Causes of defeat near Narva. The beginning of the Northern War. Defeat at Narva. Memory of the battle

The Battle of Narva is one of the most remarkable in the chronicle of the battles of Peter I. In fact, it was the first major battle of the young Russian state. And although it ended rather unsuccessfully for both Russia and Peter I, the significance of this battle is difficult to overestimate. It showed all the weaknesses of the Russian army and raised many unpleasant questions about weapons and logistics. The subsequent solution to these problems strengthened the army, making it one of the most victorious at that time. And this began with the battle of Narva. We will try to talk briefly about this event in our article.

Background

The beginning of the Russian-Swedish confrontation can be considered the conflict that flared up over the conclusion of the thirty-year Turkish peace. The process of concluding this agreement could have been disrupted due to strong Swedish resistance. Having learned about such opposition, the tsar ordered the expulsion of the Swedish ambassador Kniper-Krona from Moscow, and ordered his representative in Sweden to declare war on this kingdom. At the same time, Peter I agreed to end the matter peacefully on the condition that the Swedes cede the Narva fortress to him.

Charles XII found this treatment outrageous and took countermeasures. By his order, all property of the Russian embassy was confiscated, and all representatives were arrested. In addition, the King of Sweden ordered the property of Russian merchants to be seized, and they themselves to be used for hard work. Almost all of them died in captivity and poverty. Karl agreed to war.

Peter I found this situation unacceptable. However, he allowed all Swedes to leave Russia and did not seize their property. This is how the Northern War began. The Battle of Narva was one of the first episodes of this conflict.

Beginning of the confrontation

Trying to break through to the shores of the Baltic, Russian troops had been besieging Narva since August 1700. Six regiments of the Novgorod governor, Prince Trubetskoy, were sent to the Swedish fortress; in addition, to strengthen the positions of the Russian army, Count Golovin’s cavalry and the remaining regiments of his division were redeployed directly to Narva. The fortress was subjected to numerous bombings. which led to serious fires several times. The Russians were in no hurry to storm the well-defended walls, hoping for a quick surrender of Narva.

But soon they felt a shortage of gunpowder and shells, the supply of provisions had worsened, and there was a smell of treason. One of the captains, who had Swedish roots, broke his oath and went over to the enemy’s side. The Tsar, in order to avoid a repetition of such cases, dismissed all foreigners who held command posts and sent them into the depths of Russia, rewarding them with ranks. On November 18, Peter I personally went to Novgorod to oversee the delivery of military supplies and provisions. The continuation of the siege was entrusted to the Duke de Croix and Prince Ya. F. Dolgorukov.

Deployment of Russian troops

It should be noted that the Battle of Narva in 1700 was designed for active offensive actions - Russian troops occupied positions suitable only for active retreat, but not for defense. The advanced units of Peter's divisions were stretched along a thin line almost seven kilometers long. The artillery was also not in place - due to an acute shortage of shells, it was in no hurry to take up its positions near the bastions of Narva.

Swedish attack

Taking advantage of the absence of the king, hiding behind a blizzard and fog, they went on the offensive. Charles XII created two strike groups that managed to break through the Russian defenses in the center and on one of the flanks. The decisive offensive confused the Russians: many foreign officers of Peter’s troops, led by de Croix, went over to the enemy’s side.

The Battle of Narva showed all the weaknesses of the Russian army. Poor military training and betrayal of the command completed the defeat - the Russian troops fled.

Retreat from positions

The Russians were retreating... A large number of people and military equipment randomly flocked to the dilapidated bridge on the Narva River. Under the enormous weight, the bridge collapsed, drowning many people under its rubble. Seeing the general flight, the cavalry of the boyar Sheremetev, who occupied the rear guards of the Russian positions, succumbed to general panic and began to cross Narva by swimming.

The Battle of Narva was actually lost.

Counterattack

Only thanks to the steadfastness and courage of two separate regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky - the Swedish offensive was blocked. They stopped panicking and successfully repelled the onslaught of the royal troops. The surviving regiments were gradually joined by the remnants of the remaining Russian units. Several times Charles XII personally led the Swedes to attack, but each time he had to retreat. As night fell, the fighting subsided. Negotiations began.

Narva Agreement

The Battle of Narva ended in defeat for the Russians, but the core of the army survived. Despite the difficult situation of Peter's troops, Charles XII was not confident in the unconditional victory of the Swedes, so he accepted the terms of the peace treaty. The opponents entered into an agreement according to which Russian troops were allowed to retreat.

When floating to the other side of Narva, the Swedes captured several officers and took away all the weapons. The shameful peace that began lasted about four years. Only the next battle of Narva, in 1704, made it possible for the Russian army to even the score in this war. But that's a completely different story.

The results of the Narva embarrassment

The Battle of Narva showed the complete backwardness of the Russian army, its weak experience even in the face of a small enemy army. In the battle of 1700, only about 18 thousand people fought on the side of the Swedes against the thirty-five thousand strong Russian army. Lack of coordination, poor logistics, poor training and outdated weapons are the main reasons for the defeat in Narva. After analyzing the reasons, Peter I concentrated his efforts on combined arms training, and sent the best of his generals to study military affairs abroad. One of the priority tasks was to re-equip the army with the latest models of military equipment. Within a few years, the military reforms of Peter I led to the fact that the Russian army became one of the strongest in Europe.

[…] Hello for many years! And please remember about me. God gave this scripture in the service of the great sovereign near Rugodiv, stay healthy, and henceforth I trust in the all-generous God. And we have been standing near Rugodiv for the fourth week and are dying a cold and hungry death: bread has become expensive, we buy penny bread for two altyns. And you, Father Stepan Prokofievich, will be able to visit it yourself, and you will bring me some kind of fur coat, a shirt and trousers, and good clothes or booties, soon, without delay. And if it’s impossible on your own, and you come with someone, you really need it, and even a hryvnia’s worth of bread, and I’ll pay all the money here. Yes, write to me about your health, so that I may rejoice over your health in Christ. Therefore, I write to you little, but hit you with my forehead a lot.

SIEGE OF NARVA

[…] There was news that Narva was poorly fortified and there were few troops in it. On September 23, Peter stood near Narva and immediately began preparations for the siege together with the Saxon engineer general Gallart, who was sent by King Augustus. Difficulties emerged immediately: much less military supplies had been prepared than was needed, according to Gallart. Another problem: the troops, due to the bad autumn road and lack of supplies, moved very slowly, and valuable time was running out. In total, the troops gathered near Narva ranged from 35 to 40,000, exhausted by the difficult campaign and lack of food supplies: the guns turned out to be unusable. Finally, on October 20, fire opened on the city from all Russian batteries; They hoped that the city, with its small means, would not last long, when suddenly news came that Charles XII had landed in Pernau with what was said to be a large army. After a council of war, the Russians fortified their camp. The shooting at the city continued until finally a shortage of cannonballs, bombs and gunpowder forced a ceasefire. It was necessary to wait for their delivery.

Soloviev S.M. History of Russia from ancient times. M., 1962. Book. 14. Ch. 4. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/solov/solv14p4.htm

DISPOSITION NEAR NARVA

It was a strong fortress at that time. It was located on the left bank of the river. Narova, 12 km from its mouth. On the right bank of the river there was a bridgehead - the ancient Ivangorod castle, built at the beginning of the 17th century. The area around Narva was swampy. After the autumn rains it became impassable for troops. The fortress had solid fortifications and walls that required strong artillery to break through gaps. Its garrison, led by Colonel Horn, numbered 2 thousand people.

Russian troops numbering 34 thousand people were camped on the left bank of the Narova in one line, which in the form of a semicircle covered Narva and adjoined the flanks to the river. The front of the camp, about 7 km long, faced not the fortress, but to the west and consisted of fortifications in the form of an embankment with a moat (aproshi), behind which the troops were located. To ensure siege operations and conduct reconnaissance, irregular cavalry under the command of B.P. Sheremetev was advanced to the Revel road.

Rostunov I. I., Avdeev V. A., Osipova M. N., Sokolov Yu. F. History of the Northern War 1700-1721 http://militera.lib.ru/h/rostunov_ii2/02.html

BOMBING THE FORTRESS

On November 1, following the attack at Ivan-Gorod, a new line was drawn, and during the attack at Shlos, 2 people were killed and 5 were wounded. Today they fired heavily at the city from cannons and also threw bombs, which started a small fire in the city, but was soon extinguished. Our guns had more defense against the city; Moreover, it was noticed that some of the guns exploded, even though several charges were not discharged.

2. G. Allart ordered to make one lodgement on the false attack on the right side; Then they fired heavily, where 3 were killed and 20 people were wounded. Then one line on the left side of the batteries for 16 guns was drawn for 70 steps. Likewise, during an attack, one line was drawn for 100 steps; with 2 killed and 6 wounded.

3. The aforementioned cradle was repaired, and the line and batteries were added 60 steps; Also, during the shloss attack, they retreated 36 steps. 5 people were injured and no one was killed. Also, strong cannon fire and bomb throwing was restrained, as the regimental cannons and bombs became scarce.

"THE GREATEST VICTORY" OF KARL

The quick victory over Denmark won by the eighteen-year-old Charles XII freed his hands for immediate action against the Russians who had besieged Narva, and with extraordinary speed he transported his army by sea to Pernov (Pernau) and from there moved towards Narva. At this time, the entire ruling noble class in Sweden supported the king with particular enthusiasm. On November 18, 1700, Charles attacked the Russian army besieging Narva and inflicted a heavy defeat on it. The Russian command was in the hands of a Frenchman in the Austrian service, Duke de Croy, who happened to turn up, although he received excellent recommendations (Russian sources call him de Croy or von Croy). This adventurer, invited to Russian service in 1700, brought with him eighty officers from Vienna. Half of this “officer” recruited by De Croix, I note by the way, surrendered near Narva along with their commander, who later, already in Swedish captivity, begged Peter for efimka for a whole year, for “42 people were forced to eat with the great food.” and feed these "poor captives".

The officers, hastily recruited and untrained, commanded the majority of recruits taken straight from the plow, who had never been in battle. This de Croix turned out to be below all criticism as a strategist. He stretched out his army in a long thin strip and was content with that. During the battle, almost no orders came from him at all, and if he gave any, they were understood only by Germans who were hastily taken as officers, but not by Russian officers and certainly not by soldiers. The Russians' weapons were very bad; the guns exploded and killed the servants. Finally, the delivery of provisions was so organized that the soldiers of some regiments did not eat for a day just before Charles attacked them. The soldiers considered their unknown commander-in-chief de Croix and the German officers entirely to be traitors who would hand them over to “their” king. Under such conditions, the strange thing is not that the Russians suffered losses, but that the battle lasted so long: from morning until dark at night. This is explained by the courage and stamina of several detachments and, above all, two guards regiments (Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky), and in fact, Charles XII learned that the Swedes had won only when the Russians offered the following conditions: they receive free access with weapons, across the river, on all four sides. In captivity, despite the conditions, insidiously violated, Charles detained generals, colonels and officers of noble birth.

This “greatest victory” of Charles was trumpeted for years by the Swedes, Germans, and the French and English who sympathized with him. If we compare Narva with Poltava, where the Swedes rushed in all directions, into a stampede after just two hours of a general battle, and where (counting the capitulation at Perevolochnaya) the entire army that still survived the battle surrendered without any conditions, then it may seem strange that the Narva the defeat of the Russians was considered such an unheard of military feat by the Swedish king.

The army moved to Narva, numbering about 35 thousand, consisted mostly of recruits under the command of bad officers and foreign generals who did not enjoy trust. There were no strategic paths; they could not bring enough shells or food along the muddy autumn roads. They began to shell the fortress, but the cannons turned out to be unusable, and they soon stopped firing due to lack of gunpowder. The besiegers, according to an eyewitness, walked around the fortress like cats around hot porridge; no measures were taken against the offensive of Charles XII. In a fierce November blizzard, the king crept up to the Russian camp, and the Swedish 8,000-strong brigade destroyed the Russian corps. However, victory was every minute within a hair's breadth of disaster. The king was most afraid that Sheremetev's noble and Cossack cavalry would strike him in the rear; but she, according to Karl, was so kind that she rushed to run and swim across the Narova River, drowning a thousand horses. The winner was so afraid of his vanquished that during the night he hastened to build a new bridge in place of the one that had collapsed under the pressure of the fugitives, in order to help them quickly get to their side of the river. Peter left the camp on the eve of the battle so as not to embarrass the commander-in-chief, a foreigner, and he really was not embarrassed, he was the first to surrender himself into captivity and carried along other foreign commanders, frightened by the bitterness of his Russian command.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT

Narva was besieged by a strong Russian army (35–40 thousand people). But Peter began the campaign in the fall, the weather interfered with military operations, and the lack of roads left the army without bread and fodder. The shortcomings of the military organization made themselves felt: although the troops stationed near Narva were regular, of a new system, Peter himself admitted that they were “not trained,” that is, bad. In addition, the majority of the officers were foreigners who were not loved by the soldiers, who did not know Russian well, and there was no one authority over the entire army. Peter entrusted the command to the Russian general Golovin and the Frenchman recommended by the Germans, the Duke of Croix. And Peter himself did not refuse orders for military actions. There was thus a plurality of commands. Under all these conditions, among the Russian troops there naturally arose a fear of a clash with Charles’s army, covered with the laurels of recent victories in Denmark.

And after the defeat of Denmark, Charles went against Peter. The Russians near Narva learned about the approach of the Swedes already when Karl was only 20–25 versts away. Peter immediately left the army, leaving de Croix's command. Knowing the courage and personal bravery of Peter, we cannot explain his departure by cowardice; it would be more accurate to think that Peter considered the case at Narva lost and left to prepare the state for defense against the Swedish invasion. On November 20, 1700, Charles actually defeated the Russian army, took away the artillery and captured the generals. Peter hurried to strengthen Novgorod and Pskov, instructed Repnin to collect the remnants of the returning defeated army and waited for Charles on the borders of the Moscow state.

But Karl's mistake saved Peter from further troubles. Karl did not take advantage of his victory and did not march on Moscow. Some of the votes in his military council were in favor of a campaign in Russia, but Charles looked myopically at Peter’s forces, considered him a weak enemy - and went against Augustus. Peter could breathe more freely. But the situation was still difficult: the army was upset, there was no artillery, the defeat had a bad effect on the mood within the state and destroyed the prestige of Russia abroad. […] Under the fresh impression of defeat, Peter flashed the thought of seeking peace, but Peter did not find anyone abroad willing to help Russia […].

Plans of King Charles XII. Charles XII brought 8 thousand soldiers to Narva (5 thousand infantry and 3 thousand cavalry; according to other sources, 10 thousand soldiers came with the king). On November 19, the Swedes managed to secretly approach the defense line of the Russian army. They concentrated in the area of ​​​​the Hermannsberg heights, on which they installed their artillery. With attacks on the center of the Russian position, Charles XII planned to divide the Russian army into parts and defeat them one by one.

The Swedes are advancing. During the battle, which began in the middle of the day, the Swedes managed to implement part of their plan. Thick snow allowed them to approach Russian positions unnoticed. The Swedes filled the ditches with bundles of brushwood and quickly captured the fortifications and the cannons located there. The thin line of defense was broken through, and the Russian troops were divided into two parts. In addition, the Russian army was left without overall leadership, because foreign military specialists, led by the Duke of Croix, surrendered already at the beginning of the battle. An eyewitness justified this transition by the fact that there were cases of reprisals by Russian soldiers against foreign officers. There were shouts of “The Germans betrayed us!” On the Russian right flank, a panicked flight began towards the bridge. There was a crush and the bridge collapsed.

The Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments repel the Swedes. At this critical moment, only the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments were able to repel the enemy. They surrounded themselves with carts and steadfastly held their defense. They were joined by other troops who did not have time to cross the river. Charles XII himself led his troops to attack the Russian guard regiments, but to no avail. On the left flank, A. Weide also managed to stop the flight of his soldiers. Sheremetev's local cavalry swam across to the right bank of the Narva, while more than a thousand people went to the bottom. Each of the remaining units of the Russian army was no less in number than the army of Charles XII.

Negotiations and withdrawal of Russian troops. Therefore, the king willingly agreed to the negotiations offered to him by the Russian side. An agreement was concluded according to which Russian troops with weapons and banners were to leave for the right bank of the river. The Swedes got all the Russian artillery.

On the morning of November 20, the bridge was repaired and the withdrawal of Russian troops began. After Golovin's division, Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments crossed, Charles XII violated the agreement and demanded that the troops of the left flank surrender their weapons. Weida's division had to comply with this requirement, after which it was allowed to cross the bridge. The Swedes plundered the convoy, and 79 Russian generals and officers were captured, including Ya.F. Dolgorukov, A.M. Golovin, A. Veide, Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, I.Yu. Trubetskoy and other notable persons. Having entered Narva, liberated from the blockade, Karl ordered noble Russian prisoners to be escorted through the streets.

Causes of defeat and loss. The battle of Narva was lost by the Russian army. Losses amounted to 6-8 thousand people - killed and died from hunger and disease. 145 guns were lost. The reasons for the defeat were the poor preparation of the Russian army. Only a few of its regiments (Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky, Lefortovo and Gordonov) had little combat experience. Unlike the two guards, the old soldier regiments, whose leaders were no longer alive by this time, did not show themselves well. The leadership of the Russian army turned out to be inexperienced and disunited. Some historians consider the “disorganization of command” to be the main reason for the defeat, but the entire system of the Russian army was imperfect. The use of foreign military specialists also did not pay off.

Assessment of Peter I. Twenty years after the event, Peter I himself gave a completely objective assessment of the events near Narva: “And so the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable; but it must be understood over which army it was committed, for only one old Lefortovo regiment was... two regiments of the guard were on two attacks near Azov, but field battles, and especially with regular troops, were never seen. The other regiments... both officers and privates, were recruits... Moreover, late in the day there was a great famine, because of the great mud it was impossible to bring food, and in a single word, the whole thing was like an infant’s play, but art below the view."

Danger for Russia. After the battle of Narva, the Russian army actually lost its combat effectiveness. It is hardly possible to agree with the existing opinion that even after the Battle of Narva, Karl was afraid of the Russians; he supposedly “not only hastened to release the entire Russian army, but also retreated to Dorpat himself, without looking for a new meeting.” If Charles XII at that moment wanted to implement plans of conquest towards Russia, he could well have developed his success, seized significant territories, etc. The consequences could be catastrophic for Russia. Peter feared such a course of events; on pain of death, he forbade the remaining troops to retreat from the line of Novgorod and Pskov and ordered the hasty strengthening of the northwestern borders of the state.

But the worst did not happen. Charles XII concentrated on the fight against Augustus II, whom he considered the most dangerous of his opponents. The easy victory at Narva deceived the vain Swedish king and turned his head. As modern Swedish historians note, the contemptuous attitude towards the Russians and the Russian army that arose among Charles near Narva turned out to be fatal in 1708 and 1709. He believed that Russia was already finished. The Swedish medal, stamped in honor of the victory at Narva, depicted Peter I running, losing his sword and hat; the inscription was a quotation from the Gospel: “He went out, weeping bitterly.” The European press and journalism picked up this idea. Russia's diplomatic prestige has fallen sharply. European diplomats openly laughed at their Russian colleagues. Rumors spread in Germany about new, more severe defeats of the Russian army and about the rise of Princess Sophia to power. The European press spread the idea of ​​the Narva defeat as an irreparable catastrophe for the Russian state. For almost ten years, Europe will look at Russia through the unsuccessful experience of Narva.

Read also other topics Part III ""European Concert": the struggle for political balance" section “West, Russia, East in the battles of the 17th – early 18th centuries”:

  • 9. "Swedish flood": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
    • Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
  • 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (2 July 1644, 14 June 1645)
    • Marston Moor. Victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
  • 11. “Dynastic wars” in Europe: the struggle “for the Spanish inheritance” at the beginning of the 18th century.
    • "Dynastic Wars". The fight for the Spanish inheritance
  • 12. European conflicts are becoming global
    • War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
    • Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
  • 13. Russia and the “Swedish question”

It became the first serious test for the Russian army in the Northern War. In that year 1700, no one expected that the campaign would last two decades. Therefore, the “Narva Confusion” seemed to many to be a fatal failure.

Background of the battle

The Northern War began because Peter was trying to get convenient harbors on the Baltic Sea. These lands once belonged to the Russian kingdom, but were lost during the Troubles of the 17th century. In what year did the Narva Confusion take place? In 1700. At this time, the young Russian Tsar was making many plans to transform Russia into a real world power.

In 1698, Peter I was able to achieve diplomatic success. The King of Poland and Elector of Saxony Augustus II entered into a secret alliance with him against Sweden. Later, the Danish monarch Frederick IV joined this agreement.

Having such allies behind him, Peter hoped to act freely against Sweden. The king of this country, Charles XII, ascended the throne at a very young age and seemed a weak opponent. Peter's initial goal was Ingria. This territory is the modern Leningrad region. The largest fortress in the region was Narva. That's where the Russian troops headed.

On February 22, 1700, Peter declared war on Sweden, immediately after learning of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which freed him from conflict on two fronts. Nevertheless, he did not yet know that the Narva embarrassment awaited him.

The state of the Russian army

They prepared for war with their northern neighbor in advance. However, this did not at all guarantee success. The Russian army still lived in the 17th century and lagged behind the European ones in technical terms. In total, there were about 200 thousand soldiers in its ranks, which was a lot. However, they all lacked material support, training and reliable discipline.

Peter tried to organize the army according to the modern Western model. To do this, he invited various specialists from European countries - mainly Germans and Dutch. The vector was chosen correctly, but by 1700 only two regiments met all the norms and requirements. Modernization and retraining required a lot of time, and Peter was in a hurry to finish off his enemies, hoping that surprise would give him an advantage.

By the beginning of the Northern War, Russia still did not produce its own muskets. In addition, from the very beginning the army was faced with a problem such as an underdeveloped transport system. In bad weather, roads in the northern regions became a real test for soldiers who had to travel more than a thousand kilometers. These factors also contributed to the phenomenon that became known as the Narva Confusion.

State of the Swedish Army

Russia's northern neighbor, on the other hand, was known throughout Europe for its well-organized army. Its reformer was the famous king who terrified his enemies during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).

The Swedish cavalry consisted of contract soldiers who received large salaries. The infantry was recruited by compulsory conscription from a specific province, however, the infantry also earned good money. The army was divided into squadrons and battalions, which interacted effectively on the battlefield. Each soldier was accustomed to strict discipline, which helped him during the battle. Over the last century, the Swedish army has won only victories, and it was thanks to it that the country began its expansion in Northern Europe. This was a formidable enemy, underestimating whose power turned out to be a fatal mistake.

Events on the eve of the battle

On November 17, he informed the Tsar that the Swedes were advancing and were very close. No one carried out normal reconnaissance, and in the Russian camp near Narva they did not know the exact size of the enemy troops. Peter I, having learned about the approach of the enemy, left for Novgorod along with Alexander Menshikov and Fyodor Golovin. Field Marshal General Karl-Eugene Croix remained in command. The Duke (that was his title) tried to resist this decision of the Tsar, but was unable to convince Peter.

Later, the sovereign explained his action by saying that he needed to meet with the Polish king, as well as replenish his convoys and reserves. At the same time, the Swedes, after their victory, tried to interpret this episode as the cowardice of the king. The Narva embarrassment of the Russians served as the reason for the release of commemorative medals, which depicted a sobbing Peter.

Construction of the Russian army

The troops under the leadership of Croix did everything to strengthen themselves on the banks of the Narva River. For this purpose, fortifications were built on the western side. The entire army was divided into three parts. The right flank was occupied by units of Automon Golovin, numbering about 14 thousand people. In the middle stood Prince Trubetskoy with his squad. There were 6 thousand people under his command. On the left was the cavalry, which was subordinate to Sheremetev.

When it became clear that the Swedes were already very close, de Croix ordered the army to take up fighting positions. Communications were stretched over seven kilometers. At the same time, the troops stood in a thin line. There was no reserve or spare regiment behind them.

Karl's strategy

On the morning of November 30, 1700, she approached the Russian positions. The Narva Confusion was approaching. The date of the battle is known from three sources. If we refer to the pre-reform calendar, then the battle took place on November 19, in Swedish - November 20, in modern - November 30.

The appearance of the Swedes was unexpected, despite all previous preparations. At the military council, Sheremetev proposed dividing the army. Part of it was supposed to go to the blockade of Narva, and the other was to give a general battle to the Swedes in the field. The Duke did not agree with this proposal and decided to leave the initiative to the young Swedish monarch, who himself led his troops. De Croix believed that the Russian army would be more efficient if it remained in its old positions.

The Swedes were well aware of the enemy's state of affairs, so they were able to develop the most effective strategy. Charles XII decided to press the Russian flanks, since the center of the army was the most fortified and could defeat the king. This is how the Narva Confusion happened. The Great Northern War might have had different results if not for the best Swedish strategists - Karl Renschild and Arvid Horn. They gave wise advice to the young monarch, who was brave, but without the support of his military leaders he could make a mistake.

Swedish attack

The Narva embarrassment is not only the poor preparation of the Russians for battle, but also a lightning strike from the enemy. The Swedes wanted to pin their enemy to the fortress. Thus, the space for retaliatory maneuver practically disappeared. The only escape route led to the cold Narva River.

The infantry was covered by artillery fire, which the Swedes had installed on a nearby hill, which offered a good view of the area. Snowfall was another reason why the Narva Confusion occurred. This was the Swedes' luck. The wind blew in the faces of the Russian soldiers. Visibility did not exceed a dozen steps, which made it extremely difficult to return fire.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, two deep Swedish wedges struck the flanks of the extended Russian army. Very soon, gaps appeared in three places at once, where Karl’s blows could not be repelled. The coordination of the Swedes was exemplary; the Narva embarrassment became inevitable. Its importance is difficult to overestimate, because within a couple of hours the enemy broke into the Russian camp.

Panic and desertion began. The fugitives had no choice but to try to ford Narva. About a thousand people drowned in the icy water. Before this, a small one was thrown across the river, which could not withstand the onslaught of the fugitives and collapsed, which only increased the number of victims. The Narva embarrassment, the date of which turned out to be a dark day for Russian military history, was obvious.

The foreign generals placed at the head of the army by Peter also began to retreat, which infuriated the Russian officers. Among them was de Croix himself, as well as Ludwig Allart. They surrendered to the Swedes, fleeing from their own soldiers.

The greatest resistance was provided on the right flank. Here Russian soldiers fenced themselves off from the enemy with slingshots and carts. However, this could no longer change the outcome of the battle. As night fell, the situation worsened. There is a well-known episode when two Swedish detachments in the dark mistook each other for Russians and opened fire on their own. The center was broken through, and because of this, the two defending flanks could not contact each other.

Surrender

This was the beginning of the Northern War. The Narva embarrassment was an unpleasant but inevitable fact. As morning approached, the Russian troops remaining in their positions decided to begin negotiations on surrender. The main parliamentarian was Prince Yakov Dolgorukov. He agreed with the Swedes about free passage to the opposite bank. At the same time, the Russian army lost its convoy and artillery, but it still had banners and weapons.

The Swedes received significant trophies: 32 thousand rubles from the royal treasury, 20 thousand muskets. The losses were disproportionate. If the Swedes lost 670 people killed, then the Russians lost 7 thousand. 700 soldiers remained in captivity, contrary to the terms of surrender.

Meaning

How did the Narva embarrassment turn out for the Russians? The historical significance of this event had long-term consequences. First of all, Russia's reputation suffered. Her army was no longer taken seriously throughout Europe. Peter was openly mocked, and Charles gained the reputation of a brave commander.

Nevertheless, time has shown that this was a Pyrrhic victory for the Swedes. Karl decided that Russia was not dangerous and began to fight with Poland and Denmark. Peter took advantage of the respite provided. He took up military reforms in the state, transformed the army and invested a colossal amount of resources into it.

It bore fruit. Within a few years, the world learned about the Russian victories in the Baltic. The main battle took place near Poltava in 1709. The Swedes were defeated, and Karl fled. It became clear that, oddly enough, the Narva embarrassment turned out to be useful for all of Russia. finally deprived Sweden of its established status as the dominant power in the Baltic Sea. In 1721, a peace treaty was signed, under which Russia received many lands and ports in the region. St. Petersburg, the new capital of the country, was founded here. The Narva Confusion, the Battle of Grenham - all these events became a symbol of the bright and complex era of Peter the Great.

§ 104. The Great Northern War. The first years of the war

In 1699, Peter began preparations for war with the Swedes. He entered into an alliance with Augustus II, the Saxon-Polish king and elector, and with the Danish king Christian. The allies convinced him that the time had come for action against Sweden, since the too young and frivolous King Charles XII had reigned on the Swedish throne. However, Peter did not dare to start a war with Charles until peace was concluded with the Turks. In August 1700, he received news that his ambassadors had achieved peace in Constantinople with the concession of Azov to Moscow - and immediately Moscow troops were moved to the Baltic Sea. The famous Swedish war began - for as much as 21 years.

In his desire to seize the shores of the Baltic Sea, Peter continued the policies of all the Moscow kings who preceded him. Ivan the Terrible endured a terrible struggle for the Baltic coast (§62). What was lost from the Russian lands on the seashore during Grozny was returned to Moscow by Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich (§63) and again lost by Vasily Shuisky (§70). Sovereigns of the 17th century did not forget this loss, approved by the Stolbovo Treaty of 1617 (§77). Under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin especially insisted on the idea of ​​​​the need to break through to the Baltic Sea, specifically to the Gulf of Riga, for direct maritime relations with central Europe. But at that time, the realization of this age-old dream of Moscow patriots was still impossible: Tsar Alexei was most of all connected with Little Russian affairs and the fight with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Turkey. Under Peter, relations in the south were established, and he naturally turned his impulse to the Baltic shores, obeying Moscow’s spontaneous desire to the West.

Peter sent his troops to the Gulf of Finland and besieged the Swedish fortress of Narva. But at this time it was discovered that the young and frivolous King Charles XII had enormous energy and military talent. As soon as the allies began war against him, he gathered his available troops, rushed to Copenhagen and forced the Danes to peace. He then headed towards the Russians towards Narva and attacked them as quickly and unexpectedly as he attacked the Danes. Peter had all his regular army (up to 40 thousand people) near Narva. It stood in a fortified camp on the left bank of the river. Narova. Charles burst into this camp from the west, crushed and drove the Russians to the river (November 19, 1700). Having only one bridge on Narova, the Russians escaped by swimming and died. Only Peter’s “amusing” regiments (Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky) stood at the bridge and crossed the river with honor after the rest of the army fled. Karl got all the artillery and the entire camp of the Moscow army. Pleased with the easy victory, Charles considered Peter's forces destroyed, did not pursue the Russians and did not invade Moscow. He went against his third enemy Augustus and thereby made a big mistake: Peter quickly recovered and restored his army; Karl himself, as Peter put it, was “stuck in Poland” for a long time, where Augustus hid from him.

Before the battle, Peter himself was near Narva and saw all the disorder of his army. It was poorly trained, poorly dressed and fed; it did not like those hired “German” generals to whom it was subordinate (Duke von Krui and others); there was not enough gunpowder and shells for the siege; the guns were bad. As Karl approached, Peter left for Novgorod in the belief that the Swedes would invade Russia and that Russian fortresses must be prepared for defense. The defeat of the army at Narva did not lead Peter to despair. On the contrary, just as after the first Azov failure, he showed enormous energy during the winter of 1700–1701. managed to gather a new army and cast up to 300 new cannons, for which, due to the lack of copper in the state, even church bells were taken. Having met his ally King Augustus (in Birzhi), Peter concluded a new agreement with him on how they could stick together against Charles.

In accordance with this agreement, in all subsequent years Peter waged war in two different areas. Firstly, he helped Augustus in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with money, bread and troops. The Russian army went to Poland and Lithuania more than once, and there were no defeats, but, however, without great successes. The important thing was that it was possible to detain Charles XII in Poland and not allow him until the final triumph over Augustus. In this theater of war, Peter’s favorite of his “amusing” men, Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, was especially distinguished, to whom Peter entrusted all his troops here. Secondly, Peter, separately from his ally, undertook the conquest of the Finnish coast and the old Livonian lands in general (Estonia and Livonia), taking advantage of the fact that Charles’s main forces were diverted to Poland. In 1701 and the following years, the Russian cavalry under the command of “Field Marshal” Boris Petrovich Sheremetev “stayed” in these areas: Sheremetev ravaged the country, twice defeated the Swedish corps of General Schlippenbach (at Erestfer and Hummelshof) and took the old Russian cities of Yam and Koporye. Peter himself appeared in the fall of 1702 at the source of the river. Neva and took the Swedish fortress of Noteburg, which stood on the site of the old Novgorod Oreshek. Having resumed the fortifications of this fortress, Peter named it Shlisselburg, that is, the “key city” to the sea. In the spring of 1703, the Russians went down to the Neva estuaries and took, at the confluence of the river. Okhta to the Neva, Swedish fortification Nyenschanz. Below this fortification on the Neva, in May 1703, Peter founded the Peter and Paul Fortress and, under its walls, founded a city that received the name “Peterburkha,” or St. Petersburg.

This was for Peter a fortified exit to the sea, which he immediately took advantage of. On Lake Ladoga (more precisely, on the Svir River), sea vessels were hastily built and in the same 1703 they were already launched. In the fall of this year, Peter had already begun work on Kotlin Island to build the sea fortress of Kronshlot (the predecessor of the current Kronstadt). This fortress became the harbor for the new Baltic Fleet. Finally, in 1704, the strong Swedish fortresses of Dorpat (Yuryev) and Narva were taken. Thus, Peter not only acquired for himself access to the sea in his “paradise” of St. Petersburg, but also protected this exit with a number of strongholds from the sea (Kronshlot) and from land (Narva, Yam, Koporye, Dorpat). By allowing Peter to achieve such success, Charles made an irreparable mistake, which he decided to make up for only when he dealt with his other enemy, Augustus.

Share with friends or save for yourself:

Loading...