Chapter Six

DEAR COMMANDER

Kim Il Sung spent the night of June 25, 1950 in his office without sleeping a wink. Outwardly he behaved calmly, but his nerves were tense like a string. The tension of recent months has reached its climax. Sitting at the table, he again and again drew a map of Korea on a piece of paper, drawing arrows of tank attacks that drove Syngman Rhee's army into the mountains and threw it into the sea. Here the largest thick arrow stretched towards Seoul, from it smaller ones - towards Daegu, towards Busan... Suddenly the red pencil, which Kim, without noticing it, was pressing with redoubled force, broke in his hands.

The water rustled outside the window. The rainy season has begun. Kim Il Sung remembered how, on exactly the same rainy June night ten years ago, he sat in a tent with a flashlight over a map and racked his brains on how to deceive the punitive squads and escape from encirclement. The war is not over until Korea is unified. If then his partisans fought with such a powerful enemy as the Japanese, then now, having a serious regular army on his own soil, won’t he be able to defeat the troops of the pathetic Seoul puppets? They will crumble to dust under the attacks of KPA columns. You just have to hit it harder. The war for the liberation of the homeland will come to an end only when the regime in the South falls and the red and blue flag of the DPRK flies over the entire three thousand li native land.

The dawn was cloudy, the rain mingled with the gradually dissipating fog. Footsteps in the corridor, a knock on the door. Defense Minister Choi Yong Gon entered the office. The fit fifty-year-old general saluted and said: “Dear Commander! I'm reporting. The troops reached their original position by 24:00 on June 25. After intensive artillery preparation we got up and went on the attack together at 5.00 am. In the first hours they managed to advance several kilometers. The enemy, defending himself, retreats in all directions.”

Kim sighed with relief and wiped the sweat from his forehead. Now quickly forward, forward, to Seoul...

The Korean War has remained one of the most discussed topics in world historiography for more than half a century. Questions about who is responsible for its outbreak and to what extent, how to evaluate the course of hostilities and their results, and even who should be considered losers and winners are still debatable. Moreover, from the very beginning, the war was perceived as a conflict between the communist and free (in the terms of American historians) or imperialist (in Soviet literature) camps. The role of the Korean states themselves and their leaders in this formulation of the issue fades into the background. And completely in vain. Both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee were by no means blind executors of the will of Moscow and Washington, but played their own active role in the events. The Korean War was basically a civil war, although in the conditions of confrontation between the two camps it grew to include nineteen states and almost spilled over into the Third World War.

The desire to unite the country by force under their own rule was not hidden in both Pyongyang and Seoul. A particularly ardent supporter of this solution to the issue was Syngman Rhee. Moreover, he did not hesitate to express his views publicly. He perceived the coming war as a kind of crusade against the Reds and tried in every possible way to win over the Americans to his side. Back in the summer of 1949, he wrote to his advisor Robert Oliver: “The Korean people passionately desire a military campaign to the North... We will push some of Kim Il Sung’s people into the mountainous region and starve them there, then our defense line must be created along the Tumen and Yalu rivers.” 1.

In an interview with the United Press in October 1949, Lee explained to the world community what the role of the UN should be in Korea: “We object to any negotiations with the leaders of the Communist Party of North Korea, since we are fighting the Communist Party for democracy . The UN's job is to help democratic governments fight communists."

“In North Korea, it is necessary to destroy the regime created with the support and assistance Soviet Union, the armed forces created there, and hold general elections in North Korea,” Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok echoed his boss.

Some members of the South Korean elite thought more globally. Thus, in 1948, Syngman Rhee's adviser on foreign affairs, Yun Peng Gu, presented the chief with a war plan involving joint troops from the United States, Japan, South Korea and Kuomintang China. According to this document, the offensive was to develop in three main directions: the South Koreans and the Americans “liberated” North Korea and Manchuria, the Kuomintang restored its power in mainland China, and the Japanese moved to the northeast and gained possession of Soviet Primorye with Vladivostok.

A month and a half before the start of the war, General Kim Sok-won announced that the liberation of the North was just around the corner and he would soon “have breakfast in Haeju, lunch in Pyongyang, and dinner in Wonsan.” It is curious that Southern Kim was an old enemy of Northern Kim. In the 1930s in Manchuria, he headed a special unit to combat partisans and faced Kim Il Sung's detachment. His activities were recognized with the Order for Bravery, which he received personally from the hands of Emperor Hirohito. And now Kim Sok Won was one of the commanders of the troops at the 38th parallel, where his soldiers constantly distinguished themselves in skirmishes with the northerners.

In 1949 - the first half of 1950, clashes between the armies of the North and South on the border reached such intensity that a number of researchers (for example, American Bruce Cummings) consider this period initial stage war. During this time, 1,800 armed conflicts occurred in the area of ​​the 38th parallel, that is, on average, two or three per day. There were also major battles using artillery. The area of ​​the city of Kaesong and the Onjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea became the zone of particularly violent confrontation. In most cases, the initiator was the South Korean side. American historian W. Stuke believes that by aggravating the situation on the border, Syngman Rhee wanted to influence the US authorities. However, Washington eventually began to wonder whether requests for increased arms supplies were simply a ploy on Lee's part and whether he was actually preparing a march to the North?2

The Americans had different attitudes towards their protégé's plans. He irritated many in the White House with his stubbornness and uncontrollability, as well as fears that he could provoke a conflict, and then a big war in which the United States would be drawn. On the other hand, army hawks had their own point of view. “The campaign plan is a done deal. Although we will start the attack, we still need to create a pretext in order to have a fair reason,” said General Roberts, the head of US military advisers in South Korea, at the beginning of 19503.

In the North, Rhee Syngman was preparing a symmetrical response. Kim Il Sung passionately wanted to unite Korea under his rule. Before his eyes there were examples of winners who were worth emulating - Stalin and especially Mao. The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party confidently led his troops to victory in the civil war that lasted almost 20 years. The days of Chiang Kai-shek's army were numbered. America did not dare to directly intervene in the civil war between the Chinese. So why should she interfere in the war between the Koreans? Kim believed that if necessary, Stalin and Mao would help and would not leave the DPRK in trouble. And he persistently convinced the “big brothers” that the time had come to act.

In the spring of 1949, Kim Il Sung came to Moscow with a government delegation and, at a meeting with Stalin, announced that the Korean communists were “determined to carry out unification by military means.” At the same time, he asked the Soviet leadership to provide economic, financial and military assistance to the DPRK and assistance in training specialists. And his representative - the head of the political department of the army, Kim Il Sung - went to Beijing for consultations with Mao, where he also asked for assistance with officers and weapons.

Mao, in principle, favorably accepted the plans of the Korean comrades and promised to help. However, given that there was still a civil war going on in China itself, he proposed starting the offensive no earlier than the beginning of 1950. Stalin was completely skeptical about this idea, advising only to accumulate strength.

Despite the refusal, Kim Il Sung continued to raise the issue of an offensive in the South, transmitting relevant messages to Moscow through Ambassador Shtykov. But it would be wrong to consider Kim the main “militarist” at the top of the DPRK. He represented the consolidated position of the party leadership, and there were no pacifists in the TPSC Central Committee.

The most ardent supporter of the war was Park Hong-yong. He was confident that as soon as North Korean tanks entered Seoul, his people would raise a massive uprising throughout the country and the Syngman Rhee regime would fall on its own. The former leader of the Southern Communists convinced both Kim and, ultimately, Moscow and Beijing of this. Park could also insist on the early start of the war because if the country were successfully unified and the South Communists joined the party, his position would have sharply strengthened. Perhaps he could actually compete with Kim for leadership.

At the end of the summer, Stalin gave instructions to study the situation in Korea, compare the forces and capabilities of the North and South, and submit a memorandum on this issue to him. This note was discussed at the September meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In the directive sent to Pyongyang, Shtykov was instructed to meet with Kim and inform him that an attack on the South was not prepared either from a military or political point of view. In addition, the document astutely stated that if hostilities began from the North and became protracted, this could give the Americans a reason for all kinds of interference in Korean affairs. In conclusion, the North Korean leadership was asked to focus on helping the partisan movement in the South and strengthening the army. “Kim Il Sung did not expect such a reaction. He looked offended,” noted Shtykov.

However, the offended North Korean leader did not have the temperament to calm down. Kim Il Sung stubbornly stood his ground. In January 1950, he appeared at a reception to mark the departure of the Chinese representative from Pyongyang. The Soviet ambassador also came to see his colleague off. Having drunk heavily at the buffet table, Kim approached Shtykov and spoke frankly to him: “Terenty Fomich! Now that the liberation of China is completed, the liberation of Korea is next. Partisans will not solve matters. I don't sleep at night, thinking about reunification... Mao said that there is no need to attack the South. But if Syngman Rhee advances, then we must launch a counteroffensive. But he doesn’t advance... I need to visit Comrade Stalin and ask permission to attack to liberate South Korea. Mao promised to help, and I will meet with him. I need to make a personal report to Comrade Stalin..."

Kim spent the entire April 1950 with Pak Hong-yong in Moscow and finally received the go-ahead from Stalin. On May 14, he telegraphed Mao: “Comrade. Mao Zedong! In a conversation with Korean comrades, Filippov and his friends expressed the opinion that, due to the changed international situation, they agreed with the Koreans’ proposal to begin unification. At the same time, it was agreed that the issue should be resolved by the Chinese and Korean comrades jointly, and if the Chinese comrades disagree, the solution to the issue should be postponed until a new discussion. Your Chinese comrades can tell you the details of the conversation. Filippov"4.

What made Joseph Vissarionovich, who carefully signed his letters to Mao and Kim with the pseudonyms Feng Xi (West Wind), Filippov and Chan Fu, change his mind? The international situation has indeed changed. The USSR successfully tested a nuclear bomb. The civil war ended in China and the People's Republic was proclaimed. (It is worth noting the cautious tone of the letter: Stalin left the final decision on the issue to the Chinese.) Thus, the positions of the socialist countries were significantly strengthened.

On the other hand, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a keynote speech at the National Press Club, from which it followed that Korea was not part of the US defensive perimeter in the Far East. This means that the United States may not intervene in the war on the peninsula - they concluded in the socialist camp.

K. Asmolov makes another important argument: Kim Il Sung and especially Park Hong Yong convinced Stalin that the revolutionary situation in the South had already taken shape. And the USSR, which was an ideocratic state, could not help but help the cause of the revolution5.

Indeed, one should not discount the principle of international solidarity between socialist countries. The USSR was the leader of the communist world. Stalin could doubt and delay the process, could shift some of the responsibility onto the shoulders of another country (which he eventually did), but could not, in principle, refuse the DPRK’s attempt to bring socialism at bayonets to the South of the Korean Peninsula. Especially when its leader himself insisted on it. Confirmation of this can be found in the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, who cannot be suspected of sympathizing with the “father of nations”: “I must clearly state that this action was proposed not by Stalin, but by Kim Il Sung. He was the initiator, but Stalin did not hold him back. Yes, I believe that no communist would have stopped him in such a rush to liberate South Korea from Syngman Rhee and the American reaction. This would be contrary to the communist worldview. I’m not condemning Stalin here.”6

After their visit to Moscow, Kim and Park went to Beijing, where they were received by Mao. The Chairman fully supported their plans and assured that all necessary assistance would be provided. Preparations for war have entered their final stage.

According to the Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, by the time the hot phase of the conflict began, North Korea had ten divisions with a total strength of 130 thousand people and had another 100 thousand reservists in reserve. It was armed with 180 aircraft (Il and Yak), 258 tanks (T-34), about 1,600 guns and mortars. The South Korean army consisted of eight divisions numbering about 100 thousand people (in addition, there were police forces in approximately the same number). The southerners experienced an acute shortage of tanks, combat aircraft, and medium and large caliber artillery. However, they had a serious superiority over the northerners in anti-tank guns and mortars7.

The armed forces in the North have been rebuilt along Soviet lines since 1946. By 1950, the Korean People's Army was an effective fighting mechanism. Shortly before the start of the war, several divisions of Koreans who fought as part of Mao’s army in China joined its ranks. This experienced contingent became the main striking force of the KPA. The weaknesses were the youth and inexperience of the KPA personnel, and the insufficient training of the officer corps. Even from the high command, few received systematic military education. At best, experience in guerrilla warfare or training in the 88th Brigade.

In the Republic of Korea, things were much worse. In conditions of constant internal tension, priority was given to the police force rather than the army. Its formation began in earnest only after the departure of American troops in 1949. The backbone of the officers were former soldiers of the Kwantung Army and soldiers of the Independence Army and the Army of the Shanghai Provisional Government, who often distrusted each other, since they had previously stood on opposite sides of the front line. Syngman Rhee did not particularly rely on his own strength and counted on the help of the Americans, rightly believing that in the event of a conflict, the South on its own would not hold out for long8.

In May 1950, a group of Soviet and North Korean officers under the leadership of General Nikolai Vasiliev drew up a combat plan. They planned to end the war in 50 days by hoisting the DPRK flag in Busan, in the very south of the peninsula, on August 15, the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea. Kim Il Sung made his own adjustments to the document: first he demanded to postpone the start of the operation from July to June, then to change its course, attacking not only in the Seoul direction, but along the entire perimeter of the dividing line. In June, the transfer of troops to the border began. By the twentieth, the North Koreans managed to assemble an impressive group at the 38th parallel: the ratio of ground forces was 1:2, tanks - 1:6, machine guns -1:13, aircraft - 1:6. Everything was ready to go.

For South Korea, the rapid offensive of the northerners, which began on the morning of June 25, was a complete surprise. The troops covering Seoul, which is only 60 kilometers from the border, began to roll back. At the same time, propaganda claimed that the PK army was conducting a successful counter-offensive and would soon take Pyongyang. The seriousness of the situation was first realized by the American Ambassador John Muccio* who ordered the immediate evacuation of American citizens.

Syngman Rhee realized what was happening only on the night of June 26, and called the commander of American forces in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo. He was sleeping peacefully. The adjutant refused to wake him, to which Lee shouted: “The American citizens in Korea will die one by one, but I wish the general pleasant dreams!” - and hung up. A day later, he was already forced to evacuate from the capital, having recorded a patriotic speech before leaving: they say that Seoul will not be surrendered under any circumstances. The flight of Lee and the army command had a demoralizing effect on the troops and the population. In the confusion, bridges over the Han River were blown up before many military and ordinary Seoul residents had time to evacuate. People crawled to the other side over their ruins.

Wartime dictated its terms, and the leadership scheme of North Korea changed dramatically. On June 26, at a meeting of the Political Committee of the TPCC Central Committee, the Military Committee of the DPRK was formed as the highest state governing body. Kim Il Sung became its chairman. It also included Deputy Chairman Park Hong-yong, Hong Myung-hee and Kim Chak, Defense Minister Choi Yong-gon, Interior Minister Park Il-woo and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the DPRK Chon Chun-thaek. Martial law was declared and general mobilization began in the country. Soon Kim also became the Supreme Commander of the KPA, concentrating all power in his hands.

“Dear brothers and sisters! - he began his radio address to the nation in Stalinist style. - On June 25, the troops of the puppet treacherous Synman government began an offensive along the entire front into the territory located north of the 38th parallel. The courageously fighting security detachments of the republic took the enemy's blow and, in stubborn battles, stopped the advance of the puppet army of Syngman Rhee. Having discussed the current situation, the DPRK government ordered our People's Army to launch a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy's armed forces. Fulfilling the order of the government of the Republic, the People's Army drove the enemy back from the territory located north of the 38th parallel and advanced 10–15 kilometers to the South, thus liberating the cities of Onding, Yenan, Kaesong, Pyakchen and a number of other settlements.”9

The North Korean army was rapidly moving forward. Already on June 28, on the third day of the war, Seoul was taken, and the DPRK banner soared over the former residence of Syngman Rhee. The 3rd and 4th divisions and the 105th tank brigade, which distinguished themselves during the capture of the city, received the honorary name “Seoul”, and their commanders and military personnel were nominated for awards.

Soon a new life began to improve in the city. Portraits of Stalin and Kim Il Sung began to appear on the streets. Kim himself addressed a greeting to the people of Seoul, congratulating them on their “liberation from the fascist yoke of the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique” and calling on them to quickly restore the people’s committees “dissolved by the reaction.” About 60 members of the PK National Assembly, including Kim Po-sik, remained in the city and welcomed the new government.

The communist leaders of the South returned. Pak Hon-yong left for the city, and his comrade-in-arms, Lee Seung-yop, the Minister of Justice of the DPRK and one of the leaders of the local faction, was appointed mayor. The new government was unable to establish normal life and the work of factories during the war. According to South Korean historian Kim Sung-chil, the city stopped centralized food supplies, introducing a coupon system only for civil servants. As a result, many Seoul residents went hungry10. Park and Lee suppressed any discontent with an iron fist. It soon became clear that something had to be done with the one and a half million residents of the city. Kim decided to draft part of the population into the army, use part of it in the industrial enterprises of the North, and resettle part of the population to the countryside.

North Korean biographers of Kim write that he visited Seoul several times, supervised transformations in the KPA-occupied provinces of the South, and even personally went to the front line to re-educate commanders “infected with sycophancy and clinging to fighting methods that did not meet the conditions of Korea”11.

Despite the success of the offensive, from the first days of the war the KPA faced serious problems. Shtykov wrote to Moscow that communication between headquarters, divisions and other units was immediately lost; commanders often acted at their own peril and risk. In addition, the command staff turned out to be inexperienced in combat and poorly organized the use of artillery and battle management.

After the capture of Seoul, the troops unexpectedly paused for several days without developing an offensive. This fact is interpreted in different ways, explaining it by difficulties in transport advancement, difficulties with command and control of troops and, finally, the confusion of Kim and his comrades due to the fact that a general uprising did not begin in the country and the final fall of the Syngman Rhee regime did not occur. . In any case, valuable time was lost. Stalin, who was closely following events, anxiously asked Shtykov why there was no information about progress, and insisted that the offensive should be continued immediately.

In the meantime, the situation has changed radically. The Americans intervened in the war. Upon learning of the outbreak of hostilities, President Harry Truman, according to eyewitnesses, exclaimed: “In the name of the Lord God, I am going to teach them a lesson!” Washington concluded: “Uncle Joe” is trying to test the strength of the Western powers. If we cede Korea to the Reds today, then tomorrow the Soviets will try to take over the whole world.

Truman, who later called the decision to participate in the Korean War the most difficult of his presidency, did not hold a long debate in Congress about declaring war on the DPRK, but chose to act through the United Nations. He always attached great importance to the UN as a structure capable of resolving international conflicts. Now this was all the more convenient because the USSR boycotted the meetings of the Security Council, protesting that China was represented at the UN by the Kuomintang government, and not by the Communists. On June 26, an urgent meeting of the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the North Korean attack and called for the withdrawal of troops beyond the 38th parallel. That same day, Truman ordered the use of the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the Far East to support South Korea. American planes began to strike at advancing North Korean troops.

North Korean historians Kim Chang Ho and Kang Geun Jo argue that Resolution No. 82 contradicts a number of articles of the UN Charter and is unfair, since it was an act of interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people12. Indeed, the UN intervened in the Korean Civil War. Not to mention the fact that this “peacekeeping” organization acted as a participant in hostilities, supporting one of the conflicting parties. At the end of July, in an interview with L'Humanité, Kim Il Sung argued that if not for foreign intervention, the war would have ended already. He was not far from the truth: the fate of Syngman Rhee and his regime was sealed, but thanks to the intervention of the UN, the war lasted for three long years, claimed millions of lives and ended with zero results.

On June 27, the Security Council met again, approved the use of American troops in Korea and recommended that other countries support these actions. The UK, France, Taiwan, Cuba, Ecuador, Norway, and the USA voted in favor. Against - Yugoslavia. India and Egypt abstained. The formation of an international coalition under the UN flag has begun. A total of 16 countries took part in it: the USA, South Korea, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Greece, the Netherlands, as well as Colombia, Ethiopia, Thailand and the Philippines. The participation of exotic countries gave the war a special flavor: “On the battlefield one could meet two-meter tall Ethiopians, half-wild Algerians from the French battalion, Turks who were fluent in the art of bayonet fighting, Thais who masterfully wielded knives and other “close combat” tools, and even Puerto Ricans, in rare moments of rest, dancing incendiary dances”13. The main burden of the fighting fell on the shoulders of the Americans. In the ground forces their share was 50.3 percent (South Korean - 40 percent), in the Navy - 85.9 percent and in the Air Force - 93.4 percent. Seventy-year-old General Douglas MacArthur became the commander-in-chief of the UN forces.

Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) was born in the American outback, in Arkansas. His father was a military man; since childhood he was accustomed to traveling to garrisons and could not imagine any other career other than military service. Douglas managed to enter the prestigious military school West Point and graduating with honors. At the end of World War I, he saw action in France and became the youngest general in the American Army. Even then, many noted that he owed his brilliant career more to personal charm, the ability to get along with superiors and communicate correctly with the press than to success on the battlefield.

By the early 1930s, MacArthur became Chief of the General Staff. In this position, he became famous for the defeat of his former comrades - veterans of the First World War. During the Great Depression, authorities stopped paying them cash benefits. Many lost their livelihood. 15 thousand veterans went to seek the truth in Washington, where they held demonstrations and rallies. MacArthur, tasked by President Herbert Hoover with the task of solving the problem, immediately took action and attacked their camp with regular troops. In the “Battle of Anacostia,” several dozen peaceful protesters were killed and hundreds were wounded. The general himself stated that, no less than: “The march of the so-called veterans for benefits was a conspiracy of the Reds, and since I crushed this conspiracy, the Kremlin put me on the list of people to be destroyed.”

MacArthur met World War II in the Philippines. There he was engaged in creating an army at the request of local authorities, receiving from them the rank of field marshal and the nickname Luzon Napoleon (from the second largest city of the archipelago - Luzon). In December 1941, the Philippines was attacked by the Japanese. In the midst of heavy fighting, Napoleon of Luzon abandoned his troops and flew to Australia. The remnants of his army surrendered, where tens of thousands of soldiers and officers died. However, three years later he managed to win back. At the beginning of 1945, the Americans cleared the Philippines of the Japanese, and in the fall he already accepted Japan's surrender on board the battleship Missouri in Tokyo. It was MacArthur who led the American occupation forces in Japan, becoming the sovereign master of the country. He added a new one to his titles - the media began to call him Proconsul of the East.

For millions of Americans, MacArthur was a national hero. Therefore, President Truman, although wary of him because of the general's political and personal ambitions, did not think long. In fact, he had neither time nor choice. MacArthur received orders to lead troops into battle and stop Kim Il Sung's soldiers.

American units began to hastily transfer to Korea. Despite the rapid advance of the KPA and the chaos in the South Korean army, the Yankees were confident that they would put the enemy to flight. “We will throw out the North Koreans, and if the Russians interfere, we will throw them out too,” said Major General John Church upon arriving in the temporary capital of the PK Daejeon14. However, the reality turned out to be completely different.

The country's ancient capital, Daejeong, was the next target for North Korean troops. The operation to capture the city was given exceptional importance. By order of Kim Il Sung, the front was headed by Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Kim Chak, and another former partisan, Kang Gon, became the chief of staff of the front. It was planned to take the city with tank chains in a pincer movement from both sides and create a “cauldron” there for American and South Korean troops.

On July 5, Americans and North Koreans met on the battlefield for the first time. A column of tanks from the 105th Brigade and soldiers from the KPA 4th Infantry Division approached the village of Osan between Seoul and Daejeon. There, 400 infantrymen of Smith's American special squad were already waiting for them, lying on the hills along the road. First the artillery, and then the soldiers, opened fire on the tanks. They managed to hit several cars, but the rest went ahead. Then North Korean infantry moved in and began pursuing the Americans. By evening, some of them were killed, others retreated through the surrounding rice fields.

On July 8, Kim Il Sung spoke on the radio again. His speech was entirely devoted to the United States and its intervention in the war. He appealed to the patriotic feelings of the Koreans, calling for them to unite against the external aggressor:

“The American imperialists have launched an armed attack on our homeland and our people. Their aircraft barbarously bomb the cities and villages of our country, killing civilians. The naval squadrons of the American imperialists, who illegally invaded our territorial waters, are mercilessly shelling our coastal cities and villages, and units of American troops that have landed on the yet unliberated part of our homeland are trampling our native land with their bloody boots, expanding the front, frantically trying to stop the advance of our army to the south, committing all sorts of atrocities...

In this sacred struggle for the freedom and independence of the homeland, may the warriors of our People's Army and all our people be inspired to heroic deeds by the glorious deeds and valor of our ancestors - commanders Ylti Moon Daek, Kang Gam Chan, Lee Sun Sin and others, who selflessly defended our homeland from foreigners invaders! Forward to the complete expulsion of the American imperialists from our native land, where the ashes of our ancestors rest and our beloved generation grows up! Let us complete our just liberation struggle with victory, so that the glorious banner of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will develop in Busan, Mokpo, Jiedyu Island, and Mount Hannansan.

Forward to the victory! Long live a free and independent Korea!”15.

The source of inspiration is immediately visible. This is Stalin’s speech during the battle for Moscow: “Let the banner of Suvorov and Kutuzov overshadow you!”

The “cauldron” around Taejong soon closed. The remnants of the troops defending the city were surrounded. During the Daejeon Offensive, the North Koreans captured many prisoners. Among them was the commander of the 24th US Infantry Division, General William Dean. He became the first and only American general to be captured since World War II. Dean spent the entire war in captivity. By his own admission, the general had fun killing flies, of which he destroyed 40,671 over the course of three long years.

The KPA's next goal was to reach the Naktong River and capture the cities of Daegu and Gimcheon, which opened the way to Busan. At first, the offensive developed successfully. By mid-August, 90 percent of the territory of the Republic of Korea was in the hands of the North. In Busan, overcrowded with refugees and soldiers, panic began. Everyone who could tried to evacuate to Japan. It seemed that victory was already close.

However, here the North Koreans encountered stubborn resistance from the Allied troops. The KPA soldiers were already exhausted to the limit. And the enemy constantly brought fresh forces into the battle. By the end of August, the forces of the South Koreans and the allied coalition numbered 180 thousand people. This outnumbered the North Koreans by 2.5 times, with the Allies having an overwhelming superiority in artillery and ships. US aircraft dominated the air, bombing both KPA troops and the territories they occupied, as well as the cities of the DPRK. The new commander of the American ground forces, General Walton Walker, who resembled a bulldog in his habits and appearance, was categorical: “We are fighting a battle for time. They are fighting for space. We have no other line to fall back to. The retreat to Busan would be the greatest meat grinder in history. We must fight to the end."16 Desperate attempts by the North Koreans to launch an offensive on Busan were stopped, and by September 8 the KPA was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, Kang Gun died from a bomb explosion. The talented military leader, a graduate of the partisan children's company and the 88th brigade, was barely 32 years old. When in 1948 Kang Gon, who had just been appointed chief of staff of the KPA, went on a visit to the USSR, the Soviet generals did not hide their surprise at his youth.

Despite the successes of the first weeks and months of the war, Kim Il Sung did not indulge in euphoria. He understood the danger of the situation. After all, from the very beginning we had to fight not with Syngman Rhee, but with the Americans and the coalition led by them. The young North Korean army could not defeat such an enemy. Therefore, Kim tried in every way to solve main task- obtain help and support from the USSR and China. And they, unlike the United States, were in no hurry to actively intervene in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Soviet Ambassador Shtykov regularly reported to Stalin on the progress of hostilities, Kim’s requests and his assessment of the situation. This correspondence shows how his mood changed. In a letter dated July 1, Comrade Feng Xi asked how the Korean leaders reacted to American air raids on North Korean areas, whether they were afraid or continued to hold firm. Shtykov replied that the leadership of the DPRK and the KPA, including Kim Il Sung, correctly assessed the current military-political situation in Korea, believed in complete victory and was directing all efforts towards a further broad offensive in the South. However, some leading figures, including Kim Doo Bong and Hong Myung Hee, spoke out about the difficulties of waging war against the Americans by Korean forces and tried to find out from Kim Il Sung the USSR's position on this issue.

On July 7, after the first clashes with the Americans, the number of those wavering increased: “Some of the leadership began to fear for the success of their troops in combat operations against the American troops landing in Korea. Only a small group of leaders (Kim Il Sung, Kim Chak, Park Il Woo) show confidence and calm.

In a conversation with me, Kim Il Sung, frankly, said that it was difficult for him, since many ministers - Kim Doo Bong, Kim Dar Hyun - were cautiously expressing fears for the outcome of the war in connection with the American intervention.

He further reported that Kim Doo Bong visited him daily and asked what actions the Soviet government intended to take; and Pak Hong-yong directly raised the question of the need to officially ask the Soviet government to cover North Korea with aviation, and to the Chinese government to send the Chinese army into Korea.

Kim Il Sung did not express his opinion on these issues, but said that he scolded them and asked them not to upset him, since he himself was already starting to get nervous.”17

The North Koreans asked Moscow to use military advisers from the USSR in the KPA units advancing in the South. Kang Gon directly told Kim that he had no reason to go to Seoul without advisers, since he was not able to lead the troops. For the first time in all the meetings, Shtykov saw Kim so “upset and somewhat confused.” He offered to grant his request. But the Kremlin was silent.

On July 8, Kim personally addressed a letter to Stalin with a request to use 25–30 military advisers at the KPA front headquarters, since “national cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of leading troops.” However, the “father of nations” was adamant. Considering that the appearance of Soviet military personnel in the South or the capture of one of them could lead to a sharp aggravation of relations with the United States, he did not give such permission. As a result, during the entire period of hostilities they never crossed the 38th parallel.

But Stalin made efforts on another issue - reviving contacts between Pyongyang and Beijing. Comrade Filippov pointed out to the Chinese leadership the need to have a representative in the DPRK, and also that it was desirable to concentrate nine divisions on the border. Soon, the Chinese attorney arrived in Pyongyang and conveyed to Kim Il Sung that the PRC government was ready to help with everything necessary in the war.

On August 19, unable to withstand the constant stress, Kim fell ill and went to bed. He conveyed to Shtykov a request to send “international flying forces” to provide air cover for troops under American attacks. “Kim Il Sung has been in a somewhat depressed state lately. He is very worried about the bombing of industrial facilities and railways by American planes. transport, declaring that the Americans will destroy the entire industry and we will not be able to create such factories for a long time. And now, due to the intensification of raids on troops, he is worried that we have nothing to cover the troops with,” Shtykov wrote.

However, Stalin responded only with words of support: “In such a war there are no complete successes. There were no continuous successes for the Russians during civil war and even more so during the war with Germany... In addition, Comrade. Kim Il Sung must not forget that Korea is no longer alone, that it has allies who are and will continue to help it. The position of the Russians during the Anglo-French-American intervention in 1919 was several times worse than the position of the Korean comrades at the present time.”18

It is unlikely that these words, instead of the real help that was expected in Pyongyang, consoled Kim. Moreover, very soon the situation at the front changed and became much worse than that of the “Russians in 1919.”

MacArthur, thinking about how to ensure a turning point in the war, came to the conclusion that the blow should be delivered to the extended KPA communications. For an amphibious landing behind enemy lines, he chose Incheon Bay on the west coast of Korea, not far from Seoul. The factor of surprise was to be decisive. An attack here was considered unlikely, since only a few hours a day were suitable for landing, and during this time the coastline was filled with liquid mud. Incheon was defended by only 3 thousand North Koreans, and the island of Wolmi, which covered the harbor, was defended by two companies of marines.

From September 10 to 12, Allied aircraft and ships subjected Wolmi and Inchon to intense bombardment. For several days, the defenders of the island, who had only two guns and one machine gun left, did not allow the 45,000-strong US contingent to begin landing. The Americans were able to set foot on the island only on September 15, when almost all the sailors defending it died. Wolmi was called the “Korean Brest Fortress.”

The second period of the war began, which in the DPRK is called “strategic retreat.” The Americans landed at Inchon and moved towards Seoul. At the same time, the US 8th Army went on the offensive from the Busan bridgehead. Seoul fell on September 24. Soon the two fronts united, and in early October the Allies reached the 38th parallel.

The question of whether to move fighting to the North, was discussed in the American establishment and at the UN. The successfully launched offensive led to the fact that in both cases the point of view of the “hawks” prevailed: to move forward until the communists were completely defeated. On September 29, the UN adopted a corresponding resolution (however, this time the Americans passed it not through the Security Council, where the Soviet representative returned, but through the General Assembly, where decisions were made by a simple majority of votes). MacArthur called on the North Korean authorities to lay down their arms and surrender, and to assist the UN in creating a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea.

Kim Il Sung, however, was not going to give up. “If necessary, I’ll go back to the partisans in the mountains,” he told his generals with a smile. On October 11, he spoke on the radio, demanding to “protect every inch of our native land with blood and direct all our forces to crushing blows against the enemy.” It became dangerous to remain in Pyongyang, and Kim, along with his Cabinet of Ministers, as well as diplomats and military advisers, evacuated to the northern regions of the country, closer to the Chinese border.

During these difficult days, Soviet citizens heard very unpleasant words addressed to them. In a conversation with one of the military specialists, the head of the army’s political department, Kim Il, shouted in his face: “We do not need advisers and their advice, but real help!” Shtykov informed Kim about this, and he promised to take action: to appoint Lee Seung Yup in Kim Il’s place, fortunately he had to be relieved of his duties as mayor of Seoul.

The Allies advanced in two main directions: towards Pyongyang and further to the Amnok River, and along the east coast - to Wonsan and Chongjin. MacArthur used his favorite tactics of air and water landings. On October 20, American planes dropped a large group of paratroopers north of Pyongyang, near Sukchen. General Mu Jeong, who was defending the city, chose to leave it without a fight so as not to be surrounded. The capital was taken, but it was not possible to capture the North Korean leadership, as MacArthur had hoped.

From October 20 to 25, the amphibious assault was landed in the port of Wonsan. By this time, however, the South Koreans were already in the city. The Americans lost a lot of time clearing the water area of ​​mines. After a successful landing, the troops moved to the northern regions of the DPRK, towards the Soviet border.

On October 24, the allies reached Amnok in separate areas. The South Koreans took a flask of water and sent it to Syngman Rhee, and the Americans, in their military tradition, urinated in the river. It seemed that MacArthur's words that the war would end by Thanksgiving (November 23) and that soldiers would celebrate Christmas at home had almost become a reality. During a meeting with Truman on Wake Island, the general convinced the president that neither China nor the USSR would interfere in the conflict. However, neither he nor his interlocutor knew about the intensive negotiations that took place in those October days between Kim, Mao and Stalin.

Back on September 29, Kim Il Sung and Pak Hong Yong addressed a letter to the Soviet leader: “At the moment the enemy troops cross north of the 38th parallel, we really need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union. If for some reason this is not possible, then provide us with assistance in creating international volunteer units in China and other people's democracies to assist our struggle."19

Stalin's reaction was immediate. In the dead of night on October 1, he dictated a telegram. But not to Pyongyang, but to Beijing: “I am far from Moscow on vacation and somewhat disconnected from the events in Korea. However, from the information I received today, I see that the situation among the Korean comrades is becoming desperate.” Comrade Filippov advised Mao to “immediately move at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel.”

“MacArthur demands that we raise our hands. But we have never had such a habit,” Kim told the Chinese ambassador that same day. He gave Mao a telegram in which he expressed the hope that the People's Liberation Army would provide direct assistance in the fighting.

On October 3, Premier of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai invited the Indian Ambassador and told him that China would be forced to intervene in the conflict if American troops crossed the 38th parallel. This information was passed on to US authorities and was ignored by them. MacArthur was confident that the Chinese were bluffing.

In Beijing, long, detailed discussions began among the party leadership. Mao was not the sole ruler; he had to listen to his comrades from the CPC Central Committee before making a decision. Over a cup of green tea, the pros and cons were endlessly discussed and weighed. Opinions differed radically on the issue of the Korean War. Opponents of intervention had compelling arguments: China had just ended a years-long civil war. It was necessary to restore the country that was in ruins, and not to fight such a strong enemy as the Americans.

Zhou Enlai argued that an active offensive is the best defense. Mao also leaned toward helping Kim Il Sung, believing that the Chinese "would feel heavy at heart if they only stood by and watched while another nation was in crisis." The Chairman's point of view ultimately prevailed. On October 13, Zhou informed Stalin about the decision taken immediately move troops to Korea. Leaning back in his chair, he said with satisfaction: “After all, the Chinese comrades are good, they’re still good!” And then he promised to speed up the supply of weapons and provide air cover for the offensive in Korea in the future.

A. Pantsov believes that Mao took part in the Korean War “only to please Stalin”20. One can hardly agree with this statement. For both pragmatic and ideological reasons, China could not remain aloof. It was the Korean direction that was most vulnerable to him. The presence of American troops on the border of Manchuria, from where the northeastern regions of the country and the capital were exposed, could not be allowed. The presence of Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in Taiwan, who did not hide his desire to regain the main part of China and even bombed the territory of the PRC, created a direct danger of a war on two fronts. “Korea and China are connected like lips and teeth, like gates and houses,” Chinese political parties and organizations said in a statement. By breaking their lips, the Americans could also knock out their teeth. This was well understood in Beijing.

In addition, the same international solidarity played a significant role: the Chinese communists could not abandon the Korean communists to the mercy of fate. The leader of Manchuria, Gao Gang, said in February 1951: “We must proceed from the fact that the existence of Korea and the existence of China are phenomena of the same kind, that both of these countries belong to the same camp. Therefore, China will send its troops to help Korea and fight America. He did this to protect his home and his country."21

Sending troops to Korea seemed like a kind of debt that big China was repaying to its small neighbor. Moreover, the debt is double. After all, Kim Il Sung, firstly, was a member of the CPC for ten years and fought with his unit as part of the United Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army for the freedom and unity of China, like many other Korean partisans. Secondly, immediately after the liberation of North Korea by Soviet troops and the creation of the KPA, he sent detachments of volunteers who actively participated in the hostilities to China to help the communists.

In order not to be drawn into a big war with the United States, Beijing decided to send troops to Korea under the guise of people's volunteers. Kim Il Sung remained the supreme commander of the Chinese-North Korean coalition, and the volunteer units were led by Marshal Peng Dehuai.

Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was a native of Hunan Province and a fellow countryman of Mao Zedong. He was born into a simple peasant family. He spent his childhood in poverty: after the death of his parents, he became a beggar, worked in a mine and on construction sites. At the age of less than 18, he entered military service - first in the army of local militarists, and then in the People's Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang. After graduating from officer courses, Peng quickly made a career, going from company commander to regiment commander. Soon, however, he became disillusioned with the policies of the Nationalists and in 1928 joined the Chinese Communist Party. He did not understand communist ideology and joined the CCP out of a desire to build a more just society. However, the young commander was not required to be a Marxist theorist.

During the civil war in China, Peng took part in many battles and battles, including the Long March of the Chinese Communists. During the war with Japan he was deputy commander of the 8th Army. In 1949, after the creation of the People's Republic of China, he was appointed a member of the Central People's Government, deputy chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council.

Even during the civil war, Peng often showed independence and allowed himself to argue with Mao. However, the Chairman valued him as a talented commander and military leader. The experience of many years of guerrilla warfare was useful to the marshal in Korea.

On October 19, the Chinese began crossing the border. Peng informed Kim that there were 260 thousand people under his command, and in the future their number was planned to increase to 600 thousand. They were supposed to act together with units of the KPA, which at that time numbered about 100 thousand fighters. The Chinese-North Korean coalition had a noticeable advantage in manpower, but was significantly inferior to its allies in the number of tanks, large-caliber guns and aircraft.

There was a song about Chinese volunteers in Korea (known in Russia, performed by Yegor Letov and Civil Defense):

Through the mountains on grass and sand, Past the quiet steppe Manchu villages, To the waters of the blue river Amnokkan The young volunteer was walking. He was coming towards us, that young Chinese man, Our brother was coming to help us in battle, To help us cope with trouble: Drive the Americans away!

And off they went! The Chinese turned out to be an extremely unpleasant enemy for the UN troops. They were poorly armed and equipped, but unpretentious and hardy. Soldiers and officers wore simple, strict uniforms without insignia, thereby emphasizing the equality of all volunteers. The fighters were mostly wearing sneakers. In the icy winter of 1950/51, to prevent their feet from freezing, they rubbed them with pepper - and quickly and silently moved long distances - up to 25 kilometers per night. The Chinese were excellent at camouflage and knew how to go without food for a long time. And in the attack they took it by surprise. They did not conduct an offensive in the traditional sense of the word, but infiltrated through the front lines in small groups, surrounded enemy units and attacked them at night, suddenly swooping in with torches, whistles and shouts. In essence, the Allies were faced with a huge army fighting using guerrilla methods. And it took them a long time to learn how to effectively resist it.

Air support, as Stalin promised, was provided by the USSR. The Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, one of whose divisions was commanded by the best fighter pilot of the USSR and three times Hero of the Soviet Union, Ivan Kozhedub, was based at airfields in Manchuria. Even earlier, Soviet fighters arrived in southern China to fight Taiwanese aircraft. The 64th Corps and the anti-aircraft artillery units attached to it covered the northeast of China, irrigation structures and bridges on Amnok, as well as the border areas of the DPRK. At the same time, they were prohibited from fighting over the sea, appearing south of Pyongyang and beyond the 38th parallel. To maintain secrecy in the air, they had to communicate in Chinese. True, during the battles this turned out to be impossible, and “the great and mighty” sounded on the air, interspersed with selective obscenities.

Our pilots entered the first battles in early November. In the skies of Korea, they had a chance to get even with the Americans for the raid on October 8, when two fighters invaded Soviet airspace and bombed the Sukhaya Rechka airbase near Vladivostok. After the incident, Washington issued an official apology, but a bitter feeling remained.

The newest Soviet jet fighter at that time, the MiG-15, quickly gained air superiority, showing its superiority over the American F-80 Shooting Star, F-84 Thunderjet and F-86 Saber. The best Soviet aces Nikolai Sutyagin and Yevgeny Pepelyaev shot down 21 and 20 enemy aircraft, respectively, during the war. American pilots nicknamed the area from the Amnok River to the Cheongchon River “MiG Alley”, trying not to appear there unless absolutely necessary.

Thus, despite the fact that the USSR did not officially take part in the hostilities, this war was ours too. Soviet pilots fought in the skies of Korea, Soviet officers helped organize command and control of troops on the ground, not to mention the supply of weapons, ammunition and food, without which it was impossible to fight.

Soviet people closely monitored the situation in Korea. The Korean topic was the main one on the pages of the press. Newspapers en masse published letters of support for the DPRK, as well as poems by ordinary workers and employees:

We demand: hands off Korea, American freedom stranglers! The working people do not want war!

No, they will never achieve Good luck in their brazen undertaking. I, like everyone else, raise a cry: Get out of Korea, murderers!

However, not everyone shared the point of view of the party and government. As recorded by the competent authorities, state farm worker G. Grichuk from the Tyumen region said that “the war in Korea was started by the communists themselves, who want to spread their influence everywhere, but America does not want to allow this, and it is doing the right thing by waging a war in Korea. The Americans will defeat the communists in Korea, then they will begin to destroy this infection throughout the globe.” And the rabbi of the Vladikavkaz synagogue N. Denenberg even argued that “the Soviet government does not care about its people, but exports everything to Korea”22. Of course, such talk at the end of the Stalin era was followed by conviction under the notorious Article 58.10 and sending to a camp.

On October 25, the Chinese-North Korean coalition launched its first strike against the allies. And from the end of November, an offensive began in the South along the entire front. “The Chinese are already here. The Third World War has arrived!” - General Church exclaimed after one of their surprise attacks. Allied troops were often surrounded. “Gentlemen, we are not retreating, we are simply advancing in a different direction,” the officers cheered. However, when advancing in the opposite direction, they suffered huge losses. The situation was worsened by the onset of cold weather and partisan detachments of North Korean soldiers who remained in the rear and opened a second front there.

Realizing that there was no strength left to defend Pyongyang, General Walker gave the order to leave the city, after blowing up the bridges across Taedong. On December 6, Pyongyang was liberated, and by the New Year, Chinese-North Korean troops reached the 38th parallel. On the east coast, elements of General Almond's 10th Division had to be transported from the port of Hungnam to Pusan ​​by ship. This largest sea evacuation in US history reminded many of Operation Dynamo, when in 1940, British and French units, pinned ashore at Dunkirk by German troops, were hastily transported by sea to Great Britain.

During the volunteer offensive, UN troops lost about 23 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The Chinese and North Koreans also suffered heavy losses. They didn’t even save Mao’s own son.

28-year-old Mao Anying died in late November during an American air raid on Peng Dehuai's headquarters, where he served as a translator. Anyin was brought up in the Ivanovo boarding school in the Soviet Union, where his name was Seryozha. During the Great Patriotic War, he wrote three letters to Stalin with a request to send him as a volunteer to the front. In the end, he managed to get into the school of sergeants, then to the military academy and, at the end of the war, to the 2nd Belorussian Front, where he participated in battles. After the victory, Anying returned to China, and in the fall of 1950 he again asked to volunteer for the war, now for the Korean War. His father did not stop him.

Upon learning of the death of his eldest son, Mao sat in a chair for several days, smoking cigarette after cigarette. He became haggard and thinner, but didn’t show it. “That’s how war is, it can’t happen without casualties... A simple soldier died, there’s no need to make a special event out of it, because it’s my son.”

This incident, as well as the similar behavior of Stalin, who sent his sons to war, one of whom, Yakov, died in captivity, is often considered an example of the cruelty of both communist rulers. Like, they didn’t even spare their children. However, the very fact that their children fought and did not sit in the rear evokes respect. And they both pitied their sons; they simply believed that the leader had no right to show weakness.

The entry of the Chinese into hostilities has sparked a debate in Washington about what to do next. MacArthur proposed expanding the scale of the war: opening a second front against the PRC with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, as well as conducting nuclear bombing of its territory. Truman did not rule out the possibility of using nuclear weapons. As a result, such a scenario was abandoned, but not at all because of humanism. Washington's main priority remained containing the USSR. On the one hand, there were not so many nuclear bombs to scatter in Korea. On the other hand, the inevitable spread of the war to China in this case would involve the United States, as one of the generals put it, “in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong moment and with the wrong enemy.”

The issue of the Americans using bacteriological weapons, of which they were accused by the DPRK and the USSR, has not been completely clarified. But bombs filled with white phosphorus, thermite and napalm were actively used. In the movie Apocalypse Now there is a famous scene of the jungle being destroyed by napalm during the Vietnam War. However, long before this, in Korea, American pilots flooded villages and cities with it, burning their inhabitants alive. Soviet diplomat Viktor Tarasov recalled what the city of Sinuiju looked like before and after the “chemical treatment” from the air: “I didn’t want to leave Sinuiju. The city already seemed like its own, albeit temporary, home. I explored its central streets, small restaurants that served unpretentious local snacks of chicken and kimchi - juicy Korean cabbage and beans, sprinkled with liquid soy... But what soon happened to Sinuiju was difficult to imagine: the city was literally wiped off the face of the earth... When I got there again, the area was unrecognizable. As it turned out, American planes mercilessly doused the city around the circumference with a sea of ​​napalm and then methodically, block by block, swept away all living things. All around lay scorched and dead earth, in places covered with frost after the cold night.”23.

With the withdrawal of UN troops from North Korea, the question arose of who would be responsible for the miscalculations and defeats of the KPA in recent months. Stalin believed that Ambassador Shtykov and the military advisers should be primarily responsible. After discussing the Korean issue at a special meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 27, he sent a telegram to Pyongyang, blaming them for the following strategic mistakes: failure to comply with the order to withdraw four KPA divisions to the Seoul area during the Inchon landing; incorrect tactics of using tanks in battle, without preliminary artillery strikes, as a result of which they were easily destroyed by the enemy; illiteracy and blindness in intelligence; misunderstanding of the strategic significance of the Inchon landings; exceptionally weak assistance to the Korean command in matters of communications, command and control, organization of reconnaissance and combat, as a result of which the KPA troops are almost uncontrollable.

Stalin paid special attention to the fact that military advisers who went through the Great Patriotic War were even more to blame for the failures of the war than the inexperienced Korean command. Was he right to harshly criticize his people in Pyongyang?

In general, Stalin’s assessments of the course of hostilities, his recommendations, analysis of the situation and prediction of ways of its development show the depth of his strategic thinking. And the mistakes that he pointed out to Shtykov and Vasiliev took place. Someone had to answer for the defeat of the USSR satellite country. However, it is also obvious that the DPRK could not resist the United States and the allied coalition alone. And our military advisers, who did not even have the right to travel to the troops beyond the 38th parallel, could not fundamentally change anything. It was still impossible to do without the Chinese...

At the end of November, Shtykov and Vasiliev were removed from their duties “for miscalculations in their work that emerged during the counter-offensive of American and South Korean troops in the northern regions of Korea” and recalled to Moscow. Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Ambassador managed to get closer and even become friends. “Well, apparently, I also need to resign from the post of commander-in-chief,” he said to Shtykov at parting24.

Stalin's punishment was not particularly severe. Shtykov was demoted to the rank of lieutenant general and fired from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, but he continued his party career, becoming deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Kaluga Regional Council. Later Terenty Fomich was restored to military rank, worked as first secretary of the Novgorod regional party committee, and then returned to the Far East as first secretary of the Primorsky regional committee of the CPSU.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Razuvaev was appointed new ambassador and concurrently head of military advisers. A native of the Kursk region, a front-line soldier, during the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 1st Shock Army, Razuvaev remained in Korea until the end of the war.

Someone in the North Korean leadership also had to be held accountable for the mistakes. This is the logic of the system: either the leader will find and punish the culprits, or the leader himself will quickly be appointed guilty. This important task was resolved by Kim Il Sung at the Third Plenum of the TPCC Central Committee of the second convocation, which opened on December 21 in the city of Kang. He gave a long, devastating speech there, criticizing many high-ranking party members and military personnel. The report was so harsh that it was published with cuts.

Summing up the results of the five months of war, Kim Il Sung dwelled in detail on the pros and cons of the path traveled. Among the positive results, he named the timely creation and organization of the KPA, the rallying of the people around the party and army, the assistance received from the fraternal peoples of the USSR and China, and the heroism of the Korean people, which became “the banner of the liberation movement of the peoples of colonial countries.” In addition, he noted, during the war the KPA gained serious combat experience, and the enemy’s difficulties were increasing.

The list of shortcomings that led to defeat at the first stage of the war was much more extensive:

sufficient reserves were not prepared;

the army and its leadership are young and inexperienced;

in military units discipline is weak and orders are often not followed;

the enemy was often driven out of positions rather than his manpower destroyed;

units are not ready to conduct combat in specific conditions with the enemy’s technical superiority, and do not know how to conduct mountain and forest battles;

Supply work in the rear is insufficiently organized; many pests have penetrated into the rear units;

Political work in the troops is poorly developed.

The last point was addressed to the head of the army's political department, Kim Il. Shtykov's complaint about his arrogant conversation with the Soviet military expert had an effect. He was removed from all posts and expelled from the TPSC. “Not only did we not launch a fight against the capitulatory tendency, which was that supposedly without aircraft it is impossible to fight the enemy, moreover, Comrade Kim Il himself, who was responsible for political work in the army, adhered to the same tendency,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief25. (After some time, he reinstated Kim Il in the party and returned all his regalia to him.)

Among the culprits, Kim named representatives of all party groups. The Yan'an resident My Jong aroused particular anger when he surrendered Pyongyang to the allies without a fight. Kim called him a coward and a capitulator, saying that he should face not just political disgrace, but a criminal sentence.

The “locals” and personally member of the Central Committee Ho Son Taek got it for the fact that a large guerrilla war was never launched in the rear of the southerners. Pak Hong-yong's last name was not mentioned, but everyone remembered the one who promised the never-to-be-happened uprising of 200 thousand of his supporters in the South after the start of the war.

Kim criticized the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ministries of communications, education, culture and others for the lack of “iron discipline”, announced the expulsion of the leaders of several provinces from the party and the removal of the commanders of two divisions for cowardice. “During the current war, it has clearly become clear who is the true and who is the imaginary member of our party,” he concluded.

Kim Il Sung returned to the destroyed and burned Pyongyang at the very end of 1950. Since American air raids continued continuously and it was dangerous to stay in the houses, almost the entire population of the city moved into caves. The Pyongyang people themselves blew up their own dwellings in the rocks, extracting fuel from unexploded American bombs. Kim also had to move to live underground: he settled in one of the bunkers, an extensive network of which was hollowed out in the depths of Moran Hill in the center of Pyongyang. A whole town was set up there with living quarters, a command post and even a theater hall where official receptions, meetings and performances took place. Knowing this, American pilots constantly attacked Moran, trying to drop a bomb on the stairs so that she would roll down the steps. However, they failed to blow up the well-equipped fortification. According to the recollections of Sovinformburo representative Vladimir Tolstikov, Kim at that time behaved modestly and ate little: “In the morning, as a rule, a bowl of rice or corn and a glass mineral water. I didn’t drink tea or coffee at all, even at receptions.”26

Kim's other place of stay during the war was the headquarters of the High Command in the Sopo Valley, near Pyongyang. Here, in between work, he cultivated vegetables and fruits in the garden and received soldiers who had distinguished themselves at the front.

In January, Kim Il Sung's closest ally, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DPRK Kim Chak, died. Kim himself writes that he died in his office from cardiac paralysis. A. Lankov, in turn, claims that he died during an American raid on the crossing. Posthumously, Kim Chak received the title of Hero of the DPRK.

Meanwhile, the North Korean-Chinese coalition was faced with the question of whether to cross the ill-fated 38th parallel again. “Strike while the iron is hot” was the informal advice of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko to the Chinese Ambassador27. Needless to say that the cautious Andrei Andreevich expressed the opinion of the owner of the Kremlin, whose word was law? However, Mao also advocated continuing the offensive.

The New Year of 1951 began with the flight of the South Korean units defending Seoul under pressure from the Chinese and North Koreans. General Matthew Ridgway, describing their panicked retreat, admitted that he had never seen anything worse than a fleeing army. “When the hell are we going to get out of this damn country?” - the American infantrymen cursed, looking at the Koreans scurrying from the battlefield. Neither the general's attempts to stop the soldiers, nor even Syngman Rhee's visit to the front line helped. And again, like six months ago, soldiers and refugees blocked bridges across the Han River, covered with thin, breaking ice. On January 4, Seoul was taken, and then Incheon. UN troops entrenched themselves twenty kilometers south of the former capital of PK.

Combat General Ridgway, who received the nickname Old Iron Tits in Korea for his habit of carrying hand grenades on his chest, adopted a new tactic - destroying the maximum amount of enemy manpower. No wonder they called her “meat grinder.” Using artillery, planes and tanks extensively, he began to gradually push the Chinese and North Koreans back to the 38th parallel.

In mid-March, Seoul was occupied by the Allies. Of the 1.5 million population, only 200 thousand remained in the city, most of the buildings were destroyed. To top it all off, a typhus epidemic began; corpses of the dead and murdered were strewn on the streets. As Time magazine wrote, “the fourth capture of Seoul was a sad job, something like the seizure of a grave.”28 By early April, UN troops controlled the entire territory of South Korea.

And again the 38th parallel... MacArthur and Syngman Rhee demanded to go to Amnok and beyond, to fight with China, and if necessary, with the Soviets. Truman was more careful: he did not want a limited war to escalate into a global one. In addition, the protracted fighting and the flow of coffins with the bodies of American soldiers did not contribute to the popularity of this war in America. MacArthur pointedly ignored the opinion of the White House, making statements about war to the bitter end and predicting otherwise the fall of not only Korea, but also Europe under the onslaught of communism. All this was the last straw for Truman. On April 10, he signed a decree on MacArthur’s resignation due to his failure to comply with the instructions of the president and the American government. General Ridgway was appointed to replace the "Proconsul of the East".

In April and May, the Chinese-North Korean coalition tried several times to go on the offensive. And each time the allies were let down by the South Korean troops, who immediately fled at the first enemy attacks. One of the most famous episodes of this period was the defense of the English Gloucestershire Regiment, which, due to the withdrawal of South Korean units, found itself surrounded, but held the occupied heights for two days, and then managed to break through to its own. True, the surviving Gloucestershires were shot by American tanks, mistaking them for the Chinese. Of the 800-man regiment, 40 survived.

By the beginning of summer, it became clear that both sides did not have the strength to dislodge the enemy from their occupied positions. The front has stabilized. Against this background, peace negotiations began.

In June, Kim Il Sung secretly flew to Beijing for consultations and then to Moscow. There, together with Mao, Gao Gang and Stalin, he discussed the advisability of negotiating with the Americans29. The decision was positive. On June 23, the Soviet representative to the UN, Yakov Malik, made a speech on the radio, proposing a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel. Truman soon endorsed the Soviet initiative, and Ridgway sent a telegram to Kim and Peng Dehuai. He suggested meeting on board a Danish ship in the port of Wonsan. However, on the recommendation of Mao and Stalin, the northerners proposed the border city of Kaesong. The Americans agreed, and the first round of negotiations took place on July 10.

On the North Korean side, the delegation was headed by the new chief of staff of the KPA, the young General Nam Il. He came from Soviet Koreans, before moving to the DPRK he worked as the dean of the Pedagogical Institute in Samarkand and was considered one of the most intelligent military men in the leadership of the Korean army. In addition to him, the negotiators included two more Korean military officers and two Chinese generals. On the Allied side, the chief negotiator was Admiral Turner Joy, plus three other representatives from the American forces and one South Korean general.

From the very beginning, the dialogue took place in a very nervous atmosphere. Both sides sought to demonstrate their superiority and determination not to yield to the enemy in anything. In essence, the negotiations were a continuation of the fighting, only in the room, and not on the battlefield.

Arriving in Kaesong, Joy found a heavily armed "welcome party". He was seated at the negotiating table facing north opposite Nam Il (according to Korean tradition, the winner should face south). To top it all off, the admiral was given a low chair, while Nam Il, on the contrary, was given a tall one. As a result, the Korean, who was shorter than the American, was on the same level with him. Soon Joy noticed this and demanded a normal chair, but the necessary photographs from the negotiations had already been taken by reporters from North Korea and other socialist countries.

The very first serious question - about the dividing line - revealed the irreconcilability of positions. The Americans insisted that it should not pass along the 38th parallel, but along the front line that had developed at that time a little to the north, with a demilitarized zone of 20 miles in both directions. Nam Il called such proposals ridiculous and arrogant. Joy countered that it seemed like the North Koreans were participating in the negotiations “without any sincere or serious intentions.”

By mid-August the dialogue had reached a dead end. One day, its participants sat in complete silence for two hours, looking at each other with hatred. However, at the negotiating table they still held back, and then gave up their souls. Chinese General Zhi Fan referred to Joy as a “turtle egg,” and the Americans, in turn, referred to the North Korean and Chinese delegates as “sons of bitches” and “hypocritical savages.” Armed incidents often occurred in Kaesong, not far from the negotiation site, in which the parties blamed each other.

Speaking on August 15 at a ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, Kim Il Sung spoke about the progress of the dialogue as follows: “... More than 40 days of Kaesong armistice negotiations have passed, and they still have not produced the desired results... Our delegation made clear proposals for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and a ceasefire by establishing a demarcation line along the 38th parallel. However, the Americans still continue to pursue their aggressive policy... Representatives of the UN troops insist on establishing a demarcation line running 80 kilometers north of the 38th parallel from Songdowon through Kumchen to Kaesong, that is, they want to cut off an area equal to 1/20 of the entire Korea Square. It is clear that the enemies want to turn this extremely important militarily territory into a military bridgehead from here to launch a surprise attack on our republic and invade the borders of the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.”30

After this, the negotiations were interrupted, and within a few days the Allies launched an offensive in the central and eastern part of the front. Particularly serious battles took place in the area of ​​strategic heights 1052 and 1211, which covered the Wonsan direction. The North Korean author tells how Kim Il Sung personally, “going through the gunpowder smoke,” went to height 1211 and led one of the battles. After which he called corps commander Choe Hyun and said heartfeltly: “All soldiers are an irreplaceable, priceless treasure, we must feed them warm porridge and hot soup, provide them with comfortable rest and surround them with heartfelt care so that they do not catch a cold, since it seems It’s already blowing cool.”31

The UN troops failed to take the heights and advance to the north. Several of its defenders received the title of heroes of the DPRK. Including Lee Su Bok, who covered an enemy machine gun with his chest, thereby repeating the feat of Alexander Matrosov.

At the end of October, negotiations resumed. They were now taking place in the village of Panmunjeong right on the front line. After some time, the parties managed to agree on a ceasefire line, but new problems arose in connection with the exchange of prisoners of war. The North Koreans put up a list of 11,559 people, the Americans - of 132, 47,432. The first wanted to exchange “everyone for everyone,” the second - “person for person.” According to the Americans, many Chinese prisoners expressed a desire not to return home, but to move to Taiwan, and the Koreans - to remain in the South. (It must be borne in mind that many of the southerners were taken into the KPA during the first North Korean offensive and then ended up in captivity in the South.) No one wanted to give in, and by the end of 1951 the negotiations again reached a dead end.

Truman was furious. “The free world has suffered enough. The Chinese must leave Korea and the Soviets must give Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Hungary their freedom and stop aiding the thugs who are attacking the free world. Otherwise, a full-scale war will begin... Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dalian, Odessa, Stalingrad and every industrial facility in China and the Soviet Union will be destroyed” - this was the note the American president left on January 27, 1952 years 33. Fortunately, these dreams remained only in his personal diary. But one cannot help but think that the North Koreans who called him a “fanatic”, “fascist” and “military maniac” were not so far from the truth.

In the spring of 1952, Ridgway was replaced as commander of the UN forces by General Mark Clark. Wanting to force the enemy to accept the terms of the allies in the negotiations, he developed a plan to conduct massive bombing attacks on strategic DPRK facilities - power plants, factories, dams, government locations, KPA command posts, diplomatic missions, as well as troop positions and populated areas. In June, the Americans bombed the hydroelectric power station complex on the Amnok River, leaving the DPRK and northeast China without electricity. In August, Kim Il Sung's headquarters in Sopo was destroyed. Kim himself was not there at that moment, but Ambassador Razuvaev almost died. In October, the complex of buildings of the USSR Embassy in Pyongyang was subjected to a massive bombing using napalm. By the end of 1952, according to the American command, there were no targets left for bombing in North Korea. Everything on the surface of the earth was destroyed.

Kim wrote to Stalin: “I consider it necessary to report to you, Joseph Vissarionovich, on the following: based on the general analysis of the situation in Korea, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the armistice negotiations may drag on for an indefinite period. Over the past year of negotiations, we have actually curtailed hostilities and switched to passive defense. This situation has led to the fact that the enemy, without suffering almost any losses, continuously inflicts enormous damage on us in terms of manpower and material assets.

So, for example, only recently the enemy has disabled all the power plants in Korea and with the active actions of the Air Force does not allow them to be restored, which has brought and continues to cause enormous damage to everything national economy DPRK. In just one day of barbaric bombing of the city of Pyongyang alone (on the 1st and on the night of July 12, 1952), over 6,000 civilians were killed and wounded.”34

Kim asked to strengthen anti-aircraft defense and intensify the actions of the Air Force in order to cover North Korea with fighter aircraft, at least along the Pyongyang line, as well as to provide assistance in the form of supplies of equipment to the troops. In his opinion, the change in the nature of combat operations on the ground and in the air should have had a corresponding impact on the enemy.

Korean and Chinese fighters gave their response to the bombing. They began to burrow into the ground. The landscape of Korea in the region of the 38th parallel consists of hills surrounded by marshy rice fields. The soldiers turned each hill or hill into a fortified point, and battles took place for the possession of one or another height. In conditions when American planes rained down their deadly load on their positions every day, they began to cover the trenches from above with trees and soil, and dig “fox holes” for shelter from shelling. Gradually, branched systems of passages, weapons depots, and living quarters began to appear inside the hills. Sometimes they hid artillery in underground galleries and even fired at the enemy from there. Almost all work was done manually. What is even more striking is the fact that the 250-kilometer-long front included 500 kilometers of tunnels. And during the war, Chinese volunteers alone built more than 1,250 kilometers of tunnels35.

While providing for the front, entire enterprises in the rear also went underground, moving into caves and bunkers, mines and pits. Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the DPRK and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, who later fled to the South, Hwang Zhang Yop, spoke about the scope of underground construction in the DPRK: “It is clear that our people have developed the technology of digging trenches. Since the war of 1950–1953, we have gone underground and created a powerful network of underground communications with all life support systems”36. (Although this experience is also typical for other socialist countries. Suffice it to recall Enver Hoxha, who covered the whole of Albania with a network of bunkers.)

Another invention of the Chinese-North Korean coalition in military affairs was the emergence of squads of hunters for aircraft and tanks. These were small mobile groups of fighters, armed with anti-tank rifles and mines, light and heavy machine guns, specifically aimed at destroying enemy equipment. And this semi-guerrilla method has proven its effectiveness. At the beginning of 1952, a meeting of exemplary groups of aircraft hunters was even held in Pyongyang, who entered into social competition among themselves in terms of the number of enemy aircraft shot down.

Thus, the war gradually became protracted. A. Pantsov and some other historians believe that the blame for its delay lies entirely with Stalin, for whom “the Korean massacre was only part of a new global plan for the world revolution”37. However, in this case, it is not clear why Stalin always left the last word to Mao and Kim without imposing any scenarios on them. But it was the Soviet leadership, through its plenipotentiary representative to the UN, that was the first to propose starting peace negotiations.

All sides bear responsibility for the prolongation of the war, and Stalin is least of all to blame. Syngman Rhee, for example, generally opposed negotiations in principle. Kim formulated his position as follows: “We will respond to the enemy’s delay in negotiations with delays, to his military actions with military actions, we will agree to a truce if the enemy really wants it, but in no case will we accept unfair terms of the truce - this is our principle in the negotiations.” about the truce"38. The Americans and Chinese wanted an honorable truce, but on their own terms. The participation of several players at once, mutual persistence, bitterness and the desire to put the squeeze on the enemy became the reason for such a long path to concluding a truce.

While the guns were talking, party life went on as usual. In November 1951, the IV Plenum of the WPK Central Committee opened in Pyongyang. It was marked by the fight against “leftist excesses,” personified by the Secretary of the WPK Central Committee and the leader of the Soviet Koreans, Ho Ga I.

Kim Il Sung and Ho Ga Yi were classic antagonists. Kim could not stand this meticulous and boring apparatchik, a Marxist bureaucrat who went through the Soviet party school and looked down on poorly educated former partisans. They disagreed on how the party should be structured. Ho believed that the party should consist of no more than 60 thousand people, mainly industrial workers. And Kim called this kowtowing to other countries, which did not correspond to the real conditions of Korea, where the peasantry predominated. Thus, Ho defended the elitist nature of the WPK, while Kim was in favor of a mass organization.

Finally, the removal of Ho Ga Yi from the political scene was due to the logic of factional struggle. He was one of the key figures of the WPK, in charge of party cadres. Kim could not leave this post to a person from the Soviet faction whom he did not trust. And since the influence of the USSR fell during the war, its hands were untied. And the reason was simply wonderful.

At the last plenum, Ho Ga Yi, who headed the Control Commission of the WPK, received a responsible assignment - to conduct an inspection of those party members who temporarily found themselves in the territories occupied by the Americans. Considering that UN troops controlled most of the country in October - November, there were quite a few of them. After the arrival of the Allied troops, many threw away or burned party documents, because the South Korean special services preferred to shoot the communists first, and only then figure out whether they had put them against the wall.

Nevertheless, Ho Ga Yi carried out a brutal mass purge. He exchanged old party cards for new ones, while those who lost the document were automatically excluded. As a result, 450 out of 600 thousand party members were expelled and subjected to various penalties. At the same time, the rules for admission to the ranks of the WPK were sharply tightened.

In his report at the plenum, Kim Il Sung highlighted a number of shortcomings in his work, among which he called “closing the doors” to the party and the practice of imposing unreasonable penalties the key ones. The WPK “often does not accept workers and peasants due to insufficient political consciousness, they do not want to accept patriotic progressive people into its ranks, making various inappropriate demands,” he said39. And he demanded to stop the repression, conduct an audit and reinstate those unfairly expelled.

Kim ridiculed Ho for the fact that the “professor of party sciences,” while demanding heightened political awareness from others, could not even speak proper Korean himself. He accused him of trying to speak on behalf of all Soviet Koreans and falling into factionalism. And finally, he mocked the rivalry between factions: they say that Ho had a beef with the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Park Il Woo, since one preferred the Soviet way of warfare, and the other the Chinese. An incredibly stupid argument during a national tragedy!

During the plenum, Ho Ga Yi was removed from his posts Secretary General party and the head of its Control Commission. True, at the same time he received the post of deputy head of the Cabinet of Ministers, but this was a noticeable demotion. And most importantly, he lost the key function of working with party cadres.

Ho's final removal from the political scene occurred in 1953. As a result of an American air raid, the Sunan reservoir in the north of the DPRK was damaged, the protection of which was part of his duties. He was accused of negligence and slow progress in restoration work. On July 2, on the eve of a Politburo meeting that was supposed to discuss his mistakes, Ho Ga Yi was found dead in his home. He was lying in a child's bed with a hunting rifle in his hands, to which was tied a belt from his wife's dress. According to the official North Korean version, he committed suicide. However, A. Lankov believes that it was a political murder40.

At the V Plenum of the WPK Central Committee, held in December 1952, Kim Il Sung continued his big game. He stated that the mistakes and excesses of the “leftist deviation” had been corrected. The WPK grew into a mass political party with over a million members and 48,933 primary organizations. At the same time, the membership of 29.8 percent of those unfairly expelled was restored, 62.1 percent of decisions on transfer to candidates were canceled, penalties were lifted from 69.2 percent of party members who received them.

New draft dodgers were immediately found. Kim Il Sung in closing remarks sharply criticized “sectarians and liberals,” although without naming anyone by name: “We have to admit the fact that such elements existing within the party are unpleasant, like fleas crawling over a person’s body and giving him no peace. To get rid of this trouble, one should take a bath and wash the clothes... In their speeches, many comrades resolutely demanded that sectarians and liberals openly confess to the party, but none of them dared to appear on the podium. Apparently, they prefer to remain silent, for, judging by the atmosphere of the plenum, it is clear that they cannot avoid severe punishment if they do not admit that they were engaged in sectarian or liberal activities today, when the entire party and the entire people have embarked on a mortal struggle against American imperialists"41. No one admitted to sectarian and liberal activities, and severe punishment was not long in coming.

...On March 5, 1953, early in the morning, Kim Il Sung’s light sleep was interrupted by a young adjutant in military uniform: “Commander! Wake up! The Soviet embassy has just reported that Stalin has died...” On the ceiling of the bunker, hidden in the depths of Moran Hill, an electric light bulb shone dimly. He looked at his watch; it was 8 am. Kim thought about it. I remembered the gifts of the “Father of Nations” - an armored railway carriage and a ZIL car with 8-centimeter thick glass, which he sent to Korea after the start of the war. “Comrade Kim! You now have many enemies. You need to take good care of your safety,” the soft voice of the Kremlin highlander sounded in my ears. Stalin was right. There are many enemies, and the most dangerous of them are entrenched in the party. Factionalists are worse than Syngman Rhee.

An hour later, Kim was already sitting in his office and listening to the report of the head of state security, Pan Hak Se, about the arrest of a group of conspirators. “We took them warm,” he said, rubbing his hands contentedly. - Lee Seung Yup was lifted straight out of bed. He did not expect this, he began to shout that he would complain, that he was the secretary of the Central Committee and we had no right to touch him. But we told him that we were following the leader’s orders and if he spoke, the conversation with him would be short.”

Kim was pleased. From the arrested minister, strings stretched to the second person in the WPK, the leader of the local faction, Park Hong-yong. The Korean Trotsky is now doomed. But there are many factionalists: there are also the Korean Kamenevs, Zinovievs, Bukharins... Never mind, their turn will come.

According to official version, “the gang of Park Hong-young - Lee Seung-yeop, who, having infiltrated the party and state bodies, committed insidious actions aimed at undermining the unity and cohesion of the party and overthrowing our people's democratic system,” was exposed and liquidated during the discussion of the documents of the November plenum The Central Committee of the WPK and the campaign “for strengthening the party spirit”42. They were accused of spying for the United States and plotting against Kim Il Sung. Is it deserved?

Lee Seung-yeop (1905–1953) was born in South Korea into a poor family. At the age of 20, the young man became a member of the Korean Communist Party. In 1931 he was arrested and spent eight years in prison. As soon as he was released in 1940, he was arrested again. The Japanese did not stand on ceremony with the communists. He agreed to cooperate with the Japanese administration, after which he was released.

In 1945, after the departure of the Japanese, Lee returned to his roots and became one of the leaders of the Communist Party of South Korea. During the years of Japanese rule, many communists were forced to cooperate with the regime, and therefore often turned a blind eye to the complex past of their comrades.

In 1946, he was arrested by American military authorities for the assassination attempt on Syngman Rhee. Under torture, he accepts an offer to work with American intelligence. Lee turned out to be an extremely valuable resource for her. After Park Hong-yong defected to the North, Lee became the head of the South Korean communists.

In 1947, he was arrested for the fourth time, this time by South Korean police. After negotiations in prison, he agrees to join the coalition government of the South along with representatives of other political forces. However, in 1948, by order of Pak Hong-yong, Lee moved to the North, where he received the post of Minister of Justice of the DPRK.

In 1950, American agents Alice Hyun and Lee Sa Min were detained at the Moscow airport, carrying secret military plans signed by Kim Il Sung. Extradited to the DPRK, they soon confessed to having connections with Lee Seung Yup. Alice also worked as Park Hong-young's personal secretary. And although the latter vouched for Lee Seung-yup and high-ranking party members were not touched, the North Korean intelligence services began to develop their surroundings. Perhaps it was the danger of being discovered that prompted Lee to intend to remove Kim.

Kim Yong-sik, who worked for the Americans as a translator during the war, and later wrote memoirs, directly calls Lee Seung-yup an American agent43. Seo Dae Suk traces the history of the conspiracy back to September 1951, when Lee Seung Yup began plotting a military coup. For this, he was going to use 4 thousand cadets of a special school that trained personnel for partisan warfare in the South. The teachers and students there were from PK, and the management were close friends of Li. The conspirators divided the highest posts among themselves: Lee Seung Yup himself was to become the secretary of the Communist Party, and Park Hong Yong was to become the prime minister. The performance date was set for the first half of 1953, but the plot was discovered in time.

Many researchers argue that there was in fact no conspiracy, but that it was a matter of a banal purge - the elimination of Kim's competitors from the political scene. The same point of view is shared by A. Lankov, who points out the unreality of removing Kim with such small forces, especially during the war and when Chinese troops are in the DPRK.

The complicated case of the “Lee Seung Yup - Park Hong Young gang” is reminiscent of the “Tukhachevsky case” from Soviet history. Whether there really was a conspiracy of the generals against Stalin or not, we do not know. There are only the results of very specific trials, circumstantial evidence and diametrically opposed opinions of historians.

Kim Yong Sik, knowledgeable in the affairs of American intelligence services, claims that this attempt to eliminate Kim was not the only one. CIA Colonel Hans Tofti, who led a special training camp in Korea, recruited an Indian professional hunter to the United States who, for a small sum, agreed to cross the front line and destroy the North Korean leader. True, he never made it to Korea for an unknown reason44.

The war was entering its final stage. Harry Truman lost the presidential election in November 1952. The reason for the failure of the Democratic candidate was called four “Cs”: corruption, crime, communism, Korea. General Dwight Eisenhower, who replaced Truman in the White House, promised to end the war during his election campaign. Having become president, he personally traveled to Korea, where he became convinced that a full-scale offensive without gigantic efforts and sacrifices was impossible, and began to look for ways to resolve the conflict that was boring to everyone.

Similar sentiments were shared in Moscow. At the end of March 1953, Pyongyang received a letter from the Council of Ministers of the USSR, chaired by Georgy Malenkov, which recommended giving a positive response to General Clark’s proposal for the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war and continuing negotiations on an early conclusion of a truce. Kim Il Sung “became very excited” and supported the proposals of the Soviet side. In April, an initial exchange of prisoners was carried out, but then difficulties again arose in the negotiations.

To make the enemy more accommodating, American aircraft, on the orders of General Clark, began to destroy rice crops in the North, bombing dams and dams that regulate the release of water into the fields. In response, Chinese-North Korean troops launched a new offensive along the entire front.

But the main obstacle to concluding a truce remained Syngman Rhee. The old man demanded the continuation of the war until a victorious end, and otherwise threatened to withdraw his troops from UN subordination. Moreover, Lee launched a new political campaign under the slogan of creating a Great Korea, which was supposed to include, in addition to the Korean Peninsula itself, part of the territories of China and the USSR. A paradoxical situation arose: during the negotiations, the parties fought not so much with each other, but with Syngman Rhee. And soon he completely took a step that almost derailed the negotiations - he gave the order to open the doors of the prisoner of war camps, allowing everyone who wanted it to be released. About 25 thousand people escaped from captivity.

“Is the UN Command able to control the South Korean government and army?” - the northerners mockingly asked after this at the negotiations. The Americans began to blackmail Lee, threatening to unilaterally withdraw troops from Korea. At the same time, the Chinese-North Korean coalition launched a final offensive, aimed mainly at the positions of South Korean troops, under the slogan: “Kill the chicken to scare the monkey.” The offensive ended successfully - the ledge that had crashed 15 kilometers into the positions of the KPA and CPV was cleared of the enemy. Lee was forced to announce that he would not interfere with the conclusion of an armistice, although he himself would not sign it. He subjected his consent to a number of conditions: American troops had to remain in the South, and the United States had to continue training the local army and allocate money to restore the country’s economy.

After this, the question arose whether Kim Il Sung should personally participate in its signing. The fact is that the village of Panmunjeong was located in territory controlled by the Allies. And, given the mood of Syngman Lee, provocations could well be expected. The Kremlin advised Kim not to personally participate in the ceremony. In Beijing, on the contrary, they believed that Peng Dehuai and Kim should go there together.

As a result, on July 27, 1953, a truce was concluded. The ceremony participants were Nam Il and American General William Harrison. The signatures of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, who did not come to Panmunjeong, are also on the document. The South Korean side refused to sign.

The troops of the warring parties were supposed to retreat two kilometers from the contact line, forming a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Even today it divides the two Korean states, being the most fortified border in the world.

Prisoners of war who wanted to return were immediately returned to each other. The fate of those who did not want to return was decided by a special commission consisting of representatives of neutral countries.

And finally, it was planned to convene a special peace conference to conclude a peace treaty.

On July 28, Kim Il Sung was awarded the title of Hero of the DPRK. A little earlier, he became a marshal, and Choi Yong Gon became the first vice-marshal of the republic. In an address to the nation, Kim called the truce “a great historical victory won by the Korean people as a result of three years of heroic struggle for freedom and independence, against the combined forces of foreign interventionists and the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique.” He especially emphasized that the enemy had serious technical superiority: “The American imperialists, provoking the war in Korea, counted on the fact that the Korean people would not be able to resist their armed forces, especially their air forces... And in this they cruelly miscalculated. They could not break our people, intimidate them with their military equipment. The Korean War once again showed that technology is not the only decisive factor in victory, that superiority in military technology alone is not enough to win victory. One of the most important factors of victory is the high moral and political state, the fighting spirit of the army and the people both at the front and in the rear”45.

What were the results of the war for the DPRK and Kim Il Sung personally?

The main goal of the fighting - the liberation of the South from the regime of Syngman Rhee and the unification of the country under the auspices of the North - was not resolved due to the intervention of a more powerful enemy, the UN coalition led by the United States. At the same time, the independence of the DPRK was defended (albeit with external assistance). According to the final agreement, North Korea lost a sparsely populated mountainous region in the southeast, but in the southwest it acquired much more populated territories, in particular the city of Kaesong and its environs, and also received the entire Onda Peninsula, leveling the border in this direction and bringing it closer to Seoul . So formally the DPRK remained in the black.

Politically, during the war years, Kim strengthened his power in the country and in the party. This was facilitated by the decline in the influence of the Soviet Union on Korean affairs due to non-participation directly in hostilities. If before 1950 the USSR's control over the DPRK was total, then during the war it weakened significantly. Of course, the death of Stalin and the subsequent establishment of collective leadership in Moscow also had an impact. The Chinese authorities did not interfere in the internal politics of the DPRK. Thus, Kim managed to get rid of external guardianship.

Kim Il Sung successfully used the war years to eliminate his powerful rivals who occupied the highest levels of the party hierarchy. Soviet and local faction leaders Ho Ga Yi and Park Hong Young lost their posts. Kim's tactically competent actions made it possible to take them out of the brackets in the internal party struggle. Other factionalists were no longer so dangerous.

On the other hand, the human and material losses of the DPRK were incalculable. About 9 thousand industrial enterprises and 600 thousand residential buildings were destroyed. All the cities of the country and almost all the villages lay in ruins. Up to 1.5 million civilians and several hundred thousand military personnel died.

As for the general results of the war, the data and opinions of historians vary to the point of being diametrically opposed.

In both Korean states, it is officially stated that each of them won, preserving its territory, independence and specific development. Summarizing these points of view, S. Kurbanov believes that both the DPRK and the Republic of Korea won the war.

The position of most American historians (for example, W. Stuke): the war was won by the Western coalition led by the United States. The fact with which the UN responded to the event and entered into the conflict, as well as the broad support of the allies (16 participating states), is usually emphasized.

According to K. Asmolov and the authors of the book “Korea in the Fire of War,” there were no winners at all. Neither side achieved its goals, while in terms of the number of destructions and casualties ( total number numbering close to five million), the conflict limited to the Korean Peninsula was not much worse than a world war.

KIM IL SENG

(b. 1912 – d. 1994)

Dictator, permanent leader of the DPRK, creator of the Juche doctrine.

The long-lived dictator who led North Korea for half a century, “The Great Leader, the Sun of the Nation, the Marshal of the Mighty Republic” is Kim Il Sung. Biographical information about him is quite contradictory, and many years of his life have practically not been preserved.

The future leader was born in the village of Mangyongdae near Pyongyang on April 15, 1912. His father, a representative of the lower Korean intelligentsia, was a believing Protestant, a Christian activist associated with religious organizations. At times he taught in primary schools. Mother was the daughter of a village teacher. In addition to Kim Il Sung, who was called Kim Song Ju in childhood, the family had two more sons. They lived poorly and were in need. Need forced parents in the early 20s. move from Japanese-occupied Korea to Manchuria, where little Kim Il Sung was educated in a Chinese school and mastered Chinese. My father controlled my studies quite strictly. The boy returned home for several years, but already in 1925 he left his native place. The following year my father died.

While studying in China, in Girin, Kim Il Sung joined an underground Marxist circle created by Chinese Komsomol members. In 1929, the circle was discovered by the authorities, and its members went to prison. Six months later, the 17-year-old, released from prison and never finishing school, joined a guerrilla unit - one of many created by the CCP to fight the Japanese invaders. Already in 1932, Kim Il Sung joined the Chinese Communist Party. He fought well and quickly advanced in his career: in 1934 he was a platoon commander in the Second Partisan Army, which fought against the Japanese near the Korean-Chinese border, and after 2 years he commanded the 6th Division. The name of Kim Il Sung became famous after the successful raid on Pochonbo, when the gendarme post and some Japanese institutions were destroyed. Then rumors about “commander Kim Il Sung” spread throughout Korea, and the authorities promised a reward for any information about his whereabouts. At the end of the 30s. he was already the commander of the 2nd operational area, and all partisan units in Jiangdao province were subordinate to him. However, at this time the situation of the Manchu partisans deteriorated sharply: in battles with the Japanese they suffered heavy losses. Of the top leaders of the 2nd Army, only Kim Il Sung survived, whom the Japanese hunted with particular fury. In such a situation, in December 1940, he, together with 13 fighters, broke through to the north and, crossing the Amur ice, ended up on the territory of the USSR. Having passed the required test, within a few months the 28-year-old partisan commander became a student of courses at the Khabarovsk Infantry School.

Kim Il Sung's personal life was generally successful. True, the first wife, Kim Hyo Sunn, who fought in his detachment, was captured by the Japanese, which they reported as a great triumph. Her further fate is unknown. At the end of the 30s. Kim Il Sung married Kim Choch Sun, the daughter of a North Korean farm laborer, who fought in a guerrilla unit from the age of 16. In 1941, they had a son on Soviet territory, who was named by the Russian name Yura (today he is the leader of the DPRK, known to the whole world as Kim Jong Il). Then they had two more children.

In 1942, in the village of Vyatsk near Khabarovsk, the 88th Infantry Brigade was formed from Korean partisans who crossed over to Soviet territory, into which the young Red Army captain Kim Il Sung was appointed battalion commander. This was a special forces brigade. Some of its fighters participated in reconnaissance and sabotage operations in Manchuria. True, Kim Il Sung himself did not participate in any operations during the war. But he really liked the life of a career officer, and he did not see his future outside the army: the academy, command of a regiment, division. Many already then began to note the lust for power young officer. The 88th Brigade did not take part in the fleeting war with Japan. After the war, it was disbanded, and its soldiers and officers were sent to the liberated cities of Manchuria and Korea as assistants to Soviet military commandants and to ensure communication between the military authorities and the local population. Kim Il Sung was appointed assistant commandant of Pyongyang, the future capital of North Korea. He arrived in Korea in October 1945 on the steamship Pugachev. His arrival could not have come at a better time, since the attempt of the Soviet command to rely on nationalist groups failed, and the local communist movement was not so strong, but was too eager for independence. Therefore, a young officer of the Soviet Army with a heroic partisan biography turned out to be the best figure for the role of “leader of the progressive forces of Korea.” On October 14, the commander of the 25th Army, I.M. Chistyakov, introduced Kim Il Sung at a rally as a “national hero” and a “famous partisan leader.” This is where his ascent to the heights of power began.

In December 1945, Kim Il Sung was appointed chairman of the North Korean Organizing Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea, and in February of the following year, by decision of the Soviet military authorities, he headed the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea, the country's provisional government. This was a formal position, since even after the proclamation of the DPRK in 1948, the Soviet military authorities and the apparatus of advisers, who drew up the most important documents and made decisions, had a decisive influence on the life of the country. Even the appointment of officers to a position higher than the regiment commander until the mid-50s. it was necessary to coordinate with the Soviet embassy.

The first years of Kim Il Sung's stay in his homeland were overshadowed by two tragedies: in 1947, his son drowned, and in 1949, his wife died during childbirth. During this period, an acute confrontation emerged in the country, divided by the decision of the Potsdam Conference into zones of occupation - the Soviet North and the American South. Both regimes claimed to be the only legitimate unifier of the country. Things were heading towards war, but it was not Kim Il Sung who was the most determined supporter of solving the Korean problem by military means. The decision to start a war was made in the spring of 1950 in Moscow during the visit of Kim Il Sung and his conversations with Stalin.

During the war of 1950–1951. The leadership of the DPRK settled in bunkers carved into the rocky ground at a depth of several tens of meters. The brunt of the fighting fell on Chinese troops sent to Korea at the request of Kim Il Sung and with the blessing of the Soviet government. The Koreans operated in secondary directions and provided rear security. During the war, Soviet influence weakened and Kim Il Sung increased his independence, who began to get a taste for power. He showed himself to be a master of political intrigue, showing the ability to maneuver and take advantage of the contradictions of both opponents and allies. The only thing he sorely lacked was education, and he did not have time to educate himself.

The beginning was marked by Kim Il Sung's struggle for absolute power in the country. All his efforts were aimed at destroying the North Korean elite - four groups that were at war with each other. Their destruction gave Kim Il Sung the opportunity to get rid of Soviet and Chinese control. However, the reprisal against them led to the arrival of delegations led by A.I. from the USSR and China. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, who threatened to remove Kim Il Sung himself from leading the country. He was forced to make concessions, but the role of a puppet imposed on him forced him from the mid-50s. persistently and carefully distance themselves from their patrons. The DPRK was then very dependent on economic and military assistance from the USSR and China, therefore, by skillfully maneuvering, Kim Il Sung managed to ensure that this assistance did not stop. At first, he was more inclined to the PRC, which was facilitated by cultural proximity, joint struggle and criticism of Stalin that unfolded in the USSR. This caused discontent among the Soviet leadership and a reduction in aid, which brought a number of sectors of the economy to the brink of collapse. In connection with the conflict between the USSR and the PRC and the “cultural revolution” that began in China, Kim Il Sung began to distance himself from China, taking a neutral position in the conflict. This, of course, caused discontent in both Moscow and Beijing, but never led to a reduction in aid.

By the end of the 50s. Kim Il Sung, having destroyed (physically or expelled from the country) the opposing, mainly pro-Soviet groups, gained full power. Only old comrades in the partisan struggle, whom he trusted, were appointed to senior positions. It was then that they abandoned the copying of Soviet models and established their own methods of organizing production, their own cultural and moral values ​​based on the ideas of “Juche”, and propaganda of the superiority of everything Korean over foreign ones. Rigid planning and militarization of the economy began, “labor armies” were created, where workers were divided into military units (platoons, companies, etc.) and subordinate to commanders. Personal plots and market trade were prohibited. The basis of the economy was declared to be “self-reliance”, and the ideal was a completely self-sufficient, tightly controlled production unit. But all this led to a sharp decline in economic growth and to an even greater decline in the living standards of the population than before. Kim Il Sung turned out to be strong in the struggle for power, but not in governing the country. Since the 70s stability in the state was ensured only by strict control over the population combined with massive ideological indoctrination. The country's population was divided into groups of several families living in the same block or house. They were bound by mutual responsibility. The head of the group had considerable power. Without his consent, it was impossible even to visit. And there was no free movement around the country without the consent of the security service. Camps for political prisoners appeared. Public executions - shootings in stadiums - became a practice. Since 1972, with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Kim Il Sung, a campaign began to praise him as the most illustrious leader of the modern world: “Great Leader, Sun of the Nation, Iron All-Conquering Commander, Marshal of the Mighty Republic, Guarantee of the Liberation of Mankind.” All adult Koreans were required to wear badges with a portrait of Kim Il Sung. In general, his portraits hung everywhere. On the slopes of the mountains in his honor, toasts were carved in multi-meter letters. Throughout the country, monuments were erected only to Kim Il Sung and his relatives. The Great Leader's birthday became a public holiday; biography has been studied since kindergarten; works were learned by heart; the places he visited were marked with memorial plaques; children in kindergartens were obliged to thank the leader in chorus before lunch for a happy childhood; songs were composed in his honor; the heroes of the films performed feats inspired by their love for him. Universities began to teach a special philosophical discipline, suryeongwan—leadership.

A pompous palace was built for Kim Il Sung on the outskirts of Pyongyang, and many luxurious residences were built throughout the country. However, the leader preferred, accompanied by numerous reliable guards, to travel a lot (he did not like airplanes) around the country, visiting villages, enterprises, and institutions. In 1965, he married Kim Sun-ae, a young secretary of one of his security chiefs. They had two sons and a daughter.

In the early 70s. Kim Il Sung had the idea to make his son his heir. Weak protests among senior officials ended with the disappearance of the dissatisfied. In 1980, Kim Jong Il was officially proclaimed his father's heir, the "Great Continuator of the World Juche Revolutionary Cause." After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, he concentrated all power in the country in his hands, pursuing a policy of tyranny and political “isolation of the DPRK based on the teachings of the Chukchee.”

This text is an introductory fragment.

Biography

Born on April 15, 1912 in Mangyongdae, Pyongyang, the eldest son of father Kim Hyun Jik and mother Kang Ban Sok.

The father named his son "Song Ju" (meaning "become a support"), wanting him to become the support of the country.

Following the path of his parents' revolutionary activities, during his childhood he often moved to different regions of Korea and China.

Thanks to my father's foresightHaving learned the Chinese language early and studying in a Chinese primary school, he was fluent in Chinese, which greatly helped him later when he launched a struggle against the Japanese invaders in Chinese territory.

Fulfilling the holy will of your father: if you want to make a revolution, know well the reality in your homeland, in March 1923I've walked a thousand miles whether for study" from Badaogou China to Mangyongdae and studied at the Changdeok school in Chilgore, where his mother’s parents had their house.

In January 1925 received news that his father was again arrested by the Japanese police, and decisively left his native land of Mangende. Then he made a firm vow to himself never to return to his homeland until it became free.

After his father's death in June 1926, he entered Hwasongyisuk in Huadian, China, a two-year political-military school established by the anti-Japanese nationalist organization of Korea. On October 17 of the same year, he proclaimed the creation of the Union for the Overthrow of Imperialism. By the unanimous will of all participants in the meeting, he was elected leader.

In order to further develop revolutionary activities,
left Hwasongyisuk after six months of studies and moved the arena of his revolutionary activities to Jirin.

There he was enrolled in the Yuwen high school in Girin and continued his studies.

On August 27, 1927, he rebuilt the SSI into a more mass organization - the Anti-Imperialist Youth League, and on August 28 of the same month he created the Communist Youth League of Korea.

In addition to these, he created various other mass organizations and led their anti-Japanese struggle.

From June 30 to July 2, 1930convened a meeting in Kalun at which he illuminated the path of the Korean revolution. There he comprehensively covered the tactical and strategic issues related to the implementation of the main tasks of the Korean revolution.

July 3 of the same yearconvened in Kalun the founding meeting of the first party organization - the “union of comrades Consor”, and three days later, on July 6, created the Korean Revolutionary Army - a paramilitary-political organization - in Guyushu, Itun County, as a priority measure to prepare for the anti-Japanese armed struggle.

April 25, 1932 created a permanent revolutionary armed force - the Anti-Japanese People's Guerrilla Army (later renamed the Korean People's Revolutionary Army), and led the anti-Japanese armed struggle to victory, revived the motherland on August 15, 1945. In September of the same year he returned in triumph to his homeland.

Soon created the Central Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of North Korea and proclaimed the founding of the party on October 10, 1945.

February 8, 1946created the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea and was elected to the post of chairman of the same Committee. He published a "20-point political program."

In August 1946created the North Korean Workers' Party by merging the Communist and New Democratic parties in North Korea.

In a short timesuccessfully led the implementation of the tasks of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in the North of the country.

Through the country's first democratic electionsproclaimed the reorganization of the Provisional People's Committee into the People's Committee of North Korea and was elected to the post of chairman of the Committee, the new central body of state power. He set before the Committee the tasks of the period of gradual transition to socialism.

In February 1948turned the KPRA into a regular revolutionary armed force - the Korean People's Army (KPA).

September 9, 1948organized a unified central government of the Korean people - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). According to the unanimous will and desire of the entire Korean people, he was elected to the high post of Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, head of government.

June 30, 1949 convened a joint Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Parties of North and South Korea, at which he was elected Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

Under wise guidanceThe Korean people defeated the American aggressors in the Fatherland Liberation War (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953), defended the sovereignty of the nation and marked the beginning of the decline of American imperialism.

August 5, 1953 at the VI Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPKoutlined the main line of post-war economic construction and supervised its implementation.

In addition, he directed the socialist revolution - socialist transformation industrial relations in the city and countryside.

At the III and IV Congresses of the WPK (April 1956, September 1961), he was again elected Chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK.

He came up with a new idea to lead a continuous revolution and defined its main content as three revolutions - ideological, technical and cultural.

In connection with the increasing attempts of US imperialists to provoke a new war in December 1962 at the V Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPK of the fourth convocationput forward a new strategic course: to conduct economic and defense construction in parallel.

In October 1966, at the XIV Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPK of the fourth convocation
was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK.

From 1957 to 1970 successfully led the historical process of industrialization of the country.

According to the new Socialist Constitution of the DPRK, adopted in December 1972 at the First Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK of the fifth convocation,elected President of the DPRK.

At the V (1970) and VI (October 1980) congresses of the WPKagain elected General Secretary of the Party Central Committee.

Kim Il Sung identified the transformation of the entire society based on the Juche idea as the general task of the Korean revolution.

In May 1972 put forward three principles for the unification of the motherland, in October 1980 - a proposal for the creation of the Democratic Confederate Republic of Korea, and in April 1993 - a ten-point program for the great consolidation of the entire nation for the unification of the motherland.

To protect socialism in the country and complete the work of the Korean revolution,successfully resolved the issue of his successor.

In June 1994 in Pyongyangreceived former US President Jimmy Carter and created favorable conditions for holding Korean-American negotiations on the nuclear issue and summit talks between North and South Korea.

He continued his energetic activities until the last minute of his life in the name of the party and the revolution, the Motherland and the people, in the name of the triumph of the cause of independence throughout the world. July 8, 1994 at 2 amdied in his office due to sudden illness.

“Worship the people like heaven” - this is the President’s life credo.

He was awarded the title of Generalissimo of the DPRK, the title of Hero of the DPRK (three times), and the title of Hero of Labor.

He received more than 70 thousand foreign guests, including heads of state, parties and governments of other countries of the world, and paid 54 visits to a total of 87 countries.

He has been awarded over 180 highest orders and medals from more than 70 countries and international organizations. He received the title of honorary citizen of more than 30 cities, the title of honorary professor and honorary doctor of sciences of more than 20 well-known foreign universities. About 165,920 gifts with good wishes were sent to him, as a sign of sincere love and deep respect for him by party leaders, heads of state and government, progressive individuals from 169 countries of the world. Bronze statues were erected in China and Mongolia
, the “International Prize” was established and awarded on a global scale", in more than 100 countries, over 480 streets, institutions and organizations bear the name. Publishing houses in more than 110 countries have published 24,570,000 units of his classic works translated into more than 60 national languages.

North Korea is devastation, Mordor and executions from an anti-aircraft dog launcher, and South Korea is a paradise with K-pop and democracy. This is approximately what most modern people think, taught by the long traditions of anti-North Korean propaganda. Meanwhile, the real story is much more complex and interesting. Especially for this, the famous Russian Korean scholar wrote a series of articles about the history of the Korean Peninsula and the two states that are located on it. The first dealt with the founding of South Korea and the life of its first president, the legendary and stern Syngman Rhee. The second material is devoted to the beginning of the hardest struggle for power of the “Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung", who today continues to rule North Korea even after death.

The life of Kim Il Sung is covered in legends. On the one hand, there is an official biography. It has, however, changed, and today it is worth focusing not on the texts of the 1970s, but on the “autobiography” of the leader, which he began writing in the 1990s and managed to complete until 1945. On the other hand, there are numerous black legends, including the assertion of one Russian public figure (let’s not point fingers) that there was no Korean leader, but there was an NKVD captain and half-breed Russian Korean, Kim Arsen, a sadist, degenerate and participant in Stalin’s repressions.

However, the leader’s early years have been studied quite well. Kim was born on April 15, 1912 in the village of Mangyongdae near Pyongyang, and was the eldest child in the family - the future leader had two brothers and a sister. His name then was Kim Sung-ju.

Kim Il Sung's father, Kim Hyun Jik, was a rural teacher (according to some sources, also a Methodist priest), taught classical Chinese literature and practiced traditional medicine. In addition, Kim Hyon Jik was a relatively famous left-wing nationalist, to whom the official historiography of the DPRK attributes a fair number of achievements.

Kang Bang Seok's mother served as a deacon in the Protestant church, and his uncle Kim Hyun Gwon took part in the national liberation movement. According to one version, he belonged to anarchists and was involved in expropriations, according to another, he was a noble robber. Be that as it may, some traitor handed him over to the Japanese - he received fifteen years, and at thirty-one he died in prison after police torture. Relatives did not even see his body - they could not get to the notorious Seodaemun Prison, and the Japanese buried Kim Hyun Gwon in the prison cemetery.

Kim Il Sung's cousin, Kim Won Ju, died at the age of thirty, and also from the consequences of torture: the Japanese law enforcement model assumed that the police themselves, when considering minor cases, could judge and carry out sentences. And then they punished with bamboo sticks or batogs, which, if handled skillfully, could very seriously undermine the health of the offender.

Kim Il Sung's two younger brothers, Kim Chol Ju and Kim Yong Ju, also participated in the national liberation movement. Kim Chol-ju died at the age of 19 in battles with punitive forces, and Kim Yong-ju has safely lived to this day (having prudently gone into the shadows when Kim Il Sung made his son “crown prince”).

So the official North Korean information that all of his relatives up to the fourth generation were professional revolutionaries is partly correct. It is no wonder that the boy received an appropriate upbringing, often fought with Japanese peers, shot at police with a slingshot, and in his youth, together with a group of friends, founded the “Union for the Overthrow of Imperialism.” The name is childish enough to be true.

Kim lived in Mangyongdae until 1919 - there, according to the North Korean version, he took part in the March First independence movement. When the movement began to be crushed, Kim Hyun Jik and his family moved to China, where Kim Il Sung graduated from primary school and stayed until 1923. While his son was studying, his father was enthusiastically “engaged in nationalism,” and when he realized that the Japanese were already approaching him, he sent his son to his grandmother.

Thus began that same “path of a thousand miles,” which played a very important role in the biography of the future leader: a twelve-year-old boy with no money and practically no equipment walked about four hundred kilometers using a homemade map, almost froze on the mountain passes, but in the end he arrived safely to home in Mangyongdae. Grandma absolutely naturally greeted him with the phrase: “Your father is worse than a tiger.” It is said that Kim replied that he could walk two thousand li.

In 1926, when Kim Il Sung was 14 years old, Kim Hyun Jik was arrested. There was not enough evidence for the trial, and the police used their favorite preventative torture. The man died, and already a relatively adult Kim decided to avenge his father.

He entered a military school run by Korean nationalists. In the same 1926, he created the so-called “Union for the Overthrow of Imperialism.” From this date in modern North Korea it is customary to count the beginning modern history Korea, and for the official ideology of the DPRK it has approximately the same symbolic significance as 1917 for the ideology of the USSR. And after that, Kim Il Sung met his grandmother only on October 14, 1945, and on this occasion there is a beautiful copy of the Chinese legend about how the leader passed nearby three times, but could not turn home, since state affairs were more important.

IN military school However, they taught mainly how to work with wooden weapons and how to raise funds for the liberation of the country. Therefore, Kim studied there for six months and moved to Jirin, where he began to seriously absorb communist ideas. It was there that he read (in Chinese) not only “Capital” and “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, but also “Mother” by Gorky and “Iron Stream” by Serafimovich.

Rise of the Chief

In May 1929, while still a schoolboy, Kim joined an underground Marxist circle, becoming the youngest member of the organization. The rest of his comrades were at least school graduates or students of various colleges, so the statements of official North Korean historiography that he was its creator and leader sound rather unconvincing.

It is believed that somewhere from this time Kim Song Ju began to be called Kim Il Sung. Previously, he went by the pseudonym Han Byul, which meant "(one) Star", but since there are many stars in the sky, he was offered to "become the Sun" ("il sung", or more precisely "Il Seong", can be translated this way). Kim disapproved of this - he believed that he was too young for such a pretentious pseudonym - but the name stuck to him.

In 1929, seventeen-year-old Kim went to prison - but only for six months, because the prison was under the jurisdiction not of the Japanese, but of the local Chinese authorities (the annexation of Manchuria occurred later, in 1931), and there was a much less strict regime there. In addition, his comrades helped to ensure that he did not live in poverty. At the first opportunity, he was released, where he began to take an active part in the anti-Japanese partisan movement in Manchuria. According to the official version, already in the 1930s he began to “set the right tasks” and engage in “important party work,” but there is one important nuance.

The Korean Communist Party was declared non-existent back in 1928 due to rampant factionalism. During the three years of its existence (1925-1928), it was replaced by four Central Committees, which were completely or almost completely liquidated by the Japanese secret police. At the same time, none of the numerous factions had the opportunity to be called a party, at least according to formal criteria (presence of a program, charter, number of members, documented active activities, etc.), and pitting the authorities against their “ideological opponents” was perceived as a normal measure of internal party struggle.

As a result, on December 10, 1928, the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International decided to “refuse to recognize the right of any of the disputing communist groups in Korea to represent the Korean section in the Comintern until the actual state of affairs is fully clarified.” Therefore, all Korean communists who wanted to do something did it in the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), being considered, as it were, Chinese communists of Korean nationality. In fact, no one created a separate Korean People's Revolutionary Army (according to the North Korean version, created in 1934 led by Kim Il Sung). The Chinese communists did not try to single out Korean units based on nationality and create an analogue of the Polish Army, but Korean partisans made up a significant part of the fighters and commanders.

Now a few words about what the partisan movement in Manchuria was, since it would be incorrect to consider it an analogue of, say, the Belarusian partisans. The main difference is the absence of a large land that could help with cartridges, food and specialists. And although the inaccessible terrain and large areas of compact settlement of Koreans, where the partisans could count on the support of the population, helped in part, this was not enough.

Let's return to Kim. Kim Il Sung organized his first detachment of 18 people in the spring of 1932, but no one knew his name until September 1933. At this time he commanded two companies of Koreans, and, subordinate to his Chinese superiors, took part in an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Dongying. Then, as a result of a Japanese counterattack, the partisans were surrounded, but Kim Il Sung managed to break through the enemy encirclement and save the famous partisan commander Shi Zhongheng.

Then, however, his career growth was cut short. The fact is that in the fall of 1931, the Japanese began to create their own organization called Minsendan (People's Life Corps), which played the role of a “fifth column” in the ranks of the Chinese communists. Although his actions caused more noise than good, pro-Japanese slogans and the activities of spies and provocateurs managed to undermine trust in ethnic Koreans. As a result, a purge began within the Chinese Communist Party, which was not inferior to the Soviet one of 1937-1939. From 500 to 2 thousand people were executed, more than a thousand were arrested, expelled from the party and put under investigation.

The hunt for “Japanese spies” did not bypass the young commander: Kim Il Sung was arrested and expelled from the party as a potential pro-Japanese element, but managed to escape thanks to the intercession of Commander Shi, whom he saved from death during the Japanese encirclement. Upon learning that Kim was under investigation, he publicly declared: “Such an outstanding personality cannot be a Japanese dog,” and that if Kim Il Sung was convicted, he and the entire army would leave the ranks.

After rehabilitation, Kim Il Sung began active work again, essentially becoming the commander of a penal battalion. His entire detachment consisted of former victims of the purge, and the first thing Kim Il Sung did was to collect all the documents certifying the criminal status of his subordinates and burnt them, giving people a chance to start a new life.

But life was hard. The partisans fought mainly around Mount Paektusan or the Kapsan area - one of the most sparsely populated, remote and provincial corners of Korea. During the Li Dynasty, exiles were sent there, and in the 1930s it was inhabited by those who, for various reasons, found themselves outlaws. People there were mainly engaged in slash-and-burn agriculture or growing opium poppies. But the territory was located outside the enemy’s main communication lines, which is why the partisans somehow found themselves in the status of “elusive Joe” - elusive simply because no one caught him because he was unnecessary.

The taiga period of Kim Il Sung's biography attracted the attention of a sufficient number of critics, whose task was to belittle his merits as much as possible and turn him from a partisan commander into the leader of a bandit gang who did not play any serious role in the anti-Japanese resistance. However, according to the official version of South Korea, these are two different people altogether. There was some commander Kim Il Sung, but a man named Kim Song Ju had nothing to do with his activities.

Among the “black legends” there are frequent descriptions of how Kim Il Sung’s people kidnapped children and teenagers, forcibly joined them to the detachment in order to increase its number, engaged in racketeering towards Koreans who grew ginseng and opium poppies, or took rich Koreans hostage . “If you have weapons, give us weapons, if you have people, give us people, if you have money, give us money, and food, if you have food,” they allegedly demanded.

But Kim Il Sung himself describes a lot of this in his memoirs, and not only as “isolated cases of excesses.” Such a solution to supply issues was typical for any partisan or insurgent movement that did not have a large land, and the nationalist guerrillas, beloved by South Korean historians, solved the financial problems of their troops in the same way.

There is a very interesting source about the life of the population of Kapsan - the memoirs of Kim Yong Sik (the son of a landowner, fled to the south during the Korean War, then was a translator), who, despite all his dislike for the Reds, notes that Kim Il Sung’s partisans rather found mutual language with the peasants and protected the peasants from the tyranny of landowners and Japanese agents, cracking down on them and their families for this.

In addition, they tried to “impose civil rights” at least at the level of combating early marriage, opium smoking, gambling, illiteracy, superstitions and so on. No wonder that the village youth often left with them. However, the person who found himself between two fires had no choice: the information that such and such was communicating with the partisans quickly became known to everyone, including the Japanese.

Frame: EBS/YouTube

Let us separately note the topic of “child soldiers,” because when this phrase is mentioned, the reader’s eyes are more likely to bring to mind pictures of modern western or central Africa. Indeed, with Kim’s partisan detachment, in addition to the fighters, several dozen children lived - mostly these were the children of killed partisans or those whom the Japanese executed as their accomplices. On the other hand, the Japanese often created situations in which women and children fled to partisan detachments. According to the plan of the punishers, this, firstly, reduced the mobility of the detachment, and secondly, corroded its morale.

As a result, a “commandant company” was created from children aged 12-14 years, which received special allowances and acted as intelligence officers, messengers or bodyguards of Kim, devoted to him to the grave. There is a rather touching moment in Kim’s memoirs about how, in cold weather, the children slept under the same blanket with adults who warmed them with their bodies. There was some competition among the children for the right to sleep next to Kim, but he did not try to pick favorites, and everyone took turns spending the night with him.

On October 4, 1936, Kim Il Sung first appeared on the pages of the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, where an article was published about the raid of 40 “red bandits” led by Kim Il Sung in the village of Shiludaogou in Manchuria. However, very soon Kim forced people to talk about himself seriously.

On June 4, 1937, 70 to 200 guerrillas (unofficial figures say there were about a dozen) under Kim's command crossed the Korean-Chinese border and launched an early morning surprise attack on the small town of Pochonbo, destroying the local nine-man gendarme post and some Japanese establishments.

Kim's detachment remained in the captured town until the morning of the next day, having “carried out requisitions” in the amount of 44 thousand yen and causing damage in the total amount of 16 thousand, and moved in the opposite direction. Stunned by such impudence, the Japanese police rushed in pursuit of the partisans and overtook Kim on the same day, but the battle ended disastrously for them: 7 policemen, including the detachment commander, were killed.

Although the military-tactical benefit of the raid was minimal, this action turned out to be one of the few carried out on the territory of Korea proper, and not in the wilderness of the Kapsan mountains, which was of no interest to anyone, but in “cultivated regions.” No one has done this before or after Kim.

It was because of this that rumors about commander Kim Il Sung began to spread throughout the country, marking the beginning of the subsequent mythologization of his image. In legends, he either turns into a tiger and kills 10 Japanese in one go, then becomes a dragon and lives at the bottom of the lake, or creates 100 of his doubles who attack the Japanese in a hundred different places at the same time. In other “guerrilla stories,” Kim Il Sung flies on the clouds, produces 4 thousand sets of military uniforms from nothing, and can even write something on a piece of paper and throw this piece of paper into the river, turn it into a bridge along which the partisans cross a stormy stream. When the Japanese try to cross the bridge, it turns back into a piece of paper, and the enemies drown.

Photo: Korean Central News Agency/AP

The Japanese also reacted: to eliminate Kim Il Sung (and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the guerrilla commanders) a special unit was created under the command of Colonel Shotoku Nozoe, and if in 1936 the Japanese were willing to pay only 20 thousand for any information about his whereabouts yen, then by 1939 the price for Kim Il Sung’s head was 10 times more.

In 1939-1940, Kim was already the commander of the operational area (more precisely, the “commander of the 6th Division of the 2nd Army of the 1st Field Army of the Northeast United Anti-Japanese Army”), but by this time the Japanese began to clear Manchuria and Kando as formerly Korea. The success of the Japanese punitive actions is evidenced by the fact that during the Great Patriotic War the Germans tried to study the Japanese experience, using it against the partisans of Ukraine and Belarus. The enemy was worthy and terrible, and the title of the Korean revolutionary opera, “Sea of ​​Blood,” quite clearly reflects the scale of the repression.

In addition to the punitive expeditions themselves, the Japanese strategy included sending provocateurs and spies to the partisans, the forced relocation of the population from mountainous and forest areas to the so-called “united villages”, the introduction of mutual responsibility, the certification of the population and the introduction of a travel document system (at the same time, instead of a photograph, they put on passports fingerprints). “Self-defense units” from among pro-Japanese Koreans and Japanese settlers were used, whose settlements were supposed to repel the partisans. Observation points, defense lines and strategic roads were built to quickly transfer troops.

In addition to the economic war (the Japanese bought up all the surplus food so that the local population, by giving food to the partisans, would thereby doom themselves to starvation), ideological work was carried out. The leadership of the partisans was lured with high positions in the administration, ordinary partisans with vodka and women, using young prostitutes for this, and if they were not available, with pornographic postcards with inscriptions like “they are ready to serve surrendered partisans for free.”

At the same time, intimidation actions were carried out. To intimidate the guerrillas and their sympathizers, the Japanese beheaded Korean guerrilla leaders and displayed their heads. Villages were often burned along with their inhabitants, and the torture used would have done credit to the Middle Ages. And although the stories in North Korean propaganda about how punishers boiled partisan accomplices alive in cauldrons, and then forced the rest of the villagers to eat this boiled meat, these are most likely fantasies, there were less terrible options for demonstrative executions.

And the Japanese interrogators knew how to relieve pain shock during torture, and therefore their “shoulder masters” were very effective. There is a legend that what is mentioned in “It’s Hard to Be a God” “and if the tortured person becomes unconscious...” is a real piece of captured instruction on interrogation techniques, translated by the Japanese scholar Strugatsky. And therefore, it was easier for someone who was captured by them to immediately bite off his tongue, as Ma Dong-hee, one of Kim’s comrades, did.

This tactic paid off. If at most active period During its activities, Kim Il Sung’s detachment reached a strength of 300 people, then from May 1939 it began to decline. Some of his confidants turn out to be traitors, and in the year before the defeat of the United Army, Kim often had to operate with fewer than fifty fighters under his command.

The partisans operated in the forests in conditions of shortage of everything - even the head of the food service of Kim's detachment died of hunger. But even in this situation, the partisans continued to fight. It is no coincidence that the author considers the most important event of the guerrilla war with the participation of Kim not the raid on Pochonbo, but the battle of March 13-25, 1940 at Daimalugou, when 250 partisans of Kim Il Sung completely defeated the special police detachment of Takashi Maeda, consisting of 150 people, who were pursuing them. The two-week pursuit of the Japanese “yagdkommando” after a partisan detachment through the taiga, off-road and deep snow could become the plot of a good action movie. During the battle, Maeda himself and 58 members of his squad were killed, and the partisans received a large amount of weapons and ammunition.

On April 6, 1940, Nozoe's detachment captured five wounded Korean partisans, among whom was Kim Hyo Song, who posed as Kim Il Sung's wife. They tried to use her as bait to lure Kim Il Sung into a trap, but failed. Kim Hyo Sun was executed.

Kim Il Sung himself was also “killed” several times, which was solemnly reported in the media. Just as they were killed several times - not so much for the sake of propaganda, but because of military confusion. From Kim’s own memoirs it also follows that sometimes the Japanese mistook one of his killed comrades for him when the partisan detachment had to split up, and sometimes a captured partisan posed as a commander so that the rest of the detachment could leave more calmly.

But time was on the Japanese side. By the end of the spring of 1941, most of the Manchu partisan detachments either died, retreated deeper into China, or were forced to cross the border of the USSR. Kim was one of the last to cross the Amur, but how the partisan commander became the leader of the DPRK is in the next article.

I would like to end the conversation with two remarks. Firstly, no matter what they say in South Korea, Kim Il Sung took part in the guerrilla struggle and caused more trouble for the Japanese than other guerrilla commanders, although the official propaganda of the DPRK distorts the picture no less strongly. Even anti-communist historians recognize Kim’s taiga past: he was not killed, was not betrayed, and was not flattered by favorable terms of surrender - but, towards the end of his career, he was offered the post of governor of the province in which he operated.

Secondly, Kim should be called a communist with some caution, as, in general, the entire group of his associates. Yes, they themselves called themselves communists and considered themselves communists. The Japanese called them communists, although their communists were any leftists who took the path of armed struggle. But from the point of view of dogma, there was still a mess in their heads, and it is easier to talk about them as very left-wing nationalists. Kim did not have a serious theoretical education, and, looking ahead, we note that 90 percent of his entire collected works consists of speeches and speeches. Even the work on the Juche ideas was ultimately written not by him, but by his son Kim Jong Il.

This is due to the fact that the leadership of a partisan detachment (especially in such conditions) has a number of characteristic features, which appeared when Kim Il Sung and his comrades began to lead not a partisan detachment, but a country.

Firstly, the commander of a partisan detachment resolves all pressing issues - military, administrative, and everyday. But military issues are in the foreground, since success in military operations and evading enemy attacks is the main thing for the partisans.

Secondly, the partisan detachment exists in a situation of chronic shortage of resources - both material and human. Hence - a certain readiness for deprivation, which is perceived as a kind of norm. Hence the ability to squeeze all available resources to the end, to maintain in working order those items (from weapons to shoes) that in a normal situation would most likely be thrown out or destroyed. Hence the very high cost of error. When resources are scarce, “bird in hand” is preferable to “pie in the sky.”

Thirdly, the partisan detachment exists in a constant hostile environment, when even from the local population, which seems loyal, you can expect a dirty trick. This not only nurtures and reinforces the image of a fiery ring of enemies, but also creates a situation in which a certain distrust of the external environment is combined with the suppression of internal squabbles and any germs of factionalism in the team. The unusually harsh reaction to betrayal has the same roots.

Fourthly, a guerrilla war is always a war against an enemy with superior military and economic potential. This creates the need for an asymmetrical response, develops the ability to evade and maneuver, avoiding direct confrontation and being able to use some external forces against others. Such extreme living conditions are a very good object lesson - those who do not behave according to the rules of their existence die, and those who survive remember them for the rest of their lives.

On July 8, North Korea marks the 15th anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung. Traditionally, on this date, the central media of the DPRK publish stories from the life of the leader. “Power” chose seven, if not the brightest, then very characteristic.

VYACHESLAV BELASH

Kim Il Sung and the Constitution

“The founder of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung, while working to build a new state, paid great attention to such issues as the name of the state, its flag and coat of arms, and especially the constitution of the country. In the fall of 1947, he created a commission to which he entrusted the development of a draft constitution.

Since nothing like this had been done in the country before, he gave the commission members detailed instructions in what direction the work should be carried out, what the content of the constitution should be... Thanks to his deep attention, the draft constitution was drawn up in a month.

Comrade Kim Il Sung organized a discussion of the draft constitution... He asked those gathered to comment on the order of its chapters. There was no answer. No one had any objections. Looking around those present, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that in this regard, the draft constitution does not correspond to the real state of affairs in the country. In the constitution, the main place should be occupied by the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, and therefore it is necessary to put the chapter on the rights of citizens at the beginning. The draft constitution spoke about the fundamental rights and responsibilities of citizens in the last part.

Then we moved on to a more detailed discussion. Different opinions were expressed. In particular, they proposed to delete the word “nationality” from Article 11 “...regardless of... nationality...”, since Koreans belong to one nation, and to call the highest state body not the Supreme People's Assembly, but the parliament.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that the word “nationality” should be left, since if foreigners accept DPRK citizenship, their rights cannot be limited... He also said that the name “supreme people’s assembly” should be left, since the most The best form of parliament is the Supreme People's Assembly. So he gave important instructions about the composition and content of the constitution."

Kim Il Sung and the forest

“On April 6, 1947, when the construction of a new democratic Korea was underway on a large scale after the liberation of the country, Kim Il Sung, together with the residents of Pyongyang, took part in a tree planting ceremony on Mount Munsu.

Planting one seedling after another, he told the workers accompanying him that by organizing forest planting work, it was necessary to quickly eliminate the consequences of the colonial rule of the Japanese imperialists. Emphasizing that making the mountains green is an important task... he pointed out the need to plant trees wisely, plant economically useful species, and take good care of trees.

The heroine of the anti-Japanese struggle, Kim Jong Suk, together with her little son Kim Jong Il, also climbed Mount Munsu and, setting an example for others, began planting trees.

On this day, Comrade Kim Il Sung highlighted the fundamental issues of planting forests on all mountains and continuous expansion natural resources countries. After this, a nationwide movement began in Korea to turn all the mountains into gold. Today, all the mountains of the country have become wooded, and park areas and places of cultural recreation for the population have been established in picturesque places.”

Kim Il Sung and Carter

“Jimmy Carter, the 39th President of the United States, who met with President Kim Il Sung in mid-June 83 (1994) during a visit to the DPRK, expressed his impressions as follows:

- President Kim Il Sung is the greatest of people, with whom George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln combined cannot be compared... I can say with confidence that Kim Il Sung is the god of the Sun and the arbiter of destinies, surpassing in greatness Helios and all the combined founders of the world's states.

An old-timer in US political circles, considered the leader of the Western world, Carter was proud... But he did not hesitate to praise President Kim Il Sung... Why?

We can find the answer to this in what he experienced during his days in the DPRK.

June 17. President Kim Il Sung, together with J. Carter, went by boat to the West Sea hydrocomplex. On board he hosted a dinner in honor of the guest. Inviting the guest to the table, the president said that the dishes were prepared taking into account his allergy to soy products.

Carter... was deeply touched by the president's attention.

President Kim Il Sung conducted the conversation at ease. About the life expectancy of the population... about the prospects for the harvest, about the direction of development of international relations, about the struggle of the Korean people to implement the Juche ideas, about the prospect of the unification of Korea, about international peace and the future of mankind... There was no end to the topics of conversation.

Carter was captivated by the rich store of knowledge and erudition of the president... Suddenly Carter's gaze... stopped at two small silos in the distance.

He asked curiously:

- Mr. President, can you tell me what is stored there?

Comrade Kim Il Sung answered him in detail...

- Simply amazing! - said Carter. - There are many heads of state in the world, but none of them would be as knowledgeable as you, knowing even about the contents of some silo...

The President called one of the escorts and told him to reduce the speed of the ship. Carter asked in confusion what was the matter.

President Kim Il Sung pointed to the shore with one hand and said:

- Look, there are people fishing on the shore. You can't disturb them...

Carter was delighted..."

From the editor. In this version, the story about Carter's admiration is published in the Russian and French editions of the magazine. In the Spanish edition, the story was published without a quote from Carter. The story is not available in the English edition.

Kim Il Sung and weather forecast

“It happened at the beginning of June 70 (1981), when President Kim Il Sung went to the collective farm for leadership on the spot. While examining the surroundings of the collective farm, for some time he fixed his gaze on the crown of a tall tree, where a magpie built a nest.

Having carefully looked at the magpie, the president asked the workers accompanying him why the magpie builds a nest so that the entrance to it is from the side, and not from above.

He told the workers, who were racking their brains over this unexpected question, that the rainy season would be especially rainy and would be accompanied by not ordinary, but torrential rains. And the fact that magpies build nests with the entrance to the side should protect them from such heavy rains.

He stressed that all collective farms in the country must take all measures to protect against rainfall and floods.

The workers... were deeply moved by the words of the President, who clarified the essence of the matter with all scientific depth and extraordinary wisdom, seeing a natural phenomenon in what seemed ordinary to others.

As he predicted, the country was hit by torrential rains of extraordinary force. At the direction of the President, officials and agricultural workers completed preparations to prevent losses from heavy rains in advance... and were able to protect the entire crop."

Kim Il Sung and Bruno Kreisky

“Bruno Kreisky was a well-known political figure in Austria, who served as Federal Chancellor for many years and then became honorary chairman of the Social Democratic Party.

Unfortunately, in his old age he lost his legs. The doctors' verdict was terrible: Kreisky would never be able to walk. He told major specialists invited from the USA, France, Japan, Germany and other countries that he really loved skiing, but knew well that now it was impossible. He asked them to at least help him go to the toilet.

The doctors examined the patient, but shook their heads in disappointment.

Upon learning of this, President Kim Il Sung sent Korean traditional medicine specialists to Austria. The patient's condition was indeed serious. But Korean doctors did not lose hope and began treatment. They placed cups, did massages... used medicines manufactured in accordance with the requirements of national medicine. The tense days of intensive treatment passed. Soon signs of improvement began to appear, and after a little more time the paralysis was lifted.

In September 1986, Kreisky came to Pyongyang to personally express his gratitude to President Kim Il Sung. He said that doctors from different countries treated him unsuccessfully, but Korean doctors used traditional medicine to help him a lot, for which he is sincerely grateful to President Kim Il Sung.

Kreisky asked to leave Korean doctors in his country for some more time, so that they would pass on their knowledge and experience to their colleagues in Austria... and continue to treat him. Comrade Kim Il Sung granted his request. When Kreisky was leaving home, Comrade Kim Il Sung gave him valuable medicines and took measures to ensure that Korean doctors, while remaining in Austria, continued to help Kreisky. Later, Kreisky, having fully recovered, was able to play his favorite sport again."

Kim Il Sung and death

“To commemorate the third anniversary of the death of the great leader President Kim Il Sung, the Workers' Party of Korea published the book “The Last Days of a Great Life.” It tells that before his death, President Kim Il Sung finished his work as if he knew what would happen to him. The book consists of seven chapters. The first chapter talks about the President's ongoing efforts to ensure the continuity of the revolutionary line of the Workers' Party of Korea and the people of Korea, the Juche line. The second chapter talks about how the President has formulated the history of the nation over the past five thousand years. For example, he discovered the country's founding father, corrected the origins and development of Ancient Korea and the history of Goguryeo, led the work of rebuilding the tombs of the first kings... The third and fourth chapters include stories of how the president met with all the people he was supposed to meet, and immortalized the exploits of fallen soldiers.The fifth chapter talks about the President's teachings to achieve the revolutionary goal of Juche under the leadership of Secretary Kim Jong Il. Chapters six and seven of the book include stories about the president's death in office and the precious relics he used in his final days."

Kim Il Sung and eternal life

“In July 1997, a joint resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the WPK, the Central Military Committee of the WPK, the State Defense Committee of the DPRK, the Central People's Committee of the DPRK, and the Administrative Council of the DPRK “On perpetuating the revolutionary life and immortal merits of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.” According to this resolution, the Juche chronology system, which dated its beginning to 1912, the year of birth of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and the Day of the Sun was established - his birthday, April 15... On September 5, 1998, the first session of the tenth convocation of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK adopted a new edition of the socialist constitution, which determined the first President Kim Il Sung as the eternal President of the DPRK... Thus, Kim Il Sung, even after his death, remains the eternal President, enjoying the absolute support and trust of the people.

"The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is always with us." These words contain the strong will... of the Korean people, determined to be devoted to the cause of Comrade Kim Il Sung, in whose person the people met a great leader for the first time in 5,000 years of history... The Korean people... built towers with these words everywhere and called them the towers of Immortality. In 1997, the monumental Immortality Tower was built in Pyongyang. Its height is 82 m, which corresponds to the age of Comrade Kim Il Sung in Last year his life. The star of the Generalissimo shines at the top, and below it are the words: “The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is always with us.” On the side and bottom parts of the obelisk are magnolia and azalea flowers, which Comrade Kim Il Sung loved."