Kursk Bulge results of the battle. The Battle of Kursk is the Ural State Military History Museum. In works of art

In history Second World War The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest. It entered the annals of our country as the largest tank battle.

Victory in it allowed the Red Army to finally turn the tide of hostilities, seize the strategic initiative and not lose it until the final defeat by the Germans and the capture of Berlin.

Having defeated German troops at Stalingrad, the Red Army continued its offensive operations. During the spring battles, large territories of the Soviet Union were liberated from invaders. Near Kursk, in the front line formed bend towards west, which received the historical name “Kursk Bulge”.

By the end of spring active the fighting stopped. The warring parties needed to increase their reserves, replenish their units, and bring in ammunition. Preparations for the summer campaign were actively underway.

When developing a plan for further action in the leadership of German troops there was no consensus. Some generals proposed going on the defensive, strengthening the captured territories and, exhausting the advancing Russian armies, restoring the potential of their troops.

But the German leadership wanted revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad in order to change the course of hostilities in their favor. They believed that their armed forces were still strong enough and could defeat the Red Army. Because Objectively, the Germans could no longer ensure an offensive in several directions, so it was decided to concentrate on one. The Kursk ledge was chosen as the direction of the main attack.

It was planned to use flank attacks in the Oryol-Kursk and Belgorod-Kursk directions to encircle the Russian units located there and defeat them. The German leadership had high hopes for the new heavy tanks that they had acquired at this time. Due to the delay in their production even the due date was postponed by a month.

Defensive part of the battle

The Soviet leadership, based on intelligence and intelligence data, knew about the plans of the Germans. It was decided to create a powerful, layered defensive system with the help of which to repel the enemy’s attack, bleed him and prepare the conditions for a counterattack.

Knowing the date and time of the offensive, Soviet troops, two hours before its start, conducted pre-emptive artillery preparations against the German units preparing to attack. The Germans suffered significant losses, but they did not abandon the offensive.

Initially, a strike was struck on the northern part of the arc in the Oryol-Kursk direction, then on the southern part - in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. The Germans managed to concentrate a powerful tank group in these directions. The northern one consisted of up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns, the southern one - up to 700.

The Red Army, thanks to a well-planned defense, defended itself staunchly. During a week of fighting, German troops were able to advance 10-12 km in the Orel area, and 35 km in the Belgorod area. Trying to develop an offensive in the southern direction, the Germans abandoned near the village of Prokhorovka large tank group.

Counteroffensive

To stop this offensive and defeat the enemy, the Soviet command is conducting a counter-offensive, also using a tank army. In the battle of Prokhorovka Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part.

History has never known tank battles of this scale. As a result of the battle, the Germans were unable to capture Kursk.

Soviet troops did not defeat the enemy, but stopped his advance, bled him dry and forced him to go on the defensive. The offensive capabilities of the German troops were exhausted during 10 days of fighting.

They failed to break through the defense of the Red Army.

The final part of the battle

Seeing the impossibility of a further offensive, the German command begins to withdraw troops to their previous positions. Taking advantage of this moment, the Red Army delivers counterattacks to the enemy and prevents the Germans from gaining a foothold on occupied lines.

This was the beginning of a victorious offensive, which German troops could not stop until the end of the war. The enemy suffered irreparable losses in people and equipment.

5th of August Oryol and Belgorod were liberated. Moscow, for the first time during the war, saluted the winners.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest in the Great Patriotic War. It was attended by more than 4 million people, 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12,000 aircraft. The victory allowed the Soviet Union to finally turn the tide of the war. German troops along the entire front were forced to go on the defensive.

Germany's allies, after defeat in this battle, began leave the fascist bloc. In Russia, the day of victory in the Battle of Kursk is a day of military glory, and Orel and Belgorod became the first cities to also be awarded this title.

The crushing defeat of the Nazi army and its allies at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43 shook the fascist bloc to its core. The funeral ringing of church bells that rang out in Germany in the first days of February 1943 announced to the amazed world about the tragic finale of the Battle of Stalingrad for the Wehrmacht. The brilliant victory of the Red Army on the banks of the Volga and Don made a huge impression on the world community. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, Hitler's Germany faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat in all its inevitability. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and its prestige in the eyes of its allies was seriously shaken. To improve the internal political situation of the Reich and prevent the collapse of the fascist coalition, Hitler's command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive, it hoped to defeat the group of Soviet troops located on the Kursk ledge, again seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. However, the Nazi clique is again - for the umpteenth time! – she cruelly miscalculated, overestimating her strength and underestimating the power of the Red Army.

By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. As a result of the selfless work of the Soviet people, the organizational and inspiring activities of the Soviet leadership, the military-political position of the USSR by this time had become even stronger. The striking and firepower of the Red Army became much higher than in 1941-1942 and the first half of 1943, while Nazi Germany failed to bring the total strength of its armed forces on the Eastern Front even to the level reached by the fall of 1942. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in forces and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people by 1.1 times, in artillery by 1.7 times, in tanks by 1.4 times and in combat aircraft by 2 times.

At one of the tank factories in Germany

Based on the fact that the Red Army had the strategic initiative and was superior to the enemy in strength and especially in means, the Supreme High Command Headquarters planned to begin the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 with broad offensive actions and deliver the main blow in the southwestern strategic direction.

By the beginning of the decisive clash between the parties in the summer of 1943, a front line with a length of 2100 km ran from the Barents Sea to the west of Murmansk, then went to Karelia, 100-200 km east of the Soviet-Finnish border, then along the Svir River to Leningrad, then turned south to Lake Ilmen , Novgorod and Velikiye Luki, from where it turned again, but to the southeast, to Kirov. After that, it formed the “Oryol balcony” extended to the east and protruding far to the west, towards the enemy, the so-called Kursk Bulge. Further, the front line went to the southeast, north of Belgorod, east of Kharkov, from there to the south, along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers, then along the eastern coast of the Sea of ​​Azov to the Taman Peninsula, where the enemy held a large bridgehead. Throughout this entire space, with a length of more than 2 thousand km from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, 12 Soviet fronts operated, opposed by 4 German army groups, a separate German army and Finnish troops.

In the upcoming offensive, the German command relied on new armored vehicles - jaguars, tigers and panthers

The political and military leadership of the Third Reich persistently sought an opportunity to successfully continue the struggle. His confidence was based on the fact that, despite the severe defeat at Stalingrad, the fascist German troops still managed to stabilize the situation on the Eastern Front by the spring of 1943. As a result of a successful counter-offensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov, carried out in February-March 1943, they stopped the advance of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction and, moreover, created important bridgeheads in the central strategic direction. From the end of March 1943, for the first time in the long months of the war, relative calm established itself on the Soviet-German front. Both sides began active preparations for decisive battles that were to determine the final outcome of the war. Hitler and his entourage believed in the success of the upcoming offensive. The relatively calm situation in other theaters of World War II inspired them with hope for success. The fascist German command was confident that in 1943 Germany was not threatened by the opening of a second front in Europe by the Western powers. Hitler managed to prevent the collapse of the fascist bloc for some time and maintain the loyalty of his allies. And finally, much was expected from the new military equipment that was coming into service with the Wehrmacht in increasing quantities, primarily the T-VI (Tiger) heavy tanks, T-V (Panther) medium tanks, assault guns (Ferdinand) and aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighter and Henschel-129 attack aircraft). They were destined to play the role of the main striking force in the upcoming offensive.

Nazi Germany began preparing for the next “general offensive” on the Eastern Front back in April 1943, mobilizing all its resources and capabilities for this. To make up for the enormous human losses and restore the divisions destroyed in the winter battles, the Nazi leadership resorted to total mobilization. At the same time, maximum possible efforts were made to increase the output of military products. All these factors, taken together, gave the military-political leadership of the Third Reich a certain chance of achieving success.

The Soviet high command was ready to launch a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. But, taking into account the sad experience of the spring of 1942, it chose a different course of action. It was decided to prepare a defense in depth in advance and, relying on it, to repel the enemy’s offensive, exhaust and bleed his strike forces, and then launch a counter-offensive, complete the defeat of the enemy and finally tip the scales in favor of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.

STRENGTHS AND PLANS OF THE PARTIES

Both sides began developing plans for the summer of 1943 even before the end of the winter campaign of 1942/43. Even before the end of the fighting for Kharkov, on March 13, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 5, in which he defined the general goals of military operations on the Eastern Front for the spring and summer of 1943. “It is to be expected,” the order stated, “that the Russians after the end of winter and the spring thaw, having created reserves of material resources and partially replenishing their formations with people, they will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to, if possible, forestall them in attacking in individual places in order to impose our will, at least on one sector of the front, as is currently the case on the front of Army Group South. In other sectors, the task comes down to bleeding the enemy’s offensive. Here we must create a strong defense in advance.”

Army groups “Center” and “South” were tasked with defeating the Soviet troops operating in the Kursk salient by delivering counter strikes. The area of ​​Orel, Kursk and Belgorod became the focus of the main attention of the fascist German command. The protrusion of the Soviet front, which penetrated deeply into the enemy’s position here, caused him great concern. Using this ledge, Soviet troops could strike at the junction of Army Groups “Center” and “South” and make a deep breakthrough into the central regions of Ukraine, to the Dnieper. At the same time, Hitler’s strategists could not resist the temptation to encircle and destroy the large group of Soviet troops located on it by launching counter strikes from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge. In the future, it was planned to launch an offensive to the northeast or south. Thus, Hitler's commanders intended to take revenge for Stalingrad. This operation was considered the main one at Hitler's headquarters. To carry it out, troops were withdrawn from other sectors of the Eastern Front (from Rzhev, Demyansk, the Taman Peninsula, etc.). In total, in this way it was planned to strengthen the Kursk direction with 32 divisions, including 3 tank and 2 motorized.

The fascist German command, after receiving Hitler's directive, intensified the development of a plan for an offensive operation in the Kursk area. Its plan was based on the proposals of Colonel General V. Model (commander of the 9th Army). The essence of his proposals was to encircle and destroy large forces of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient by striking 2 army groups from the north and south in the general direction of Kursk. On April 12, the operation plan was presented to Hitler. After 3 days, the Fuhrer signed an order, according to which army groups “Center” and “South” were to complete preparations for the offensive on Kursk by May 3. The developers of the plan for the offensive operation, codenamed “Citadel,” assumed that the exit of the attack tank groups of Army Groups “South” and “Center” to the Kursk area would take no more than 4 days.

The creation of strike forces in army groups in accordance with Hitler's orders began back in March. In Army Group South (Field Marshal E. von Manstein), the strike force consisted of the 4th Panzer Army (Colonel General G. Hoth) and Task Force Kempf. In Army Group Center, the main blow was delivered by the 9th Army of General V. Model.

However, all the calculations of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command turned out to be very far from reality and immediately began to show major failures. Thus, the troops did not have time to carry out the necessary regroupings by the specified date. The actions of partisans on enemy communications and attacks by Soviet aviation seriously hampered the work of transport, the transportation of troops, military equipment, ammunition and other materiel. In addition, the arrival of new tanks to the troops was very slow. In addition, their production was not yet properly debugged. Due to a number of significant technical shortcomings, imperfections and shortcomings, the new tanks and assault guns, simply put, were not ready for combat use. Hitler was convinced that a miracle could only happen through the massive use of new types of tanks and assault guns. By the way, the imperfection of the new German armored vehicles appeared immediately with the transition of the Nazi troops to the offensive: already on the first day, out of 200 “Panthers” of the 4th Tank Army, 80% of the vehicles were out of action due to technical problems. As a result of a number of inconsistencies during the preparation of the offensive operation and the miscalculations that emerged, the timing of the transition to the offensive was repeatedly postponed. Finally, on June 21, Hitler set the final date for the start of Operation Citadel as July 5. The creation of two powerful strike groups on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, the basis of which were tank and motorized formations, was completed by the beginning of July. The necessary adjustments were made to the original plan of the offensive operation. The main idea of ​​the revised plan was to create a significant superiority over the Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks and, using massive tank formations, to quickly break through the defenses before the arrival of large Soviet reserves. The enemy was well aware of the strength of our defense, but he believed that surprise and speed of action, coupled with the high penetrating ability of tank divisions equipped with new equipment, would bring the desired success. But the confidence of the fascist German command was based on ephemeral calculations and was in flagrant contradiction with reality. He did not take into account in a timely manner many factors that could have had the most direct, and, moreover, negative, impact on the course and outcome of the offensive operation. These include, for example, a gross miscalculation by German intelligence, which failed to detect as many as 10 Soviet armies, which then took part in the Battle of Kursk. Another such factor was the enemy’s underestimation of the power of the Soviet defense and overestimation of its own offensive capabilities. And this list can be continued for a long time.

In accordance with the plan for Operation Citadel, Army Group South launched two strikes: one with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, the other with Army Group Kempf, which had a total of 19 divisions (including 9 tank divisions), 6 separate divisions of assault guns and 3 battalions of heavy tanks. In total, by the time they went on the offensive, they had 1,493 tanks, including 337 Panthers and Tigers, as well as 253 assault guns. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (1,100 aircraft). The best formations of Army Group South - 6 tank (motorized) and 4 infantry divisions - were part of the 4th Tank Army. Among them was the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, whose 4 motorized divisions received almost all the new tanks allocated to Army Group South. Field Marshal E. Manstein, who was considered the “best operational mind” of the German General Staff, was primarily counting on the striking power of this corps. The corps acted in the direction of the main attack of Army Group South.

The strike force of Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. von Kluge) included 8 tank and 14 infantry divisions, 9 separate divisions of assault guns, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks and 3 separate companies of remote-controlled tanks intended for detonating mines. fields. All of them were part of the 9th Field Army. It consisted of about 750 tanks, including 45 Tigers, and 280 assault guns. The army was supported from the air by the 6th Air Fleet (up to 700 aircraft).

The final plan of Operation Citadel was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending on the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod in the general direction of Kursk, and then strike in the rear of the South. Western Front. After this, it was planned to develop an offensive in the northeast direction with the aim of reaching deep behind the central group of Soviet troops and creating a threat to Moscow. In order to divert the attention and reserves of the Soviet command, simultaneously with the strike on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazi command planned an attack on Leningrad. Thus, the Wehrmacht leadership developed a plan to defeat the entire southern wing of the Red Army's strategic front. If this plan were successfully implemented, this would radically change the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front and would open up new prospects for the enemy to continue the struggle.

Unlike Wehrmacht operations in 1941-1942, the tasks of enemy strike groups in Operation Citadel were significantly less in depth. The troops of Army Group Center were supposed to advance 75 km, and Army Group South - 125 km. The fascist German command considered such tasks quite feasible. For the offensive in the Kursk region, it attracted about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized, more than 20% of infantry divisions operating on the Soviet-German front, as well as over 65% of aviation. These were selected Wehrmacht troops, commanded by the most experienced generals. In total, for the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the enemy initially sent 50 of its most combat-ready divisions, including 17 tank divisions, as well as a large number of individual units of the RVGK. In addition, about 20 more divisions operated on the flanks of the strike groups. Ground troops were supported by aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets (over 2 thousand aircraft in total). The Nazi command believed that it had done everything possible for the success of Operation Citadel. For no other operation during the entire Second World War did it prepare so comprehensively and so carefully as for the offensive near Kursk. “Today,” said Hitler’s address to the troops, read out to him the night before the offensive, “you are beginning a great offensive battle, which can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole... And you must know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.” . This appeal from the German Fuhrer very eloquently shows what hopes the enemy had for his summer offensive near Kursk in 1943.

After the victorious offensive in the winter of 1942/43, the Soviet command gave the troops the order to temporarily go on the defensive, gain a foothold on the achieved lines and prepare for new offensive operations. However, having timely guessed the enemy's plan, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to switch to deliberate defense. The development of the Red Army action plan for the summer of 1943 began in March 1943, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief made the final decision only in June. The high command of the Red Army was in a decisive mood. In particular, such front commanders as N.F. Vatutin, K.K. Rokossovsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky and some others considered it necessary to continue the offensive. However, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not want to take risks, was cautious and did not fully share the warlike views of his military leaders. He was not confident in the success of the offensive, which had previously failed in the Red Army during the summer. The defeats in the spring and summer of 1942 (in the Crimea, near Lyuban, Demyansk, Bolkhov and Kharkov) left a mark on his mind too deep to rely on chance. The Supreme Commander's hesitation intensified even more after the enemy's intentions to launch a major offensive in the Kursk region became known. On April 8, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov sent a report from the Voronezh Front to Stalin, in which he outlined his point of view on the current situation and made his proposals regarding upcoming actions. “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days,” he wrote, in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.”

Having studied the opinions of the front commanders and the General Staff, I.V. Stalin held a meeting on April 12, which was attended by G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and Lieutenant General A.I. Antonov (chief of the operational department of the General Staff). After a detailed discussion of the current situation, it was decided, while strengthening the defense, to concentrate the main efforts on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, where, according to all calculations, the main events were to unfold. Here it was planned to create strong groups of troops, which, having repelled powerful attacks from the enemy, were supposed to go on a counter-offensive, delivering the main attacks on Kharkov, Poltava and Kyiv with the aim of liberating Donbass and the entire Left Bank of Ukraine.

From mid-April, the General Staff began developing a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive under the code name Operation Kutuzov. It was planned to involve troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts in this operation. It was supposed to begin with the defeat of the enemy group on the Oryol ledge. The counteroffensive in the Kharkov direction, which involved troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, received the code name Operation Commander Rumyantsev. The fronts were supposed to carry out this operation in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front. The task of repelling the enemy's advance from Orel to the northern part of the Kursk salient was assigned to the troops of the Central Front, and from the Belgorod area to the southern part of the Kursk salient - to the Voronezh Front. In the rear of the Kursk salient, the Steppe Front was deployed, which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. It consisted of 5 combined arms, tank and air armies, as well as 10 separate corps (6 tank and mechanized, 3 cavalry and 1 rifle). The front numbered about 580 thousand people, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 470 aircraft. It was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough of the enemy both from Orel and from Belgorod, and when the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts went on a counteroffensive, it was supposed to increase the force of the strike from the depths. The actions of the front troops on the Kursk Bulge were coordinated by representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. Thus, the situation that had developed in the Kursk Bulge area by the summer of 1943 was generally favorable for the Soviet troops. This gave certain chances for a successful outcome of the defensive battle.

By the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Central Front (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky) had the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk ledge, repelling the enemy’s offensive, and then, going on a counteroffensive, together with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, defeating his group in the Orel region. The Voronezh Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin) received the task of defending the southern part of the Kursk ledge, exhausting and bleeding the enemy in defensive battles, and then launching a counteroffensive to complete its defeat in the areas of Belgorod and Kharkov. The troops of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front were supposed to assist the Central Front in disrupting the enemy offensive and be ready to launch a counteroffensive.

At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the central front included 5 combined arms (48, 13, 70, 65 and 60th), 2nd tank and 16th air armies, as well as 2 separate tank corps (9th and 19th). In total, the front had 41 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, a fighter division, 5 rifle and 3 separate tank brigades, 3 fortified areas - a total of 738 thousand people, over 10.9 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.8 thousand. tanks and self-propelled guns and 1.1 thousand aircraft. The front defended a strip 306 km wide. When organizing the defense, the commander of the troops of the Central Front proceeded from the fact that an enemy attack would most likely follow through Ponyri to Kursk, and therefore deployed his main forces on the right wing of the front in a strip of about 100 km - 3 armies (48th, 13th and 70th ) - 58% of rifle divisions, about 90% of tanks and self-propelled guns, 70% of artillery. Particular attention was paid to the 30-kilometer strip along the Orel-Kursk railway. On the rest of the front, 2 armies (65th and 60th) occupied the defense. Anticipating the fierce nature of the upcoming battle, General Rokossovsky created a strong second echelon and reserve. The 2nd Tank Army was in the second echelon, with the 9th and 19th Separate Tank Corps in reserve. Both the second echelon and the reserve were located in the direction of the expected enemy attack. The front troops were supported from the air by the 16th Air Army. The idea of ​​the defensive operation of the Central Front was to use stubborn defense on the occupied lines to weaken the enemy strike force as much as possible, stop its advance, and in the morning of the 2-3rd day of the operation, launch a counterattack and restore the previously occupied position, or go on a counteroffensive.

At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Voronezh Front included 5 combined arms (38, 40, 69, 6th Guards and 7th Guards), 1st Tank and 2nd Air Armies, as well as 2 separate tank (2 1st and 5th Guards) and rifle (35th Guards) corps. In total, the front had 35 rifle divisions, 4 tank and 1 mechanized corps and 6 separate tank brigades - a total of 535 thousand people, about 8.2 thousand guns and mortars, 1.7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 1.1 thousand .airplanes. The front defended a strip about 250 km wide. The commander of the Voronezh Front believed that the enemy could strike simultaneously in three directions: from the Belgorod area to Oboyan, from the same area to Korocha and from the area west of Volchansk to Novy Oskol. The first two directions were considered as the most probable, and therefore the main forces of the front were deployed in the center and on the left wing. Here, in a zone of 164 km, the 6th and 7th Guards Armies defended. The rest of the sector was occupied by 2 other armies of the first echelon of the front (38th and 40th). In the second echelon were the 1st Tank and 69th armies, in reserve - 2 separate tank and rifle corps. The second echelon and reserve, as well as on the Central Front, were located in the directions of expected enemy attacks. The front troops were supported from the air by the 2nd Air Army.

The troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts outnumbered the enemy: in men - 1.4-1.5 times, in artillery - 1.8-2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns - 1.1-1.5 times. However, in the directions of their main attacks, the fascist German command achieved a temporary superiority in forces and means. Only on the northern front did the Soviet troops retain some superiority in artillery. The concentration of superior forces in selected directions allowed the enemy to deliver powerful initial blows to the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts.

Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal G.K. Zhukov
and the commander of the Steppe Front, Army General I.S. Konev

Chief of the General Staff, representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky
and the commander of the Southwestern Front, Army General R.Ya. Malinovsky

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to switch to deliberate defense, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, by the beginning of the enemy offensive, had basically completed their task of preparing a positional defense in depth. A total of 8 defensive lines and lines were equipped. The organization of defense was based on the idea of ​​deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions with a well-developed system of trenches, communication passages and other engineering structures. On the Central and Voronezh fronts there were 5-6 defensive lines and lines. The first two lines constituted the tactical defense zone, and the third was the army defensive line. In addition, there were 2-3 more front lines. Along with this, a defensive line of the troops of the Steppe Front was created, and a state defense line was prepared along the left bank of the Don. The total depth of the defense prepared by Soviet troops near Kursk was 250-300 km. The most developed in engineering terms was the tactical defense zone, the depth of which for the first time during the war reached 15-20 km. Its first (main) line consisted of 2-3 positions, each of which had 2-3 full-profile trenches connected to each other by communication passages. The depth of the position was 1.5-2 km. The depth of defense of the armies was 30-50 km, of the fronts - 180-200 km. In the most important directions, defensive lines were occupied by troops in the expectation that even if the enemy managed to break through the army defenses, in the depths he would not encounter “operational space” where he could freely maneuver, but a new defense saturated with engineering structures and occupied by troops.

Anti-tank artillery moves to the front edge

Refueling tanks with fuel

Tank column heading to the front

The defense was built primarily as an anti-tank defense. It was based on anti-tank strong points (ATS), built, as a rule, in battalion (company) defense areas, and anti-tank areas (ATR), created independently or within regimental defense areas. Anti-tank defense (ATD) was strengthened by maneuvering artillery and anti-tank reserves. The PTOP and PTR fire system was coordinated with artillery fire located in open and closed firing positions. A characteristic point was that even cannon and howitzer artillery were prepared to fire at tanks at direct fire. Tank crews of the second echelons and reserves equipped firing lines for ambushes. It was also planned to use flamethrower units, tank destroyers and units of tank destroyer dogs to fight enemy tanks. More than 1 million anti-tank mines were installed in front of the front line and in the depths of the defense, and many tens of kilometers of anti-tank obstacles were erected: ditches, scarps, counter-scarps, gouges, forest rubble, etc. Mobile obstacle detachments (POZ) became an important element of anti-tank defense. The depth of the PTO near Kursk reached 30-35 km for the first time in the war. All fire weapons were supposed to be used massively, taking into account the likely directions of enemy attacks.

Considering that the enemy, as a rule, attacked with powerful air support, special attention was paid to the organization of air defense (air defense) of the troops. In addition to military forces and equipment, anti-aircraft artillery (1026 guns) of the fronts, fighter aircraft and significant forces of the country's Air Defense Forces were involved in carrying out air defense tasks. As a result, more than 60% of the combat formations of the troops were covered by two or three layers of anti-aircraft artillery fire and aviation.

Armor-piercers are preparing to meet enemy tanks with fire. Photo by B. Ignatovich

The population of the Oryol, Voronezh, Kursk, Sumy and Kharkov regions, mobilized by local authorities, provided enormous assistance to the troops of the fronts. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved in the construction of defensive fortifications. For example, in April, in the zones of the Central and Voronezh fronts, more than 100 thousand people were involved in defensive work, and in June almost 300 thousand.

The balance of forces at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was as follows. The fascist German command used over 900 thousand personnel, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, over 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and more than 2 thousand aircraft to carry out the offensive Operation Citadel. They were opposed by the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, numbering more than 1.3 million people, 19.1 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. Consequently, the Soviet troops (excluding the Steppe Front) outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in artillery (excluding rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns) - by 1.9, in tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.2, and in aircraft - 1.4 times.

Based on an analysis of the current situation, the front commanders increasingly doubted the advisability of the decision taken by the high command to switch to deliberate defense. General Vatutin showed particular persistence. He tried to convince Vasilevsky, and then Stalin, that in the current situation, deliberate defense was hardly advisable, since it would lead to the loss of precious time and could ultimately lead to the failure of the entire plan planned for the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. He believed that a preemptive offensive was necessary. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered this option to be carefully studied and ordered Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Malinovsky (commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front) to submit their proposals to the Supreme Command Headquarters. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky, firmly convinced of the need to meet the German offensive near Kursk with defense, defended the previously developed plan.

Thus, during the period of relative calm on the Soviet-German front, which lasted from late March to early July 1943, the warring parties made great efforts to fully prepare for the upcoming battles. In this competition, the Soviet state and its Armed Forces were ahead. All that remained was to skillfully use the forces and means at the command’s disposal. Considering the unfavorable balance of forces for the enemy, we can conclude that Hitler’s decision to attack at all costs from a military point of view was a gamble. But the Nazi leadership agreed to it, giving priority to political considerations. The German Fuhrer directly stated this in his speech in East Prussia on July 1. According to him, Operation Citadel will have not only military but also political significance, will help Germany retain its allies and thwart the plans of the Western powers to open a second front, and will also have a beneficial effect on the internal situation in Germany. However, the position of the fascist German troops was further aggravated by the fact that surprise, due to which they were able to largely achieve success in the summer operations of 1941 and 1942, was lost. This was facilitated, not least by the repeated postponements of the offensive near Kursk and the good work of Soviet intelligence. By the beginning of July, all decisions had been made, tasks were assigned to the troops, the huge masses of troops of the parties opposing the Kursk Bulge froze in tense anticipation...

July came, and there was still calm on the entire huge Soviet-German front. Sovinformburo reports invariably read: “Nothing significant happened at the front.” But it was a pre-storm calm. Soviet intelligence closely monitored the enemy's actions, especially the movements of his tank formations. Based on a thorough analysis of the situation and the latest intelligence data coming from various sources, the Supreme High Command Headquarters came to the conclusion that the enemy offensive could begin on July 3-6, and promptly warned the front commanders about this. On the night of July 5, it was possible to establish the exact time of the Nazi troops' transition to the offensive - 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5.

Having assessed the current situation, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to conduct pre-planned artillery counter-training in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated. It was necessary to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with a powerful and sudden fire strike even before he went on the offensive, and thereby weaken the force of his initial onslaught. “We were faced with the question: to believe the testimony of the prisoners or not? It was necessary to immediately make a decision to carry out the artillery counter-preparation provided for in the plan, since there was no time to request a rate and receive a response. And it was accepted. The front artillery commander received an order to attack the enemy with the full power of fire weapons planned for this purpose.”

At 2:20 a.m. on July 5, the pre-dawn silence of the short summer night on the Central Front was broken by a thunderous salvo of many hundreds of Soviet guns. A deadly barrage of artillery fire fell on the German divisions, frozen in anxious anticipation. The enemy, who was in the starting position, suffered heavy losses in men and equipment in a matter of minutes and was forced to postpone the transition to the offensive for 2.5 hours. The enemy failed to achieve surprise. Artillery counter-preparation was also carried out on the Voronezh Front. There the enemy's advance was delayed for 3 hours. For the first time during the war, artillery counter-preparation, carried out on the eve of the enemy's general offensive, had a real result. The fascist German troops suffered great losses in manpower and military equipment, their artillery fire was disorganized, and troop control was disrupted. The Wehrmacht High Command bitterly stated on July 6: “The enemy became aware of the start date of the offensive, so the element of operational surprise was lost.”

At 5:30 a.m., having brought its troops in order, the enemy Oryol group, after a powerful artillery barrage, went on the offensive. Under the cover of strong artillery fire and with the support of many aircraft, an avalanche of enemy tanks rushed towards the front line of our defense. The infantry followed them. The main blow was delivered to Olkhovatka, with a secondary blow to Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets. Nazi troops attacked on a 45-kilometer front the entire defense line of the 13th Army (Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov) and the adjacent flanks of the 48th (Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko) and 70th ( Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin). 9 divisions took part in the attack, including 2 tank divisions, as well as all assault gun divisions (280 units) and a separate battalion of heavy tanks. The enemy delivered the main blow in the Olkhovat direction with large infantry forces supported by 500 tanks and assault guns. Their actions were accompanied by massive air strikes. A fierce battle ensued. The enemy had no doubt about success. According to his calculations, the latest military equipment was supposed to crush the Soviet defense.

Our troops met the enemy's attack with exceptional resilience, although there were times when up to 400 enemy aircraft were simultaneously over the battlefield. Soviet soldiers fought to the death. The first enemy attack was repelled thanks to the high density of fire, especially anti-tank fire, combined with a barrage system. The enemy suffered heavy losses in the minefields. On the first day of the battle alone, up to 100 German tanks and assault guns were blown up. Our rifle units cut off the German infantry from the tanks and destroyed them with all types of fire, and the Nazis who broke into the trenches and communication passages were exterminated in hand-to-hand combat. In order to break through the front edge of the main defense line of the Red Army, the enemy repeated a 60-minute artillery preparation from 7:30 a.m. Only after this did German tanks manage to penetrate the defenses of the first echelon units in a number of areas. It must be said that the enemy’s actions were characterized by high coordination and intensity of the use of fire of all means. Thus, groups of 10-15 heavy tanks, being out of reach of our anti-tank guns and tanks, fired hurricane fire at infantry trenches and artillery positions. Under their cover, medium and light tanks attacked, followed by infantry in armored personnel carriers. The enemy attacks were carried out with powerful air support. Bombers in groups of 50-60 aircraft almost continuously bombed the defenders, and our fighters acted rather dispersedly. Only 3 hours later, the commander of the 16th Air Army, Aviation Lieutenant General S.I. Rudenko, on the orders of the front commander, took measures to concentrate the main forces of the army's fighter aviation to fight enemy bombers. Soon up to 200 Soviet fighters took to the air. The intensity of enemy air strikes decreased sharply.

German column after a Soviet air raid

The fighting on the ground became more and more fierce. In the Olkhovat direction, units of the 81st Infantry Division (Major General A.B. Barinov) and the 15th Infantry Division (Colonel V.N. Dzhandzhgava) heroically defended their positions. Here, unlike the Battle of Stalingrad, where the infantry mainly took on enemy tank attacks, the artillerymen became the real heroes of the battles. On the first day of the battle, the battery of the 276th Guards Artillery Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant S.I. Podgainov, especially distinguished itself. Skillfully controlling the battery fire from his observation post, he knocked out 6 tanks. When the enemy surrounded him at the observation post, the brave officer called artillery fire on himself, and then with a group of soldiers broke through the encirclement, personally destroying 17 German machine gunners and an officer. The 4th battery of the 540th artillery regiment in the Ponyrev direction repelled an attack by 23 German tanks, destroying 15 of them. In the 5th battery of the same regiment, Sergeant A.D. Sapunov’s gun destroyed 7 enemy tanks. When only one gun commander remained alive and the shells ran out, a new enemy tank attack began. Sapunov prepared anti-tank grenades, intending to stand to the end, but was hit by machine-gun fire. Posthumously, the valiant artilleryman was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On that first day of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, which went down in history as the “fiery arc,” warriors of all branches of the military fought heroically, repelling the all-crushing blow of the enemy.

Significant damage to enemy tanks was caused by attack aircraft using new bombs with shaped charges. They penetrated the armor of all German tanks, including Tigers. The greatest success fell to the squadron commander of the 58th Guards Attack Aviation Regiment, Major V. M. Golubev. The six Il-2s he led destroyed 18 enemy tanks on the battlefield in just 20 minutes. The brave attack pilot was awarded the second Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

But enemy tanks and infantry, despite heavy losses, continued to stubbornly move forward. The enemy went ahead, regardless of losses. He had one goal - to break the resistance of the Soviet troops at all costs, break through their defenses and carry out the orders of his Fuhrer. To delay the enemy, General Pukhov reinforced the 81st Infantry Division with a tank regiment, then a tank brigade and a self-propelled artillery regiment. 2 army mobile obstacle detachments were deployed into the zone of the 15th Infantry Division. The commander of the front troops transferred a rifle corps, anti-tank and mortar brigades from his reserve to the Olkhovat direction. And yet our troops failed to completely restrain the enemy’s furious onslaught. After the fifth massive attack, the Germans broke into the front line of the 13th Army’s defense, advanced to a depth of 6-8 km in one section, and reached the second line of defense on a 15-kilometer front. Several units of the 15th and 81st rifle divisions were surrounded. By decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery, further advance of the enemy was stopped by the end of the day on July 5th. The aviation of the 16th Air Army provided great support to the ground forces that day. During the day, its pilots carried out 1,232 sorties, conducted 76 air battles and shot down 106 enemy aircraft.

On the evening of July 5, the commander of the Central Front, having established the direction of the enemy’s main attack, decided in the morning of the next day to launch a counterattack against the main enemy grouping with the forces of 2 tank and rifle corps and restore the situation on the left flank of the 13th Army. Early in the morning of July 6, formations of the 13th Army, 2nd Tank Army (Lieutenant General A. G. Rodin) and the 19th Tank Corps (Major General I. D. Vasilyev), with aviation support, launched a counterattack on the main group 9 th German army. The ferocity of the struggle reached its climax. Both sides fought with extraordinary tenacity. Although the troops of the Central Front failed to defeat the enemy as a result of the counterattack, they detained him on the main line of defense for another whole day. Units of the 15th and 81st Infantry Divisions, who were fighting surrounded, were released. Thus, the enemy’s attempt to break the resistance of Soviet troops in the Olkhovat direction was unsuccessful. His advance over 2 days of fierce fighting was only 6-10 km. The enemy paid too high a price for this rather elusive success. In the battles of July 5-6, the fascist German troops advancing in the Olkhovat direction lost up to 25 thousand people, about 200 tanks and assault guns, over 200 aircraft and a lot of other military equipment.

Having failed to achieve success at Olkhovatka, the Nazi command shifted the direction of the main attack to Ponyri. Two German infantry divisions, supported by 170 tanks, artillery and aircraft, attacked the 81st Rifle Division at dawn on July 7 and broke through its defenses. However, they failed to break into the second line of defense on the shoulders of the retreating division. Supported by powerful artillery fire, units of the 81st Infantry Division managed to hold out in front of Ponyri.

In the Ponyri area, one of our most powerful resistance units was equipped. It was protected from the front by minefields. The approaches to the front edge were covered with wire barriers, including electrified ones.

In tank-dangerous directions, bollards were installed. In anti-tank strongholds, in addition to artillery, there were tanks in special trenches. Many firing points had armored or concrete caps. Here the 307th Rifle Division (Major General M.A. Enshin), reinforced by an army mobile barrage detachment, occupied the defense. The enemy tried to break into Ponyri on July 6, but 3 of his attacks were repelled by Soviet troops. On the morning of July 7, 2 German infantry and tank divisions, after 60 minutes of artillery preparation, again launched an attack on Ponyri. But the Soviet command, having guessed the enemy's plan, quickly concentrated large artillery forces in this direction - the 5th breakthrough artillery division, the 13th anti-tank artillery and 11th mortar brigades, as well as the 22nd guards mortar brigade. Never before during the war had any rifle division in a defensive battle been covered by such a powerful artillery shield as was created for the 307th Division at Ponyri.

Fire at enemy tanks. Photo by M. Savin

The enemy, who went on the offensive, was met with massive artillery and mortar fire, and guided minefields and landmines went off. In just a matter of minutes, the enemy lost 22 tanks. Five times he rushed to attack and retreated each time, suffering heavy losses. Our artillerymen, allowing enemy tanks to come close, shot them almost point-blank. The display of exceptional tenacity and heroism by Soviet soldiers in the battle of Ponyri was massive. They fought without sparing their blood or life itself. One of these heroes was the foreman of the 540th anti-tank artillery regiment K. S. Sedov, who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The gun crew he commanded knocked out 4 heavy German tanks during the battle. The crew was completely killed along with their gun from a direct hit from an enemy shell.

At about 10 a.m. on July 7, having brought fresh forces into the battle, the enemy nevertheless broke through to the northeastern outskirts of Ponyri, but was driven back to its original position by a counterattack of the second echelon of the 307th division. The enemy breakthrough was eliminated. But after an hour, 4 German divisions again attacked the defenders of Ponyri, coming close to the railway station. Exhausted by continuous battles for many hours, the 307th Rifle Division, under pressure from vastly superior enemy forces, retreated to the southern part of Ponyri. The next day, having regrouped its forces and received reinforcements, the 307th Division counterattacked the enemy and drove him out of Ponyri. Thus, the fascist German troops failed to break through the defenses of the 13th Army in the Ponyri area. But the enemy was still strong and had not lost its offensive capabilities. On July 8-9, he introduced new forces into the battle and continued attacks in the directions of Olkhovatka and Ponyri. On July 9, the Nazis made their last attempt to break through along the railway. The tank division they brought into the battle reached the southern part of Ponyri, but soon, as a result of a counterattack by tank brigades and the second echelon of the 307th division, it was thrown back to its original position.

Soviet troops are fighting stubborn defensive battles

Simultaneously with the fighting in the Ponyri area, fierce fighting continued throughout the entire defense zone of the 13th Army. The enemy persistently looked for weak points in its defense, but everywhere received a brutal rebuff. The defense of the Soviet troops remained unshakable. The personnel of the 3rd Fighter Brigade, led by Colonel V.N. Rukosuev, showed boundless courage. This brigade blocked the enemy's path northwest of Olkhovatka. On the morning of July 8, the brigade was attacked by up to 300 German tanks with motorized infantry. But the tenacity and devotion of Soviet soldiers to their duty turned out to be stronger than the enemy’s armored armada. In a brutal battle that lasted many hours, the brigade's units destroyed several dozen fascist tanks and held their occupied line. Most of the brigade fell on the battlefield, but did not retreat a single step from their positions. Later, a monument was erected at the mass grave of the fallen soldiers, in the very place where they courageously defended their native land. On the granite pedestal, which is crowned with one of the cannons of the valiant brigade, the names of the heroes who sacredly fulfilled their soldierly duty are carved.

Commander of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General Model on the front line talking with infantrymen

The intensity of the fighting increased every day. The commander of the 9th German Army, General Model, brought almost all his forces into the battle - 13 infantry and 8 tank divisions. On July 10, he strikes at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. A particularly fierce struggle took place in the Samodurovka area. The rifle and artillery units defending here repelled 13-16 enemy attacks per day. But the Soviet soldiers survived, showing unsurpassed courage and mass heroism. Despite the power of the blow, the enemy was unable to break through our defenses. At the cost of huge losses, he advanced another 3-4 km. But this was his last success. In fruitless attacks, the best divisions of the 9th Army were bled dry, and a huge amount of military equipment and weapons were lost. Model had only one motorized division left in reserve. It became quite obvious that further attempts to continue the offensive would not yield any results. The fascist German command came to the conclusion that the plan to encircle Soviet troops in the Kursk area was impossible to implement, but decided to continue the offensive in order to force the Soviet command to use up all their reserves. To this end, Model was preparing a new blow. But the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, which began on July 12, confused the enemy’s plans. Instead of continuing the offensive, Model was forced to decide to move the 9th Army to the defensive. This ended the offensive of the Nazi troops on the northern front of the Kursk ledge. In 8 days of desperate efforts, they only managed to wedge themselves into the defenses of the Central Front in an area 10 km wide. The greatest depth of their advance did not exceed 10-12 km. The troops of the Central Front, in heavy defensive battles, bled the enemy's powerful strike force dry and thwarted its offensive. Having lost 42 thousand soldiers and officers, up to 500 tanks and assault guns, the enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was ultimately forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

Counterattack

The struggle was also extremely intense on the southern front of the Kursk salient - in the Voronezh Front. Here, on July 4, in the afternoon, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army, after a 10-minute artillery fire raid and air strikes, went on the offensive and began fighting with the outposts of the 71st, 67th and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 6th Guards Army. Having knocked down the outposts of these divisions from their positions after stubborn battles, the enemy reached the front line of the army's defense at the end of the day. It became obvious that at night or at dawn on July 5 the enemy would launch a general offensive. Intelligence established that the main forces of the opposing enemy group were concentrated against the 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov), defending in the Oboyan direction. This strike force of the 4th German Tank Army included 2 tank, 4 motorized, 2 infantry divisions, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks and an assault gun division. 3 tank and 3 infantry divisions of the Kempf operational group were deployed against the 7th Guards Army (Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov) in the Korochan direction.

Having assessed the current situation, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General Vatutin, decided to conduct artillery counter-training, as a result of which significant damage was inflicted on the enemy. His advance was delayed for 3 hours. At the same time, the 2nd (Lieutenant General of Aviation S.A. Krasovsky) and 17th (Lieutenant General of Aviation V.A. Sudets) air armies attacked 8 enemy airfields and destroyed up to 60 aircraft.

The tanks were preparing to attack

At 6 a.m. on July 5, after artillery preparation and massive air raids, the Nazi troops went on the offensive. They delivered the main blow in an area about 30 km wide with the forces of the 4th Tank Army (Colonel General G. Hoth) in the general direction of Oboyan. The second blow was carried out on Korocha by the Kempf task force (General of Tank Forces W. Kempf).

Although the strength of the initial enemy strike in the Oboyan direction was somewhat weakened as a result of artillery counter-preparation, it was still quite powerful. In an effort to achieve the intended goals as quickly as possible, the fascist German command immediately brought 14 divisions into battle (including 5 tank and 4 motorized). On the first day, up to 700 enemy tanks took part in the battles. Soviet soldiers defended themselves with the greatest steadfastness, showing massive heroism and courage. Artillerymen destroyed enemy tanks with direct fire, infantrymen pelted them with anti-tank grants and Molotov cocktails, many tanks were blown up by mines (in the very first hours of the battle in the zones of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, about 70 German tanks and assault rifles were blown up by mines guns). Companies of high-explosive flamethrowers acted skillfully, destroying 11 tanks and 4 assault guns, as well as specially trained tank destroyer dogs, which blew up 12 tanks. But the main means of fighting was artillery. Aviation provided active support to ground forces. In a relatively limited space in the air, more than 2 thousand aircraft operated simultaneously on both sides, and 100-150 aircraft often took part in air battles at once. At the same time, the main efforts of the bomber and attack aviation of the 2nd and 17th air armies were directed primarily at the destruction of enemy tanks.

Knocked out tigers

The intensity of the fighting increased every hour. Entire battalions and regiments fought to the last. The 3rd Battalion of the 228th Rifle Regiment of the 78th Guards Rifle Division, defending in the Dorogobuzhino area, was attacked by the enemy first from the flanks and then from the front in the early morning of July 5th. A frontal attack across the Seversky Donets River was repulsed by the 8th Rifle Company of Senior Lieutenant B.N. Kalmykov. Having lost 6 tanks, the enemy, having more than 40 tanks, tried to bypass the battalion from the south. At the same time, he struck from the north. The rifle companies of Senior Lieutenant M.P. Pogrebnyak and Lieutenant M.P. Znobin, as well as the armor-piercing officer of the 2nd company of the 4th Guards Anti-Tank Battalion, despite the enemy’s great fire superiority and losses, held their positions and only on the orders of the regiment commander together with the rest of the battalion units, they retreated in an organized manner to the second position - behind the railway embankment. Here the advancing enemy was met with sudden fire by the artillerymen of Senior Lieutenant D. O. Grishin. 5 enemy tanks were immediately knocked out, others retreated. But after some time the Germans resumed their attacks. This time the 8th Infantry Company had the hardest time. Its commander was killed by a shell explosion. Lieutenant V.V. Ksenofontov took command. The company repelled an attack by up to 15 German tanks and a company of infantry. An hour later, the enemy attacked the right-flank 7th rifle company. Its commander and 2 platoon commanders were killed, and during the counterattack the battalion commander, Captain P.N. Yastrebov, was killed. By 18 o'clock the enemy surrounded the remnants of the battalion. 14 officers were killed or injured. The enemy was detained for as much as 8 hours.

In a captured Russian village

Having determined that the enemy was delivering the main blow to Oboyan, the commander of the Voronezh Front troops on the very first day of the German offensive took measures to strengthen the defense by moving forward brigades of the 1st Tank Army (Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov) to the main strip. Despite the enormous power of the enemy attack, the troops of the 6th Guards Army, in cooperation with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps brought into the battle and part of the forces of the 1st Tank Army, during fierce battles, stopped the enemy offensive by the end of the day on July 6. Only in certain areas did the Germans manage to break through the main line of our defense. The two-day battle on the Oboyan and Korochan directions did not bring the enemy the expected success. Although he managed to advance 10-18 km, he suffered heavy losses and was stopped on the second line of defense. In these battles, Soviet soldiers again showed high examples of courage and heroism.

The gun changes firing position

On July 6, the 1st Tank Army took the main blow from the enemy's tank strike group. A major tank battle broke out. In the area of ​​the village of Yakovlevo, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel V. M. Gorelov) and the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkiladze) were attacked by the SS Motorized Division "Adolf Hitler". The Soviet guards fought to the death, but did not retreat a single step. Thus, the tank company of Captain V.A. Bochkovsky entered into battle with 70 enemy tanks. The thirty-four crew of 18-year-old Lieutenant V.S. Shalandin hit 2 “tigers” and several enemy medium tanks in 10 hours of battle, but by the evening the T-34 tank was also hit by an enemy shell and caught fire. The radio operator and gunner were killed, and the seriously wounded driver escaped the burning vehicle with great difficulty. German tanks continued to press. And then the wounded tank commander also decided to ram the enemy “tiger”. The plan was a success, but the valiant tanker himself died. Comrades buried the lieutenant's charred body at a height near the village of Yakovlevo with military honors. And there were many such examples of the heroism of Soviet soldiers, faithful to their military duty to the end, in those terrible days.

The tank crew is given a combat mission

A fierce battle also unfolded in the air. Pilots of the 2nd Air Army flew about 1 thousand sorties on July 6 and shot down up to 100 German aircraft in 64 air battles. During intense battles in the skies near Kursk, Soviet aviation gained air supremacy. Many of our air fighters showed unparalleled valor and courage, including Junior Lieutenant I.N. Kozhedub (later three times Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Aviation) and Guard Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets - the only pilot in the world who destroyed in one battle 9 enemy aircraft. Posthumously A.K. Gorovets was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Pilot of the 8th Guards Fighter Aviation Division A.K. Gorovets, flying a La-5 fighter, fearlessly attacked 20 enemy bombers and shot down 9 of them, but he himself died in that battle. In the battle of Kursk, the famous Soviet ace I.N. Kozhedub also opened his combat account. On July 6, he shot down a German Ju-87 bomber, the next day - another, and on July 8, he destroyed 2 Me-109 fighters. Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, who obtained permission from the command to fly, despite the amputation of the feet of both legs, shot down 3 enemy aircraft in battles on the “Fire Arc”.

In the following days, having introduced a reserve into the battle, the fascist German command sought to carry out the Fuhrer’s order at any cost and break through to Kursk. But the Soviet troops stood unshakably, heroically defending every inch of their native land. Having met staunch resistance from the 6th Tank (Major General A. L. Getman) and 3rd Mechanized (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) Corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 48th German Tank Corps of General of Tank Forces O. von Knobelsdorff in the afternoon of July 6 turned northeast in the direction of Luchka, where he occupied the defense of the 5th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General A. G. Kravchenko) with the 156th Infantry Regiment. All day and part of the night on July 7, stubborn fighting did not stop here. Having lost 95 tanks and several Ferdinand assault guns, the enemy nevertheless captured Luchki at the end of the day, and with part of his forces captured the left flank of the 1st Tank Army. Thus, in 2 days of the offensive, the enemy advanced 10-18 km in the main (Oboyan) direction, breaking through the second line of defense of the 6th Guards Army on a narrow section of the front. In the Korochan direction, the 3rd German tank corps of the Kempf operational group, on a 3-kilometer section of the front, reached the second line of defense of the 7th Guards Army.

On the night of July 7, N.F. Vatutin decided to launch a frontal counterattack with two strike groups at the base of the enemy wedge with the goal of encircling and destroying it. But there followed a personal order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who demanded that the commander of the Voronezh Front continue to wear down the enemy in defensive battles until active operations began on the Western, Bryansk and other fronts. At the same time, the Supreme Commander gave orders to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps and move the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front into its zone. The commander of this army, Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, was given the order to advance to the Oskol River and prevent a deeper breakthrough by the enemy.

Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army. P.A. Rotmistrov

Meanwhile, the 4th German Tank Army had already broken through the second line of defense of the 6th Guards Army, and its 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) was approaching the third (army) line like a steel wedge. On the morning of July 9, the enemy strike force, numbering several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer area and by the end of the day had broken through to the third lane. In the Korochan direction, the enemy started fighting for the second line of defense. On this day, soldiers and commanders of one of the battalions of the 73rd Guards Rifle Division (7th Guards Army) under the command of Captain A.A. Belgin performed a heroic feat in the battle near Krutoy Log. On July 9, the guards bravely met the attack of the enemy, who had an overwhelming superiority in forces. The battle, unprecedented in its ferocity, lasted 12 hours; the guards repulsed 11 fierce enemy attacks, knocking out 14 tanks and destroying up to 600 Nazis. The battalion lost two-thirds of its strength, but did not miss the enemy. For this legendary battle, the entire personnel of the 3rd battalion of the 214th rifle regiment was awarded with orders and medals, and Captain A. A. Belgin (posthumously) and I. V. Ilyasov, as well as Sergeant S. P. Zorin were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Tigers are preparing to attack

On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops in the Oboyan direction forced the fascist German command to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. But the Soviet command closely monitored the enemy’s actions. In order to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the northeast, the 69th Army (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General S.G. Goryachev) were moved into the combat area. On July 9, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the commander of the troops of the Steppe Front, Colonel-General I. S. Konev, to advance the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the 5th Guards Army (general Lieutenant A.S. Zhadov) and the 5th Guards Tank Army. The commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin, received permission to take active action and disrupt the enemy’s offensive with a strong counterattack. 5 armies were to take part in it: the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, the 6th Guards Army, and part of the forces of the 5th and 7th Guards Armies. It was necessary to strike Yakovlevo from several directions in order to encircle and destroy the main forces of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army. At the same time, the 7th Guards Army was to strike east of Belgorod with the goal of defeating the 3rd Tank Corps and the Rous Army Corps.

By this time, the pace of enemy advance continued to decline inexorably. The enemy planned to capture Kursk on the 2nd day of the offensive, but it was already the 7th day, and his tank divisions managed to cover only a third of the way. Blinded by impotent rage, the fascist German troops continued to stubbornly rush forward, increasing the force of their attack. They achieved the greatest success in the Prokhorovsky direction. Here the enemy strike force managed to penetrate our defenses to a depth of 35 km. But this was his last success. The Voronezh Front, reinforced with reserves, began to solve a new task - delivering a powerful counterattack and defeating the enemy group that had wedged itself into its defense.

On the morning of July 12, the commander of the 4th German Tank Army planned to build on the success achieved the day before in the Prokhorovsky direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps operated here. The 48th Tank Corps received the task of capturing the crossing of the Psel River southeast of Oboyan. After this, both tank corps had to make a rapid rush to Kursk. The 3rd Tank Corps was ordered to advance north along the left bank of the Seversky Donets, defeat the Soviet 69th Army and secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was advancing on Kursk. The successful offensive of the fascist troops on July 11 instilled confidence in the German military leaders. On this day, the enemy managed to push back the troops of the 1st Tank, 5th, 6th and 7th Guards Armies and capture the line planned for the deployment of the 5th Guards Tank Army. A particularly tense situation developed in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, which was defending in the Prokhorovsk direction. The enemy's tank divisions were stopped only 2 km from Prokhorovka, and even then with the support of 2 tank brigades urgently promoted by General Rotmistrov.

The battle that began on July 12, which went down in history as Prokhorovsky, unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. At 8:30 a.m., after a 15-minute artillery raid, the main forces (18th and 29th Tank Corps) of the 5th Guards Tank Army with two tank corps attached to it went on the offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo. The Soviet command assumed that the enemy would be taken by surprise. However, at the same time the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps also went on the offensive. In a rather narrow space of a plain cut by ravines, 2 tank avalanches moved towards them. The collision of 2 strong strike groups led to a grandiose oncoming tank battle, in which more than 1,200 tanks simultaneously participated on both sides. This tank battle, the likes of which had never before been seen in the history of war, lasted the whole day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the fight was unusually fierce, “the tanks ran at each other, grappled, could no longer separate, fought to the death until one of them burst into flames with a torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.”

Soviet tanks near Prokhorovka

The day after the Prokhorovsky battle, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed the battle of our 18th and 29th tank corps with more than 200 enemy tanks... As a result, the battlefield was dotted with burning German and our tanks for an hour. Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov’s 29th Tank Corps lost up to 60 percent of its tanks irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Tank Corps lost 30 percent of its tanks.”

All attempts by the enemy, using their numerical superiority, to envelop the 5th Guards Tank Army from the flanks ended in failure. But our tank army, having used up all its reserves, was no longer able to continue the offensive and by the evening went over to the defensive. As a result of the oncoming battle near Prokhorovka, neither side was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - enter the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed.

Counter-offensive of German troops

Having lost more than 350 tanks, up to 100 guns and mortars, about 10 thousand soldiers and officers during the battle, the selected SS motorized divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf” were forced to stop attacks and gain a foothold on the achieved lines (on In some areas during the day they managed to advance 1-2 km). Our 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies suffered no less losses. On this day, the enemy's 3rd Tank Corps pushed back the troops of the 69th Army by 10-15 km. The other Soviet armies that took part in the counterattack on July 12 were also unable to advance. In general, the counterattack of the Voronezh Front significantly slowed down the enemy’s advance and thwarted his plans to break through to Kursk, although the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters could not be fully achieved.

In connection with this, all armies of the front were ordered to stop the offensive and, through stubborn defense, to finally exhaust the forces of the advancing enemy. The fact that the counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end in the complete defeat of the wedged strike group of the enemy played a significant role in the fact that a powerful group of Soviet troops struck the strongest group of the enemy, but not on its flanks, but, as they say, head-on. The advantageous configuration of the front line, which made it possible to strike at the base of the enemy wedge with the aim of encircling and subsequently destroying the entire group of fascist German troops operating north of Yakovlevo, was not fully used.

But nevertheless, the day of July 12, 1943 became the day of the collapse of the German offensive near Kursk. However, the enemy did not accept failure. Having regrouped his forces, he tried to encircle and destroy the troops of the 69th Army south of Prokhorovka. But as a result of intense fighting that lasted until July 15, the plan of the fascist German command was thwarted. Having exhausted all its offensive capabilities, the enemy was forced on July 16 to begin a partial withdrawal of its troops to their original position. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, introduced into the battle on July 18, began to pursue him. By the end of the day on July 23, they had restored the position occupied by Soviet troops before the start of the defensive battle.

Soviet troops on the offensive

Events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. Already on the first day, the Southern Front broke through the enemy’s defenses to the Mius River. On the evening of the same day, Field Marshal Manstein gave the order to General Hoth to withdraw the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the battle and prepare it to be sent to the 6th Army, which was defending on the Mius Front. The next day, the command of Army Group South made a decision to withdraw the 3rd Tank Corps from the battle. On the night of July 19, a general withdrawal of fascist German troops began on the southern front of the Kursk ledge.

Thus, during the Kursk defensive operation, troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts thwarted the plan of the fascist German command to encircle and defeat a group of more than a million Soviet troops. The enemy's attempt to take revenge for Stalingrad and wrest the strategic initiative from the Red Army completely failed. During a fierce defensive battle near Kursk, Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and created favorable conditions for launching a decisive counteroffensive.

Reconnaissance before the attack

The success of the defensive operation was due to the fact that the Soviet command not only guessed the enemy’s plans, but also quite accurately determined the place and time of his attacks. By concentrating large forces in the areas of upcoming operations, it achieved significant superiority over the enemy, which made it possible not only to successfully defend, but also to attack. Resisting the temptation to go on the offensive before the enemy, the Soviet command decided to stick to a campaign plan based on deliberate defense while preparing a counteroffensive. To achieve the goals of the defensive operation, the strongest defense of the entire war was built on the Kursk Bulge. This defense was designed primarily to repel massive tank attacks; it was unprecedented in depth, in the engineering equipment of positions and zones, and in the density of forces and means.

The offensive of the Nazi troops also failed because enemy aircraft failed to gain air superiority. During the defensive battle, Soviet pilots destroyed more than 1.5 thousand German aircraft, while their own losses amounted to about 460 aircraft. In the Battle of Kursk, the enemy finally experienced the full power of Soviet attack and bomber aircraft.

Coming soon again

The defense near Kursk turned out to be insurmountable for the enemy thanks to the unparalleled courage and heroism of the Soviet soldiers, who stood to the death on the occupied lines, defending them to the last drop of blood, to the last breath. The enemy’s blow was of terrible force, without exaggeration, all-crushing, so it was not so easy to withstand it. It is unlikely that any other army could have done this. But the Soviet soldier survived. And he not only survived, but also repelled the enemy, and then drove him west.

True, victory over the enemy came at a high price. In defensive battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost about 180 thousand people, more than 1.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 4 thousand guns and mortars. But the enemy also suffered huge losses.

In this regard, it should be noted that the data of beaten Nazi generals about the loss of 80-100 thousand people during the offensive of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943 can hardly be considered reliable, as some of our defeated “historians” do, not burdened with even the most basic knowledge of military affairs. They need this in order to belittle the greatness of our victory and justify their false thesis that the Red Army allegedly “overwhelmed the enemy with its corpses.” If this is so, then, one wonders, who then stopped the enemy at the Kursk Bulge and then drove him west? From whom, then, did the “invincible” Nazi warriors scurry without respite all the way to the Dnieper? After all, the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy in men on the Kursk Bulge was only 1.4:1. And this is not such an overwhelming superiority to “pelt” the enemy with corpses. Someone had to fight the enemy, and, moreover, defeat him...

Leisure during quiet times

Go ahead. It has long been known quite well, at least to people familiar first-hand with military affairs, that the side attacking the enemy’s prepared defense suffers significantly greater losses compared to the defenders. The fact is that the soldier on the defensive is sitting in a shelter (trench, trench, dugout, etc.), and the soldier advancing on him is deprived of such an advantage; he must move across open terrain under enemy fire. So who is more likely to survive in battle? We leave the question open and let the reader answer it himself. And for some reason the denigrators of our military past do not want to take this fact into account. But this is an axiom that does not require proof. In this regard, it is permissible to ask these kinds of “historians” who accept the conjectures of our former opponents on faith, why then did the attacking side suffer half as many losses as the defending side? Moreover, the attacker had no superiority either in tanks or artillery, and German aviation lost air supremacy during the battle.

Now let's look at the problem from the other side. The Germans themselves admit that their tank and motorized divisions suffered heavy tank losses. The new technology on which they had placed such hopes did not help them either. Thus, their tank corps, which formed the basis of the strike groups that were supposed to crush the Soviet defense, lost from 60 to 80% of their tanks during the offensive on the Kursk Bulge. As a result, almost half of the German tank and motorized divisions lost their combat effectiveness. But it is incomparably more difficult to destroy a tank than a person. So, with regard to the losses of the Nazi troops during their offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, since there are no accurate data on German losses (and this, despite the famous German pedantry!), we invite the reader to draw his own conclusions. And finally, in conclusion, it should be said that the fascist German command was well aware (this is evidenced by numerous documents and other sources) that the failure of Operation Citadel and the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive meant a radical turning point in the war with the Soviet Union and the final transition of the strategic initiative to the Soviet side.

The battle of Kursk, unparalleled in the ferocity and intensity of the struggle, ended in victory for the Red Army. The enemy's armored armadas crashed against the inaccessibility of the Soviet defense. The ambitious hopes of the fascist German command to seize the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor collapsed. Hitler's strategists had to abandon offensive plans and hastily decide to switch to strategic defense. Thus, harsh reality refuted the enemy’s deeply erroneous ideas about the invincibility of the German army in the summer and forced him to take a more sober look at the real state of affairs.

The Soviet command, possessing the strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy. The breakdown of the Nazi offensive near Kursk created an advantageous situation for delivering a crushing retaliatory strike. This was facilitated by the fact that, simultaneously with measures to create a strong defense on the Kursk salient, Soviet troops were also preparing to launch a counter-offensive with the aim of defeating enemy strike forces in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. According to the plan approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May 1943, it was planned to be carried out by 2 groups of fronts. The enemy’s Oryol group (2nd tank, 2nd and 9th field armies - a total of 37 divisions, including 8 tank and 2 motorized, numbering up to 600 thousand people, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 1.1 thousand aircraft) were planned to be defeated by the forces of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts. This operation received the code name "Kutuzov".

The troops of the Western Front (Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky) delivered the main blow with their left wing. They had to first, in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group, which was covering the main forces of the fascist German troops on the Oryol bridgehead from the north. Then, advancing south towards Khotynets, they were supposed to cut off the routes to the west for the Oryol enemy group and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, defeat it.

The Bryansk Front (Colonel General M. M. Popov) delivered the main blow with its left wing in the general direction of Orel, and part of its forces advanced on Bolkhov. The troops of the Central Front received the task of striking with their right wing in the general direction of Kromy. Then, developing success in the north-west direction, they were supposed to cover the enemy’s Oryol group from the south-west and complete its defeat in cooperation with the Bryansk and Western fronts.

Thus, the idea of ​​​​Operation Kutuzov was to cut through the enemy group and destroy it piece by piece with counter strikes from three fronts from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.

The concentration of troops, military equipment and all other preparatory measures were carried out by the fronts in advance. Particular attention was paid to the massing of forces and assets in the directions of the main attacks. The need for this was determined by the fact that, attaching great importance to the Oryol bridgehead, the fascist German command, long before its attack on Kursk, created a strong defense in depth here with a widely developed system of field fortifications. Most settlements were prepared for all-round defense. A serious obstacle for the advancing Soviet troops was a large number of rivers, ravines and gullies. This made it difficult to use large tank forces and, therefore, complicated the task of developing tactical success into operational success. The fact that on the bridgehead the enemy had such a large junction of highways and railways as Oryol was also important for the development of events, which provided him with the possibility of wide operational maneuver in all directions. Thus, the Soviet troops on the Oryol bridgehead were opposed not only by a powerful enemy group, but also by a qualitatively new – positional – defense, which they encountered for the first time in the war.

Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky talks with a soldier on the front line

Under these conditions, commanders and staffs had to solve the issues of troop echeloning and the use of tanks, artillery and aviation in many new ways. The main attention was focused on deep formation of battle formations and the creation of high operational densities. Thus, the 11th Guards Army, operating in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front, was supposed to advance in a 36 km zone. At the same time, its main forces and means were concentrated on a breakthrough area 14 km wide. And on the rest of the front there was only one rifle division defending. The army had an operational formation in one echelon with the allocation of a combined arms reserve (infantry division). Rifle corps (there were 3 of them in the army) had a battle formation of 2-3 echelons, and rifle divisions, except for flank ones, had 1 echelon. The artillery density in the breakthrough area exceeded 200 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. The army received 2 tank corps, 4 tank brigades, 2 tank and 2 self-propelled artillery regiments for reinforcement. Tank corps formed the mobile group of the army. There were up to 250 tanks directly supporting the infantry. They were assigned to divisions advancing in the main direction. Their average density was 14 units per 1 km of the breakthrough front.

Such a distribution of forces and their operational-tactical formation, as the army command reasonably believed, ensured a rapid build-up of efforts in breaking through the enemy’s tactical defense zone and the development of success in its operational depth, right up to reaching the Bolkhov area (depth 65 km). During the preparation of the operation, reconnaissance, organization of interaction, measures for operational camouflage and engineering support were carried out with great skill. The rear provided the troops with everything necessary to conduct a major offensive operation.

Breaking through the strong defenses on the Oryol bridgehead and defeating a powerful enemy group required the utmost effort and high military skill from the attacking troops. Political agencies and party organizations also faced new tasks. Having ensured the creation of insurmountable strength of the troops in defense, they now focused all their attention on creating a high offensive impulse among the personnel, mobilizing soldiers to quickly break through the enemy’s defenses and completely defeat the enemy.

Yaki in the sky. Photo by E. Khaldei

Bomber crew after completing a combat mission

By the beginning of the Oryol offensive operation, the 3 Soviet fronts included about 1.3 million people, more than 21 thousand guns and mortars, 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 3 thousand aircraft. Consequently, the overall superiority of the Soviet troops over the enemy was 2 times in men, 3 times in artillery, 2 times in tanks and almost 3 times in aviation.

This was a slight advantage for the attacking side. However, some unscrupulous historians, trying to belittle Soviet art during the Great Patriotic War, deliberately distort the facts, talking about the 10-fold superiority of the Red Army in the counteroffensive near Kursk. These statements are in blatant contradiction with the facts.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation(code name “Commander Rumyantsev”) was carried out with the goal of defeating the enemy’s 4th Tank Army and Task Force “Kempf” (18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions - a total of up to 300 thousand people, over 3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 600 tanks and assault guns and more than 1 thousand aircraft). The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, as well as part of the forces of the Southwestern Front, were involved in its implementation. In this direction, the Nazi troops also relied on a well-developed, well-prepared defense, which included 7 defensive lines. Their total depth reached 90 km. The enemy’s desire to hold the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was explained by the fact that it covered the Donbass group from the north and was considered by the fascist German command as a gate that blocked the exit to Ukraine. All this required particularly careful preparation from the Soviet troops for the upcoming offensive.

A local woman shows the scouts the direction

Unlike the counteroffensive in the Oryol direction, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation was planned and prepared during a defensive battle. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, having reached the front line of the German defense on July 23, were not ready to conduct a major offensive operation.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command Headquarters for the Belgorod-Kharkov operation was to cut through the opposing enemy group with a powerful blow from the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the general direction of Bogodukhov and defeat it piece by piece. An auxiliary attack bypassing Kharkov from the south was carried out by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front.

Based on this plan, the Soviet command assigned tasks to the fronts. The Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with its left wing in the general direction of Bogodukhov, Valki, enveloping the Kharkov enemy group from the west. The steppe front was supposed to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod area, and then advance on Kharkov, which was planned to be captured on the 10th day of the operation. Thus, the main idea of ​​​​the plan for the operation “Commander Rumyantsev” was to isolate the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Nazis from the influx of reserves from the west, split its defense into separate centers and create conditions for the defeat of this entire enemy group in parts. The choice of this form of operational maneuver clearly demonstrated the creative approach of the Soviet command to planning an operation and its ability to comprehensively take into account the peculiarities of the current situation.

The operation plan provided for an offensive on a front 200 km long and to a depth of 120 km. Preparations for the counteroffensive took place in an extremely limited time (10 days), which required great skill and intense efforts from the command and troops.

At the beginning of August, preparations for the counteroffensive were completed. After intra-front regroupings and replenishment, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts included over 1.1 million people, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars, 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 1.3 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops had a superiority over the enemy in men by more than 3 times, in artillery and tanks by 4 times, and in aviation by 1.3 times. In the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, thanks to the skillful massing of forces and means, this superiority was even higher. Artillery density in breakthrough areas reached 230 guns and mortars, and tanks and self-propelled guns - 70 units per 1 km of front. To develop success, 2 tank armies were used as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front for the first time in the war.

On the night of August 3, Soviet troops, hidden from the enemy, took up their starting position for the offensive. Under the cover of darkness, they prepared to unleash a blow of enormous force on the ignorant enemy.

The successful counter-offensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions, according to the Supreme Command Headquarters, was supposed to develop into a general offensive of the Red Army along the entire Soviet-German front.

The defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge was still in full swing when, on the morning of July 12, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The enemy, suppressed by our artillery fire and air strikes, was unable to offer any serious resistance at first. In the Western Front, the Soviet command used a new technique: the offensive began not after artillery preparation, as was usually practiced, but during it, which stunned the enemy. However, he gradually recovered from his confusion and began to offer stubborn resistance.

Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front. However, an hour after the troops went on the offensive, the first echelon division of the 11th Guards Army (11 rifle divisions, reinforced by 4 tank brigades), commanded by Lieutenant General I. Kh. Bagramyan (future Marshal of the Soviet Union), under the cover of a barrage of fire and, with massive support from attack aircraft, captured the first position, including the key point of the German defense of Dudino. This was the signal for the entry into battle of advanced detachments - tank brigades with infantry landings.

The pace of the offensive immediately increased. By mid-day, units of the 8th (Major General P.F. Malyshev) and 16th (Major General A.V. Lapshov) Guards Rifle Corps captured the second enemy position. To develop success, the commander of the 11th Guards Army introduces the 5th Tank Corps (Major General M. G. Sakhno) into the battle in the Bolkhov direction. Together with the 83rd Guards Rifle Division (Major General Ya. S. Vorobyov), the corps completed the breakthrough of the first line of enemy defense and began to advance to the second line.

But by this time the enemy had already managed to come to his senses, his resistance had increased sharply. The 5th German Tank Division was advancing from Zhizdra to the breakthrough site. By the end of the day on July 12, in almost the entire offensive zone, the troops of the 11th Guards Army had penetrated 8-10 km into the enemy’s defenses, and its tank units approached the enemy’s second defensive zone. The fighting continued into the night. The forward detachment of the 5th Tank Corps, commanded by Major S.I. Chubukov, was especially successful. Under cover of night, he crossed the Vytebet River, captured the heavily fortified regional center of Ulyanovo, and then attacked and destroyed the headquarters of the infantry division.

From the morning of the next day the army continued its offensive. Increasing the force of the blow, the army commander introduces the 1st Tank Corps (Lieutenant General V.V. Butkov) into the battle. But almost immediately he was counterattacked by the approaching 5th German Panzer Division. In the ensuing oncoming battle, the enemy was defeated and driven back. This allowed the troops of the 11th Guards Army to break through the second defense line in the center by the middle of the day on July 13, and by the end of the day to advance 20-25 km in depth in a narrow wedge. However, the advance slowed down on the flanks. Intelligence received information about the possibility of the enemy launching a strong counterattack in order to restore the situation in the Bolkhov direction. These data were confirmed by the fact that he removed the 18th and 20th tank divisions from the front of his 9th Army and began transferring them to the breakthrough site of the 11th Guards Army. The 25th Motorized Division was moving there from Orel.

German artillery takes up a firing position on the outskirts of the village

On the morning of July 14, as expected, the enemy, after an artillery raid and air strikes, counterattacked the 5th Tank, 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps of the 11th Guards Army. Heavy fighting ensued. Meanwhile, in the Khotynets direction, the 16th Guards Rifle Corps was moving south almost unhindered. By the end of the day on July 14, the depth of his advance reached 45 km. To develop the success achieved by this corps, I. Kh. Bagramyan removes the 11th Guards Rifle Division from the Bolkhov direction and sends it to strengthen the 16th Guards Rifle Corps. On July 17, he introduced the 25th Tank Corps (Major General F. G. Anikushin), which had just arrived in his army, into battle in the Khotynets direction. As a result, by July 19, the depth of the wedge reached 70 km, and the advanced units of the army approached Khotynets. Thus, the troops of the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses by the end of the second day of the offensive and began to develop success in its operational depth.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front troops developed in more difficult conditions. All 3 of his armies fought heavy battles, but frontal attacks did not produce results. The 61st Army (Lieutenant General P. A. Belov), as a result of two days of fighting, was only able to wedge into the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 5-8 km. In an effort to hold Bolkhov, an important defense center, at all costs, the Nazis hastily brought fresh troops into this area, removing them from other sectors of the front. The fighting was so fierce that many settlements and heights changed hands more than once. The same tense situation developed in the zones of the 3rd and 63rd armies.

Offensive supported by T-34 tanks

Only by the end of the first week of the operation, the 61st Army, together with the 20th Tank Corps (Lieutenant General I.G. Lazarev), managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, advance 20 km and bypass Bolkhov from the northeast. In the Oryol direction, troops of the 3rd (Lieutenant General A. V. Gorbatov) and 63rd (Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kolpakchi) armies broke through the enemy’s defenses by July 16 and advanced to a depth of 17-22 km. Their success was largely ensured by the introduction of the 1st Guards Tank Corps (Major General M.F. Popov) into the battle. However, their advance was soon stopped by approaching enemy reserves.

Alarmed by the unfavorable development of events, the fascist German command ordered its troops to repel the advance of the Soviet troops on the occupied lines at all costs. Enraged by the failures, Hitler dismissed the commander of the 2nd German Tank Army, Colonel General R. Schmidt, who failed to prevent deep breakthroughs by Soviet troops in 3 sectors of his front. The 2nd Tank Army was quickly subordinated to the commander of the 9th Field Army. General Model took urgent measures to strengthen his troops on the northern and eastern fronts of the Oryol bridgehead. Several divisions were taken by him from the 9th Army and urgently transferred to the north. The offensive of the 9th Army according to the plan of Operation Citadel, naturally, had to be stopped. Now it was necessary to think not about the defeat of the Soviet troops, but about saving our own. The troops of the Central Front took advantage of the weakening of the enemy strike force. On July 15, they launched a counteroffensive, striking the enemy’s Oryol group from the south. Having broken the resistance of the seriously weakened 9th Army, the troops of the Central Front after 3 days completely restored the position occupied before the start of the defensive battle.

Meanwhile, Soviet troops continued to build on their success. Having repelled the counterattacks of the approaching enemy reserves, the 11th Guards Army deeply enveloped the Bolkhov group of Germans from the west and part of its forces reached Khotynets. A serious threat loomed over the most important communication line controlled by the Nazis, the Orel-Bryansk railway. In an effort to hold the Oryol bridgehead at any cost, the command of Army Group Center sent new reinforcements to the Oryol area. In 7 days, from July 12 to 18, 12 divisions (including 7 tank and 1 motorized) had already been transferred to strengthen the 2nd Tank Army. But these measures turned out to be insufficient. The enemy only managed to somewhat slow down the pace of the advance of our troops, but he was unable to stop them.

Increasing the force of the strike, the Soviet command introduced strategic reserves into the battle: July 19 - in the Bryansk Front zone, the 3rd Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General P. S. Rybalko), July 20 - in the Western Front zone, the 11th Army (General Lieutenant I.I. Fedyuninsky), and on July 26 - the 4th Tank Army (Lieutenant General V.M. Badanov). On July 20-30 there were fierce battles in all directions. The enemy launched strong counterattacks against the flanks of the 11th Guards and at the front of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, which had been re-introduced into battle. He managed to stop the advance of the tank army and push back the formations of I. Kh. Bagramyan’s army from the Bryansk-Orel iron road.

On July 26, Hitler’s headquarters decided to leave the Oryol bridgehead and withdraw troops to the Hagen defensive line being created east of Bryansk. For the purpose of a systematic withdrawal of troops, intermediate lines were equipped there. Prisoners and civilians were widely used for their construction. The withdrawal of the main forces of the Nazi troops from the Oryol bridgehead began on the night of July 31. Nevertheless, heavy fighting continued along the entire 400-kilometer front, as the enemy retreated rather slowly and in a very organized manner. On July 29, troops of the Bryansk and Western Fronts defeated the Bolkhov group of German troops and captured the city of Bolkhov. In achieving this success, the 4th Tank Army, which had previously been introduced into the battle in the Bolkhov direction, played a decisive role. The defeat of the enemy in the Bolkhov area predetermined the defeat of the entire Oryol group of fascist German troops.

Officers of the 29th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 12th Guards Rifle Division on the eve of the Battle of Kursk near Bolkhov. June 1943

The beginning of August was marked by a fierce struggle on the approaches to Orel, which the Nazis turned into a powerful center of resistance. By this time, for closer interaction between the troops advancing on Orel, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the left-flank armies of the Western Front (11th Guards and 11th Combined Arms, 4th Tank Army) to the Bryansk Front. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, Soviet troops persistently moved forward. The Bryansk Front was pushing the enemy east and north of Orel. Formations of the right wing of the Central Front advanced towards Orel from the south.

Eagle is free!

No less fierce battles took place in the air from the very first days of the operation. The actions of the Soviet pilots were distinguished by outstanding courage, high military skill and determination. Working closely with ground forces, the 1st (Lieutenant General of Aviation M. M. Gromov), 15th (Lieutenant General of Aviation N. F. Naumenko) and 16th Air Armies in a tense struggle inflicted great damage on fascist aviation and , having seized strong air supremacy, played a big role in the successful outcome of the offensive operation. In those days, volunteer pilots of the French Normandie squadron fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet pilots in the skies of the Oryol region, having shot down 33 German aircraft in battles over the Oryol bridgehead. The intensity of the combat work of Soviet aviation during the Oryol offensive operation is evidenced by the following fact: in just 5 days in the middle of the operation, pilots of the 15th and 16th air armies carried out about 9.8 thousand sorties. All the roads along which German troops retreated to the west were literally littered with broken and burned cars, tanks, and other equipment.

The main reason that prompted the fascist German command to leave the Oryol salient of the front was the desire to prevent the threat of encirclement of their group in the Oryol area, which was becoming more and more real. The enemy's position in the Kursk direction continued to deteriorate, and not only in the Orel area. On August 3, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a counteroffensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Having broken into the enemy's defenses, they began to develop success in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The southern wing of the German Eastern Front was again cracking at all seams.

Retreating under the powerful blows of the Soviet troops, the enemy destroyed everything on Russian soil that could be destroyed. But no matter how angry the invaders were in their impotent rage, the hour of retribution was inevitably approaching. In response to the atrocities of the enemy, the wave of sacred hatred of the Soviet soldiers towards the cruel invaders only rose higher, and the power of their blows increased. Many thousands of heroic deeds were performed by them in those days on the Oryol land. The struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines became increasingly widespread. In July 1943, partisans launched active operations on its communications. According to the plan developed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, they began an operation to massively disable the railways, which went down in history under the name “Rail War”. This operation carried out by the partisans played a big role in the successful outcome of Operation Kutuzov.

Inclement weather (heavy torrential rains) and continuous minefields did not prevent the advanced units of the 3rd and 63rd armies from approaching Orel on the night of August 4th. The ancient Russian city appeared before them, engulfed in smoke from conflagrations, shaken by explosions. Soviet soldiers rushed to storm Orel. The first to break into the city were units of the 5th Rifle Division (Colonel P. T. Mikhalitsyn), 129th (Colonel I.V. Panchuk), 380th (Colonel A.F. Kustov) rifle divisions and the 17th Guards Tank brigade (Colonel B.V. Shulgin). But the enemy was not going to surrender the city without a fight. Stubborn street fighting ensued. They went for every block, every house. Fighting in the city with units of the enemy's 12th Panzer Division continued throughout the day on August 4. Only in the evening our troops reached the Oka River and began crossing it. At night, fighting raged in the western part of the city. Units of the 289th (Major General T.V. Tommola) and 308th (Colonel N.K. Maslennikov)1 rifle divisions that burst into Orel from the north and northeast finally broke the fierce resistance of the enemy.

At dawn on August 5, Oryol was completely liberated from the Nazi invaders. The population of the city joyfully welcomed their liberators. For the courage and heroism shown in the battles for Oryol, 9 units and formations of the Bryansk Front were awarded the honorary names “Oryol”. On the same day - August 5 - the city of Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. In honor of the victories won on the evening of August 5, 1943, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow for the first time in the Great Patriotic War - 12 salvoes from 124 guns. Since that memorable day, artillery salutes to commemorate the victories of the Red Army have become a glorious military tradition.

Prisoners

On August 6, the Supreme Command Headquarters set the Bryansk Front the task of concentrating efforts on capturing Khotynets and Karachev. The central front received the task of destroying the enemy, who was retreating from Orel to the southwest. The fascist German troops, having shortened the front line, condensed their battle formations and put up strong resistance on intermediate lines. However, the position of the enemy group west of Orel became extremely complicated after the main forces of the Western and then the Kalinin fronts went on the offensive on August 7, north of the Oryol bridgehead. Now there is also a threat hanging over it from the north. The fascist German command had to withdraw 13 divisions from the Oryol bridgehead and transfer them to the Smolensk-Roslavl direction. Enemy resistance on the Oryol bridgehead has noticeably weakened. On August 9, the 11th Guards and 4th Tank Armies began fighting for Khotynets. On the morning of August 10, this city was liberated. Building on their success, Soviet troops continued to move west. Fierce fighting broke out on the approaches to Karachev. Under the threat of encirclement, the enemy was forced to abandon this city on August 15. With the liberation of Karachev by the troops of the 11th and 11th Guards armies, the enemy's Oryol bridgehead was eliminated. By August 18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, previously prepared by the Nazis, which ran east of Bryansk. Here they temporarily went on the defensive in order to prepare for a new offensive operation.

The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north. The liquidation of the enemy's Oryol bridgehead led to a sharp change in the situation in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's strong defenses in depth and advanced westward to a depth of 150 km. 15 German divisions were defeated (including 3 tank divisions). During the operation, the enemy lost about 90 thousand people killed alone, more than 1.4 thousand aircraft and a huge amount of other military equipment and weapons. The Soviet troops also had to pay a high price for the victory. Human losses on 3 fronts during the Oryol offensive operation amounted to 430 thousand people (including irrevocable ones - about 113 thousand), more than 2.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 900 guns and mortars, over 1 thousand aircraft. And yet the enemy’s Oryol bridgehead, this “dagger aimed at the heart of Russia,” was eliminated.

At the very height of the battle near Orel, Soviet troops dealt a second crushing blow to the enemy, launching a counteroffensive on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. The offensive of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction began early in the morning of August 3 after powerful artillery bombardment and air strikes.

In the direction of the main attack, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army in a 16 km wide sector, the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin concentrated 7 rifle divisions, a breakthrough artillery division, a guards mortar division, 14 artillery and mortar regiments, a tank brigade, 5 tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The average density of tanks in the 5th Guards Army zone was 87 units per 1 km of front. And in a breakthrough area 6 km wide, there were an average of 230 guns and mortars, 178 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km. Even higher densities of forces and assets were created in the offensive zone of the 57th Army (this army was included in the Steppe Front). Here, on a 7-kilometer breakthrough section, artillery densities exceeded 300 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. In the middle of the day, the commander of the Voronezh Front brought into battle the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies (1,111 tanks and self-propelled guns), which, in cooperation with rifle formations of the 5th Guards Army, by noon on the second day of the operation, broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced to a depth of 30 km.

Guards Yaks in the sky. Photo by E. Khaldei

For the first time during the war, advancing in the same operational direction, 2 tank armies acted as a kind of armored sword, delivering a deep cutting blow to the enemy. The massive use of tanks on a narrow sector of the front had a decisive influence on increasing the tempo of the operation. Having broken through the tactical defenses and destroyed the enemy’s nearest operational reserves, the front’s strike groups began to pursue him. The pace of their advance gradually increased. Already on the second day of the operation, the tank armies fought to a depth of 50 km. Great assistance to the ground troops was provided by the 2nd and 5th (Lieutenant General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov) air armies.

Having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops of the Steppe Front reached Belgorod and began fighting for it on the morning of August 5th. Units of the 69th Army attacked the city from the north, and units of the 7th Guards Army attacked from the east. The 1st Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General M.D. Solomatin) bypassed Belgorod from the west. But despite the threat of encirclement, the enemy continued to hold the city. Fierce street fighting began, ending in the evening with the defeat of the German garrison and the liberation of Belgorod. In the battles for this ancient Russian city, the 89th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel M.P. Seryugin, the 305th Rifle Division of Colonel A.F. Vasilyev and the 23rd Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment, awarded the honorary name “Belgorod”, especially distinguished themselves.

Participant in the Battle of Kursk, attack pilot Major Lomantsev. 1943 Photo by Y. Ryumkin

The Voronezh and Steppe fronts continued to develop the offensive. The tank armies acted quickly. By mid-day on August 6, the 1st Tank Army had advanced to a depth of 50-55 km, and on the right flank, the 5th Guards Tank Army had eliminated a strong enemy resistance center in the Tomarovka area and broke through to Zolochev. It was already well after midnight when the tanks of the 181st Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps (Colonel A.V. Egorov) with their headlights off reached the outskirts of the city. The brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyrev, decided to attack the city on the move, using surprise. The engines roared and Soviet tanks burst into Zolochev. Awakened by gunfire, the roar of engines and the grinding of tracks, half-naked Nazis jumped out of their houses in a daze and came directly under the fire of tank guns and machine guns. Moving along parallel streets, the tanks shot and crushed equipment standing on the side of the road: trucks and staff vehicles, tractors, guns, camp kitchens, etc. Captain Ya. P. Vergun and senior lieutenant E. V. especially distinguished themselves in this fleeting night battle. Shkurdalov. Both of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. With dawn, enemy resistance increased sharply. However, the main forces of the corps came to the aid of the brigade. By evening, the city of Zolochev was completely liberated from the enemy, and the remnants of its garrison were thrown back to the southwest.

The 29th Tank Corps (Major General I.F. Kirichenko) of the 5th Guards Tank Army at that time was developing an offensive against Cossack Lopan. The enemy's resistance here was also quickly broken. On August 7, the tank armies liberated Bogodukhov and Zolochev, completing the breakthrough of the enemy defense to its entire operational depth. The breakthrough front of our troops reached 120 km, and the depth was 80 - 100 km. The Belgorod-Kharkov group of fascist German troops was essentially cut into two parts.

Soviet aviation gained air supremacy in a tense struggle. Between 3 and 8 August she destroyed about 400 German aircraft. By August 11, the Voronezh Front reached its right wing to Akhtyrka, and its left wing to the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov. In order to prevent the encirclement of its Kharkov group, the command of Army Group South began an urgent transfer of troops to this section of the front from Donbass and from Orel. The Supreme High Command headquarters ordered aviation to prevent the transfer of enemy operational reserves to the Steppe and Voronezh fronts. As a result of the continuous impact of Soviet aviation, enemy reserves suffered significant losses, and most importantly, they were unable to arrive in the designated areas in a timely manner. During the period of the most intensive transfer of enemy reserves, partisans attacked his railway communications. Their active actions significantly slowed down the pace of concentration of the Nazi counterattack groups. However, our command failed to disrupt the regrouping of large enemy forces in the Kharkov area.

Marshal I.S. Konev speaks to the fighters

By August 10, the enemy’s defenses in the Kharkov direction were finally cut into two parts. An almost 60-kilometer gap opened up between the 4th Panzer Army and the German Task Force Kempf. This created the conditions for the liberation of Kharkov and the development of an offensive in Left Bank Ukraine. In accordance with the plan approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters, the capture of Kharkov was supposed to be carried out by a concentric strike from several directions while simultaneously enveloping it deeply from the west. The 53rd, 57th, 69th, 7th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Armies were to attack Kharkov. The Voronezh Front with the forces of 3 armies was supposed to attack Akhtyrka, part of the forces - on Bogodukhov and further on Merefa, bypassing Kharkov from the north-west. To carry out the tasks of the second stage of Operation Commander Rumyantsev, the Voronezh Front was strengthened by Headquarters reserves. Instead of the armies that had left, new ones arrived - the 4th Guards and 47th Armies.

The Southwestern Front (Army General R. Ya. Malinovsky) delivered the main blow to Stalino (Donetsk), and with part of its forces - to Merefa with the aim of assisting the Steppe Front in isolating Kharkov. Headquarters also involved the Southern Front (Colonel General F.I. Tolbukhin) in the operation, which received the task of advancing from the area south of Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) in the general direction of Stalino to meet the main attack of the Southwestern Front. After the operation to liberate Kharkov, all the fronts participating in it had to launch an offensive in Left Bank Ukraine, towards the Dnieper.

Soviet troops are fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov

On August 10, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a general attack on Kharkov and the next day approached its outer defensive perimeter. By this time, the troops of the Voronezh Front had liberated Akhtyrka and cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There was a real threat of deep envelopment by Soviet troops of the entire Kharkov enemy group. To prevent this, the command of Army Group South secretly concentrated the 3rd Tank Corps, numbering up to 400 tanks and assault guns, south of Bogodukhov. On August 11, this corps launched a surprise counterattack on the 1st Tank Army and the left flank of the 6th Guards Army. In the area of ​​Bogodukhov, an oncoming tank battle unfolded, which was extremely intense and stubborn. The enemy sought to cut off the 1st Tank Army, which had rushed forward, from the main forces of the front and defeat it south of Bogodukhov. Using their almost triple superiority in tanks and strong air support, the enemy pushed our tank formations 20 km to the north and liberated the section of the Kharkov-Poltava railway that they had cut. But he failed to break through to Bogodukhov, much less encircle and defeat the tank army.

On August 13, the main forces of the left wing of the Voronezh Front - the 5th and 6th Guards Armies, as well as the 5th Guards Tank Army - entered the battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were redirected to support them. After fierce fighting, by the end of the day on August 17, the enemy’s counterattack in the Bogodukhov area was repulsed. Having suffered heavy losses, selected formations of the fascist German Wehrmacht - motorized SS divisions "Reich", "Viking" and "Totenkopf" were forced to go on the defensive.

German infantry fighting in the streets

But the enemy command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, with the forces of 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, it launched a new counterattack on the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Akhtyrka area. The enemy, who concentrated large forces in a narrow area, managed to break through the front of the 27th Army (Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko) and advance 24 km in the direction of Bogodukhov. To repel this enemy group, the 4th Guards Army (Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik), the 3rd, 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the main forces of the 1st Tank Army transferred from near Bogodukhov, were deployed. By August 20, the enemy's offensive was stopped by a powerful counter-strike from the Soviet troops. As a result of the oncoming battle that unfolded east of Akhtyrka, the enemy strike group suffered heavy losses and was forced to go on the defensive.

Meanwhile, the armies of the right wing of the Voronezh Front: - which continued to successfully develop the offensive in a western direction, deeply enveloped the enemy’s Akhtyrka group from the north and created a threat to its rear. In stubborn battles that unfolded on August 22-25, the strike group of fascist German troops in the Akhtyrka area was defeated, and formations of the Voronezh Front again captured this city. Thus, the attempt by the command of Army Group South to stabilize the front line and remove the threat to the Kharkov industrial region failed.

While the armies of the Voronezh Front repelled the frantic onslaught of German tank divisions near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, the troops of the Steppe Front fought a stubborn battle for Kharkov. The enemy fiercely resisted, following Hitler's orders not to surrender the city under any circumstances. The intensity of the struggle increased every day. On August 13, troops of the Steppe Front broke through the outer defensive line, located 8-14 km from Kharkov, and 4 days later, having broken through the inner defensive line, they began fighting on the northern outskirts of the city. Breaking the fierce resistance of the enemy, repelling his continuous counterattacks, Soviet troops successively broke through the outer and inner defensive contours around the city and enveloped it on three sides.

In liberated Kharkov

On the afternoon of August 22, ground and air reconnaissance discovered the beginning of the withdrawal of enemy troops from Kharkov. “In order to prevent the enemy from escaping from the attacks,” Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev later wrote, “on the evening of August 22, I gave the order for a night assault on Kharkov. Throughout the night of August 23, there were street battles in the city, fires blazed, and strong explosions were heard. Warriors of the 531st, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th2 Armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army, showing courage and bravery, skillfully bypassed enemy strongholds, infiltrated their defenses, and attacked their garrisons from the rear. Step by step, Soviet soldiers cleared Kharkov from fascist invaders.” By dawn on August 23, the roar of the battle for the city began to gradually subside, and by noon Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy. With the liberation of Kharkov and the Kharkov industrial region, Operation Commander Rumyantsev ended, and with it the Battle of Kursk. On the evening of August 23, 1943, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, saluted the liberators of Kharkov, the largest political and economic center of the South of our country, with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns. The 10 most distinguished formations in the battles for the city were awarded the honorary name “Kharkov”.

The scope, intensity of the struggle and the results achieved place the Battle of Kursk among the largest battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the entire Second World War. For 50 days, two powerful groups of armed forces of the opposing sides waged a fierce struggle in a relatively small area. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12 thousand aircraft took part in the battles, unprecedented in intensity, bitterness and tenacity, on both sides. On the part of the Nazi Wehrmacht, over 100 divisions were involved in the Battle of Kursk, which accounted for more than 43% of the divisions located on the Eastern Front. On the part of the Red Army, about 30% of its divisions were involved in the battle.

Guard scout Sergeant A.G. Frolchenko. Photo by Y. Ryumkin

Victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a high price. During its course, Soviet troops lost a total of over 863 thousand people (including more than 254 thousand irretrievable losses). Losses in military equipment amounted to: over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 5.2 thousand guns and mortars and 1.6 thousand aircraft. Immediately after the end of the Battle of Kursk, all 5 tank armies, 13 tank corps and 28 rifle divisions, as well as a significant number of individual units of various branches of the military, had to be withdrawn to the rear for replenishment.

The enemy in the Battle of Kursk lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.7 thousand aircraft.

The large losses of Soviet troops are largely explained by the fact that, despite two years of war experience, the Soviet command staff, headquarters and troops as a whole did not yet possess proper combat skills. Often, combat experience was poorly used and was not creatively refracted, primarily due to the enormous turnover of personnel at all military levels. Often, an extremely negative role was played by the desire of individual commanders (commanders) to launch frontal attacks on the enemy, attempts to encircle him to a shallow depth, almost in the tactical defense zone, the most saturated with enemy forces and means. Such actions allowed the German command to carry out a wide maneuver with their forces and means in operational depth, occupy new defensive lines with them and carry out effective counterattacks (counterstrikes). There were also shortcomings in the organization of interaction, especially between the branches of the military and aviation with ground troops. Excessive haste in bringing reserves into battle did not always justify itself. There was a dispersion of reserves, their introduction into battle (battle) in parts, as well as a number of other negative aspects in the organization and conduct of combat operations.

Guard Lieutenant

Nevertheless, the enemy suffered a brutal defeat, which radically undermined its combat power. His tank troops, armed with new military equipment, on which Hitler’s strategists placed special hopes, suffered especially heavy damage. The famous German general G. Guderian was forced to admit this with bitterness: “The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were out of action for a long time due to large losses in people and equipment. Their timely restoration to conduct defensive operations on the Eastern Front... was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the Eastern Front.”

During the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army not only withstood a tremendous blow from the enemy, but also, going on a counteroffensive, completely defeated it, throwing it back 140-150 km in the southern and southwestern directions. As a result, the prerequisites were created for the deployment of a general offensive by Soviet troops with the goal of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and access to the Dnieper. In total, during the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions. In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht's offensive strategy finally collapsed. From this time until the end of the war, the Red Army firmly held the strategic initiative in its hands.

The defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge had far-reaching military and political consequences. He had a decisive influence on the entire further course of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the entire Second World War. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.

After the victory won at Kursk, the international authority of the Soviet Union as a decisive force in the fight against fascism increased immeasurably, the hopes of the Nazi-occupied countries of Western Europe for early liberation strengthened, the Resistance movement intensified in the states captured by the Nazis and the anti-fascist struggle in the Third Reich itself. The defeat of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk exacerbated the crisis within the Hitlerite coalition and marked the beginning of its collapse.

The victory of the Red Army was highly appreciated from our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, US President F. Roosevelt wrote in his message to J.V. Stalin: “During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also began a successful a counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences... The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories.”

The victory at the Kursk Bulge was of invaluable importance for further strengthening the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and raising the morale of the Red Army. The struggle of Soviet people located in the territories of our country temporarily occupied by the enemy received a powerful impetus. The partisan movement gained even greater scope.

The decisive factor in achieving the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was the fact that the Soviet command managed to correctly determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s summer (1943) offensive. And not only to determine, but also to be able to reveal in detail the plan of Hitler’s command, to obtain data about the plan for Operation Citadel and the composition of the group of enemy troops, and even the time of the start of the operation. The decisive role in this belonged to Soviet intelligence.

In the Battle of Kursk received further development Soviet military art, moreover, all 3 of its components: strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, in particular, experience was gained in creating large groupings of troops in defense capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tanks and aircraft, creating powerful positional defense in depth, the art of decisively massing forces and means in the most important directions, as well as the art of maneuvering as during a defensive battle as well as an offensive one.

The Soviet command skillfully chose the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy’s strike forces were already thoroughly exhausted during the defensive battle. With the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, the correct choice of attack directions and the most appropriate methods of defeating the enemy, as well as the organization of interaction between fronts and armies in solving operational-strategic tasks, were of great importance.

Female tank crew

The presence of strong strategic reserves, their advance preparation and timely entry into battle played a decisive role in achieving success.

One of the most important factors that ensured the Red Army's victory on the Kursk Bulge was the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, their dedication in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, their unshakable resilience in defense and unstoppable pressure in the offensive, readiness for any test to defeat the enemy. The source of these high moral and fighting qualities was by no means the fear of repression, as some publicists and “historians” are now trying to present, but a feeling of patriotism, hatred of the enemy and love of the Fatherland. They were the sources of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their loyalty to military duty when carrying out combat missions of the command, countless feats in battle and selfless dedication in defending their Fatherland - in a word, everything without which victory in the war is impossible. The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of Soviet soldiers in the Battle of the Arc of Fire. More than 100 thousand participants in the battle were awarded orders and medals, and over 180 of the bravest warriors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The turning point in the work of the rear and the entire economy of the country, achieved by the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people, made it possible by mid-1943 to supply the Red Army in ever-increasing volumes with all the necessary material resources, and above all with weapons and military equipment, including new models, not only not inferior in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, they were the best examples of German weapons and equipment, but often surpassed them. Among them, it is necessary first of all to highlight the appearance of 85-, 122- and 152-mm self-propelled guns, new anti-tank guns using sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles, which played a big role in the fight against enemy tanks, including heavy ones, new types of aircraft, etc. d. All this was one of the most important conditions for the growth of the combat power of the Red Army and its increasingly steadily increasing superiority over the Wehrmacht. It was the Battle of Kursk that was the decisive event that marked the completion of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union. In a figurative expression, the backbone of Nazi Germany was broken in this battle. The Wehrmacht was never destined to recover from the defeats it suffered on the battlefields of Kursk, Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to victory over Nazi Germany. In terms of its military-political significance, it was the largest event of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most glorious dates in military history of our Fatherland, the memory of which will live for centuries.

At the exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, it was developed and approved in April 1943 military operation codenamed "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).

The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. Plan Barbarossa, a plan for a lightning war with the USSR, was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it was put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - attacked in three groups (North, Center, South), aimed at quickly capturing the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and in the south, Kyiv.

Kursk Bulge

In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Here two large fronts could be surrounded at once, as a result of which a large gap would form, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the southern and northeastern directions.

The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began developing a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.

July 5, 1943 German troops launched an offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to retreat. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was ultimately forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The struggle was also extremely intense on the southern front of the Kursk salient - in the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history took place near Prokhorovka. The battle unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the fight was unusually fierce, “the tanks ran at each other, grappled, could no longer separate, fought to the death until one of them burst into flames with a torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.” For an hour, the battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, neither side was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - enter the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed, and July 12, 1943 became the day the German offensive near Kursk collapsed.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15 - the Central.

On August 5, 1943 (the day of celebration of the Pochaev Icon of the Mother of God, as well as the icon of the “Joy of All Who Sorrow”) Oryol was liberated. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.

Events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, a general withdrawal of fascist German troops began on the southern front of the Kursk ledge.

On August 23, 1943, the liberation of Kharkov ended the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main group of German troops.

Liberation of Smolensk (1943)

Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. According to the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from August 7 to 20. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demen operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchina offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Elny-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchina offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation.

On September 25, 1943, troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk - the most important strategic defense center of the Nazi troops in the western direction.

As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified multi-line and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200 - 225 km to the West.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, held With 5 July By 23 August 1943 of the year.
The German command gave another name for this battle - operation "Citadel", which according to the plans of the Wehrmacht was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it should have withstood any attack.

Strengths of the parties

Germany
At the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to the enormous amount of manpower, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: this is more 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) "Ferdinand" or "Elephant" in the number about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions, which had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet with a total number of more than 1000 combat aircraft the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's offensive, the Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. But the Soviet Army had tanks 3-4 thousand., which also outnumbered the German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has them 10 thousand, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial enemy attack.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern front of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon encountered very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the attack, but did not achieve significant results, to 10 July- they managed to get through only 12 km, losing near 2 thousands of tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
5'th of July The attack began on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery barrage. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
Famous battle of Prokhorovka– the biggest tank battle in history has begun July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle was July, 12. On a small section of the front they collided 700 German and about 800- that of Soviet tanks and guns. The tanks of both sides mixed and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end 12 July The tank battle began to wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy's tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
German losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70 % all tanks in this direction.
Over the next few days, the Germans were almost completely bled dry and had lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
July 15 The Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousands of soldiers, a large amount of equipment and guns. The Soviet army lost, according to various estimates, approximately 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure are irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began 5 July, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this section of the front.
17 July from the Soviet army began Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation. The Soviet command set the goal of encircling the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves on this section of the front.
During Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (17 July – 2 August) managed to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
July, 12 began offensive in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So 5 August In the capital, the first fireworks display was organized during the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. During the operation the Germans lost over 90 thousand. soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
In the southern region, the offensive of the Soviet army began August 3rd and the operation was called "Rumyantsev". As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city Kharkov (August 23). During this offensive, the Germans attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
WITH 7 August By 2 October offensive operation was carried out “Kutuzov” – Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the Center group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during Donbass operation (13 August – 22 September) The Donetsk basin was liberated.
WITH 26 August By 30 September passed Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of Left Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became turning point of the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued the offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
The losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that on the Kursk Bulge More than a million soldiers were killed. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. IN 1944 And 45 local offensives were undertaken over the years, but were not successful.
The German command has repeatedly said that defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.