had an unpleasant conversation over a direct line with the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, who expressed Moscow's great dissatisfaction with the losses of Soviet aviation.

The next day, May 28, two squadrons flew to the combat area: one consisting of ten I-15 fighters and the second - consisting of ten I-16s. While in the air, the chief of staff received an order from the air brigade commander to put 20 I-15 aircraft on combat readiness, which was carried out. After some time, a new order was received: “Planes should fly to the area of ​​operation of ground troops.” After the first flight took off, the order came: “Stop the flight.” The chief of staff reported that one flight had already taken off. The order “Stop the flight” was confirmed and carried out (instead of twenty fighters, an I-15 flight flew out, which did not return from the front).

Two squadrons I-15 and I-16, flying to the front, did not meet the enemy and returned to their airfield. After their landing, the regiment commander received the order: “Prepare for a second flight in the same composition.” Before the regiment commander had time to give instructions to the squadrons to prepare for departure, he received an order for the immediate departure of two squadrons. The regiment commander reported that the I-15 squadron was not yet ready to take off, but despite this, the order to take off was confirmed: “The I-16 squadron should take off without waiting for the I-15 squadron to be ready.” This order was carried out. After 25–30 minutes, ten I-15s took off, led by the assistant regiment commander.

The ten I-16 fighters that took off did not meet the enemy and returned to the airfield, and the ten I-15s remaining in the air met 15–18 enemy aircraft and entered into battle with them.

According to reports from pilots and eyewitnesses who watched the battle from the ground, after the first attack the Japanese managed to set fire to the plane of the assistant regiment commander. The pomcomm put out his car, but the Japanese who was pursuing him at low level attacked him and shot him down.

The squadron commander was wounded in the head and lost consciousness. Almost at the very ground, he regained consciousness, managed to level the car and returned safely to his airfield.

After the lieutenant commander and squadron commander left the battle, the remaining I-15 fighters scattered, began to leave the battle and return to their airfield. According to eyewitnesses who watched the battle from the ground, the Japanese began to pursue single Soviet aircraft and shoot them down. If the I-15s had not fled in panic from the battle, but had fought, supporting each other, such losses would not have occurred. As a result, of the ten pilots who took off, four were killed in action, one was missing, two were wounded, one pilot jumped out of a burning plane with a parachute and appeared in his unit two days later, and one pilot returned to his airfield with numerous holes in the plane. The enemy still had no losses.

By the end of June, the Japanese concentrated in the combat area the entire 23rd Infantry Division, the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments, the 26th Infantry Regiment and part of the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division, the 4th, 5th 1st and 12th Manchu Cavalry Regiments and remnants of the 1st, 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. They reinforced these units with artillery from units of the Kwantung Army. In addition, the Japanese pulled in at least two hundred aircraft from different areas of Manchuria, from the Chinese front and from Japan.

The enemy's goal was a sudden and quick defeat of the Soviet units and a strike with the main forces through Mount Bain-Tsagan on the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.

According to the plan of the Japanese command, the offensive of ground forces should have been preceded by the defeat of Soviet aviation at airfields and the conquest of air supremacy. The strike group under the command of Major General Kobayashi, consisting of the 71st and 72nd infantry regiments, reinforced with artillery, had the task of crossing Khalkhin Gol north of Mount Bain-Tsagan on the night of July 2-3 and moving south, cutting off the escape route to our units. The 26th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel Sumi, mounted on vehicles, had the task of operating on the approaching flank of the strike group and preventing the approach of our reserves, and if our units retreated, pursuing them. The crossing and advancement of the strike group was ensured by the 23rd Engineer Regiment. The crossing was covered by a detachment consisting of one squadron of the 23rd Cavalry Regiment, an infantry platoon and a machine gun company of the 64th Infantry Regiment.

The pinning group under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka consisted of the 64th Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion), a battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment, the 4th, 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments of the Khingan Division, the 3rd and 4th th tank regiments had the task during July 1 and 2 to provide a flank march and concentration in the initial area for the attack of the strike group, and on July 3 to advance, covering the left flank of the Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol with infantry and tank regiments, and the right flank with cavalry , and destroy Soviet units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol.

July 1939 Khalkhin-Gol. Soviet pilots play dominoes during a break between battles. I-16 fighter in the background

D4Y2 dive bomber

A reserve detachment under the command of Colonel Ika, consisting of one battalion of the 64th Infantry Regiment, the 23rd Cavalry Regiment and one battery, moved behind the strike group.

The command of the 57th Special Corps had information about the concentration of the enemy in the area of ​​​​Jinjin-Sume and Lake Yanhu and expected the enemy to attack. It was only unclear where the enemy would direct the main blow. Therefore, it was decided to pull up reserves from Tamtsak-Bulak and concentrate them by the morning of July 3 in the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command is taking emergency measures to strengthen the Air Force. On May 29, a group of ace pilots led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from the Central Moscow Airfield on three Douglas transport aircraft to the site of hostilities. Another group of experienced pilots, who had already fought in Spain and China, was sent by train. In Chita, the pilots received planes, flew around them and went to the front line.

By June 22, 1939, the Air Force of the 57th Special Corps included: 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment - 60 I-16 fighters and 24 I-15 fighters; 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment - 35 I-16s and 32 I-15s; 150th mixed air regiment - 57 SB bombers and 38th medium bomber regiment- 59 Sat. A total of 267 aircraft.

The enemy air force included: 1st combat detachment - 25 I-97 fighters and 19 reconnaissance aircraft; 11th combat detachment - 50 I-97; 24th combat detachment - 25 I-97; 59th combat detachment - 25 I-97; 10th mixed combat detachment - 27 scouts; 15th mixed combat detachment - 30 scouts; 12th and 61st combat detachments - 19 heavy bombers each. A total of 239 aircraft.

In the twentieth of June 1939, major air battles broke out in the area of ​​Lake Bunr-Nur, in which Soviet aviation took revenge on the Japanese. On June 22, three air battles took place involving 95 Soviet fighters against 120 Japanese. On June 24, three air battles also took place involving 96 Soviet fighters against 60 Japanese. On June 26 there was one air battle of 50 Soviet fighters against 60 Japanese. In these battles, the Soviet side lost 23 fighters, mainly I-15s, and the Japanese lost 64 aircraft.

The Japanese, stunned by such an unexpected outcome of the air battles, decided to respond with a surprise attack on Soviet airfields. Early in the morning of June 27, 23 Japanese bombers, covered by 80 fighters, attacked the aircraft stands of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment in the Tamtsak-Bulak area. The Japanese managed to achieve tactical surprise, and our I-16s took off during the raid. According to Soviet data, in air combat Only three vehicles were lost, and the Japanese had five aircraft shot down.

At the same time, the parking lot of the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment was attacked. The telephone line connecting the air surveillance posts and the command of the 70th Air Regiment was cut by Japanese saboteurs. As a result, according to Soviet data, 16 I-15 and I-16 aircraft were destroyed, but the Japanese had no losses.

Soviet tank crews inspect a Japanese Type 95 Ha-go tank abandoned on the battlefield. Khalkhin Gol. July 1939

The Japanese began their ground offensive on the night of July 2-3. At 9 o'clock in the evening, Soviet units - the 3rd battalion of the 149th rifle regiment and the 6th battery of the 175th artillery regiment, which were in combat guard - were attacked by tanks and infantry. The 6th battery of Senior Lieutenant Aleshkin opened fire. In a stubborn battle, the artillerymen knocked out 15 Japanese tanks, but superiority remained on the enemy's side. The tanks broke through to the firing position and tried to crush the guns and fill up the cracks with the soldiers hiding in them. But the light Japanese tanks were unable to cause significant damage. Having broken the rules of the guns and ironed out the cracks with the soldiers, the tanks began to leave. Then the artillerymen jumped out of cover and opened fire on the retreating tanks, knocking out several more vehicles. Turning around, the tanks again attacked the battery. This was repeated three times. Finally the attack was repulsed. About thirty enemy tanks remained on the battlefield, the rest went to Manchurian territory.

The 6th Cavalry Division fought a heavy battle with Japanese troops all night from July 2 to 3 and by dawn retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. Under attacks from the tank regiments of the Yasuoka group, the left flank battalion of the 149th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Tank Brigade were forced to retreat to the river, turning their front to the north.

Kobayashi's strike group, having broken the weak resistance of the 15th Mongolian cavalry regiment, approached the river in the area of ​​Mount Bain-Tsagan and began crossing. By 8 a.m. on July 3, the Japanese had crossed to the other side and quickly moved south. The position of the troops located on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol became threatening, since there were no Soviet-Mongolian units on the western bank, except for the 3rd division of the 185th artillery regiment and the command post of the 175th artillery regiment. But the determination and resourcefulness of the commander of the 175th artillery regiment, Major N.I. Polyansky saved the situation. As the senior commander who was there, he ordered the commander of the approaching armored division of the 6th Cavalry Division to cover the crossing and the road to Tamtsak-Bulak. The armored division acted boldly and decisively. Instead of defending himself, he attacked the advancing Japanese troops, sowing panic among them and forcing them to stop. Having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, the division retreated and occupied a position convenient for defense.

At 10 a.m. on July 3, the 11th Tank Brigade began its offensive. The brigade attacked in two groups - from south to north along the Khalkhin Gol River with one battalion and from west to east with two battalions supporting the brigade's artillery division. At that time, the artillery division had six SU-12 self-propelled guns, which were an unarmored GAZ-AAA vehicle with a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 on a pedestal installation.

Together with the 11th tank brigade, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and a detachment of Mongolian cavalry were supposed to advance, but they launched the attack “without interaction with the tank brigade organized in time and place.” There was no artillery support for the tank brigade at the beginning of the attack, and only at the end of the battle “weak” artillery fire was opened.

Nevertheless, the attack by 132 tanks made a great impression on the Japanese - they had never seen anything like it in China. The tanks passed through the Japanese positions and turned back near the Japanese crossing of Khalkhin Gol. This raid cost the brigade 36 damaged and 46 burned tanks, and more than two hundred crew members were killed.

Meanwhile, the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment left in a completely different place, called “Ruins,” and only in the afternoon turned south. At 13:30, having deployed into battle formation south of Lake Khuhu-Usu-Nur, the 24th Regiment went on the offensive, striking from west to east. At 15:00 the 7th motorized armored brigade under the command of Colonel Lesovoy entered the battle.

Japanese aircraft continuously attacked our positions. The enemy found himself surrounded in the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan from the northwest, west and south. A river flowed from the east. But the Japanese managed to quickly gain a foothold on Mount Bain-Tsagan, organized an anti-tank defense and put up stubborn resistance. The battle lasted all day on July 3. At about seven o'clock in the evening, Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a simultaneous attack from three sides, but the Japanese repelled it. The battle continued after dark.

On the morning of July 4, the Japanese attempted to launch a counterattack, while a large group of Japanese aircraft attempted to attack the Soviet-Mongolian units from the air. But Soviet pilots entered the battle and forced the Japanese planes to return to their airfields. The Japanese, who launched a counterattack, were met by hurricane fire from Soviet artillery and quickly retreated to their fortifications.

On the evening of July 4, Soviet-Mongolian units launched a third general attack along the entire front. The battle lasted all night, the Japanese tried to hold Mount Bain-Tsagan at any cost. Only by 3 o'clock in the afternoon on July 5 was the enemy's resistance broken. Unable to withstand the onslaught of Soviet-Mongolian units, especially Soviet tanks, the Japanese fled in disarray to the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. But the only pontoon bridge built by the Japanese for the crossing had already been blown up by the Japanese themselves. In panic, Japanese soldiers and officers rushed into the water and drowned in front of the Soviet tank crews. The remnants of the Japanese on the west bank were destroyed in hand-to-hand combat. Only the swampy banks and the deep riverbed of Khalkhin Gol prevented our tanks and armored vehicles from crossing to the eastern bank.

After the Bain-Tsagan battles, the Japanese command tried more than once to defeat the Soviet-Mongolian units on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. So, on the night of July 7-8, the Japanese launched a strike from the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area on the right-flank 2nd battalion of the 149th Infantry Regiment and on the battalion of the 5th Rifle-Machine-Gun Brigade, which by this time had approached the area military operations. This battalion defended to the left of the 149th Infantry Regiment. The blow was unexpected, and the 2nd battalion with the 5th battery attached to it began to retreat, while the 1st battalion with the 4th battery continued to repel enemy attacks. At dawn, this battalion was forced to leave the occupied line.

Thus, as a result of these battles, the Soviet-Mongolian units retreated and took up positions at heights 3–4 km from the river.

On July 11, the Japanese launched a new attack in the direction of Remizov Heights. Having a significant superiority in forces, the enemy captured the heights, but his further advance was stopped by artillery fire and tank counterattacks.

After July 11, the sides, taking up defensive positions, continued to concentrate additional troops. Thus, units of the 82nd Infantry Division began to arrive in the combat area from the Ural Military District. The division included two artillery regiments. The 82nd light artillery regiment consisted of twenty 76-mm guns mod. 1902/30 g and sixteen 122-mm howitzers mod. 1910/30, and the 32nd Howitzer Regiment had twelve 152 mm howitzers.

Somewhat later, the 57th Infantry Division with the 57th Artillery Regiment, the 212th Airborne Brigade, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 85th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, and the 37th and 85th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Divisions arrived.

Corps artillery also appeared for the first time: the 185th Corps Artillery Regiment, consisting of twenty-four 107-mm guns mod. 1910/30 and twelve 152-mm guns mod. 1934; 1st division of the 126th artillery regiment (twelve 107 mm guns) and 1st brigade of the 297th heavy artillery regiment (four 122 mm guns model 1934).

On June 1, the deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District, G. K. Zhukov, was urgently summoned to Moscow. The next morning he was received by Voroshilov and received orders to fly to Mongolia. On the same day, June 2, at 16:00, a plane carrying Zhukov and several General Staff officers took off from the Central Airfield. On the morning of June 5, Zhukov arrived in Tamtsak-Bulak, at the headquarters of the 57th Special Corps, where he met with N.V. Feklenko. Zhukov traditionally began with a scolding: “... is it possible to control troops 120 km from the battlefield,” etc. On the same day, Zhukov contacted Moscow. On June 6, an order from People's Commissar Voroshilov came from Moscow to release Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko from the command of the 57th Corps and the appointment of G.K. to this position. Zhukova. Soon, from all the troops concentrated near the Khalkhin Gol River, the 1st Army Group was created under the command of Corps Commander Zhukov.

In July, our aircraft attacked enemy airfields on the territory of Manchukuo several times. So, on July 27, 1939, nine I-16 fighters, under the cover of ten I-16s, took off to attack the Ukhtyn-Obo airfield, 15 km southwest of Ganchzhur, where about twenty enemy fighters were located. The Japanese clearly did not expect the attack. The cars were uncamouflaged, their engines were facing the center of the airfield. The assault I-16s, with a turn to the left of 10–15° from an altitude of 1200–1500 m, entered a dive and at an altitude of 1000 m opened aimed fire: the leading and right link - at the southern and western groups of aircraft, the left link - at the gas tankers standing behind by planes, and by planes. Three to five long bursts were fired. At an altitude of 300–500 m, the fire was stopped and the planes were taken out of the dive.

Nine I-16s carried out only two attacks, and individual aircraft carried out two or three attacks. 9000-10,000 rounds were fired.

According to reports from the pilots who took part in the attack, four or five aircraft and two gas tankers were on fire at the airfield. All Soviet aircraft returned to base.

On July 29, aircraft of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment attacked a Japanese airfield 7 km north of Lake Uzur-Nur, that is, approximately 12 km deep into Manchurian territory. There were 8–9 fighters and 4–5 bombers at the airfield.

On the first flight at 7:15 am. 19 I-16 vehicles took part in the attack, covered by eight I-16s. The first approach was made in the direction from the sun at an altitude of 2000 m. When the target was detected, the fighters dived onto it, made a slight turn, reached the target and, descending to a height of 150–100 m, opened fire, and then left the attack with the left combat U-turn. After the first attack, two Japanese planes caught fire.

The second approach was made in the direction from south to north, from the side of Lake Uzur-Nur, along the front of the aircraft. The fire opened from a distance of 450–500 m and was conducted in short bursts, moving from one target to another. During this approach, the Japanese fired soviet fighters from anti-aircraft machine guns.

The third approach was made in the direction from northwest to southeast. Before the attack, one Japanese I-97 fighter took off and left at maximum speed in the same direction in which the attack was carried out.

After the third attack, most of the planes had used up their cartridges and shells, but some pilots, including the leader (regiment commander), still had cartridges, which made it possible to make a fourth approach in the direction from southeast to northwest and from make a left turn to your airfield. During the entire attack, eight I-16s covered the assault raid of nineteen I-16s at an altitude of 3500 m.

On the same day at 9:40 a.m. a repeated assault attack was carried out, in which ten I-16 fighters (mostly cannon) took part. The first organized approach was made in the direction from west to east, subsequent approaches (from three to six approaches) were made by separate aircraft (one or two aircraft). There was also no opposition from the enemy; the attacks continued until the cartridges and shells were completely used up.

According to Soviet pilots, as a result of the attack, up to ten enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and two I-97s were shot down on takeoff.

August 2 at 7:25 a.m. The 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment, consisting of 23 I-16s, under the cover of nineteen I-16s, carried out an assault attack on enemy aircraft located at the airfield, 20 km northwest of Jinjin-Sume. The attacked objects at the airfield were aircraft, a camp and a base located 2–3 km northeast of the airfield. The Japanese planes were not dispersed, their engines were facing in different directions, and from the air it seemed that the planes formed a circle. Inside this circle there were tents and yurts, apparently it was a camp. At the base there were many cars, property and yurts, and in the center there was a brick building. All objects at the airfield were not camouflaged.

The attacks were carried out by single aircraft. The withdrawal from the attack took place at an altitude of 100–200 m. During the attack, the attack aircraft managed to fire two to four bursts and transfer fire to other targets. In total, from two to eight passes were made and up to 18 thousand rounds were fired.

According to the pilots' reports, during the attacks up to 12 enemy aircraft were destroyed, of which 6 aircraft were set on fire on the ground, 4 aircraft were set on fire in the air during takeoff, 2 aircraft did not catch fire (apparently they were without fuel), but the whole group attacked them between two and four attacks were carried out. One plane took off and flew north. Burning cars and warehouses were visible.

From August 13 to 18, there were low clouds, passing rains and poor visibility in the combat area, so Soviet aviation did not carry out active operations.

There were no night bombings by the enemy during the entire period of hostilities.

From August 18 to 26, groups of heavy bombers (from 3 to 20 four-engine TB-3 bombers) bombed enemy troop concentrations and artillery positions every night in the areas of Khaylastyn-Gol, Lake Uzur-Nur, Lake Yanhu, Jinjin-Sume and Depden- Sume. The purpose of the night bombing was to “exhaust and destroy the enemy.” Night bombing was carried out by single aircraft from 8 pm to half past three at night at intervals of 15–30 minutes, from an altitude of 500 to 2000 m. The TB-3 bomb load ranged from 1200 to 1800 kg.

An interesting assessment of the actions of the TB-3 bombers was given in a secret publication: “According to the reports of the flight crew and the observations of our advanced ground units, the results of the bombing were excellent. Night bombing exhausted the enemy and at the same time inspired our advanced units.” In one paragraph - both for health and peace! What could the flight crew observe during the bombing? And if at least some result of these bombings had become known, for example, the destruction of an enemy field gun, then this fact would certainly have been included in the report.

Notes:

Shogun is the title of the supreme ruler of the state (leader, military leader).

Melikhov G.V. Manchuria, far and near. M.: Main editorial office oriental literature RAS, 1994. P. 52.

Fighting aviation in the Mongolian People's Republic. May-September 1939. M.: Voenizdat, 1940. P. 56.

The Japanese command decided to repeat the invasion of the border region of Mongolia. Strike military groups were created under the command of Generals Yasuoki and Kobayashi. The general leadership of the Japanese group was carried out by the former military attache of Japan in Moscow in 1927, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara. He was considered a great expert on the enemy Red Army.

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, General Kobayashi's troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River. One of the regiments of the Mongolian 6th Cavalry Division, which was standing here as a barrier, was shot down after a short and fierce battle. The Japanese immediately began to strengthen it with fortifications and concentrate their main forces here. Sappers built dugouts, and infantrymen dug single round trenches. Anti-tank and divisional guns were dragged up the steep slopes to the top of the mountain. Within a day, the border peak turned into a Japanese stronghold. Mount Bain-Tsagan was destined to become the scene of fierce and bloody battles from July 3 to July 5.

The situation for the defenders was critical, but the mobile reserve created by G.K. Zhukov rushed to the rescue. Without giving the enemy time to organize further offensive actions, Zhukov, with all his determination, without waiting for the approach of the accompanying rifle regiment (motorized infantry), threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P., which was in reserve. Yakovlev, who was supported by the Mongolian armored division. Soon the tankers were supported by the approaching battalions of the 24th motorized rifle regiment and the 7th motorized armored brigade, which had 154 armored vehicles.

The fierceness of the battles for the Bayin-Tsagan height is evidenced by this fact. On July 4, Fedyuninsky’s rifle regiment repulsed about a dozen enemy attacks, which more than once turned into bayonet and hand-to-hand combat. The initiative completely passed to the Soviet-Mongolian troops, and the Japanese had to go on the defensive, but they could not hold the mountain. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bain Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. Units of the Japanese 26th Infantry Regiment, which covered the withdrawal of units of the strike force from the western bank of Khalkhin Gol, concentrated in this area. The fighting on Bayin Tsagan continued all evening and all night.

On the morning of July 5, the Japanese troops wavered and began to retreat from mountain peak along steep slopes to the river bank. Soon the retreat turned into flight.

Zhukov G.K. "Memories and Reflections"
Volume 1, Chapter 7 "The Undeclared War on Khalkhin Gol"

Combat operations of the 26th Infantry Regiment near Bayin-Tsagan July 3–5, 1939

Combat operations of the 26th Infantry Regiment near the city of Bayin-Tsagan July 3 - 5, 1939 (From the diary of Colonel SUMI Shinichiro, commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment).

The 26th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division, stationed in Qiqihar, was ordered to reinforce the Komatsubara troops. My unit, consisting of 1,500 officers and soldiers, was ordered to attack the enemy from the rear, at his crossing.

On July 3, only Major Adachi's battalion was able to be transferred. The remaining units of the regiment reached the opposite bank before dawn the next day (July 4). We deployed as a second line behind Adachi's battalion.

After some time we came under furious attacks from a group of about 300 enemy tanks. The distance was about 800 meters and our infantry guns could achieve an effective hit with only every third shot. Enemy armor was able to approach before we could fire more than a few shots; We had no time to continue firing and 300 enemy medium tanks rushed into our positions... My soldiers frantically threw Molotov cocktails at the tanks with deadly accuracy. The tanks burst into flames like matchboxes. I counted 84 disabled enemy tanks.

This was our first and last success in the Nomonhan Incident.

In large areas of Outer Mongolia, temperatures rose to 42°C. From time to time we were fired upon by enemy heavy artillery; we could barely hide, tearing off cells in the sand.

On July 5, enemy tanks, having suffered such heavy losses from our Molotov cocktail, stopped approaching. Instead, they fired from long range from time to time; The tank hulls were buried in the sand, with only the turrets sticking out. We suffered heavy losses from this shelling, since we did not have the appropriate weapons to respond to this fire. Soon about a third of my men were killed or wounded. On July 5 we began to retreat to Manchurian territory. Meanwhile, on the right bank of the Khalkha, the 64th Infantry Regiment suffered the same fate as us - it was under heavy fire from heavy guns and tanks.

The enemy demonstrated his material superiority.

From the diary of Colonel SUMI Shinichiro,
commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment

From the combat log of the 11th Tank Brigade named after. M. P. Yakovleva

Log of combat operations of the 11th Tank Brigade named after. M. P. Yakovleva (RGVA, fund 37977, op. 1, case 115)

During the battle on July 3, 1939, the Brigade lost: out of 152 BT-5 tanks, 45 tanks were destroyed by the enemy, 37 were knocked out, a total of 82 tanks or 53.9% were out of action, out of 11 BKhM brought into battle - 4 were destroyed, 2 were knocked out, in total 6 or 55.5% dropped out.

Killed - senior military personnel 2 (head of the 1st unit, Captain Lyakhovsky, commander of the 3rd TB, Captain Podolny), middle command personnel - 18 people, water personnel - 10 people, junior personnel - 67, privates - 38 people, and total killed -135 people.

Wounded - senior personnel - 3 people, middle personnel - 8 people, political personnel - 1 person, junior personnel - 28 people, privates - 17 people, a total of 57 people.

Missing: junior personnel - 7 people, privates - 4 people, 11 people in total.

In total, 203 people were out of action in 3.7.39.

Losses for 4.7.39. Killed - 1 Red Army soldier, 1 junior commander and 6 Red Army soldiers were wounded, there were no losses of combat vehicles.

Losses on July 5, 1939. 2 junior commanders and 10 Red Army soldiers were wounded. There are no losses of combat vehicles.

From the combat log
11th Tank Brigade named after. M. P. Yakovleva
(RGVA, fund 37977, op. 1, case 115)