Local militia. Local and Streltsy army. Peter's reforms before the start of the Northern War

The Army and the Revolution The uprising in Sevastopol is growing (61). The matter is nearing its end. Sailors and soldiers fighting for freedom eliminate their superiors. The order is maintained completely. The government is unable to repeat the vile trick of Kronstadt, it is unable to call

In the second half of the 17th century, Russia experienced economic growth. This became a prerequisite for the creation of a powerful army and navy. But by the beginning of the war with Sweden, Russia did not have a single military system. The army consisted of branches of troops created in different eras: local noble cavalry (heir to feudal squads), streltsy army (created under Ivan the Terrible), regiments of the “foreign system” - soldiers, reiters, dragoons (created in the 17th century). Plus various irregular units, including Cossacks. In wartime, warriors, military men, were also recruited for service. They were recruited from the tax population (tax-paying people who bore a set of duties - taxes). They helped the gunners, served in the convoy, participated in the creation of fortifications, camps, etc. The fleet was only in the Sea of ​​​​Azov.

Local cavalry convened only at the beginning of the war. With the end of the war, people returned home. The weapons were the most varied; the rich boyars, nobles, and their servants were better armed. In such detachments there was poor organization, management, discipline, and supplies. Servants of nobles and boyars could generally be untrained in military affairs. It is clear that the noble cavalry could effectively fight the hordes of nomads on the southeastern borders of Russia, but it could no longer resist the regular armies of Europe. In addition, some of the boyars and nobles had poor motivation; they wanted to quickly return home to their farm. Some did not show up for duty at all, or were “late.” The combat importance of the many thousands of noble troops was sharply reduced by the increasing role of firearms, increasing their effectiveness and rate of fire. The cavalry could not withstand the massive gun and weapon fire. The infantry became more important than the knightly and noble cavalry. The importance of infantry and the decline in the importance of noble cavalry were noticeable in Russia already in the 17th century (in the West even earlier).

By 1680, the local cavalry of the centenary service, together with serfs, made up only approximately 17.5% of all Russian armed forces (about 16 thousand people). Peter eliminated the local army already during the war with Sweden. Although at the initial stage of the Great Northern War, the noble cavalry, under the leadership of B.P. Sheremetev, inflicted a number of defeats on the Swedish forces. Although it is known that several regiments fought after the Battle of Narva. Most of the boyars and nobles from the local cavalry were transferred to dragoon and guards regiments, many of them became officers of the regular army.

Sagittarius were a more modern army. They carried out constant service and underwent some training. In peacetime, the archers carried out city service - they guarded the royal court, the king during his trips, were engaged in guard duty in Moscow and a number of other cities, and became messengers. In their free time from war and service, they were engaged in crafts, trade, arable farming, and gardening, since the royal salary could not fully meet the needs of the servicemen and their families. The Streletsky army had an organization - it was controlled by the Streletsky order. He was in charge of appointments, payment of salaries, and supervised military training. Throughout the 17th century, regular combat skills were introduced into the rifle regiments.

The combat effectiveness of the Streltsy was highly appreciated by contemporaries, who believed that the main force in the Russian army was the infantry. Strelets regiments were widely used in various wars, participating both in the defense of fortresses and in long-distance campaigns (for example, the Chigirin campaigns of 1677-1678). But gradually their role began to decline; they were strongly tied to their daily activities, the life of the townspeople (the majority were close in status to the lower classes of the townsfolk population). As a result, in a number of uprisings of the 17th century, their “shakyness” - political unreliability - was revealed; the archers were ready to support those who offered more. In the uprisings of 1682 and 1698, the Streltsy became the main driving force. As a result, the growing royal power began to think about eliminating this social layer. After the Streltsy revolt of 1682 (Khovanshchina), Tsarevna Sofya Alekseevna ordered the disbandment of 11 of the 19 Moscow Streltsy regiments. Several thousand people were settled in different cities. Peter I, after suppressing the uprising of 1698, completed this process. It should be noted that a significant part of the cadres of the Streltsy army joined the emerging regular army. And the city archers survived the era of Peter.

Russian artillery, “cannon outfit”, was formed like the Streltsy regiments. Gunners received cash and grain salaries, or a land allotment for their service. The service was hereditary. In peacetime, they served in the garrisons of cities and fortresses. In their free time from service, gunners could engage in trade and craft. All Russian artillery in the 17th century was divided into siege and fortress weapons (“city outfit”), light and heavy field artillery (“regimental outfit”). The gunners were controlled by the Pushkarsky Prikaz (a military command body created under Ivan the Terrible). The order was in charge of recruiting people for service, their salaries, promotion or demotion, sending to war, etc. In 1701, the Pushkar order was transformed into an artillery order, and in 1709 - into an artillery office.

A practical guide for gunners was the “Charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science” by Anisim Mikhailov Radyshevsky (dated 1621). It must be said that Russian artillery masters at that time practically solved the problem of creating rifled and breech-loading guns, far ahead of the level of technical development of that time. At the end of the 17th century, there was a tendency to replace old guns with more advanced ones and to unify the types and calibers. By the beginning of the war, Russian artillery (very numerous) had the same disadvantages as the artillery of Western countries - a lot of different types, calibers, the guns were heavy, slow-moving, and had a low rate of fire and range. The troops had many guns of old designs.

Regiments of the “foreign system”. In 1681, in Russia there were 33 soldier (61 thousand people) and 25 dragoon and reiter regiments (29 thousand people). At the end of the 17th century, they made up over half of all the country's armed forces and at the beginning of the 18th century they were used to form the regular Russian army. Units of the “foreign system” began to be formed back in the Time of Troubles by Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky. The second organization of regiments of the “foreign system” was carried out in the early 1630s, preparing for the war for Smolensk. At the end of the 1630s they were used to guard the southern borders; during the Russian-Polish War of 1654-1667, regiments of the new system became the main part of the Russian armed forces. The regiments were created from “willing” free people (volunteers), Cossacks, foreigners, “streltsy children” and other social groups. Later and from the Danish people on the model (organization, training) of Western European armies. People served for life. Soldiers were taken from 100 households, and subsequently from 20-25 households. Every year and monthly they were given cash and grain salaries or a land allotment. The reitar regiments were staffed not only from datnik people, but also from small estates, non-placeless nobles and children of boyars. For their service they also received cash salaries, and some received estates. The soldier regiments were infantry, reitar and dragoon cavalry. The dragoons were armed with muskets, swords, reeds and short pikes and could fight on foot. The reitars relied on pistols (there were several of them), unlike the dragoons, the reitars, as a rule, did not dismount, but fired directly from the horse, edged weapons were auxiliary. During the Russian-Polish wars, mounted spearmen - hussars - emerged from the reitar.

It must be said that, unlike the regiments of the Western armies of that period, which were recruited from mercenaries of different nationalities, the Russian regiments were mononational in composition, and therefore more morally stable. The regiments of the “foreign system” became the prototype and core of the future Russian regular army. They had a state supply of weapons, ammunition, food, more or less regular combat and tactical training, a more orderly hierarchy of officer ranks, division of units into companies and squadrons, and the first official manuals for military training were created.

Weaknesses: after the end of hostilities, a significant part of the employees went home, only a part of the officers, soldiers, dragoons, and reiters remained under the banner of the regiment. Therefore, military training could not be made systematic. In addition, the country's industry could not provide the regiments with the same type of weapons, equipment and uniforms.

Military industry. The emergence of manufactories in Russia contributed to the development of the military industry. By the end of the 17th century, there were 17 enterprises in Russia that produced handguns and artillery pieces. For example, the Tula-Kashira factories produced 15-20 thousand muskets in 300 working days. Russian gunsmiths have been persistently searching for the modernization of domestic handguns. New types of weapons were created - “screw-mounted squeaks”, the design of gun locks was improved - they were called “locks of Russian design” and became widespread. But due to the weakness of the industry, it was necessary to make quite significant purchases of weapons abroad.

Reform of Prince V.V. Golitsyn. At the end of the 17th century, Princess Sophia's favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, attempted to reform the Russian armed forces. Streltsy orders were transformed into regiments, and companies were introduced into the noble cavalry instead of hundreds. In 1680-1681, the entire European part of Russia was divided into 9 military districts (“categories”): Moscow, Seversky (Sevsky), Vladimir, Novgorod, Kazan, Smolensk, Ryazan, Belgorod and Tambov discharges (Tula or Ukrainian was abolished, Siberian discharges transformations were not affected). All military men of the state were assigned to the districts. In 1682, localism was abolished, that is, the procedure for distributing official places taking into account the origin and official position of ancestors.

Thus, by the time Peter came to power, the Russian armed forces had already made significant progress towards becoming a regular army. This process only had to be completed, formalized, consolidated, which is what Peter I did. Only the achievements of the previous era in the field of military construction and economic development allowed the reformer tsar in the shortest possible time (a very short historical period) to create a regular army, navy, and develop military industry.

Peter's reforms before the start of the Northern War

Amusing troops. Even under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, a “Petrov Regiment” was organized from several dozen children for the Tsarevich. Gradually, the game turned into real military-practical training, and adults began to enroll in “funny” games. In 1684, in the village of Preobrazhenskoye near Moscow, the amusing town of “Presburg” was built, where elements of an assault on a fortress were practiced. In 1691, the amusing troops received proper organization and were divided into two regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky, they were equipped according to Western European standards. Based on this experience, Peter developed a program for military professional orientation for young men. It included the following elements: the development of love for the sovereign and the Fatherland; development of discipline close to military; feelings of honor and camaraderie; familiarizing young people with weapons and the skills to use them; development of physical strength and dexterity of boys 9-12 years old through games in nature and gymnastic exercises, war games; developing courage and initiative in children through special games (with a certain amount of danger, requiring courage and intelligence); knowledge of the Fatherland and the historical tasks of the state by familiarizing children with the brightest and darkest pages of our past, with the study of the strengths and aspirations of our enemies.

Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, together with the elected (best) soldier regiments F. Lefort and P. Gordon formed the backbone of the new army. Regular military training was carried out in these units, and the king himself looked after them. Together with Peter, the basics of military affairs were mastered by his closest associates - A. Golovin, M. Golitsyn, A. Weide, F. Apraksin, A. Repnin, Y. Bruce, A. Menshikov, etc. The Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments became the forge of officers personnel for other military units.

Peter laid the foundation for the correct tradition of officership - to serve from the lower ranks. He started as a drummer, received the rank of sergeant in 1691, and bombardier of the Preobrazhensky Regiment in 1693. This allowed him to develop the qualities necessary for a commander. Peter became acquainted with the military literature of that time, studied sciences related to military and naval affairs - geometry, fortification, astronomy, shipbuilding, artillery, etc.

They began to conduct large-scale military maneuvers, so in the Kozhukhov campaign of September-October 1694, up to 40 thousand people took part, they were divided into two armies. During the exercises, techniques for siege and storming a fortress, crossing a water barrier were practiced, and the field training of troops was tested. This was a new phenomenon in the history of Russian military art. The training was conducted under the guidance of foreign officers. We began to introduce elements of linear tactics.

The Azov campaigns of 1695-1696 demonstrated the advantages of the new regiments over the forces of local and streltsy troops. The Streltsy, who participated in the campaign, were left in the south, entrusted with garrison duty. The number of elected soldier regiments was significantly increased. In addition, Peter decided to use the experience of countries Western Europe To reorganize the army, at the beginning of 1697, 150 people were sent abroad for officer training. Major A. Weide was sent to study the experience of organization and structure of the best Western armies. He studied the experience of the French, Dutch, Austrian, Saxon armies and in 1698 provided a detailed analytical report. The main conclusion of his report: the basis of victory is “diligent training.” Weide's revised report became a source for the creation of regulations, instructions, and manuals for the Russian regular army.

The regular army needed personnel and a lot of weapons and uniforms. Various types of ammunition. Already in 1698, about 700 foreigners arrived in Russia. The Grand Embassy purchased 10 thousand muskets and other weapons abroad. By August 1698, the main preparatory measures for army reform were completed.

Reform 1699-1700

The Streltsy uprising of 1698 only accelerated the reform process. The rifle regiments were disbanded and in 1699 they began to recruit people into the “direct regular army”.

Peter and his associates developed the first statutory documents. They were quite simple, everything superfluous was discarded, they took only those positions that were necessary for the combat training of soldiers. The documents were distinguished by their clarity and simplicity of presentation. In 1699, A. Golovin’s “Military Articles” were compiled, and in 1700, Peter’s “Brief Ordinary Teaching” was published. In 1700, regulations were published regulating the internal life of the troops" "Military articles on how a soldier should conduct himself in life and in the ranks and in training how to get by" and "Company infantry ranks."

The training of domestic officers has intensified. At the beginning of May 1699, Peter held a review of Moscow stewards, and then other nobles. Their regular training began. The negligent were punished very harshly, including exile, with confiscation of estates and estates. The Tsar personally checked the suitability of the nobles for military service. After the “young fighter” course, the nobles were distributed into divisions (“generalships”), commanded by Repnin, Weide, Golovin. In July, a review took place, the distribution of the next group of nobles.

The personnel training system was also deployed for the troops themselves. In 1698, the first artillery school in Russia was opened in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. A training team of sergeants was created in the Semenovsky regiment. 300 foreigners were sent to Golovin, but they did not live up to expectations. According to Golovin, most were “revelers”, while others were simply ignorant, not knowing which end to take a musket from. Half had to be abandoned immediately, and in the end the idea of ​​mercenaries was abandoned altogether.

Having prepared a minimal officer corps, Peter began recruiting soldiers. In this case, the experience of creating regiments of the “foreign system” was used. First they took free people - a decree of November 1699. Volunteers were promised 11 rubles of annual salary and “grain and feed supplies.” In the same month there was a decree on the allocation of dat people. The mission to select Danish people was entrusted to a special commission headed by Admiral General Fedor Golovin. By May 1, 1700, it recruited 10.3 thousand people. Another 10.7 thousand people were recruited by Repnin’s commission (recruiting dat and free people in the Volga region), 8-9 thousand free people (volunteers) were recruited in the soldiers’ hut under the leadership of General Avtonom Golovin. In addition, the staff of the first 4 regiments was greatly expanded.

A few months later, the first 3 divisions were formed, each with 9 regiments. They were led by generals Avtonom Golovin, Adam Weide and Anikita Repnin. Each infantry regiment had the following staff: lieutenant colonel, major, 9 captains, captain-lieutenant, 11 lieutenants, 12 warrant officers, regimental transport and regimental clerks, 36 sergeants, 12 captains (non-commissioned officer military rank, military rank and position in a company, battery , squadron, was in charge of accounting and storage of property and the issuance of provisions, as well as weapons, equipment and clothing), 12 ensigns, 48 ​​corporals, 12 company clerks. Junior command staff (from sergeants to corporals) were recruited from soldiers. The regiment was supposed to have 1,152 people. The regiment was armed and supplied at the expense of the state. The infantry regiments were armed with fusees (a muzzle-loading smooth-bore rifle with a flintlock, there were infantry, dragoon, and officer versions of the rifle; they differed in overall length, barrel length and caliber) and baguettes (bayonets inserted into the barrel).

The basis of the future regular cavalry were two dragoon regiments. They took in “children of boyars and poor princes,” and then they began to fill them with nobles. By the beginning of the Northern War, the local army formed the basis of the Russian cavalry.

Considering the fact that hopes for foreigners were not justified, and the army needed officers, at the suggestion of A. Golovin, from May 1700, a focus was placed on training domestic commanders. Moscow nobles from the best families were attracted, and 940 people were sent for training. This was a novelty - before this, nobles en masse served in the cavalry, considering it a class prerogative, and were reluctant to join the infantry. But Peter broke this tradition. All attempts to evade were mercilessly punished, the nobles were obliged to serve. The results of energetic activity quickly had an impact; if at the beginning of the Northern War foreigners predominated in the senior command staff, then two-thirds of the middle and junior command staff were Russian.

The second in time were the reforms of the local militia. The government of Ivan the Terrible showed special attention and care to the military structure of the nobles and children of the boyars. The noble militia was not only the basis of the armed forces of the state, but also, most importantly, it was the class support of the autocracy. To improve the legal and economic situation of the nobles and boyars' children, to streamline their military service and, in connection with this, to strengthen the condition and organization of the local militia, and therefore the entire army as a whole - these were the tasks that Ivan the Terrible set for himself when carrying out reforms of the local militia.

The earliest of the military reforms of the nobility of the mid-16th century. there was a verdict on localism.

In the fall of 1549, Ivan the Terrible began a campaign against Kazan. On the way, the tsar invited the clergy to his place and began to convince the princes, boyars, boyars’ children and all service people who had set out on the campaign that he was going to Kazan “for his own business and for the zemstvo”, so that there would be “discord and place” between the service people... “None of them were there” and during the service everyone “went without a seat.” In conclusion, Ivan the Terrible promised to resolve all local disputes after the campaign.

The fact that during the campaign it was necessary to convince the military people of the need for unity, for which the clergy were specially invited, shows how corrupting the influence of localism was on the army. The persuasion did not yield positive results, and the boyars continued to wage a fierce struggle for “places.” Then the government decided to influence the recalcitrant through legislation.

In July 1550, the tsar, the metropolitan and the boyars reached a verdict on localism. The verdict consisted of two main decisions. The first decision concerns localism in general. At the beginning of the sentence it is stated that in the regiments, princes, princelings, nobles and boyar children must serve with the boyars and governors “without places.” The verdict proposed to write down in the “service attire” that if nobles and boyar children happen to be in the service of governors not in their “fatherland,” then there is no “damage” to the fatherland in this.

This part of the sentence quite decisively raises the question of localism and on the basis of it alone one can conclude that the tsar wants to completely abolish localism in the army. However, the further content of the verdict significantly reduces the first part of the decision. Further in the verdict we read: if the great nobles, who are in the service of smaller governors not in their own country, in the future happen to be governors themselves along with the previous governors, then in the latter case the parochial accounts are recognized as valid and the governors must be “in their own country.”

So, canceling parochial claims on the part of ordinary soldiers to their governors, i.e., to the command staff, the verdict upheld and confirmed the legality of these claims to the places of governors among themselves. Thus, the sentence of 1550 did not yet completely abolish localism in the army, but, despite this, it was of great importance. The abolition of localism between ordinary soldiers and ordinary soldiers with their governors contributed to the strengthening of discipline in the army, increased the authority of the governors, especially the ignorant, and generally improved the combat effectiveness of the army.

The second part of the sentence was an adaptation of the local accounts between the governors to the existing division of the army into regiments: “he ordered to write in the service outfit where to be in... the service of the boyars and governors by regiment.”

The first (“big”) governor of a large regiment was the commander of the army. The first commanders of the forward regiment, the regiments of the right and left hands and the guard regiment stood below the large commander of the large regiment. The second commander of the large regiment and the first commander of the right-hand regiment were equal. The governors of the forward and guard regiments were considered “not inferior” to the governor of the right-hand regiment. The commanders of the regiment of the left hand were no lower than the first commanders of the forward and guard regiments, but lower than the first commander of the right hand; the second commander of the regiment of the left hand stood below the second commander of the regiment of the right hand.

This means that all the governors of other regiments were subordinate to the first governor of a large regiment (the commander of the army). The governors of all the other four regiments were equal to each other, and equal to the second governor of the large regiment. The exception was the commander of the left-hand regiment, who stood below the commander of the right-hand regiment. This subordination was stipulated, apparently, because in fact the regiments of the right and left hands (flanks) occupied the same place in the army. The subordination of the first regimental governors corresponded to the subordination of the second, etc., governors, and within each regiment the second, third governor, etc. were subordinate to the first governor.

The official position of regimental commanders, established by the verdict of 1550, existed until the middle of the 17th century, that is, until the collapse of the old regimental organization of the army. The verdict determined the relationship between the regimental commanders, simplified and improved the leadership of the army and reduced local disputes. Despite the obvious advantages of the new procedure for appointing commanders in the army, this procedure was poorly absorbed by the arrogant boyars. Localism continued to exist, and the government had to repeatedly confirm the verdict of 1550.

The next step taken by the government of Ivan the Terrible to organize a local militia was the formation of the “chosen thousand.”

The verdict provided for the “infliction” of 1000 people in the Moscow district, Dmitrov, Ruza, Zvenigorod, in obrochny and other villages from Moscow 60-70 versts away from “landowners of the children of the boyars’ best servants”. These boyar children were divided into three articles and received estates: the first article was 200, the second was 150, and the third was 100. In total, according to the verdict, 1078 people were “placed” in the vicinity of Moscow and 118,200 quarters of land were distributed into local ownership.

This “chosen thousand” was included in a special “Book of a Thousand” and marked the beginning of the service of boyar children according to the “Moscow list”. For the children of boyars, service in the thousanders was hereditary. For many boyar children, entry into the “thousand” meant a major promotion, getting closer to the royal court.

The “chosen thousand” included many representatives of the most noble princely and boyar families. The recruitment of princes into the service was of great political importance. Receiving estates with the obligation to be ready “for dispatches” to fill various positions in the military and civil service, the descendants of appanage princes moved from their family estates to estates near Moscow, where they were ordered to live permanently. Thus, the princes were drawn to Moscow, became noble landowners and lost contact with those places where they owned hereditary appanage lands as descendants of appanage princes.

The division into three articles did not last long. By decree of 1587, the same size of local dachas near Moscow was established for all Moscow nobles at 100 quarters per field (150 dessiatinas in three fields). This decree was included in its entirety in the Code of 1649.

Sources of the second half of the 16th century. (rank books and chronicles) show that the thousand officers, who were obliged to always “be ready for dispatch,” spent most of their time outside Moscow, mainly in military service. In peacetime, they were sent as city governors or siege leaders to border cities, assigned to patrol the towns and to build cities and border fortifications.

During hostilities, a significant number of thousands became regimental commanders, heads of hundreds, streltsy, Cossacks, staffs, convoys, outfits, etc. Many thousanders were among the command staff of the “sovereign” regiment and in the tsar’s retinue. Thousanders were sent ahead of the troops setting out on a campaign as quarterers; they also monitored the condition of roads, bridges and transportation. Through them, in times of peace and war, relations were maintained with the army and city governors.

Thousanders stood at the head of the orders, were governors and volosts. They appointed captains of thousands and tiuns, mayors, sent for inventory, surveying and patrol of lands and census of the tax population, sent as ambassadors and messengers to other states, etc.

The creation of the “chosen” thousand was the beginning of the formation of a new group of urban nobility; elected nobles and boyar children or simply “choice” appeared. Elected nobles and boyar children received official recognition from 1550. From the elected nobility at the royal court a special category of service people emerged under the name of “tenants”.

The thousanders did not lose their former estates and estates and maintained contact with the district nobility. An estate near Moscow was given to the “tenant” as an aid, since he was obliged to be in Moscow, far from his land holdings. Being part of the district nobility, elected nobles (thousanders) were counted in the 16th century, but not among the provincial nobility, but among the metropolitan nobility. They became part of the sovereign’s court and were included in the so-called courtyard notebook, compiled, as A. A. Zimin’s research has established, in 1551.

Elected nobles and boyar children strengthened the Moscow metropolitan nobility and were the cadres from which service people were later formed, in the terminology of the 17th century, the “Moscow list” or “Moscow rank”.

The education of the chosen thousand was of great political importance. The descendants of the well-born nobility were equal in official position with the landowners-nobles and the children of the boyars. The government's connection with local nobles and boyar children, who made up the bulk of the local militia, expanded and strengthened. There appeared cadres of service people on whom the autocracy could rely.

Together with the “elected” (Moscow) archers, the thousand officers constituted the closest armed force and guard of the tsar.

The verdict of 1550 marked the beginning of the reorganization of the service from estates and estates, which received its final establishment in the “Code of Service” of 1556.

In 1556, a verdict was passed on the abolition of feeding and service, according to which a major reform of the noble militia was carried out.

The verdict, first of all, noted the enormous harm of feeding. The princes, boyars and boyars’ children, who sat in cities and volosts as governors and volosts, “created many empty towns and volosts... and committed many evil deeds against them...”

In this regard, the feeding system was abolished, and the governor's "feed" was replaced by a special state monetary collection - the "feed payback". The payback went to the treasury and was one of the main sources of state income. The introduction of payback made major changes to the system of the state apparatus. Special state financial bodies were created - “quarters” (cheti).

All these events had important political and economic consequences. The abolition of feeding and the liquidation of the governor's office led to the fact that huge funds collected by the boyars from the population in the form of governor's feed began to flow into the state treasury. Thus, the boyars became economically and politically weaker, and the fed payback turned into a source of financing for the nobility. Cash income in the form of payback allowed the government to assign a constant cash salary to the nobles and boyars' children for their service. The abolition of feedings was carried out in the interests of the nobility.

The verdict of 1556 also resolved the issue of the service of nobles and children of boyars. This part of the sentence was called the “Service Code”.

Central to the verdict is the decision to establish service from the ground. From fiefdoms and estates, the owners had to perform “stipulated service.” From one hundred quarters (150 dessiatines in three fields) of “good pleasing lands” one man was sent on horseback and in full armor, and on a long journey with two horses. For service to landowners and patrimonial owners (except for land ownership), reward was established in the form of a permanent cash salary. Salaries were also given to people brought with them by landowners and patrimonial owners. Those nobles and boyar children who brought with them people in excess of the established number under the sentence had their salaries increased.

If the landowner or patrimonial owner was not on duty, he paid money for the number of people that he was obliged to provide according to the size of his land holdings.

The Code of 1556 established the norm for military service from the land; an estate of 100 quarters provided one mounted armed warrior. The Code equalized service from estates and estates; service from the latter became as compulsory as from manorial lands. This meant that all those patrimonial lords who had previously served individual feudal lords had to perform public service. The Code created the interest of landowners and patrimonial owners in the service and led to an increase in the number of noble militia by attracting new landowners to the service. In general, the Code improved the recruitment of troops.

In addition to the above-mentioned purely military reforms of the noble militia, the government’s concerns about improving the legal and economic situation of the nobles and children of the boyars were expressed in a number of other legislative acts.

The landowners received the right to have their cases judged, except for “murder, theft and robbery,” directly from the tsar himself; Judicial power over the peasants living on his lands was concentrated in the hands of the landowner, and, finally, it was forbidden to turn the children of the boyars (except for those unfit for service) into slaves, which was supposed to lead to the preservation of cadres of military men.

In addition to the “Code of Service” of 1556, the government took a number of measures to alleviate and eliminate the debt of landowners.

Finally, a major reform of local government controlled, carried out in the mid-50s, transferred local power from the hands of princely-boyar circles (governors) to the jurisdiction of local landowners, who were under the control of the central state apparatus.

In general, all the reforms of the mid-16th century. had a pronounced noble character and reflected the growth of the nobility as a reliable political, economic and military force in a centralized state.

Since its formation, the Moscow state either strengthened its positions in military battles, or carefully prepared for new wars, or defended itself from predatory invasions. Naturally, this required the correct organization of the Russian army, its recruitment and leadership, and the preparation of the defense of the frontiers.

Composition and internal organization of the Russian army

In the XV - XVI centuries. The internal structure of the armed forces of the Moscow State was determined. The backbone of the Russian army was made up of “service people”, who were divided into “service people for the Fatherland” (service princes, boyars, okolnichy, tenants, nobles, boyar children, Tatar “princes”) and “service people according to the device” (Cossacks, archers, gunners).

The organization of the Moscow army at first was carried out in two ways: by prohibiting the departure of service people from the Moscow princes and attracting landowners to serve, and also by attracting permanent military detachments of appanage princes. At all times, the issue of material support for the service of soldiers was quite acute. In this regard, the government of Ivan III, having received a large fund of lands in the process of attracting the Novgorod Republic and the Tver Principality, decided to distribute parts of them to service people. Thus, the foundations for the organization of the local army, the core of the Moscow army, are laid.

All other military men were distributed among the regiments of the noble army. This structure of the armed forces lasted until the middle of the 17th century. In modern historical literature the opinion was established that all groups of military men, by type of service, belonged to four main categories: infantry, artillery, cavalry and auxiliary units.

Local army

In the process of annexing new principalities to the Moscow state, the number of squads entering the service of the Grand Duke increased. The authorities began to reorganize the armed forces. Petty princes and boyars now received land dachas for their service.

The core and main striking force of the armed forces, the bulk of which were nobles and boyar children, became the mounted local army. The soldiers who served under Grand Duke Ivan III as part of the “Sovereign's Court” received generous land and cash salaries. The majority either remained at their previous place of residence or moved to other principalities at the behest of the government. In this case, the warrior-landowners began to be called city children of the boyars, Novgorod, Kostroma, Tver, Yaroslavl, Tula, Ryazan, Sviyazh, etc.

In the middle of the 14th century. As a special category of troops, nobles were distinguished, who, along with the boyars' children, received estates from the Grand Duke for temporary possession, and in wartime were his closest military servants. In order to preserve the cadres of the noble militia, the government limited their departure from service.

In the middle of the 16th century, a series of important reforms were carried out aimed at centralizing the country and streamlining the military system. The Code of Law of 1550 prohibited the conversion of boyar children fit for service into serfs. This was due to the fact that there was a certain barrier to the growth of personal troops of large feudal lords. Since 1558, boyar children (from the age of 15) and service people were assigned to the royal service. Thus, the noble army and the “sovereign regiment” were replenished by the service people of the appanage principalities.

When organizing the local army, servants from the dissolved boyar households were accepted into service. They were allocated land, which passed to them under the rights of conditional holding. Such displacements became widespread after the annexation of the Novgorod land to the Moscow state. Local landowners received estates in Vladimir, Murom, Nizhny Novgorod, Pereyaslavl, Yuryev-Polsky, Rostov, Kostroma and other cities.

The formation of the local militia was an important milestone in the development of the armed forces of the Moscow state. Their numbers increased noticeably, and the military structure received a clear organization.

The local militia had major shortcomings. It gathered only in case of military danger, armed itself at its own expense, and therefore was distinguished by great diversity. These aspects were noted in his studies by one of the most authoritative experts on the history of the Russian armed forces, A.V. Chernov40. While taking care of their farms, the owners of the estate were not always willing to serve. The unity of the state's armed forces was also undermined by independent detachments of large feudal lords. A distinctive step compared to the previous organization of troops was subordination to one leadership and the conduct of military operations according to a single plan. The real misfortune of the Russian local army was the “non-appearance” (failure to show up for service) of nobles and boyar children, their flight from the regiments, the massive nature of which was noted in the last years of the Livonian War. This was due to the ruin of the farms of service people, who were forced to abandon their farms at the first order of the authorities. In this regard, a system was organized for searching, punishing and returning “netchikov” to duty, and later the government introduced mandatory third-party guarantees for the proper performance of service by every nobleman or son of a boyar. It was decided to deprive the “netchins” of their estates, and they could receive a land salary again only after achieving it through diligent and efficient service.

The government of Ivan IV, having given a harmonious military organization to the local system and equalizing patrimonial landowners with landowners in service, created a large cavalry army, the number of which reached 80 - 100 thousand soldiers. In general, the local cavalry, ready to go on any campaign at a moment’s notice, demonstrated good training and the ability to win in difficult circumstances. In XV - 16th centuries the defeats were caused primarily by the mistakes and incompetence of the governors (in the Battle of Orsha on September 8, 1514, the battle on the Oka River on July 28, 1521).

Many service people “in the homeland” who took part in battles showed true courage and devotion to duty. These exploits are mentioned in chronicles and documents. For example, it tells about the famous hero, the Suzdal son of the boyar Ivan Shibaev, who captured a prominent Tatar military leader in the battle near the village of Molodi Diveya-Murza (April 30, 1572).

In Moscow and other cities, general reviews (“debriefings”) were often held to check the combat readiness of the landowner soldiers. Children of landowners who had grown up and were already fit for service were assigned an appropriate land and monetary salary. Information about such appointments was recorded in “ten”, the layout lists of district service people. In addition to the layout ones, there were “tithes”, “collapsible” and “distributing” ones, designed to record the attitude of landowners to the performance of their official duties. They included information about the names, salaries, weapons of each serviceman, as well as the number of slaves assigned to him, data on the number of male children, information about previous service, the reasons for their failure to appear for the “debriefing”, etc. Local and monetary salaries could be increased depending on the results of the review and on the readiness for service of the children of boyars and nobles. If landowners were found to have poor military training, cash and land salaries could be reduced. The first reviews of nobles were held in 1556. This was facilitated by the adoption of the Code of Service (1555/1556). All collapsible, distributing and layout “tithes” were to be sent to Moscow, notes were made on them about official appointments, military and diplomatic assignments, participation in campaigns, battles, battles and sieges.

Land grants were called "dachas". Their sizes differed from the salary and depended on the land fund being distributed. With the increase in the number of service people “at home,” the size of dachas began to decrease noticeably. At the end of the 16th century. the landowner owned land several times less than his salary. Thus, in order to feed themselves, other service people had to engage in peasant labor. The number of city nobles and boyar children recruited into service in each district depended on the amount of land freed up in that area for local distribution.

Small-scale servicemen were not assigned to long campaigns, they were often exempted from guard and village service, their main duty was to perform siege (garrison) and sometimes even “foot” service. Those who were completely impoverished were automatically dropped from service.

The most important task of the officials conducting the inspections was the correct establishment of salaries for those newly called up for service. A service man could receive the land dacha due to him and an increase to it only through good service.

In each district, according to the “tithes” and scribe books, salaries had their own limits. The authorities tried not to lower the salary below a certain level (50 quarters of land), preferring to leave some service people without local dachas. Local land ownership was most regulated in the Moscow district.

In the second half of the 16th century. The military service of the children of boyars and nobles was divided into city (siege) and regimental. Siege service was carried out either by small-scale residents with a salary of 20 rubles or by those who were unable for health reasons to perform regimental (march) service. It was carried out on foot. These soldiers were not paid a monetary salary, but for proper performance of their duties they could be transferred from siege service to regimental service with an increase in local salary and the issuance of a cash salary.

Regimental service was long-distance (march) and short-range (Ukrainian, coastal), which in peacetime was reduced to border protection. Moscow service people (the most prominent part of the nobility - solicitors, stewards, Moscow nobles and tenants41, heads and centurions of the Moscow archers) were in a more privileged position. In the regiments, they occupied command positions of governors, their comrades, hundreds of heads, etc. Their total number was small - no more than 2 - 3 thousand people in the 16th century, but they brought into service a significant number of combat slaves. In this regard, the strength of the Tsar’s regiment reached 20 thousand people (in the Kazan campaign of 1552), and with the participation of “elected” nobles and boyar children, and more.

Hundreds, like regiments, were temporary military units of local militia. The landowners called into service were formed at assembly points in the hundreds; from the remnants of the district hundreds, mixed hundreds were created; they were all distributed on the shelves. At the end of the service, the nobles and boyar children went home, hundreds disbanded, and at the next call they formed again.

Thus, the basis of the marching Russian army was the regiments of the noble cavalry, and rifle and Cossack orders, instruments and hundreds were distributed among them.

The Code of 1556 finally formalized the local system of recruiting troops. It attracted a large number of feudal lords to military service and created an interest among the nobility in serving the sovereign. The creation of the noble cavalry had progressive significance in accordance with the requirements of the growing Russian state.

Introduction

Chapter I. Armed forces of the Moscow state in the first half of the 17th century

§ I. Boyar and noble army

§ II. Streletsky army

§ III. Cossack army

Chapter II. “Shelves of the new system” by Alexei Mikhailovich

§ I. Recruitment to the “Regiments of the New System”

Conclusion

List of used literature

Introduction

In the 17th century, the Moscow state practically did not lag behind and promptly responded to all the latest innovations in military technology. The rapid development of military affairs was due to the widespread use of gunpowder and firearms.

The Moscow state, located at the junction of Europe and Asia, was influenced by both military schools. Since in the XV - XVI centuries. for him, the main opponents were nomads - at first the experience of the eastern military tradition was taken. This tradition was subjected to significant revision, and its main idea was the dominance in the structure of the armed forces of light irregular local cavalry, supplemented by detachments of archers and Cossacks, who were partly self-sufficient, partly on state support.

Early 30s The 17th century, when the government of Mikhail Fedorovich and Patriarch Filaret began to prepare for the war for the return of Smolensk, became the starting point in the history of the new Russian army. The previous structure of the armed forces did not meet the needs of the new government. And with the active help of foreign military specialists, the formation of soldiers, regiments and other regiments of the “new order”, trained and armed according to the latest European model, began in the Moscow state. From that moment on, the general line of Russian military development for the remaining time until the end of the century was a steady increase in the share of the regular component and a decrease in the importance of the irregular.

The relevance of this work lies in the fact that currently the history of the Russian Armed Forces, especially their reform, is of interest in society. The period of reforms of the 17th century attracts special attention. The range of problems that the Russian government faced then in the military sphere echoes those of today. This is the need for an optimal mobilization system to fight powerful Western neighbors with limited financial and economic capabilities and human resources, as well as the desire to master the effective aspects of military organization, tactics and weapons.

The work is also relevant in that it does not focus only on issues of regularity or irregularity of troops, but shows its combat effectiveness during military battles.

Chronological framework The topics cover the period from the beginning of the 17th century to 1676 - the end of the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.

Self-study military forces of the Russian state began at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, when a certain supply of factual information accumulated in general historical literature. The largest work of that time was the work of A.V. Viskovatov. "Historical description of clothing and weapons of Russian troops", published in 1902. In his work, the author presents a unique, one-of-a-kind, large-scale study in the field of the history of military ammunition. Viskovatov A.V. relies on a wide range of written and material sources. Among them: royal letters (“nominal” and “boyar sentences”), orders and memorial orders to the heads of the Streltsy, petitions, unsubscribes, as well as notes from Russian and foreign travelers.

The next significant contribution to science was the collective work of a group of generals and officers of the tsarist army and navy, published in 1911 and called “History of the Russian Army and Navy”. “History” shows the development of Russian military affairs and examines outstanding military episodes. The authors of the book are Grishinsky A.S., Nikolsky V.P., Klado N.L. describe in detail the organization, life, weapons and characterize the combat training of troops.

In 1938, Bogoyavlensky S.K.’s monograph “Armament of Russian troops in the 16th-17th centuries” was published. . The historian, relying on a large amount of archival data, describes in detail the weapons and equipment of the Russian troops. The author's achievement is that after the revolution it was the only new work that later became a classic.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War release scientific works is shrinking. In 1948, an article by Denisova M.M. was published. "Local cavalry". In this article, the author convincingly refuted one of the myths of the old historiography about the military-technical backwardness of the Russian army. In addition, Denisova M.M. Based on archival data, it gives a description of the real appearance and weapons of the local cavalry in the 17th century.

Chapter I. Armed forces of the Moscow state in the first half of the 17th century

Boyar and noble army

The basis of the armed forces of the Moscow state was the local army, which consisted of nobles and children of boyars. During the war, they acted with the Grand Duke or with the governors, and in peacetime they were landowners and received conditional holdings of land for their service.

The prerequisites for the emergence of a local army appeared in the second half of the 14th century, when the junior and senior warriors began to be replaced by feudally organized groups, headed by a boyar or a serving prince, and the group included boyar children and courtyard servants. In the 15th century, such an organization of detachments replaced city regiments. As a result, the army consisted of: the grand ducal court, the courts of appanage princes and boyars. Gradually, new appanage principalities were included in the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the courts of appanage princes and boyars were dissolved, and service people passed to the Grand Duke. As a result, the vassalage of princes and boyars was transformed into the sovereign's servants, who received estates for their service in a conditional holding (less often - in a fiefdom). In this way, a local army was formed, the bulk of which were nobles and boyar children, as well as their military slaves.

Boyar children, as a class, formed at the beginning of the 15th century, were initially not very large patrimonial owners. They were “assigned” to one city or another and began to be recruited by princes for military service.

The nobles were formed from the servants of the princely court and at first played the role of the closest military servants of the Grand Duke. Like the boyars' children, they received plots of land for their service.

During the Time of Troubles, the local army, at first, could resist the interventionist troops. However, the situation was aggravated by the peasant uprisings of Khlopok and Bolotnikov. Tsars Boris Godunov and Vasily Shuisky were also not popular. In connection with this, landowners fled from the army to their estates, and some even went over to the side of the interventionists or rebel peasants. The local militia, led by Lyapunov, acted as part of the First People's Militia in 1611, which did not take place. In the same year, nobles and boyar children became part of the Second People's Militia under the leadership of Prince Pozharsky, as its most combat-ready part. For the purchase of horses and weapons, they were given a salary of 30 to 50 rubles, collected through public donations. The total number of service people in the militia was about 10 thousand, and the number of the entire militia was 20-30 thousand people. The following year, this militia liberated Moscow.

The Time of Troubles led to a crisis in the local system. A significant part of the landowners became empty-handed and could not receive support at the expense of the peasants. In this regard, the government took measures to restore the local system - made cash payments and introduced benefits. By the second half of the 1630s, the fighting efficiency of the local army was restored.

The number of troops in the 17th century can be established thanks to the surviving “Estimates”. In 1632 there were 26,185 nobles and boyar children. According to the “Estimate of all service people” of 1650-1651, there were 37,763 nobles and boyar children in the Moscow state, and the estimated number of their people was 40-50 thousand. By this time, the local army was being replaced by troops of the new system, a significant part of the local army was transferred to the Reitar system, and by 1663 their number decreased to 21,850 people, and in 1680 there were 16,097 people in the hundred service (of which 6,385 were Moscow ranks) and 11 830 of their people.

In peacetime, the landowners stayed on their estates, but in case of war they had to gather, which took a lot of time. Sometimes it took more than a month to fully prepare the militia for military action.

They went on a hike with their own food.

The local army had a number of disadvantages. One of them was the lack of systematic military training, which negatively affected his combat effectiveness. The arming of each person was left to his discretion, although the government gave recommendations in this regard. Another important drawback was failure to show up for service and flight from it - “noness”, which was associated with the ruin of estates or with the reluctance of people to participate in a certain war. It reached particular proportions during the Time of Troubles. Thus, from Kolomna in 1625, out of 70 people, only 54 arrived. For this, their estate and monetary salaries were reduced (with the exception of good reasons for non-appearance - illness and others), and in some cases the estate was completely confiscated. However, in general, despite the shortcomings, the local army showed high level combat effectiveness. Manor cavalry tactics were based on speed and developed under Asian influence in the mid-15th century. Initially, its main goal was to protect the Orthodox population from attacks, mainly by Turkic peoples. In this regard, coastal service became the most important task of military men and a kind of school for their combat training. In this regard, the main weapon of the cavalry was the bow, and melee weapons - spears and sabers - played a secondary role. Russian strategy was characterized by a desire to avoid major clashes that could lead to casualties; preference was given to various sabotage attacks from fortified positions. The main forms of combat were: archery combat, “baiting”, “attack” and “removable combat” or “great slaughter”. Only advanced detachments took part in the “harassment.” During it, an archery battle began, often in the form of a steppe “carousel” or “round dance”: detachments of Russian cavalry, rushing past the enemy, carried out mass shelling. Archery combat was usually followed by an “attack” - an attack using contact melee weapons; Moreover, the start of the attack could be accompanied by archery. During direct clashes, multiple “attacks” of detachments were made - they attacked, if the enemy was steadfast, they retreated in order to lure him into pursuit or to give room for other units to be “launched”. In the 17th century, the fighting methods of local troops changed under Western influence. During the Time of Troubles, it was rearmed with “traveling arquebuses”, and after the Smolensk War of the 30s - with carbines. In this regard, “shooting combat” with firearms began to be used, although archery combat was also preserved. Since the 50-60s, a cavalry attack began to be preceded by a volley from carbines. The main bladed weapon was the saber. Mostly they were domestic, but imported ones were also used. West Asian damask and damask sabers were especially valued. Based on the type of blade, they are divided into massive kilichis, with a bright elmani, and narrower sabers without elmani, which include both shamshirs and, probably, local Eastern European types. During the Time of Troubles, Polish-Hungarian sabers became widespread. Conchars were occasionally used. In the 17th century, broadswords became widespread, although not widely. Additional weapons were knives and daggers, in particular, the planting knife was specialized.

Until the Time of Troubles, the noble cavalry was widely armed with hatchets - these included hammered hatchets, mace axes and various light “hatchets”. In the 17th century, pear-shaped maces associated with Turkish influence became somewhat widespread, but they had primarily ceremonial significance. Throughout the entire period, warriors armed themselves with pernachs and six-feathers, but it is difficult to call them widespread weapons. Flails were often used. The main weapon of the local cavalry from the end of the 15th to the beginning of the 17th centuries was a bow with arrows, which was worn in a set - a saadak. These were complex bows with highly profiled horns and a clear central handle. Alder, birch, oak, juniper, and aspen were used to make bows; they were equipped with bone plates. Master archers specialized in making bows, saadaks - saadachniks, and arrows - archers. The length of the arrows ranged from 75 to 105 cm, the thickness of the shafts was 7-10 mm. The arrowheads were armor-piercing, cutting and universal. Firearms were initially present in the local cavalry, but were extremely rare due to their inconvenience for riders and the superiority of the bow in many respects. Since the Time of Troubles, nobles and boyar children preferred pistols, usually imported with a wheel lock; and they gave the squeaks and carbines to their fighting slaves. Therefore, for example, in 1634, the government ordered those servicemen who were armed only with pistols to purchase more serious firearms, and those who were armed with a saadak to stock up on pistols. These pistols were used in close combat, for point-blank shooting. From the middle of the 17th century, screw-mounted arquebuses appeared in the local cavalry and became especially widespread in the east of Rus'. The main armor was chain mail, or, more precisely, its variety - a shell. Ring-plate armor was also widespread. Mirrors were used less frequently; hussar and reiter armor. Wealthy warriors often wore several pieces of armor. The lower armor was usually a chain mail shell. Sometimes they wore a shishak or misyurka under the shell. In addition, metal armor was sometimes combined with tegils. The local army was abolished under Peter I. At the initial stage of the Great Northern War, the noble cavalry, under the leadership of B.P. Sheremetev, inflicted a number of defeats on the Swedes, however, its flight was one of the reasons for the defeat in the Battle of Narva in 1700. At the beginning of the 18th century, the old noble cavalry, together with the Cossacks, still figured among the regiments of horse service and took part in various military operations. However, Peter I was unable to immediately organize a combat-ready army. Therefore, it was necessary to improve the new army in order to lead it to victories, in which the old troops still took a significant part at the beginning of the 18th century. The old parts were finally liquidated by the middle of the 18th century.

Streletsky army

In 1550, the pishchalnik-militia were replaced by the Streltsy army, initially consisting of 3 thousand people. The Sagittarius were divided into 6 “articles” (orders), with 500 people in each. The Streltsy “articles” were commanded by heads from the children of the boyars: Grigory Zhelobov-Pusheshnikov, Duma clerk Rzhevsky, Ivan Semenov son of Cheremesin, V. Funikov-Pronchishchev F. I. Durasov and Ya. S. Bundov. The centurions of the Streltsy “Articles” were also children of the boyars. The archers were quartered in the suburban Vorobyovoy Sloboda. Their salary was determined to be 4 rubles. per year, archery heads and centurions received local salaries. The Streltsy formed a permanent Moscow garrison. The first archers were probably organized from among the best squeakers. They took part in campaigns and battles in wartime as part of the army; they were the first to attack, storming cities. The senior command staff was determined only from among the service people “in the fatherland” - nobles and children of boyars. The salary of the Streltsy head, who commanded the order (regiment), was 30-60 rubles. annually, in addition, he received a large local salary, equal to 300-500 quarters of land. Garrisons of city archers were located mainly in border cities. Their number ranged from 20 to 1000 people, and sometimes more. A distinctive feature of the Streltsy troops was their mobility, as a result of which they were often transferred to strengthen a certain section of the border. For example, in the summer, significant streltsy troops from Moscow, as well as border northwestern Russian cities, were transferred to the southern outskirts. These units were supposed to strengthen the defense of the lines, which were often subject to Tatar and Nogai attacks. Streltsy and Cossacks from the troops of the southern Russian fortresses were sent on the campaign against the Don in 1630. A total of 1960 people. More than half of the instrument people available there were taken from other cities. Often, the most experienced archers in military affairs from border cities were redirected for “yearly” service to a less protected border fortress. In such situations, they tried to replace them in their city with service people transferred from districts that were calmer militarily. City archers performed garrison service in both peace and war. Their duty was to guard the fortress and fort. They kept guard at the walls, on the towers, at the city and prison gates, near government offices. The main role for them was assigned to the defense of cities. The functions of the archers were varied. They could be sent as guards for the “netchiks”, to the saltpeter trades; as accompanying ambassadors, as well as escorting various supplies, cash treasuries, and criminals; Streltsy were involved in the execution of court sentences. In wartime, city riflemen were assigned by separate orders or in hundreds to different regiments of the army. Almost all archers, with a few exceptions, served on foot. As for long-distance trips, they usually went there on carts. Mounted service was carried out by Moscow “stirrup” archers, archers in Oskol, Epifan, Astrakhan, Terki, Kazan, Cherny Yar, Tsaritsyn, Samara, Ufa Saratov. Streltsy, who performed equestrian service, received horses from the treasury or money to buy them.

Each archer was armed with a arquebus, a reed, and sometimes a saber (later a sword), which was worn on a belt belt. He also had a belt with pencil cases with gunpowder charges attached to it, a bag for bullets, a bag for the fuse, and a horn with gunpowder for putting gunpowder on the charging shelf of the squeak. The archers were armed with smooth-bore matchlocks, and later - flint arquebuses. Interestingly, in 1638, the Vyazma riflemen were given matchlock muskets, to which they stated that “they don’t know how to shoot from such muskets with zhagras, and they never had such muskets with zhagras before, but they did and still have them.” the old locks were squeaking.” At the same time, matchlock weapons persisted and probably prevailed until the 70s of the 17th century. Our own production of screw-mounted arquebuses began in the middle of the 17th century, and from the 70s they began to be supplied to ordinary archers. In particular, in 1671, 24 were issued to the rifle regiment of Ivan Polteev; in 1675, the archers going to Astrakhan received 489 rifles. In 1702, rifles accounted for 7% of the Tyumen archers.

By the late 1670s, long pikes were sometimes used as additional weapons, but the existence of pikemen remains questionable. The sword becomes the main bladed weapon. The Streltsy regiments had a uniform and obligatory dress uniform (“colored dress”) for all, consisting of an outer caftan, a hat with a fur band, pants and boots, the color of which (except for the pants) was regulated according to belonging to a particular regiment. The ceremonial uniform was worn only on special days - during the main church holidays and during special events. To perform everyday duties and during military campaigns, a “portable dress” was used, which had the same cut as the dress uniform, but made of cheaper cloth in gray, black or brown.

Cossack army

Since the 17th century. Don Cossacks were used to protect the southern borders of the state, as well as in wars with Turkey and Poland. The government paid the Cossacks a salary for their service in money, as well as in the form of bread, cloth, gunpowder, and lead. Since 1623, the affairs of Donskoy Cossack army began to be in charge of the Ambassadorial Order, with which it dealt with the sending of “light” and longer-term “winter villages”. In 1637, the Cossack army captured Azov from the Turks and held it for five years, while withstanding a siege that lasted 3.5 months. Don Cossacks also took part in the Azov campaigns of 1695-96.

The Cossacks constituted the third main group of troops after the local and rifle troops. The Cossacks remained the numerically decisive armed force of the Moscow state after the people's militia was disbanded.

Due to the fact that the government did not trust the Cossacks and tried to reduce their number by separating peasants and slaves from them, as a result, the number of serving Cossacks in the army numbered about 11 thousand people. The authorities sent most of the Cossacks from Moscow to other cities for city service along with the Streltsy troops. Settled in different cities, the Cossacks also lost their military organization. An indicator of Cossack freedom was their unification into villages headed by elected atamans.

The state seeks to subjugate the Cossacks. The city governors were ordered to list the Cossacks in hundreds, as well as other service people, and assign heads to them. As a result, the Cossacks lost their village organization and atamans.

The structure of the Cossack army became hundreds, hundreds, like Streltsy, were reduced to orders. Basically, the Cossacks now obeyed the Streltsy heads, and in some cities - the children of the boyars. As for the size of the Cossacks' salary, in 1613 the Pskov Cossacks were paid 10 rubles. atamans, 8 rubles each. esaulam and 6 rubles. private. Feed salaries were collected from the population of Pskov, which caused discontent among the residents and was not always enough for all the Cossacks. State reserves were insufficient. To facilitate the maintenance of the Cossacks, the government replaced the fodder salary with land. During the reign of Mikhail Romanov, the land salary of the Cossacks was not large and was intended mainly for atamans, as a result of which a whole group of local atamans was formed, whose wealth and position were practically equal to the financial situation of the boyars’ children.

Due to the fact that the land was difficult to cultivate under wartime conditions, the Cossacks did not value land grants. However, after the war it began to be valued, and the Cossacks sought the right to transfer their lands to their children and relatives. For service and siege, the state gave some groups of Cossacks land as estates, thereby equalizing their financial situation and service with the children of the boyars.

Cossacks with estate ownership made up about 15% of all service Cossacks, most of whom, in their financial situation, were close to the archers and other service instrumental people. Cossack landowners received land and cash salaries slightly higher than the Streltsy, but they were equal in benefits. Separately, a group of white-local Cossacks appeared, whose salaries ranged from 20 to 30 quarters in the field. According to petitions, the state gave them benefits in the form of exemption from taxes and duties of Cossack households and land plots or settled them in such areas.

The training was hard and constant. From the age of three to five, the Cossack boy learned to ride a horse. They were taught to shoot from the age of seven, to chop with a saber from the age of ten. First, they released water in a thin stream and “placed their hand” so that the blade cut the water at the right angle without leaving splashes. Then they were taught to “cut down the vine,” sitting on a hitching post, on a log, and only then on a war horse, saddled in a combat style, in a combat style. Hand-to-hand combat was taught from the age of three. Passing on special techniques stored in each family. The boy was raised much more strictly than the girl, and his life from early childhood was filled with work and learning. From the age of five, boys worked with their parents in the fields: driving oxen to plow land, herding sheep and other livestock. But there was still time to play. And the godfather, and the ataman, and the old people made sure that the boy was not “tampered with” and that he was allowed to play. But the games themselves were such that in them the Cossack learned either work or military art. The sons of Cossack officers were given less time for children's games than the sons of ordinary Cossacks. As a rule, from the age of five to seven, their fathers took them into shift hundreds, regiments and took them with them to service, often to war. It was the skills acquired in the happy years of childhood that helped the Cossack become the best in the craft for which he was born - military service. The principle of collection was completely medieval, Horde. The ataman chose regimental commanders from among the rich and famous Cossacks. They were given instructions to raise a regiment named after them. The order stated which villages to take the Cossacks from. They were also given several uniforms as a sample, cloth for the entire regiment, saddle chips, belts, all the material for equipment, and 50 experienced combat Cossacks for training young recruits. The regiment commander was told the day and place where the formed regiment should be brought. Further, the authorities did not interfere with his orders. The regimental commander was the owner and creator of his regiment, he made ideas about promotion to officer ranks and appointed officers, wrote the charter on the basis personal experience or the experience of elders, if you were young. But since there were Cossacks in the regiment who were older and more experienced than him, they acted quite independently, according to common sense. Discipline lay in the exclusively responsible attitude of the Cossack to the fulfillment of his military duty. The Cossacks had very few losses in battles, since they fought next to their villagers: often grandfather, father and grandchildren in the same formation. They protected each other and would rather allow themselves to be killed or wounded than their comrade. One earring in a Cossack's ear served as a sign that this man was the only son in the family; such people were protected in battle; if they died, there would be no one to continue the family line, which was considered a great tragedy. If a mortally dangerous task was ahead, it was not the commander who decided who would go to it: sometimes it was volunteers, but more often the matter was decided by lot or drawing. Well-armed warriors who were trained in their craft from birth, who had excellent command of various combat skills, including tactical ones, and who were able to quickly complete assigned tasks - all this, taken together, made the Cossacks absolutely indispensable for the Russian army. Thus, summing up the state of the Russian armed forces in the first half of the 17th century, it is necessary to note the following. The Moscow government, guided by familiar ideas in matters of military development, did not remain aloof from newfangled trends and, not without success, tried to put them into practice during conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tatars. The government was still unable to completely abandon the old military system for various reasons. However, despite all the limited steps to reform the military sphere taken under Mikhail Fedorovich, the Russians accumulated valuable experience in creating a “new model” army, which was later successfully used by his son Alexei Mikhailovich.