Fire at the Mir orbital station. Remembering the fire at the Mir orbital (space) station - Video. Leaking from the air conditioning system

Jerry Linenger dons a mask during his mission to Peace in 1997. Credit: NASA

- Keep up with the latest research. There are, in fact, two fire suppression systems on the International Space Station: a water foam system in the Russian sections, and a carbon dioxide system in the US area. NASA is now working on a more modern "water mist" fire suppression method based on the ongoing trend seen in terrestrial defense areas such as electronics and shipping cabins. This system emits fine particles like a nebulizer that are only tens of microns throughout and acts like a gas. Urban said the system is in the final stages of development and should be ready for use at the station within a couple of years.

One 2011 NASA announcement about the accident also highlighted the importance of emergency preparedness and safety to mitigate fires when they occur. "More effective warning systems could save a few seconds of reaction time, which, in a crisis, could mean the difference between success and failure," he said. You can read the rest of this post

, Feoktistov, Semenov and Tregub, who flew in from Evpatoria.

We have a “veil” on board,” Volkov transmitted to Earth. According to the code, “curtain” meant either smoke or fire. On Earth they forgot about the code and began to ask again what the “veil” was. The negotiations with Earth were conducted not by the crew commander, but by Volkov. He could not stand it and, cursing, said openly:

We're on fire! Now we're leaving for the ship. He further said that they could not find instructions for urgent evacuation and descent and asked that the Earth dictate to them what should be done and in what order. In Podlipki, it was possible to establish duplication of negotiations between the crew of the DOS and NIP-16.

Provide the data for urgent undocking,” Volkov demanded very excitedly.

The Earth's answer, after a long search, was this:

Read the procedure in case of emergency departure on pages 110-120, they describe the steps to transfer to the descent module. After the transition, reactivate the ship according to the instructions on 7K-T, pages 98, a and 98, b. Undocking is standard. Prepare pages 133-136. Landing only at the direction of the Earth. Take your time. The remote control is turned off and the smoke should stop. If you leave the station, leave the harmful impurity absorber on. Take headache pills. According to telemetry data, CO2 and O2 are normal. The decision to transfer and undocking is made by the commander. Dobrovolsky realized that it was time to take on the connection with the Earth:

- "Zarya", I - "Yantar". We decided not to rush. PUNA is off. While we are on duty in twos, one will rest. Don't worry, we are in the mood to continue working.

- "Yantar-1", I - "Zarya". We have analyzed the state of the on-board systems and believe that the measures taken guarantee normal operation. We hope that you will continue to work as usual. The smells will go away. On June 17, we recommend that you take a day of rest, then get back into the routine. Please note that after leaving the NPC zone, the ship "Akademik Sergei Korolev" can hear you well.

From further negotiations, we understood that Dobrovolsky and Patsayev “muted” Volkov’s emotions and sent him to rest. After a couple of orbits, “Akademik Sergei Korolev” reported that everything was fine on board. "Yantar-1 and -3" had dinner, and "Yantar-2" is resting. When everyone calmed down a little, Mishin gathered everyone who was experiencing an unexpected emergency and instructed Tregub to return to Yevpatoriya on NIP-16 to restore order. Rauschenbach and I will fly there with the necessary specialists in five days. Mishin himself planned to fly with the minister to the test site on June 20 to prepare and launch the N1N 6L.

The launch is scheduled for June 27. We will spend a day analyzing the comments. This means that the minister and I will fly to you in Yevpatoria on June 29. If they don’t have any more fires there, prepare all the materials for regular planting on June 30th. The commotion under the code "veil" passed through all the "floors" of our hierarchy, right up to the chairman of the military-industrial complex. Subsequent reassuring reports from the Evpatoria control center and from space eased Mozzhorin's situation. He was instructed to prepare the text of a TASS message about the incident at the orbital station and, in connection with this, about the safe, but premature return of the crew. Now there was no need for such a TASS message and it was possible to calmly endorse standard messages about the station’s flight, the work of the cosmonauts and their well-being.

On June 20, Mishin, taking with him Okhapkin, Simakin, a full “set” of representatives of services and enterprises, participants in the preparation and launch of the N1, flew to the test site. After the departure of the expedition led by Mishin, there was a short lull. I decided to use it to reduce the “debts” that had accumulated in correspondence regarding promising work. In the evening, the attendant brought a pile of mail from the first department. I started by analyzing policy documents and letters from subcontractors. The study of documents and forwarding of instructions moved quickly until I discovered the recording

On February 23, 1997, at 22:35 Moscow time, a fire occurred at the Russian orbital station Mir. The so-called “microfire” happened while flight engineer Alexander Lazutkin was on duty, when the backup oxygen production system was turned on. The total fire area was 2 m2.

The Mir station (Fig. 1) had three oxygen supply systems for the crew. The first system was the main one and consisted of two overlapping Electron installations that produced oxygen by hydrolysis of water condensate. One such installation was located in the Kvant-1 module, and the other in the Kvant-2 module.

The second, backup system - a solid fuel oxygen generator (SOG) - produced oxygen from solid chemical bombs with a certain composition, which released oxygen during decomposition at a temperature of about 400°C (photo 1).

The TGK could provide the crew with oxygen for as long as the checkers lasted, and was provided in case of repair of the Electron installations. One person needs about 600 liters of oxygen per day. Depending on the type of bomb, its combustion releases from 420 to 600 liters of oxygen.

The third system for supplying gaseous oxygen into the station’s atmosphere from a special cylinder was located in the Progress station on duty. Her work should have been enough for 23 days for a crew of three.

If necessary, it was also possible to use the oxygen stored at the station for use during spacewalks.

It was decided to switch to a backup system for providing the crew with oxygen using checkers due to the failure of the Electron installations and the simultaneous presence of cosmonauts of the 22nd and 23rd expeditions at the Mir orbital station. At that moment, six people from two expeditions were working at the station: Valery Korzun, Alexander Kaleri, Vasily Tsibliev, Alexander Lazutkin, Reinhold Ewald (German cosmonaut) and Jerry Linenger (American astronaut).

Two Soyuz TM ships were docked at the station, which made it possible to evacuate all people, but one of the ships was cut off by the burning zone. The situation was made worse by the fact that the atmosphere of the station was heavily smoky. Due to circumstances related to the location of the center of gravity, only three crew members out of six present could return on one Soyuz. In the event of an uncontrolled fire, the remaining three crew members would have to evacuate through fire and smoke to the second Soyuz.

After turning on the backup system, sparks began to fly out of the pipe in which the bomb was smoldering and smoke began to appear. The fire occurred in the Kvant module on the bulkhead on the starboard side. A white flame, characteristic of an oxygen-enriched environment, stretched across the entire empty space of the module to the left side partition and was accompanied by the release of sparks and molten metal particles. In less than a minute, smoke filled the entire module, visibility dropped, and only the outlines of objects could be discerned.

Damage to some of the plant's equipment was caused primarily by high-temperature exposure rather than by open flame. As a result, the installation in which the THC checker was burning, covering its panel, was destroyed, and the outer layers of insulation of the electrical cables melted, while the cables continued to function (Photo 2).

Three foam fire extinguishers were used to extinguish the microfire, and the fire was extinguished after a minute and a half. There was a lot of smoke and a burning smell on board.

The crew reported the emergency situation to the Mission Control Center. The astronauts were ordered to put on gas masks, which were replaced with respirators a few hours later. For about 36 hours, while the Mir station's systems purified the air, the crew had to wear protective masks so as not to endanger their health.

After the emergency situation that occurred on the Mir, a commission was created to investigate the causes of the fire, which included the developers of the TGC and specialists from the fire institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was found that the start of operation in 1986 of solid-fuel oxygen generator cassettes was preceded by a full cycle of ground tests and there was not a single failure.

Possible causes of the fire were damage to the cassette casing or the closing of the cassette outlets with moistened material. It was determined that a single cassette failure had occurred, and it was recommended to use cassettes produced in 1995–1996.

The final conclusion was to be presented after the cassette was delivered to the ground and ground tests were carried out. It was decided to postpone the issue of using cassettes produced before 1995 until the results of additional special tests were received at NPO Nauka.

After the damaged TGC cassette was delivered to the ground, the working commission to investigate this incident at the ECC of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia appointed a comprehensive fire-technical examination, during the production of which it was necessary to answer the question about the cause of the fire, as well as consider organizational and technical aspects related to compliance with the technology manufacturing both the pyrotechnic composition itself and the product as a whole.

The main probable causes of the fire were initially considered to be damage to the cassette casing or closing of the cassette outlets with a foreign object, associated with unlawful actions of the crew when working with fire-hazardous equipment (a source of increased danger), which resulted in violations of the operating rules of the TGC.

Based on judicial practice in cases of fires, careless handling of fire or other sources of increased danger, leading to destruction or damage to property, in accordance with part two of Article 168 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, may consist of improper handling of ignition sources near flammable materials, as well as operation technical devices with unrepaired defects, leaving high-risk devices unattended, etc. In relation to this case - in the operation of a faulty TGC.

When analyzing the circumstances of the incident, it turned out that on February 23, one of the checkers installed in the TGC unit was working abnormally, with the emission of flame. According to the crew's testimony, the bomb burned at a temperature of about 900°C (photo 3).

The process of abnormal combustion began a minute after the launch of the TGC, which is carried out using an igniter-heater. To extinguish the generator, the astronauts used fire extinguishers, first in foam mode, but the gas stream coming out of the TGC blew away the foam. Then, switching to the liquid supply mode, they continued extinguishing, and the evaporated moisture filled the atmosphere of the “Quantum” with steam, which the burning bomb tinted in a bright white-red color. As a result, the crew, who were in the base unit at that time, had the feeling that the entire atmosphere of the “Quantum” had flared up.

As part of the fire-technical examination, advanced methods of scanning electron microscopy, X-ray fluorescence and metallographic analysis were used, which made it possible to establish the design features and elemental composition of the TGC checker, analyze the production technology, draw up a work program and conduct model experiments aimed at studying the behavior of the checker under various external influences and emergency situations.

Based on the research results, it was established that the pyrotechnic composition of THC meets the requirements of the manufacturer’s technical documentation.

When studying the mechanism of combustion, it was determined that initially it was not the pyrotechnic composition of the THC that ignited, but the fuse-heater, the destruction of which resulted in damage to the casing of the generator cassette.

The destruction of the igniter-heater in the TGC cassette was an isolated case of defects. In other batches of TGC cassettes, no malfunctions in the igniter-heater device were identified (photo 4).

Thus, the results of the examination made it possible to establish the true technical cause of the fire, completely exclude the crew’s guilt, and develop a set of measures for the further safe operation of solid-propellant oxygen generators at orbital space stations.

After the incident, the Mir orbital space station was successfully operated for another four years, then (March 23, 2001) it was deorbited and sunk in the Pacific Ocean.

Internet resource. URL: http://www.gctc.ru/main.php?id=700

Literature

Zhdanov A.G. Subject, objects and initial data of fire-technical examination. – M.: VNIII Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, 1989.

Nowhere to run. Fire on the space station // Documentary film. Production: Prospekt TV, 2006.

On February 23, 1997, a fire occurred on the Mir space station, which was extinguished in time. Flights into space have always been associated with great risk for the crew. But staying on the space station is also unsafe for astronauts. The Mir orbital station was launched into orbit in February 1986 and operated until 2001, when it was sunk in the Pacific Ocean. Over the 15 years of operation, many incidents occurred at the station. We will talk about the five most serious incidents on the Mir space station.

Fire

On February 23, 1997, an oxygen regeneration bomb caught fire at the station. At the station at that moment there were six people from the 22nd and 23rd expeditions: Valery Korzun, Alexander Kaleri, Vasily Tsibliev, Alexander Lazutkin, Reinhold Ewald and Jerry Linenger. Two Soyuz TM ships were docked at the station, which made it possible to evacuate all people, but one of the ships was cut off. The situation was made worse by the fact that the station was filled with smoke.

The entire crew put on gas masks. After the fire was eliminated due to smoke, the astronauts had to wear respirators for some time. The crew themselves were able to extinguish the fire before it got out of control. The investigation revealed that the fire was caused by a single defect in the oxygen bomb.

Leaking from the air conditioning system

During the 23rd expedition in March 1997, the air conditioning system failed - first, the Electron oxygen generation units sequentially failed, and then a refrigerant leak began - poisonous ethylene glycol. The temperature at the station increased to 50 °C with the maximum permissible 28 °C, and the humidity increased.

By the end of March, the source of the leak was discovered. Progress-M34 was launched from Earth on April 6, containing additional materials for repairing the station, oxygen bombs for regeneration, and water supplies. By the end of April, it was possible to detect and repair a dozen cracks in the pipes of the station's air conditioning system. The station returned to normal operation. The Atlantis shuttle mission STS-84, which was in danger of being canceled due to technical problems on the station, was allowed to go ahead. She delivered oxygen generation units to the station to replace those that had failed and supplies of water.

Collision of Progress-M34 with the Spektr module

On June 25, 1997, during a manual docking experiment in the BPS+TORU mode (ballistic precision rendezvous - teleoperator control mode) of the Progress-M34, a loss of control of the space truck occurred. As a result, Progress crashed into the station, damaging the solar panels and leaving a hole in the Spectrum module with an area of ​​2 cm2.

The control center urgently gave the command to seal the module, thereby ensuring life support for the station. The situation was complicated by the fact that cables ran through the hatch connecting the module to the station. Cutting off the module resulted in a temporary loss of electricity generated by the station - when the module was de-energized, the Spectra solar panels, which provided 40% of the electricity, were turned off. The power supply to the Mir station was completely restored only by August 1997. The crew members of the 23rd expedition were awarded state awards: Lazutkin received the title of Hero of Russia, Tsibliev received the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, III degree.

Loss of orientation

In September 1997, as a result of a computer error, Mir lost orientation to the Sun. To carry out astronomical observations of the Sun, Moon, planets and stars, it is necessary to orient the telescopes or the entire station accordingly. Solar collectors of the power supply system must be constantly directed towards the Sun. And therefore, having lost the desired direction, the station was left without the main source of energy.

Also, a certain orientation is necessary for various antenna devices, which means that control was also lost, since the crew could not accurately determine the location of the station. 24 hours passed before control of the station was restored.

Loss of oxygen

On August 28, 1997, another problem happened at Mir. In the evening, shortly before lights out, the Electron hydrolysis unit, which produces oxygen, spontaneously switched off. The astronauts tried to turn it on several times, but Electron immediately turned off again. From Earth it was recommended to postpone repairs to the installation until the morning and use a solid fuel oxygen generator - a bomb that produces oxygen when burned. However, the checker did not catch fire either.

Remembering that in February, due to exactly the same checker (produced by the Moscow NPO Nauka), a serious fire broke out at the station, the control center ordered that the checkers no longer be used and still try to repair the Electron. Fortunately, the malfunction was identified in just a few minutes (it turned out that some kind of contact had broken), and already at half past ten the normal supply of oxygen to the station was restored.

However, it was this incident that was the last straw - since mid-1999, due to difficulties in financing the Mir station flight program, in order to save money, the operating mode of the complex was changed by including relatively long unmanned sections in the program. And in 2001, it was decided to flood the orbital station in the Pacific Ocean.

At the station, an oxygen regeneration bomb caught fire. At the station at that moment there were six people from the 22nd and 23rd expeditions: Valery Korzun, Alexander Kaleri, Vasily Tsibliev, Alexander Lazutkin, Reinhold Ewald and Jerry Linenger. Two Soyuz TM ships were docked at the station, which made it possible to evacuate all people, but one of the ships was cut off. The situation was made worse by the fact that the atmosphere was filled with smoke. The entire crew put on gas masks. After the fire was eliminated due to smoke, the astronauts had to wear respirators for some time.

An investigation revealed that the fire was caused by a single defect in an oxygen bomb.

Air conditioning system leak (March 1997)

In addition to enormous damage to the solar panels, as a result of the collision, a hole was formed in the Spectrum module with an area of ​​2 cm 2, which led to a decrease in air pressure throughout the station. At the time of the collision, cosmonauts Vasily Tsibliev and Alexander Lazutkin, as well as American astronaut Michael Foale, were on Mir. The crew decided to hermetically isolate the damaged module, thereby ensuring life support for the station. The situation was complicated by the fact that numerous cables and hoses ran through the docking hatch connecting the module to the station. Cutting off the module resulted in a temporary loss of electricity generated by the station - when the module was de-energized, the Spectra solar panels, which provided 40% of the electricity, were turned off.

At the time of the accident, Spektr was the main source of energy for the Mir station. Due to damage to the solar panels and interruption of critical cable connections when the module was isolated, the module's solar panels could not turn toward the Sun and release energy to the station. Immediately after the accident, there was insufficient energy to conduct experiments and supply most of the station's equipment.

The crew members of the 23rd expedition were awarded state awards - A. Lazutkin received the title of Hero of Russia, V. Tsibliev received the Order