Underground War * (From the experience of the Korean War). National Interest spoke about the “secret weapon” of North Korea The development of mine warfare in the 15th-18th centuries with the spread of gunpowder

* See "TiV" No. 2,3,9,10/2001, 1,3,4,5/2002

The Korean War began in an extraordinary way. An analysis of the experience of World War II led the American high command to the conclusion that in future wars everything would be decided by aviation. Therefore, various theories began to be developed, the basis of which was the idea of ​​​​the predominance of the air component over all others. Other branches of the armed forces, as often happens, faded into the background.

Therefore, from the very beginning of the Korean War, the American command sought to decide its outcome, mainly through aviation. He viewed the war itself as a kind of “police operation.” However, by the end of 1950, realities forced the American generals to reconsider their views. No matter how strong aviation is, it alone cannot win the war. It was necessary to involve the 8th Field Army and naval forces, which were not quite prepared for this, in conducting combat operations in a complex theater of operations.

Nevertheless, aviation continued to play a very important role in the fire defeat of the enemy. The number of aircraft was constantly increasing. So, if by January 1, 1951, the aviation of the Americans and their allies numbered 1,800 aircraft, then a year later - 2,124. The intensity of its operations in 1950-1952. was quite high, and sometimes reached 1200 - 1500 sorties per day. Of these, combat aviation accounted for 70% total number sorties. The distribution by type of aviation was as follows: fighter - 75%, medium bomber - 11%, heavy bomber - 4%, reconnaissance - 10%. Bombers posed the greatest danger to the defending troops. They dropped only for the period from June 25, 1950 to January 1, 1952:

154,208 tons of aerial bombs, 52,149,332 liters of napalm incendiary fluid. In addition, the American command attached great importance to tactical aviation, with the actions of which it sought to compensate for the low combat readiness of its own and South Korean ground forces. To support an infantry division advancing on a front 10-15 km wide, an average of about 200 sorties per day were carried out during certain periods of the war. Tactical aircraft were increasingly used to support ground forces. In addition to striking troops defending in well-equipped engineering areas, tactical aviation carried out missions to isolate combat areas by launching systematic strikes during the day and night on railway lines and junctions, marshalling yards, tunnels, bridges, highways and port facilities.

The massive use of aviation did not save the Americans and their allies (Great Britain, Australia, Greece, South Africa, Canada, South Korea) from quite large losses, which by January 10, 1952 alone amounted to 1,543 aircraft (of which 608 aircraft were shot down in air battles , anti-aircraft artillery fire and rifle-machine-gun fire - 935). By the end of the war, US losses amounted to about 2,000 Air Force aircraft, more than 1,200 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, and several hundred Army aircraft. The air war cost the United States approximately $4 billion, which amounted to about 20% of the cost of ground forces in Korea.

To fight North Korean soldiers and Chinese volunteers holed up in underground structures, the Americans used various bombs. Among them: incendiary bombs filled with white phosphorus, thermite, as well as flammable oils and caustic liquids. The most widely used was napalm, which was a gelatinous mass obtained by dissolving a powdery mixture of aluminum salt and various acids (naphthenic, oleic, coconut palm, etc.) in gasoline at the rate of 4-8% of the mixture to 92-96% gasoline. Mainly four types of napalm bombs were used: 45-kg (100-lb.) AN-M47, AN-M47-A2, AN-M47-A4, 6-lb. (about 3 kg) – MN-M69. In addition, the Americans filled a drop-shaped case with a capacity of 416 or 624 liters with an incendiary mixture (Fig. 1). Such bombs, when dropped from a minimum height, covered an area of ​​up to 2,000 square meters. m. Another means of destroying personnel hiding in tunnels, as well as bridges, were parachute high-explosive bombs (Fig. 1a). The Americans used three main types of parachute bombs: 230, 115, 45 kg. But greater effect was achieved by using the heaviest of them - 230 kg.

Rice. 1. P-51 "Mustang" one of the main attack aircraft of the Americans in Korea

Rice. 1a. Bombing a bridge with parachute bombs

In order to more effectively combat enemy underground structures and large tunnels, in December 1950, the Americans began to use radio-controlled Tarzon bombs weighing 3,400 kg. However, this experience was unsuccessful.

In addition to striking troops hidden in underground structures and galleries, American aircraft actively fought against ground and underground facilities that were of great value for maintaining the combat potential of the DPRK. These included a network of hydroelectric power stations. At first, the North Koreans' power supply system was not included in the 18 strategic targets planned by the Americans for destruction. One of the main reasons for preserving the electricity supply system was the prospects for its use in the post-war period by the new pro-American leadership of the country. The high cost of restoring hydroelectric power stations left them beyond air strikes. However, in 1952, data began to appear in American intelligence reports that the North Koreans were producing military products in underground factories (Fig. 2), which were difficult to detect and destroy from the air. Then it was decided to disable their power supply system by destroying energy sources - hydroelectric power stations.

The huge hydroelectric power plants built by the Japanese in the mountains of North Korea were of great value, primarily for Asia.

It was also one of the largest, interconnected electrical power systems in the world, capable of not only providing electricity | Korea, but also export it abroad. The basis of the system was represented by four complexes of stations: Fusen, Changjin, Suphung and Kesen (Fig. 3). A feature of the power plant cascades was that one part of the network structures was located on the surface of the earth, the other - underground. Large reservoirs or reservoir systems were created on the wide and gentle western slopes. Water from these reservoirs was pumped under pressure through tunnels across the watershed and carried through canals and tunnels in the steep eastern slopes to cascades of hydroelectric power stations located at various altitudes on the mountain slopes. The water that had done the work in the turbines of one station was then transported through a tunnel to the next hydroelectric station. This process was repeated at each cascade, allowing maximum use of water energy.

Such a supply of water to the stations, moreover, contributed to increasing the survivability of the country's power supply system, covering the main channels for supplying the working fluid to the turbines of the stations. Seeing the strength of the water supply channels, the Americans chose turbines, transformers and switches, which were on the surface and served as easy prey for bomber aircraft, as the main targets in destroying power plants. During American air raids in the summer-autumn of 1952, some of them were disabled. Subsequently, they were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft, but were quickly restored with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists.

Massive bombings and the active use of artillery against ground forces forced the command of the North Korean troops and Chinese volunteers to look for ways to increase the survivability of personnel, equipment and weapons, etc. in difficult conditions of powerful enemy influence. In addition, no one was sure that the Americans would not use nuclear weapons. Everyone had Hiroshima and Nagosaki before their eyes.

The experience of previous wars showed that the Chinese walls of the 20th century: the Maginot, Siegfried, Mannerheim lines, the strip of fortified areas on the Soviet-Polish border, etc. did not save France, Germany, Finland, and the USSR from defeat. In the war with Japan, Soviet troops were able to quickly overcome powerful fortified areas in the mountains, the basis of which were underground structures and communication passages. The nature of the armed struggle, new means of destruction, theaters of military operations, and the general skill of commanders in previous wars made it possible to overcome the strong obstacles of the defenders, well protected from ground and air enemies. Therefore, the Korean command, at the beginning of the war in 1950, did not really hope for underground operations. However, the rank and file thought differently.

Massive attacks by American aviation and artillery forced us to look for ways to shelter from the damaging factors of enemy weapons. The rank and file and junior command staff were the first to get down to business. First, the trenches and communication passages were blocked with poles and covered with soil on top (Fig. 4). The total length of the blocked sections was about 10% of the total number of communication passages and trenches. These ceilings protected personnel from shell and bomb fragments, as well as napalm. In the context of the intensification of the use of napalm by the Americans, coating the materials from which the lining of trenches, etc., was made with clay or wet soil was of primary importance. To prevent the flooding of communication passages and trenches by rainwater flowing along the mountain slopes, as well as the rolling of grenades and napalm, CPV and KPA troops tore off mountain ditches.

Rice. 2. Underground mortar production plant.

Fig.3. North Korea power plant network

Rice. 3a. Suphunskaya HPP

Rice. 4

The first underground structures began to be built as shelters from air strikes without any system or connection with the commander’s plan for defense. They were “fox” holes and cave shelters. Squads and platoons carved out niches (semi-tunnels) for themselves where terrain conditions permitted. At first, these shelters did not fit into the overall plan of a defensive battle. However, subsequently the niches deepened and connected to each other, turning into horseshoe-shaped galleries. This created a certain system of defensive positions.

(End to follow)

Project 956 destroyer. Photo by V. Drushlyakova

Ending. For the beginning, see “TiV” No. 2/2001

In the post-war period, in local wars, troops from various countries more than once resorted to underground fighting. In general, a certain pattern has emerged in their actions. As soon as one of the warring sides achieved superiority in means of destruction, especially in aviation, the other immediately sought, by switching to underground operations, to increase the security of its troops and achieve stability and active defense. This was most clearly demonstrated in the wars in Korea and Vietnam. In these wars, the transition to underground warfare ensured success in repelling enemy attacks. Moreover, the attacking side itself subsequently moved not only to counter-mine actions, but also to sheltering its troops, warehouses, and control points underground.

The first striking example of an active and effective underground struggle was the Korean War. Korean troops, while repelling powerful enemy air and ground attacks, prepared positions that became insurmountable for the enemy. In one of the defense sectors, in addition to trenches and communication passages, trenches and underground galleries were opened at the positions of the main and second defense lines, and underground artillery and machine-gun structures were erected. The total length of the galleries in the defense line reached 7.4 km (with a total defense front of 23 km), with 70% of them in the main line and 30% in the second line. In addition to underground communication passages, pit-shaped wood-earth shelters and various underground structures were equipped in battalion defense areas. Each battalion area had on average 2.5 km of trenches, 1.5 km of communication passages and 0.4 km of underground galleries. In a company defense area, as a rule, there were 2 trenches, one or two communication passages, an underground gallery, a separate fire structure and a pit-type shelter. Intensive enemy air raids forced, in addition, to equip under parapet dugouts, “fox holes,” and cave shelters with a capacity for one compartment. To protect against napalm, the lining of trenches and underground passages was coated with clay and wet pound. Individual underground observation posts, artillery trenches, tank positions and other underground structures were connected to each other by trenches or underground galleries.

During the war, massive American air and artillery strikes forced the Korean army to make greater use of underground galleries, shelters, gun firing positions, machine guns, and tanks. The galleries “cut through” the heights from the front edge to the reverse slope. The protective layers of such galleries sometimes reached 30-50 m.

At the same time, there were certain shortcomings in the underground struggle. This is a limited maneuver with fire and “wheels”, difficult ventilation of firing positions, underground premises and communication passages during the battle. The defenders tried to solve these problems by increasing the angle of fire from guns and tanks, installing powerful equipment for ventilating underground rooms, and using the direction of movement of natural air flows when designing underground structures.

To shelter the tanks, railway tunnels were used, and special underground shelters were also opened. The most vulnerable were the entrances and exits from the galleries. To protect them, covered sections of trenches, approaches to galleries, branched entrances and exits (double, triple) were created, and canopies such as canopies (heads) were installed.

The strength of the defense was significantly influenced by hidden firing points with underground shelters. Hidden firing points were narrow underground exits to the front slopes of the heights, adapted for firing. Such exits were sometimes made in front of the trench and had a connection with both the gallery and the trench. Hidden firing points in some cases contributed to inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

For example, in October 1952, from one of the points of the 135th PP of the 45th Infantry Division of the Korean Army, over 300 soldiers and officers of the 7th American Infantry Division were destroyed within a few hours.

On certain sections of the front and at the most important heights, a very developed network of underground structures was created with all the necessary elements of household equipment, including bathhouses and clubs.

The American command took into account the experience of underground fighting in the Korean War, reflecting it in the combat manual “Combat in fortified areas and cities” (FM 31-50). It indicated how it would be more expedient to create fortified areas and what to include in them. Particular attention was paid to linking ground fortifications with multi-tiered underground passages and shelters, firing points in the form of towers, as well as equipping field fortifications with an underground part. This soon came in handy for the US Army in the Vietnam War. The National Liberation Front of Vietnam (NLF), significantly inferior to the American troops and their allies in forces and means (especially in aviation), chose underground mine warfare as one of the main methods of fighting the enemy. This method of warfare allowed the Vietnamese command to quite often avoid losses and defeats from superior enemy forces, and also often inflict significant blows on the enemy.

To combat the NLF, the American command carried out more than one operation. One of the main goals of many operations was the destruction of underground communications, shelters and personnel, weapons, and material supplies of the Vietnamese troops located there. During Operation Crimp in 1966, the Americans encountered little resistance in the area of ​​the river. Saigon. Attempts to encircle and destroy the patriots ended unsuccessfully. However, while pursuing the rearguards of the Vietnamese troops, the Americans discovered an extensive network of underground tunnels with warehouses, supplies of weapons and food, as well as a large number of well-camouflaged trenches for firing from small arms. During the operation, American troops began to widely use tear gas and toxic substances to “smoke out” the personnel of the NLF units who had retreated through underground passages. In addition, in order to destroy the tunnel system, several raids were launched by strategic bombers, which used large-caliber bombs with delayed fuses.

Section of a field fortification with an underground part:

1 – machine gun; 2 - rifle cells; 3 – premises for personnel

Typical tower (general view and section):

1 – armored turret about 15 cm thick; 2 – combined periscope and compass; 3 – embrasure; 4 – racks for ammunition; 5 – tables for mounting weapons; 6 – compass; 7 – staircase, 8 – inner diameter of the tower (2.95 m), 8a – height of the inner part of the tower (1.95 m), 9 – entrance.

Between 1966 and 1969 The Americans and their allies have repeatedly used toxic substances to “smoke out” the personnel of the NLF forces. This happened in operations “Cider Falls”, “Overlander”, etc. However, their actions were not always successful. Properly equipped underground communications with an air purification system, the presence of airlocks, and individual and collective means of protection allowed the Vietnamese troops to avoid losses from toxic substances. The Americans often used napalm ammunition to defeat NLF troops located in tunnels.

With each subsequent operation, the fight against the NLF troops acquired an increasingly focused underground character. To increase the effectiveness of underground mine warfare, special combat groups were created, which included infantry, sappers, units of flamethrowers and chemical troops. It was quite difficult to counter these groups, and NLF units sought to break away from the enemy, making extensive use of underground passages several kilometers long.

In 1967-1968 the war began to acquire a mutual underground character. Thus, in Operation Scotland, American troops were surrounded in the Ke-San stronghold. The extensive system of tunnels and barriers quickly created by the NLF forces did not allow the Americans to escape from the blocked area. Not entirely skillful attempts at underground counteraction to the Vietnamese troops did not bring much success to the besieged. Therefore, the Americans were forced to carry out all transfers of people, equipment, and materiel only by air. Strategic and tactical aviation, including helicopter units, were used to fire at the NLF troops.

By the end of the Vietnam War, the American command, using the experience of the NLF troops, switched to placing a fairly large part of its forces and assets in underground, mostly reinforced concrete, structures.

In the post-war period, Russian troops gained quite a lot of experience in underground warfare in Afghanistan and the Chechen Republic. The use of an extensive tunnel system by Afghan opposition troops sometimes baffled the Soviet command. Operations carried out by special detachments to combat sabotage groups of Afghan Mujahideen did not always lead to success. It was necessary to destroy existing underground communications. A method such as burning underground passages was also used. However, it was not possible to completely establish control over underground communications. However, Soviet troops, constantly participating in the underground war, gained extensive experience in destroying enemy combat groups in the most difficult underground conditions.

Analysis of the first and especially the second Chechen campaigns indicates the intensification of underground struggle on the part of gangs in modern conflicts. Complete superiority of Russian troops in airspace, the presence and widespread use of artillery led to the transition of militants to underground operations, quick and invisible maneuver of forces and means. This confirms the assault and actions to restore constitutional order in Grozny, the battles for the village. Pervomaiskoye, etc.

In Grozny, underground communications are so well developed that our troops still cannot destroy the militants in them. On the contrary, the militants almost feel like masters there. There is a system of transport highways near Grozny, along which not only groups of people, but also cars can move. There are a large number of underground dugouts and hospitals where militants rest, are treated, prepare for the next action, and even make weapons. These underground structures have not yet been completely taken under control by federal troops. In addition, the militants also have specially trained units for underground mine warfare, which makes it difficult for our troops to operate effectively.

To increase the effectiveness of the underground struggle of Russian troops against gangs, it seems advisable to create a countermeasures system that includes a set of measures to use the experience of underground mine warfare when planning operations, preparing troops for mine warfare, creating special detachments from units of various types of troops, suppressing the use of existing and created underground communications by gangs, etc.

Currently, the experience of underground struggle is very relevant. Future wars will be characterized by great dynamism. At the same time, some countries of the world, having achieved superiority in means of destruction such as nuclear weapons, aviation, space assets, artillery, missile forces, etc., will force other states to seriously think about their security with less expenditure of forces and resources. One of the ways to solve the problem is to locate the main strategically important facilities, weapons and troops underground. The presence of underground structures (for example, subways, underground cities, factories, shopping centers, underwater overpasses - the English Channel, Victoria Bay in Hong Kong, etc.) will, in turn, contribute to an accelerated transition to underground fighting on both sides.

To skillfully counter the enemy in such wars, it is important to timely generalize the experience of underground mine warfare of the past, develop not only ground-based means of armed warfare, but also the latest devices for quickly and silently cutting off underground communications, unconventional means of destruction underground, and create underground structures of the sluice-consular type , prepare troops for underground warfare, skillfully use and at the same time effectively counteract the enemy’s use of toxic substances and gases underground, and develop the theory of underground warfare.

Israeli soldiers liquidating Gaza tunnels

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Alexander Shulman
Gaza: underground war.

Israeli experts, based on the results of the fighting in Gaza, agree: today we can talk about a new type of terror - “underground terrorism”, which poses a particular threat due to the secrecy of the actions of terrorists operating deep underground

underground city

Under the rule of the Islamic terrorist organization Hamas, the Gaza Strip is a huge eastern city, with confusing dirty streets, chaotic traffic, noisy bazaars and dukhans, mosques filled with crowds of praying Arabs.

But this is only a disguise for the real, underground Gaza - there, underground, tunnels, secret passages and bunkers stretch for tens of kilometers, in which more than twenty thousand militants of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas are hiding. In underground Gaza, thousands of tons of explosives, weapons and equipment are stored in secret caches; underground launchers are concentrated there, from which Palestinians fire rockets into Israel.

Dozens of underground tunnels, designed to secretly transport militants, go from Gaza deep into Israeli territory.

Israel launched a large-scale military operation, called “Enduring Rock,” on July 7, 2014. The operation began in response to massive rocket attacks on Israeli territory - over the past month, Hamas militants from Gaza have launched a barrage of rockets into Israeli territory: more than three thousand Palestinian rockets were launched at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and dozens of other Israeli cities and villages. The purpose of the Palestinian rocket attacks was to massacre Israeli civilians and destroy the Israeli economy.

However, almost none of the Palestinian missiles reached their targets - they were shot down by the Iron Dome missile defense systems, which had proven to be extremely effective.

In response to the rocket attacks, the Israeli air force launched an air offensive against terrorist targets in Gaza, during which hundreds of rocket launchers, weapons depots, and command posts of Hamas militants in Gaza were destroyed.

By July 15, the Israeli military command had come to the conclusion that the air offensive had achieved its goals and Hamas leaders were offered an agreement on a mutual ceasefire.

Hamas' response did not take long - on the night of July 16, thirteen Palestinian militants, dressed in Israeli military uniforms, entered deep into Israeli territory through an underground tunnel with the aim of massacres and hostage-taking. The border violators were promptly detected by Israeli border guards and destroyed during a short battle.

Destruction of a “Palestinian” gang that penetrated through a tunnel into Israeli territory on the night of July 16, 2014

According to Israeli intelligence, the Hamas leadership planned a massive breakthrough of the Israeli border at the end of September 2014 - during the celebration of the Jewish New Year, hundreds of heavily armed Palestinian militants were supposed to penetrate ten underground tunnels into Israel and carry out massacres in border settlements. The tunnel exits were under kindergartens, shopping complexes - in places of mass gathering of residents of border settlements

It has now become clear that the threat of terrorist penetration through underground tunnels is the most pressing problem national security Israel, before which even constant rocket attacks recede into the background.

On July 17, 2014, the Israeli government ordered the army to conduct the ground phase of Operation Enduring Edge. Now the goal of the military operation was to eliminate the system of underground tunnels leading from Gaza to Israeli territory.

About 100 thousand military personnel were involved in the operation, and 82 thousand reservists were mobilized.

On the night of July 18, 2014, Israeli infantry and tank columns, under the cover of aviation and artillery, entered Gaza.

Palestinian "metro construction"

As Israeli troops advanced deeper into Palestinian territory, an entire underground city was discovered, surprising even the seasoned Israeli military - dozens of tunnels were discovered in Gaza, stretching for many kilometers.

Israeli experts, based on the results of the fighting in Gaza, agree: today we can talk about a new type of terror - “underground terrorism”, which poses a particular threat due to the secrecy of the actions of terrorists operating deep underground

Another surprise for the advancing Israeli troops was the militants' continuous mining of streets and houses in Gaza. The commander of a group of Israeli troops in the southern Gaza Strip, General Mickey Edelstein, said that on one street alone his soldiers found booby traps in 19 of 28 houses.

Having seized power in Gaza in 2007, Hamas began building a whole network of underground concrete bunkers where the leaders of Palestinian militants are located and hide from Israeli attacks. The bunkers are interconnected by a network of tunnels with numerous exits in residential areas of Gaza. Military analysts estimate that each such tunnel takes two to three years to build and costs millions of dollars.

Israeli experts divide terrorist tunnels into “offensive” and “defensive.” “Offensive” tunnels are designed for breakthroughs into enemy territory, while “defensive” ones serve as storage places for weapons and explosives, militant leadership hides in bunkers there, and many underground branches, corridors and exits to the surface allow for the secret movement underground of large groups of terrorists.

Israeli underground special forces fight in a tunnel

Tunnel construction begins in a place hidden from prying eyes - usually in the basement of a residential building, mosque or hospital. The entrance to the tunnel is a vertical pit that goes underground to a depth of 20-30 meters. Next, horizontal tunnels with many intricate branches and corridors are built underground, with exits to the surface at many points. As an officer who fought in Gaza says: “We threw smoke bombs into a tunnel running deep under the street, and then smoke came out of every house.”

Inside the tunnels there are warehouses where weapons, explosives, food are stored - everything that militants need for underground life.

Palestinians dig offensive tunnels towards the Israeli border, traveling hundreds of meters and sometimes several kilometers to emerge behind Israeli lines, usually near a civilian target - kindergarten, school, shopping center or residential area.

Suddenly emerging deep inside Israeli territory, the Palestinians are planning massacres and hostage-taking. During the fighting in Gaza, the Israeli military discovered a tunnel where Palestinian militants stored motorcycles - apparently, the militants planned to enter the “operational space” on Israeli roads on motorcycles.

Motorcycles found in the Palestinian tunnel

The most successful Palestinian tunnel operation took place in 2006, when Hamas militants managed to penetrate the tunnel deep into Israeli terrorism, kill two Israeli soldiers and kidnap a third, Gilad Shalit. The Palestinians hid the captured Israeli soldier Shalit in underground caches for six years, using him as a bargaining chip with the Israeli authorities. Then the Israeli government exchanged Shalit for a thousand Palestinian militants who were serving sentences in Israeli prisons, after which they immediately returned to terrorist activities.

Another way to use tunnels is to lay mines. In such cases, the Palestinians seek to dig as close as possible to an army base or civilian facility on Israeli territory, where the explosives are planted.

A similar tunnel was blown up on July 21, 2014. Three Israeli soldiers died in an explosion in a building that had previously been checked by sappers and dogs - the fatal thing for the soldiers was the planting of explosives in a tunnel passing under the house.

The tunnels are designed for long-term use - they are lined with concrete slabs and electrical cables are installed. Most tunnels are up to 2.5 meters high and more than a meter wide - this space is quite enough for the movement of people carrying heavy loads. In case of failure, there are many booby traps installed in the tunnels.

The Hamas leadership probably does not have exact plans for tunnels either - the leaders of Palestinian militants have a more or less clear idea of ​​the tunnel system only in the areas of Gaza under their control. To eliminate possible witnesses, militants deliver workers blindfolded to the tunnel construction site. There are known cases of workers being killed by Hamas militants after the completion of the tunnel.

Hamas leaders consider it most effective to use children 10-13 years old to dig tunnels. According to the Journal of Palestine Studies, in 2012 alone, 160 Palestinian teenagers working on the construction of tunnels for Hamas died in the Gaza Strip - they died from suffocation and collapses in the tunnels under construction at many meters deep.

Search and elimination of tunnels

Searching and destroying tunnels is a very complex and time-consuming operation. According to Israeli expert Ido Hecht, in order to detect a tunnel, it is necessary to detect its exit or use various acoustic, seismic or radar devices to detect cavities under a multi-meter layer of earth

But even having discovered the entrance, it is impossible to guess where exactly the tunnel itself lies.
As a rule, tunnel exits are located in the basements of residential buildings, mosques, schools or other public buildings in order to complicate reconnaissance work.

Digging the tunnel is a complex manual process that takes months because the use of excavators creates noise and can attract the attention of Israeli intelligence. Excavation also takes time and is carried out secretly.

However, there is still no reliable technology that would allow remote detection of narrow tunnels at great depths.

Meanwhile, Hamas tunnels usually go to a depth of 30 meters, so even with a rough guess about the existence of an underground passage in this place, it is almost impossible to detect.

Thus, in order to find the tunnel, it is necessary either to have accurate intelligence data, because to look for it on the ground, conducting house-to-house searches from house to house.

But even destroying an already discovered tunnel seems to be a difficult task.

Blasting the entrance or ventilation shaft does not affect the main tunnel, and Hamas diggers will be able to quickly dig a bypass and continue to use the tunnel.

Tunnel destruction

Americans faced similar problems of underground warfare during the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Military experts agree that the only analogue to the extensive system of tunnels dug in Gaza can only be the many kilometers of tunnels used by the Viet Cong and North Koreans during the wars in Vietnam and Korea. The only difference from the tunnels built in the Vietnamese jungle is that that the Palestinian tunnels were built of much better quality - using reinforced concrete structures and electrified.

The Americans used gas, water and explosives to smoke out the partisans, but even carpet bombing from the air did not help, since the tunnels were at a depth of 20 meters. Therefore, to destroy tunnels, special sapper units are needed, trained to fight in many meters of earth.

The Americans used special infantry units called “tunnel rats” to search and eliminate tunnels. The soldiers descended underground and engaged in battle with the enemy. They fought heroically, despite the fact that traps awaited them; the tunnel could suddenly end in a cliff, the bottom of which was studded with pointed bamboo sticks.

In the Israeli army, such tasks are usually solved by sapper special forces. Sapper special forces soldiers are trained for underground warfare at a training base that simulates a system of underground tunnels and bunkers. As a rule, soldiers are not allowed to enter such tunnels if they are located in enemy territory. Unless an Israeli soldier is captured.

As one of the commanders of the Israeli sapper special forces, Major S., says: “The main task is to get to the tunnel, study it, collect valuable information and, if there are hostages, free them. We prefer not to enter the tunnels, we want the soldiers to remain outside, but if necessary, we know how to do it."

Underground War

During the fighting in Gaza, the Israeli army encountered almost no resistance to Palestinian militants on the surface - the Palestinians preferred not to engage in open battle with Israeli soldiers. Instead, Palestinian militants preferred surprise attacks from tunnels, where they immediately hid after the attack.

One of the main goals of Palestinian militants was to kidnap Israeli soldiers - alive, wounded or dead - whom they planned to use as hostages for bargaining. There are two known cases where Palestinian militants dragged two corpses of Israeli soldiers underground. On July 26, 2014, to rescue wounded Israeli soldiers who were about to be dragged underground by Palestinian militants, an Israeli artillery battery, contrary to all regulations, set up a “wall of fire” just a few tens of meters from the wounded soldiers to prevent their abduction.

The Palestinians actively used suicide bombers, as well as animals - horses, donkeys, dogs, loaded with explosives. However, the attacks of suicide bombers - humans and animals - were repelled. There is only one known case where the Palestinian ploy worked - a Palestinian boy asked Israeli soldiers to provide medical assistance to his sick mother and transport her to an Israeli hospital. As soon as the Israeli soldiers entered the house in which the supposedly sick “mother” was, an explosion occurred and both the Israeli soldiers and the inhabitants of this house died under the ruins.

Attempts by Palestinian militants to set up ambushes against Israeli tanks in the narrow streets of Gaza also failed. Palestinian militants carried out several launches of Kornet-type anti-tank missiles, but all of them were destroyed on approach by the Meil ​​Ruach active defense missiles equipped with Israeli tanks.

Our troops eliminate a group of "Palestinian" suicide bombers. The suicide bombers entered through the tunnel, their corpses dressed in Israeli military uniforms and hung with explosives.

Perhaps the most difficult task for the Israeli army during the fighting in Gaza was protecting the Palestinian civilian population caught in the middle of the fighting. The battles took place in densely built-up areas, the tunnels had exits to residential buildings, schools, mosques, and hospitals.

The Israeli army inflicted heavy losses on Hamas militants operating from underground tunnels, with minimal harm to Palestinian civilians.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that Palestinian militants used their compatriots as human shields, covering underground tunnels with their bodies. The militants forced women and children onto the roofs of houses, under which there were exits from the tunnels. The Israeli military has discovered at least fifty corpses of Palestinians shot by Hamas militants allegedly for collaborating with Israeli intelligence.

During the fighting, about ten thousand buildings in Gaza were destroyed. Before the start of hostilities, the Israeli military command used various methods to notify the population about upcoming battles:
- leaflets were scattered from airplanes with calls to leave the battlefield and instructions
safe corridors for exiting the combat zone,
- Residents were called by phone and sent SMS messages with instructions about urgent evacuation from the battle zone.
- as a last warning before the attack, a method called “Knock on the roof” was used - an explosive package was dropped on the roof of the building to be destroyed. After the explosion of a safe explosive package on the roof of the building, residents were given enough time to leave the dangerous place. And only after all these warnings did Israeli aviation and artillery launch rocket and fire attacks on the area in which Palestinian militants were hiding.

It must be said that the “underground war” in Gaza was followed with alarm in different countries of the world. It is known that the US and European countries fear the return of thousands of Islamic militants fighting in Syria and Iraq. They will bring with them not only the experience of bloody jihad against infidels, but also methods of waging underground warfare. Russia will become one of the main targets of the “underground war” of Islamic fanatics
.
“Underground terrorism” may become a dangerous weapon of Islamic terrorists operating around the world in the coming years. That’s why today military experts from around the world are arriving in Israel to study on the spot the experience of repelling this threat, paid for with the blood of Israeli soldiers.

Leaders of the victorious states in Potsdam

2. Version officially adopted in the USA:

“North Korean forces - seven divisions, a tank brigade and rear units on June 25, 1950, crossed the border in four columns and moved towards Seoul. The suddenness of the invasion was complete. The invading forces, with a powerful strike, accompanied by loud radio noise calling for "national defense" against the planned "invasion" of the Republic of Korea Army, overcame the scattered pockets of resistance of the forces of the four divisions of the South Korean Army (ARK) operating in the breakout areas. The attackers' goal was to capture Seoul and, ultimately, the entire Korean Peninsula, which would present the world with a fait accompli."

Thus, both sides agree on the start date of the conflict, June 25, 1950, but each determines the initiator at his own discretion.

From point of view international law The clash between North and South in the initial period had the character of an internal armed conflict between different parts of one nation opposing each other.

It is no secret that both the North and the South were preparing for military action. Armed clashes (incidents) on the 38th parallel occurred with varying intensity until June 25, 1950. Sometimes more than a thousand people from each side took part in the battles. Both sides were interested in them, because it increased Soviet and American military and economic assistance to each side, respectively.

It can be argued that even if there was a provocation on the part of Seoul, Pyongyang’s reaction was inadequate and went far beyond the scope of “rebuff” or “punishment.” Consequently, this time a political decision was made to begin military operations along the entire 38th parallel, and the northern troops were prepared for this in advance.

It is absolutely clear that the DPRK, being economically and militarily dependent on the USSR, could not help but coordinate its policy with Moscow. From the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, we can conclude that Kim Il Sung was able to convince J.V. Stalin that the revolutionary situation in the south was ripe and only a push from the North was needed to overthrow Syngman Rhee. Apparently, it was assumed that the Americans, having been “punched on the nose” in China, would not dare to directly intervene in the conflict.

However, the United States still interferes in Korean affairs, radically moving away from the previously chosen strategy of “containing communism” in Asia. Underestimating this turn of events became a major diplomatic miscalculation of the Soviet leadership.

Another version is described by American journalist Irwin Stone: the United States announces the exclusion of South Korea from the list of countries that the United States intends to protect in Asia after it becomes clear in which direction events are beginning to develop. Dean Acheson, who was then US Secretary of State, later said that this ploy was deliberate.

Russian historian Fyodor Lidovets notes another strange fact: the draft resolution condemning aggression from North Korea was prepared by US State Department officials several days before the outbreak of hostilities.

At an emergency session, the UN Security Council (which boycotted this meeting of the USSR, thereby depriving itself of the opportunity to veto its decision) called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of KPA troops to the 38th parallel. US President Harry Truman (founder of the cold war") gave the order to the commander of the American armed forces to Far East General Douglas MacArthur to support the actions of the South Korean army (hereinafter referred to as the “southerners”) and provide air cover. On June 30, a decision was made to use not only air forces, but also ground forces. This decision was supported and made available to the Americans by limited contingents of their armed forces from Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Holland and New Zealand.

Such T-34–85 were transferred to the North Korean army by the Soviet Union

If we discard the propaganda and rhetorical statements of the Americans about “defending freedom and democracy” in Korea from the machinations of the communists, then the reason for the Yankee intervention was the threat of creating a unified Korean state friendly to the Soviet Union. The “loss” of China and Korea automatically created a threat to American interests in Japan. Thus, we can say that the threat of collapse of the entire US Asian policy looms.

What were the armed forces of the countries participating in the war that had begun? initial stage military action?

By the beginning of the war, the DPRK's armed forces consisted of ground forces, air forces and navy. The leadership of all armed forces was carried out by the Ministry of National Defense through the General Staff and the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and branches of the armed forces.

By June 30, 1950, the Armed Forces of the DPRK (hereinafter referred to as “northerners”) numbered 130 thousand people. (according to other sources - 175 thousand) and 1,600 guns and mortars in ten divisions (four of which were at the formation stage), the 105th medium tank brigade (258 T-34 tanks) and the 603rd motorcycle regiment. Most of the infantry formations were equipped with personnel and small arms, the number of artillery weapons was insufficient (50–70%), and the situation with communications equipment was even worse.

The “Northerners” also had 172 combat aircraft of obsolete designs (Il-10 attack aircraft and Yak-9 fighters), although there were only 32 trained pilots (22 attack aircraft pilots and 10 fighter pilots, another 151 people were undergoing flight training). At the beginning of the war, the Navy consisted of 20 ships, of which three were patrol ships (OD-200 project), five G-5 torpedo boats, four minesweepers and several auxiliary ships.

Five Soviet-made G-5 torpedo boats were transferred to the North Koreans

The first stage of the Korean War - the offensive of the “northerners”

These forces were opposed by an army of “southerners” armed mainly with American weapons, which organizationally included ground forces, air forces, naval forces and a territorial army. The ground forces consisted of eight divisions numbering about 100 thousand people. (according to other sources - 93 thousand) and were armed with 840 guns and mortars, 1900 M-9 bazooka rifles and 27 armored vehicles. The air force had 40 aircraft (25 fighters, nine transports and a number of training and communications aircraft). Navy had 71 vessels in service (two submarine hunters, 21 basic minesweepers, five landing ships and a number of other vessels). At the beginning of the war, the Territorial Army consisted of five brigades. In total, including security troops, there were 181 thousand “bayonets” in the South Korean armed forces.

After the defeat of the “southerners” at the first stage of the war, forces under the UN flag, commanded by General MacArthur, also joined the armed struggle: the US 5th Air Force (835 of the latest combat aircraft), the US 7th Fleet (about 300 ships), four infantry US divisions, combined into two army corps, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and five destroyers of the British Navy and ships of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (15 units in total). The military fleet of the “southerners” itself consisted of 79 ships, mostly of small displacement.

The main core of the forces of the “southerners” were American (70%) and South Korean (25%) troops, while the remaining Allied troops made up up to 5% of the armed forces. In the event of direct military intervention by a “third” party (most likely the USSR) on the Japanese Islands, the Americans created another powerful group of ground forces numbering more than 80 thousand people.

The entire Korean War can be divided into four periods:

The first is the beginning of hostilities and the advance of the “northerners” to the so-called Busan bridgehead (June 25 - the first half of September 1950);

The second is the active intervention of American troops, the counter-offensive of the “southerners” almost to the Sino-Korean border (September - October 1950);

The third is the appearance of Chinese people's volunteers at the front, massive supplies of weapons from the USSR, the interception of the strategic initiative by the “northerners”, the liberation of the territory of North Korea (late October 1950 - June 1951);

Fourth - in the context of ongoing sluggish hostilities on the 38th parallel, peace negotiations are underway and a ceasefire agreement is signed on July 27, 1953.

Until the end of August, fortune was clearly on the side of the “northerners”. The “southerners” managed to stop their advance only at the “Busan Perimeter” - along a line along the Naktong River, starting 145 km north of the Tsushima Strait and stretching east to a point 100 km from the Sea of ​​Japan. This area covered the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula with its only port being Busan. In the first month and a half of the war, American and South Korean troops lost about 94 thousand people. killed and captured.

B-29 "Superfortress" - the main strategic bomber of the US Air Force

The M9 Bazooka is an anti-tank rocket rifle that has been in service with the US Army since 1944.

It was at this moment that the air superiority on the part of the “southerners” took its toll. The Air Force of the Far Eastern zone, together with carrier-based aviation (in total, more than 1,200 aircraft of the latest designs), almost completely destroyed the air force of the “northerners” and began massive bombing of supply routes for the army of the “northerners”, providing close support to ground forces. The “Northerners” were forced to suspend their attacks along the perimeter.

B-29s entered combat almost immediately after the war began. When the North Korean armies crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, it became obvious that any counterattack, as the experience of the recently concluded World War II had shown, would have to have massive air support.

The Guam-based 19th Bombardment Squadron (BG) was immediately transferred to Okinawa and on July 7, Major General Emmett O'Donnell created the provisional Bomber Command (FEAF) in Japan.

The second stage of the Korean War - the Incheon-Seoul operation and the general counter-offensive of the “southerners”

US attack aircraft carrier Essex (Essex CV9). The first American aircraft for the ground forces were delivered on the decks of aircraft carriers

This tactical headquarters took control of the 19th BG on July 13, as well as the 22nd and 92nd BGs of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which were assigned that same day to strike North Korean targets. However, it took eight days for the 22nd BG from March AFB (California) and the 92nd BG from Fairchild AFB to arrive in the battle zone and carry out their first raid on the important railroad junction of Wonsan. In July, two additional B-29 air groups arrived from SAC—the 98th BG from Fairchild AFB (Washington) and the 307th BG from MacDill AFB (Florida). The 31st Reconnaissance and Fighter Squadron (SRG) completed the formation of the formation. The 92nd and 98th BGs, together with the 31st SRG, operated from Japan, while the 19th, 22nd, and 307th BGs were based in Okinawa. The first sorties of the "Superfortresses" were directed against tactical targets: concentrations of tanks, troop bivouacs, marching columns, arsenals and field supply depots. Air opposition and anti-aircraft fire were weak.

B-29 "Superfortress" in the skies over Korea

In conditions of strong opposition from the ground, the “southerners” unusually used F-6F Helket fighters. They were stuffed with explosives and used as a guided bomb. After takeoff and activation of the autopilot, the pilot bailed out and left the car, which was further controlled from an aircraft flying nearby.

On September 15, the counter-offensive operation of the “southerners” began. The military genius of General Douglas MacArthur turned a chaotic defense that seemed sure to follow disaster into a brilliant victory. The 8th US Army, with the forces of the 1st Cavalry Division (read “armored”), began to break through the Pusan ​​perimeter. At the same time, a beautiful amphibious landing operation began at Incheon (Chemulpo).

To carry out the landing operation, the 10th Army Corps, numbering 69,450 people, was allocated. 45 thousand people landed directly as part of the landing force. In addition to the Americans, it included a detachment of British “commandos” and a unit of “southerners” marines. En route to the start of the landing operation were the US 3rd Infantry Division, the 187th Regiment of the 11th US Airborne Division and the 17th Regiment of the South Korean Army.

They were opposed by separate units of the Marine Corps and border troops“northerners” numbering about 3 thousand people. In order to disorient the command of the “northerners” regarding the landing area, air strikes were planned and carried out not only in the Inchon area, but also to the south, and demonstration landings were also landed in the Kunsan area.

Inchon - American tank landing ship at the pier after low tide

The American command widely used operational camouflage measures to achieve surprise. For the purpose of misinformation, the press indicated various dates for the start of offensive operations, named deliberately false landing points and lines, etc. To divert the forces of the People's Army from the actual landing area, in the period from August 18 to September 15, 1950, demonstrative tactical landings and reconnaissance landings were landed. sabotage groups in secondary directions. The largest tactical landing (about 700 people) was landed in the Pohang area, but it suffered significant losses and was evacuated.

The American fleet and aircraft attacked areas of the coast convenient for landing. During the 28 days preceding the landing, Navy ships shelled coastal facilities and ports in nine areas. Ten days before the landing ships left the formation ports, American aviation carried out over 5,000 sorties, bombing communications, railway junctions and airfields, mainly in the southwestern part of the country. The landing forces were dispersed across several ports; troops were boarded on transports in Yokohama (Japan) and Busan.

The ships delivering the demonstration landing party carried out intense radio traffic, while the ships of the main landing party maintained radio silence and camouflage discipline throughout the entire sea crossing. The timing of the landing was also chosen correctly (at high tide the depth increased by almost 10 m, which made it possible to use shallows and capes for six hours a day).

On September 15, at dawn, after artillery and air preparation, an advance detachment (a battalion of Marines) landed and captured Wolmi Island, covering the entrance to the port of Incheon. From 14:00 to 17:30, powerful artillery and air preparation was again carried out, after which the first echelon of the 1st Marine Division (two regiments), and then the main landing forces began to land.

The American landing quickly suppressed the resistance and the enemy and launched an attack on Seoul with the aim of cutting off the group of “northerners” in the south of the peninsula. However, the Americans encountered fierce resistance near Seoul and the battle for the city dragged on for several weeks.

By the end of September 16, American troops captured the port and city of Incheon and advanced 4–6 km eastward. They were separated from Seoul by a distance of 20–25 km. They managed to capture Seoul only on September 28, 1950 after fierce fighting. Despite the enormous superiority, the rate of advance did not exceed 4 km per day, and the battles for Seoul lasted about 10 days.

Simultaneously with the landing (September 15), the troops of the 8th American Army from the Pusan ​​bridgehead also went on the offensive. By this time, they numbered 14 infantry divisions and were armed with 500 tanks, over 1,600 guns and mortars.

Cut off from sources of supply by constant air strikes and experiencing pressure both from the front and in the rear (landing in Incheon), the troops of the “northerners” practically lost their combat effectiveness, and only thanks to the protracted battles for Seoul, Marshal Cho Yong Gun managed to withdraw most of the troops from south.

MiG-15. Preparing for departure

By October 1, the troops of the “northerners” retreated beyond the 38th parallel. According to the Americans, the US armed forces lost about 12 thousand military personnel in this operation, and they themselves captured up to 125 thousand prisoners and a large amount of North Korean military equipment.

By joint decision taken by the UN Security Council and US President Harry Truman, General Douglas MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel. The only restriction that was imposed on the actions of the Americans concerned the Air Force - it was a ban on operations in the north beyond the Yalu River (Amnonkan), i.e. over the territory of China.

The offensive of the “southerners” was successful, and the “northerners” were especially annoyed by aviation. In fact, any movement of troops during the day was impossible; attack aircraft were chasing every car on the road, and sometimes even single people.

M47 Patton II - the main battle tank of the US Army during the Korean War F2H-2 "Banshee" - a carrier-based fighter of the US Navy during the early Korean War, often used as an attack aircraft

The capital of North Korea (Pyongyang) was taken on October 20, and then (by November 24) units of the 6th South Korean Division reached the border with China (Yalu River) near the city of Chosan.

In connection with the crossing of the 38th parallel by the Americans, the USSR government decides to form the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps of the Soviet Air Force on the territory of the People's Republic of China, consisting of three fighter aviation divisions, one night fighter regiment, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, one anti-aircraft searchlight regiment and one aviation - technical division. The corps consisted of 844 officers, 1,153 sergeants and 1,274 soldiers.

The MiG-15UTI is the main fighter of the 64th Air Corps in the skies of Korea. In the photo - a training "spark" with Soviet identification marks

Battleship Iowa fires at ground targets during the Korean War

The combat strength of the corps was not constant during the fighting. It was formed, as a rule, on the basis of air force units of military districts and air defense districts located on the territory of the USSR. The change of units and formations occurred on average after 8–14 months of participation in battles (in total, 12 fighter aviation divisions, two separate fighter aviation regiments, two fighter aviation regiments from the Air Force, Navy, etc. passed through Korea).

The air corps administration was located in the city of Mukden, and aviation units were based at the airfields of the Chinese cities of Mukden, Anshan and Andong. By the end of the war, the corps control was based in Andong, and its divisions were at the airfields of Andong, Anshan and Miaogou.

Soviet internationalist soldiers were dressed in PLA flight uniforms and did not have any documents. An order was conveyed to each of them: if the pilot was shot down, then when attempting to capture the sixteenth cartridge, he must keep the sixteenth cartridge for himself. This is how the pilot of the 196th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Evgeny Stelmakh, died, who, after ejection, was attempted to be captured by saboteurs from the US special operations forces.

The third stage of the Korean War - the transition of the Chinese People's Volunteers to the offensive

Simultaneously with the formation of the 64th Fighter Air Corps, the Soviet leadership is considering the issue of carrying out acts of sabotage by the Soviet station (the group of the “Latin American businessman” Colonel Filonenko, who legally operated in the United States under the legend of a Czech emigrant, and Kurt Wiesel, an emigrant of German origin who worked as a leading engineer at a shipbuilding plant ) in ports and naval bases of the US Navy. To help the militants of Filonenko and Wiesel, demolition specialists were transferred from Latin America to the United States, who were ready to assemble mine-explosive devices on the ground. But the order for combat use never came; the demolition officers returned to the Soviet Union.

Along with the intensification of Soviet military assistance to North Korea, the PRC government decides to allow Chinese people's volunteers to participate in hostilities on the land front (according to various estimates, over two and a half years of hostilities, up to 3 million Chinese “volunteers” in uniform and with standard PLA weapons).

On November 25, 1950, the American 8th Army, which had been advancing forward for 24 hours and almost unopposed, was suddenly stopped by an attack on the right flank. Chinese units numbering about 180 thousand people. (i.e., about 18 divisions according to the peacetime PLA states) broke through the front in the sector of the 2nd South Korean Corps and created a threat of encirclement of the entire 8th Army of the “southerners”. Another 120 thousand Chinese volunteers began an offensive to the east, on both banks of the Chasan Reservoir, against the 3rd and 7th South Korean divisions, threatening to encircle the 1st US Marine Division.

The actions of the “northerners” were covered from the air by Soviet internationalist soldiers of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, which consisted of 189 MiG-15 and 20 La-11 aircraft. From the very first days, fierce air battles broke out.

F-80A “Shooting Star” - when entering into confrontation with the “Bassoons” (as the MiG-15 was called according to NATO classification), it showed itself to be a completely outdated machine

Our pilots - veterans of World War II - were up against equally experienced aces, but the number of American Air Forces over the battlefields far outnumbered the number of Soviet aircraft. Total number US aviation in the Far East at that time amounted to up to 1,650 aircraft, of which: bombers - more than 200, fighters - up to 600, reconnaissance aircraft - up to 100, and naval aviation of various types - up to 800 aircraft.

The Southerners used the following main types of aircraft when raiding targets in North Korea: B-26 Invader medium bombers, B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers, F-51 Mustang and F-80 Shooting Star fighter-bombers. ", F-84 Thunderjet and F-86 Saberjet fighters.

Thus, we can say that the Americans still retained air superiority, but there was no longer any need to talk about undivided air supremacy. The air division of Ivan Kozhedub was one of the first to fight in the skies of Korea (he himself was not allowed into battle). The best results in terms of downed aircraft were achieved by: Evgeny Pepelyaev and Ivan Sutyagin - 23 victories each; Lev Shchukin and Alexander Smorchkov each shot down 15 planes; Dmitry Oskin and Mikhail Ponomarev each shot down 14 American planes.

Air battle between a Saber and a MiG over the Yalu River - the MiG already has “alien” (North Korean) identification marks

The MiG-15 and F-86 Saber are representatives of the first generation of jet fighters, differing little in their combat capabilities. Our plane was two and a half tons lighter (take-off weight 5044 kg), but the “heaviness” of the F-86 was compensated by greater engine thrust (4090 kg versus 2700 kg for the MiG). Their thrust-to-weight ratio was almost the same - 0.54 and 0.53, as was the maximum speed at the ground - 1100 km/h.

At high altitudes, the MiG-15 gained an advantage in acceleration and rate of climb, while the Saber maneuvered better at low altitudes. It could also stay in the air longer, having 1.5 tons of “extra” fuel.

Due to the “southerners’” reliance on technical means of warfare (dependence on artillery support, tanks and road transport), the Americans and their allies turned out to be quite rigidly tied to the existing road system.

The Chinese units - lightly armed, quickly maneuvered, secretly passed through difficult terrain and therefore appeared, from the American point of view, suddenly, like a “jack in the box” - compensated for the lack of heavy weapons with all this. They moved and attacked mainly at night, and during the day they camouflaged and rested.

North Korean soldiers in a trench. In the middle ground is a heavy-caliber machine gun DShK

A frontal attack ensured the Chinese success when carrying out a large number of attacks with small forces. Most often, Chinese volunteers used infiltration, ambushes and encirclement, with the expectation of going deep into great distances. Each battle began with a series of small skirmishes with small forces.

It was a war of platoon commanders. The Americans were never able to fully realize their advantage in firepower. During the first phase of the winter offensive of the “northerners,” the “southerners” lost 36 thousand soldiers and officers, of which more than 24 thousand were Americans.

The offensive of 400 thousand Chinese volunteers and 100 thousand soldiers of the North Korean army, who had undergone reorganization, continued until January 25. The battered American units and almost completely demoralized South Korean troops (a total of about 200 thousand people), barely avoiding encirclement, retreated beyond the 38th parallel and again left the capital of South Korea, Seoul, to the “northerners.” Troop positions stabilized approximately 50 km south of the 38th parallel - from Pyeong-taek on the west coast to Samcheok on the east (by January 15).

Jeep 4x4. Used as a means of delivering heavy weapons to infantry and conducting sabotage operations and close-in reconnaissance

South Korean and American military personnel often used captured weapons: a soldier in the second row has a PPSh-41 on his chest

At the end of January 1951, the “southerners” attacked again, and on March 14, Seoul changed hands for the fourth time. By March 31, the front line again reached the 38th parallel. At this time, the commander of the UN forces, General Douglas MacArthur, realizing that it was impossible to win by conventional means, began to advocate for the limited use of nuclear weapons and subsequently for a land invasion of China to destroy the bases of the “northerners” in Manchuria. MacArthur was confident that the Soviet Union would not risk entering the war by coming to the aid of China, but if the USSR did decide to take this step, then the United States would not have a more favorable moment, given its absolute superiority in nuclear weapons, to carry out its plans in regarding the Kremlin.

Without consulting Washington, MacArthur invited the Chinese commander-in-chief in Korea to capitulate (March 25, 1951) and made it clear to him that, if hostilities continued, the United States would not hesitate to fire from the sea, air bombardment, or even invade the territory itself. China.

Despite the fact that on April 11, 1951, General MacArthur was relieved of his post by decision of US President Harry Truman, his successor, Lieutenant General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, decided to try to disrupt the communications system of the “northerners” with air raids of “Superfortresses”, while simultaneously continuing offensive operation(albeit with limited goals).

On April 12, 1951, 48 B-29 Superfortresses, under cover of 80 F-84 Thunderjet and F-80 Shuting Star jet fighters, prepared to strike a hydroelectric power station on the Yalu River and the Andong Bridge. The destruction of these objects was supposed to contribute to the disruption of communication lines. If on that day the Americans had destroyed the crossings through which flows of goods and troops flowed from China to the front, then the destruction of the North Korean army would have been almost inevitable, and the Americans and their allies would have taken control of the entire territory of Korea.

At 8 a.m., the radars of the 64th Air Corps detected numerous air targets. The enemy's battle formations were echeloned, the bomber planes were in formations of four aircraft, each in a diamond formation. The units were united into detachments that went to the specified targets from various directions.

The picture of this air battle, which entered the annals of world military history, is recreated in the book by V. P. Naboki, “Soviet pilots defending the skies of China and Korea. 1950–1951.”

F-84G. One of the surviving Thunderjets

On this day, soldiers of the 64th Corps destroyed ten “Superfortresses” and two F-80 fighters, heavily damaging another dozen B-29s. At the same time, Soviet pilots did not lose a single aircraft. Then the Yankees will call this day “Black Thursday.” The battle was won - the crossings held, despite the fact that several B-29s managed to drop their cargo with precision.

In this battle, the eight MiG-15 under the command of the guard captain Sheberstov stood out the most: the commander himself and the pilots Ges, Subbotin, Suchkov, Milaushkin chalked up victories. In addition to the pilots of Sheberstov’s “Superfortress” group, pilots Plitkin, Obraztsov, Nazarkin, Kochegarov and Shebonov were also shot down. Kramarenko and Fukin shot down one F-80 each.

The Americans stopped bomber flights for a week and developed new tactics. The main striking force during the day was attack aircraft, for which the F-80 and F-84 were primarily used, since in the role of fighters they were significantly inferior to the MiGs of the “northerners”. The main fighter was the F-86 Saberjet. Bombers began to be used mainly for operations at night and in difficult weather conditions.

F-86F "Saber" - becomes the main fighter for the Americans and competes on equal terms with MiGs

The hijacking of the plane led to the fact that only a few units of the latest MiG-17 fighters were sent to Korea, although our pilots repeatedly asked for this in order to more effectively fight the improved Sabers.

The “northerners” conducted a similar hunt for the new Yankee F-86 Saberjet jet fighter, and we were less fortunate - the damaged Saber made an emergency landing on October 6, 1951 in shallow water after Yevgeny Pepelyaev damaged its engine and catapult. The pilot was evacuated by a rescue helicopter, but the plane went to us and was flown through China to Moscow. Another Saberjet was captured on May 13, 1952, after it was shot down by anti-aircraft gunners of the 64th Corps and landed in China.

We never got the whole plane in Korea, despite the fact that a special group of “Nord” aces of 12 pilots was created under the leadership of Major General of Aviation Blagoveshchensky. The group made ten combat missions, tried to take the Saber into the “box” (based on the experience of World War II), but, having suffered losses, never completed the task.

MiG-17PF (“Fresco-S” - according to NATO classification) - had better flight characteristics and a new set of on-board equipment

The MiG-15 turned out to be a very durable machine: after one of the battles on the plane of Senior Lieutenant Georgy Oleinik, the technician counted 61 holes, but the machine was repaired and returned to service (according to statistics, 2/3 of MiGs were repaired after damage in battle and returned to service).

Our pilots carried out the second defeat of the “fortresses” on October 30, 1951. Twelve B-29s and four F-84 fighters were “overwhelmed” at once near the Yalu River, losing only one MiG-15.

During air battles, Soviet pilots from November 1950 to January 1952 shot down 564 southern aircraft, of which: 48 - B-29, 1 - B-26, 2 - RB-45, 2 - F-47, 20 - F-51, 103 - F-80, 132 - F-84, 216 - F-86, 8 - F-94, 25 - Meteor, 3 - F-6 and F-5. In the night battles, two B-26 aircraft were shot down.

The main infantry weapon of the “northerners” is the PPSh-41

The F-84G Thunderjet is the latest straight-wing jet. The picture shows a fighter aircraft mounted on European theater to counter the Soviet Air Force

During this period, Soviet pilots lost 71 aircraft and 34 pilots. The overall ratio is 7.9:1 in favor of Soviet pilots.

In the spring of 1952, B-29s continued to hit bridges, dropping their payloads from heights of 1,500–2,500 m onto bridges up to 2.5 m wide. Despite difficult conditions, 143 hits were recorded during May alone, when ten bridges were destroyed 66 spans. The neutralization of airfields continued, and over 400 sorties were flown against North Korean airfields south of the Yalu River. During the summer and fall of 1952, targets changed and raids were carried out against bridges, supply centers, hydroelectric power plants and factories. By the late spring of 1953, the emphasis was again on bridges and airfields. There had to be a 12-hour period between the signing of the armistice agreement and its entry into force; this could allow the "northerners" to move big number aircraft to ten main North Korean airfields.

“Superfortresses” returned to their airfields in this form

US Bomber Command's goal was to keep these airfields inoperable, and until the end of the war B-29s raided them night after night. On the very last day of the war, B-29s raided Saamcham and Teechon airfields. On July 27, 1953, 7 hours before the ceasefire, at 15.03 an RB-29 reconnaissance aircraft from the 91st SRG returned from a flight. The crew's report noted that all target airfields designated by Bomber Command were unsuitable for combat. Thus the “Superfortresses” ended their combat career.

All these events in the air took place against the backdrop of negotiations that began at the initiative of the USSR in Panmunjong and ongoing military operations along the entire front, albeit of a limited nature. The result of these local battles were only rivers of blood flowing from both sides.

To increase the stability of the defense, the American command began to widely use napalm, bazooka-type anti-tank rifles, and indirect tank fire to reinforce artillery fire.

At this point, General Ridgway was forced to admit: “We have become convinced that air and naval forces alone cannot win the war and that a small ground force cannot achieve victory either.”

Both the “northerners” and the “southerners” continued to increase their strength. By the end of 1952, the forces of the “northerners” reached (according to American estimates) 800 thousand bayonets. Three quarters of them were Chinese "volunteers". Artillery systems, including 57 mm radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, arrived in large quantities from the Soviet Union. The saturation of the border line with China with these guns led to the appearance of an order prohibiting Southern pilots from crossing the 50th parallel.

According to the Americans, out of almost 4,000 lost aircraft, the Yankees lost 1,213 aircraft from air defense fire. In general, air superiority over the battlefield remained with the Americans. The “southerners” also retained superiority in technology: the M48 Patton fought against several dozen T-34–85 tanks, the only successful English tank, the A41 Centurion, took part in battles for the first time, and a 155-mm tracked self-propelled tank also appeared on the battlefield for the first time high-power gun M40 “Long Tom” (the main gun supplied to the “northerners” was the obsolete SU-76, which P. A. Rotmistrov called a “spoiled tank” in 1944, and our tankers called a “bitch”) and etc.

SU-76 - self-propelled gun from the Great Patriotic War, supplied to Korea in the largest quantities (among artillery systems)

M40 “Long Tom” - a powerful 155-mm cannon on the chassis of the M4 Sherman tank, proved to be a wonderful weapon in Korea

Taking into account the above, one can consider the tactics of the infantry units of the “northerners” to be logical: during the daytime, the “northerners” almost did not conduct combat operations; the personnel were holed up in bunkers and other underground structures. At night, as before, the “northerners” attacked in small groups, sometimes with the support of tanks, trying to penetrate the enemy’s location. Attacks that were fierce at night usually weakened or even stopped during the day.

Anti-tank weapons were mainly located along roads and valleys, echeloned in depth, creating a kind of corridor in which tanks that broke through were destroyed by flanking fire.

To combat enemy attack aircraft, small arms (mounted and light machine guns, anti-tank rifles) were widely used, and shooters were involved - hunters of enemy aircraft.

Fierce fighting also took place in the air, over the so-called “Fighter Alley”, northwest of Pyongyang. During 1952, Soviet “volunteer” pilots shot down 394 enemy aircraft, of which: 8 - F-51, 13 - F-80, 41 - F-84, 315 - F-86, 1 - Meteor and 1 - F4. In night battles, 11 B-29s, 3 B-26s and 1 F-94 were shot down. The losses of our 64th Fighter Wing amounted to 172 aircraft and 51 pilots. Overall loss ratio 2.2:1 in favor Soviet pilots.

The main feature of the actions of the American Air Force during this period can be called the creation of an entire emergency rescue service for the evacuation of downed pilots from the territory occupied by the “northerners” using a fundamentally new means - helicopters. During the conflict, the rescue service of the 5th Air Army alone assisted more than 1,000 people. flight personnel of downed aircraft (this does not include pilots of the bomber force, naval aviation, ground forces and marine corps).

It was to capture such a rescue service helicopter that a special operation was developed in the Genzan area on February 7, 1952, carried out under the leadership of military advisers Colonels A. Glukhov and L. Smirnov. Based on the results of the successful operation, they were awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner, respectively.

B-29 “Superfortres” - a strategic bomber from the end of World War II, produced in the USSR under the Tu-4 brand. Pictured is the Enola Gay plane that launched a nuclear attack on Hiroshima.

The main small arms of the “southerners”, a direct descendant of the American rifle from the First World War M1 “Garand” - the M14 automatic rifle

The fighting continued with varying success until March 28, 1953, when North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung and the commander of the Chinese “volunteers” General Peng Dehuai, after the death of J.V. Stalin (March 5), agreed to continue negotiations on the exchange prisoners and a truce. South Korean President Syngman Rhee initially categorically refused to participate in negotiations that would confirm the division of the country, but after massive attacks on South Korean units by Chinese People's Volunteer units and the American threat to withdraw their troops, he soon agreed to take part in the negotiation process.

On July 27, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed in Panmunzhong. The front line that existed at that time was recognized as the de facto border.

The Korean War cost the “southerners” 118,515 people. killed and 264,591 wounded, 92,987 military personnel were captured. The losses of the United States in this war are 33,629 people. killed, 103,284 wounded and 10,218 captured. The losses of the “northerners” in this war (according to American estimates) reach at least 1,600 thousand people, of which up to 60% are Chinese volunteers.

According to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Soviet pilots of the 64th Fighter Air Corps, flying MiG-15s, shot down 1,106 enemy aircraft from November 24, 1950 to July 27, 1953. Another 212 aircraft were shot down by corps anti-aircraft artillery fire. Only 262 American pilots were captured by the “northerners”. The losses of the Soviet “volunteers” amounted to 335 aircraft and 120 pilots. North Korean and Chinese pilots shot down 271 Southern aircraft, losing 231 of their own.

It is also necessary to reveal the causes of combat losses. Note that more than half of the 335 MiG-15s shot down were left safely by the pilots. Almost all of them returned to duty and spoke with respect about the reliability and simplicity of the MiG-15 ejection system.

A large share of the losses incurred are during landing. The first line airfields (Andong, Dapu, Miaogou) were located close to the sea, and MiG-15s were prohibited from landing from the sea. That’s where the Sabers were concentrated with a special mission: to attack MiGs over the airfield. On the landing line, the plane was with its landing gear and flaps extended, that is, it was not ready to repel the attack or evade it. The quality of equipment and the level of training of the pilot did not matter in this forced situation.

Most of the vehicles shot down directly in battles are loners, “lost the ranks” and deprived of support. Statistics also show that 50% of flight personnel losses were incurred in the first ten sorties. Survivability is thus closely related to the pilot's experience.

Single machine gun of the US Armed Forces - M60, one of the most successful designs

The total irretrievable losses of our units and formations amounted to 315 people, of which 168 officers, 147 soldiers and sergeants. Almost all the dead and deceased Soviet soldiers were buried in the Russian cemetery of Port Arthur (Lüshun), next to the Russian soldiers who fell in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.

According to American analytical data, the number of total losses (including non-combat) of the “southerners” amounted to about 2,000 Air Force aircraft, 1,200 aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps, and the losses of ground forces aviation amounted to several hundred light aircraft. The best American aces Korean War captains Joseph McConnell and James Jabara shot down 16 and 15 Fagots (MiG-15s), respectively.

At the same time, the best Soviet aces Evgeny Pepelyaev and Ivan Sutyagin achieved a result of 23 victories each, Alexander Smorchkov and Lev Shchukin chalked up 15 victories each, Mikhail Ponomarev and Dmitry Oskin “caught up” 14 American planes (according to other information, Oskin also shot down 15 Southern aircraft). Another amazing fact - Anatoly Karelin shot down six (!!!) B-29 “Superfortresses” in night battles!

Armored car BA-64. Such vehicles were transferred to the PLA army of North Korea

The first Centurion (Centurion Mk3), delivered to the USSR from Korea in 1952, was burnt out due to the detonation of ammunition; we would receive it intact only in 1972 (model Mk9)

For the successful completion of a government task, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 3,504 military personnel of the corps were awarded orders and medals, and 22 pilots received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

So, we can say that the Korean War was a significant event from many points of view. In this war, the Americans’ hopes for the heavy four-engine B-29 (“heroes” of the burning of Tokyo and the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) as a means of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of the USSR collapsed. And although nuclear weapons were not used, the threat of using an atomic bomb was constantly in the air and prevented both sides from taking full advantage of the successes achieved.

In this war, technical superiority, the advantage of fire weapons moving on roads, turned out to be crossed out by automatic fire from small arms, the actions of individuals and small units, off-road conditions and difficult terrain.

Neither side, despite the enormous amounts of money spent, achieved its political goals, and the peninsula remained divided into two independent states.

Currently, an American military contingent of up to 37 thousand people is stationed on the territory of South Korea, but in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, the US government is ready to deploy here a total of up to 690 thousand of its military personnel, 160 warships, including aircraft carriers, and also 1,600 combat aircraft.

Notes:

15 developing countries have ballistic missiles in service, and another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 countries.

6o12.7 Colt-Browning machine guns, but the F-86 had a radar sight, which the MiGs did not have, and an ammunition capacity of 1800 rounds.

This aircraft (tail number 2057) is now located at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington.

Ridgway M. Soldier. - M., 1958. P. 296.

Soldier of fortune. - 2001., No. 1. P. 19.

You can take photographs in the demilitarized zone between North and South. But not all soldiers like it

“I couldn’t believe my eyes when I saw these photos taken with a hidden camera: a perfect four-lane highway with constant lighting, which ultimately ends up in a huge airplane hangar,” Seoul journalist Sun (who asks not to give her last name), expressively gesturing, shares with The New Times with the latest information from North Korean defectors and South Korean intelligence sources. According to her, an underground 8-kilometer highway connects the Kumsusan memorial complex, where the bodies of the deceased North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il are buried, and Pyongyang Sunan International Airport. In addition, a one and a half kilometer branch runs from the main route to an underground square, where you can also go down using special secret elevators equipped not far from the Pyongyang Zoo. “This underground arena has been compared in size to Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square, the largest in North Korea, capable of accommodating up to 100,000 people,” says Sun. - It was built in case of nuclear and conventional war - to accommodate people and military equipment. There is a fully equipped command post, with 10-ton trucks at the ready, including old Soviet ZILs and Japanese Isuzus.

Grass underground

According to Sun, reliable information about these two objects - the square and the Kumsusan - Sunan road - appeared only at the end of last year, no one knew about them before, while the first information about the secret underground infrastructure of the most closed state in the world leaked to the West in 1997. Then their source was the highest-ranking North Korean defector to South Korea, former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Hwang Chang Yop. He said that before his escape, he managed to visit secret underground passages connected to the Pyongyang metro. There are secret entrances to these catacombs - so that they can be used in case of emergency - in schools, hospitals, hotels, and important civilian sites.

In the 2000s (and later), Yop’s information grew with information from other defectors. In 2011, one of them, a former apparatchik of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), said that you can get anywhere from Pyongyang through underground passages. For example, one of the tunnels, more than 100 kilometers long, leads from the capital to the Hyangsan-gun region of Pyongyang province.

„

You can get anywhere from Pyongyang via underground passages

”

Another tunnel leads from the capital to the city of Pyeongsong, 40 kilometers from Pyongyang, and a separate branch of the tunnel connects the capital with the residence of the current leader of the DPRK Kim Jong-un in Myohansan, Pyongyang Province. However, the Pyongyang-Pyongsong tunnel has been known since the time of the escape of Hwang Chang Yop, who said that he saw a spring with drinking water and green grass underground.

Two underground passages to the east and west of Pyongyang - each 40 kilometers long - lead to the port of Nampo and to the leader’s summer residence in Gangdong-gun: it was here, according to Kim Jong Il’s order, that the commander-in-chief and the general staff were to move in the event of a threat to the capital. Measures have also been taken in case of further retreat: the residence of Gangdong-gun is connected by a direct tunnel to the port of Nampo on the coast of the Yellow Sea, where the personal submarine of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the WPK and the Chairman of the DPRK Defense Committee is moored*.

From another summer residence of the North Korean leaders - in Changseong - an underground tunnel was built under the bed of the Amnokkan River, which leads to the territory of neighboring China. Thus, if necessary, the North Korean leader can be on Chinese territory in just a couple of hours, without resorting to either rail or air transport**.

If tomorrow there is war

In addition to underground escape routes in case of an unforeseen turn of events, the DPRK leaders also took care of military tunnels, through which the rapid transfer of troops to the south of the peninsula should be ensured in the event of a war with Seoul. The South Korean military has already discovered 17 such tunnels, some of them located directly under the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas.

The same Hwang Chang Yop also spoke about the system of secret metro lines in Pyongyang - in addition to two lines open to the general public. By the way, the first stations of the “official” metro were opened in 1973, they were located at a depth of 100-150 meters: just like in Moscow, they were built with the expectation of a possible war, only adjusted for nuclear weapons: metro stations in Pyongyang are equipped three-layer blast-proof doors.

According to some evidence, the Pyongyang metro is connected to a top-secret underground bunker from which the DPRK leadership intended to wage a nuclear war with the West. “A recent defector from construction unit No. 583 reported that starting in 1991, after the American bombing of Iraq (as part of Operation Desert Storm. - The New Times) and in anticipation of an inevitable war with the United States, the DPRK intensified the construction of “underground airstrips.” “landing strips and underground naval bases,” as well as other military installations,” Joseph Bodansky, former head (1988-2004) of the US Congressional Task Force on Counterterrorism, wrote in his book “Crisis in Korea.” “The DPRK has also completed the construction of a new command post for operational control in wartime.” According to Bodanski, the bunker, equipped for 5 thousand people, is located at a depth of about 100 meters under the Sosong district in Pyongyang.

The Pyongyang metro is one of the deepest in the world and also serves as a bomb shelter. The author of the photo was asked to remove this photo: taking pictures of the tunnels is prohibited

Path to freedom

Strangely enough, the underground roads built specifically for the leaders of the DPRK are also actively used by North Korean defectors. Thus, American journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick in her book “Escape from North Korea” writes about an underground railway line crossing China from the northeast to the southwest. More precisely, the underground road connects one of the settlements in the northeast of China and Kunming, the capital of the southwestern province of Yunnan, bordering Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. It was built, according to Kirkpatrick, most likely specifically for Kim Jong Il, who traveled exclusively by train. His foreign routes were not varied; they all led to neighbors: either China or Russia. The subway was designed to ensure the safety of the leader during his visits to the PRC. However, it was not possible to completely classify its existence - it was with its help that several dozen North Koreans managed to get through China to third countries. Moreover, Chinese human rights activists, in order to help fugitives from the DPRK, allegedly even equipped the subway with a network of hidden shelters and exits to the surface.

Reverend Timothy Peters, an American missionary and human rights activist who founded the NGO Helping Hands Korea in 1996, also wrote about the “secret underground road” that helps North Koreans escape the country. Peters personally worked as an activist on the Underground Railroad, helping North Korean fugitives gain a foothold in China or escape to a third country.

However, the main method of escape remains by land - through the shallow and narrow Tumangan (Tumannaya) River, the natural border between the PRC and the DPRK. The 17-kilometer Russian-North Korean border runs in the lower reaches of the same river. But the North Koreans are fleeing mainly through the Chinese part of the border: the Russian part is better guarded, and there is no large North Korean diaspora in Russia on whose help and support one could count. In winter, Tumangan is crossed on foot on the ice, in summer - by swimming. It was through Tumangan that tens of thousands of North Koreans fled to China during the 1995-1999 famine.

Once in China, men most often get jobs on construction sites, earning tens of times more than at home - about $90 a month, women become waitresses for $50, many marry Chinese, fortunately this is the safest way to stay in China** *. The average salary in North Korea in dollar terms is only $5-6 per month.

For fear of being caught and deported to their homeland, defectors try not to linger in the Middle Kingdom and strive by any means to get to the USA, Great Britain or South Korea, where they automatically receive citizenship, a one-time cash subsidy for settling in (many of them give part of this amount to brokers) and undergo six-month integration course. However, it doesn’t help everyone.

“I have friends who fled here from the North,” says Seoul journalist Sun. “They are radio engineers by profession, they have been living in Seoul for seven years, but they are still afraid to use mobile phones and credit cards. Their past life does not let them go. And he will never let go."