Battle of Rzhev. Rzhev meat grinder Germans about the battle of Rzhev

More than seventy years have passed since the end of the Battle of Rzhev. But, despite its grandeur, not inferior in scale to either the Battles of Stalingrad or Kursk, few people know about it. Unless a war veteran who was in that meat grinder will never forget it. Yes, Alexander Tvardovsky could not help but remember her after the war in his poem “I was killed near Rzhev.” Nobody else! - neither generals, nor authorities, nor military historians, nor writers, nor even journalists - no one! did not say a word about it AS ABOUT THE BATTLE.
Our losses in killed and wounded in the Battle of Rzhev approached TWO AND A HALF MILLION PEOPLE. This exceeds the total losses of our troops in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk combined.
But Rzhev was never taken.

Therefore, officially, the GREATEST BATTLE OF RZHEV is still not called a BATTLE, but is listed in the rank of “battles of local significance.” Ask any of the three front-line soldiers you met, and you will be convinced that one of them fought near Rzhev. How many of our troops were there!
The question arises: where does this belittlement and silence come from? Indeed, in fact, IN THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THERE WAS NO MORE GRAND AND MORE SCALE BATTLE THAN THE BATTLE OF RZHEV - neither in terms of the number of troops involved - ABOUT TEN MILLION ON BOTH SIDES, nor in terms of the territory covered - EIGHT AREAS, nor in terms of the duration of the battles - 17 MONTHS, neither in the NUMBER OF OPERATIONS and sophistication of maneuvers, nor in the ingenuity of the configurations of detours, detours, “cauldrons” and counterattacks, and also in STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR BOTH WARRIORS, this battle was KEY.

During the Battle of Rzhev, our side carried out an unprecedented number of military operations for one battle: six offensive and four defensive. 5 FRONTS, more than 30 ARMIES and CORPS were involved in the battles. An unprecedented number of TANKS took part in the battles - MORE THAN ONE AND A FIFTY THOUSAND units. Our losses also indicate the scale of the fighting: 2,060,000 people. This does not take into account the losses of the 39th Army, which in July 1942 was surrounded southwest of Rzhev, and the Germans alone captured 50,100 people. And without taking into account the losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the battles in the Rzhev and Sychevsky directions in November - December forty-two. Nobody calculated what the total losses were during the 17 months of the Rzhev confrontation. Because the fighting went on day and night for more than a year, the units were constantly replenished with new soldiers and officers. During the periods of the most fierce fighting, the divisions lost 300-350 people killed and 700-800 wounded per day. Surrounded by the Germans in swampy forests, far from human habitation, our armies were almost completely destroyed or perished from starvation. That is why volunteer search teams of students and schoolchildren still carry out cartloads of bones of soldiers who died in the swamps and bury them.

The circumference of the Rzhev salient along the front arc was 530 kilometers. In depth it went beyond Vyazma to 160 kilometers. And it was only 150 kilometers from Moscow. Both Stalin and Hitler were aware of the importance of this bridgehead, and therefore the former sought to eliminate it at all costs, and the latter tried with all his might to retain it. The following facts speak of the constant interest that both Hitler and Stalin showed in the battles for Rzhev. Hitler, when his troops were leaving Rzhev, wanted to hear on the phone the explosion of the bridge across the Volga. And Stalin, who had never gone to the front, could not resist visiting Rzhev on August 4, 1943, six months after the fighting. It was there that he signed the order for the first fireworks in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
The battles near Rzhev were led on our side by later outstanding commanders: Marshals Stalin, Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky.

Our whole tragedy consisted in the fact that we advanced, made detours through swampy forests, along the floodplains of numerous rivers and rivulets, along the shores of countless lakes, along the hills and ridges of the Valdai and Smolensk hills, under endless bombings of enemy aircraft, often finding ourselves without food and ammunition in deserted swamps and without any hope of help from their own, and the Germans blocked our communications with the rear and held their defense in dry places, towering above our positions, in well-equipped bunkers and dugouts. Our soldiers and officers fought selflessly and heroically near Rzhev and Vyazma, Sychevka and Pogorelye Gorodishche, at Olenin and Bely. The most offensive thing for a soldier in war is when, with all his courage, endurance, ingenuity, dedication, and selflessness, he cannot defeat a well-fed, arrogant, well-armed enemy occupying a more advantageous position - for reasons beyond his control: due to lack of weapons, ammunition, food, aviation support, remoteness of rear areas. It was not the fault of our soldiers and officers that the commanders, prompted by Stalin, carried out military operations that were not supported financially, and primarily from the air, although in concept they were daring and remarkable.

The Germans called Rzhev all sorts of things: “the key to Moscow”, “a pistol aimed at the chest of Moscow”, “a springboard for a jump to Moscow”. And they fought furiously near Rzhev. If we, following the example of Hitler, issued Stalin’s order No. 227 “Not a step back!”, reinforced by barrier detachments that lay behind the attackers with machine guns and fired at the retreating, then the Germans dealt with their retreating no less brutally. By the way, our soldiers and officers, rushing forward in a rush of offensive, did not notice any barrier detachments behind them. The Germans are still hiding their losses near Rzhev, although they were also very high: in battalions of 300 soldiers there were up to 90, or even 20 people left. Our losses during the attack on the broken German defense in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation were small. They began after delays due to rains, when the Germans' fear subsided and they again firmly settled in the internal, well-equipped lines.
We advanced on Rzhev through corpse fields. During the Rzhev battles, many “valleys of death” and “groves of death” appeared. It is difficult for anyone who has not been there to imagine what a stinking mess under the summer sun is, consisting of thousands of human bodies covered with worms.

This fact speaks about the fierceness of the battles for Rzhev. In only one village of Polunino, which stands four kilometers north of Rzhev, THIRTEEN THOUSAND SOVIET SOLDIERS from SEVENTY-THREE DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES who fought here are buried in a mass grave. Their bodies were collected from the surrounding fields. An obelisk rises above the grave. It is carved on it: “Soldiers, sergeants and officers 2, 5, 10, 16, 20, 24, 32, 37, 43, 52, 78, 107, 111, 114, 143, 178, 182, 183, 210 are buried here, 215, 220, 243, 246, 247, 248, 250, 348, 357, 359, 369, 371, 375, 379, 413, 415, 632, 879, 966th Rifle Division, 33rd Separate Armored Division, 4 , 35, 36, 119, 130, 132, 133, 136, 153, 156, 238th Rifle Brigade, 18, 25, 28, 35, 38, 55, 85, 115, 119, 144, 153, 238, 249 , 255, 270, 298, 427, 438, 472, 492, 829th tank brigades, 91st Guards. min. brigade, 438th division. sapper brigade."

There were twelve thousand soldiers in each division and eight thousand soldiers in each brigade. True, no more than two thousand from each division participated directly in the battle at the same time, the rest served them. You can count how many of our soldiers took part in the battles just in the area of ​​the village of Polunino!
A very truthful assessment of the Rzhev military epic was given by Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov. He was a participant in the Battle of Rzhev, leading a platoon and company in an attack on the Germans. In 1998, in the Rzhev News newspaper on February 27, the marshal published an article “Between Rzhev and Vyazma,” in which he spoke very critically about the Rzhev military epic. We also used the figures he provided in the article. Unfortunately, as Marshal Kulikov notes, the command of the Kalinin and Western Fronts unsuccessfully organized the pursuit of the enemy leaving Rzhev, which led to the loss of 138,500 people, including 38,800 killed. Why were these 140 thousand victims thrown after the Germans?

However, without the “Rzhev Academy” - this bloody school of failures, the future successes of our commanders at Stalingrad, Kursk and all the way to Berlin would hardly have been possible.
As a result of the liquidation of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky salient, the threat to Moscow was finally removed. But the fact that Rzhev was not taken by us either in January, as Stalin ordered, or in August forty-two, and was abandoned by the Germans only in March forty-three, did not honor our command. That is why the commanders who fought there were so bashfully silent about the battles of Rzhev. And the fact that this silence crossed out the heroic efforts, inhuman trials, courage and self-sacrifice of millions of Soviet soldiers who fought near Rzhev, the fact that this was a betrayal and outrage against the memory of almost a million victims, whose remains for the most part have not yet been buried - It turns out that this is not so important.

The battle for Rzhev is the most tragic, bloodiest and most unsuccessful of all the battles fought by our army. And it’s not customary for us to write about failures. But a long war cannot consist of victories alone. Isn’t the tragedy of millions more important than the dubious honor of even the most important uniform?! And patriotic education will not suffer from showing the heroism and tragedy of soldiers who laid down their lives for victory in failed military operations.

And so we remain silent about the Battle of Rzhev. The Germans boast of their victories, calling Rzhev “the cornerstone of the Eastern Front.” But this was not their success - but our failure, the origins of which lie in the tragic beginning of the war. Stalin's strategic miscalculation at the beginning of the war allowed Hitler to reach not only Rzhev, but also Moscow WITHOUT SPECIAL VALOR. Well, possessing an excellent defensive line Vyazma - Rzhev, the Germans, under the personal supervision of Hitler, stubbornly defended themselves. If it weren’t for Stalin’s haste and impatience, and if instead of six unsupported offensive operations, in each of which just a little bit was missing for victory, one or two crushing operations had been carried out, there would have been no Rzhev tragedy.

	Rzhev, USSR
	Exhausting battles on both sides. Victory of the USSR
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
Zhukov G.K.	G. von Kluge
Konev I. S.	B. Model
Purkaev M. A.
Efremov M. G.
Sokolovsky V.D.
Strengths of the parties
Unknown	Unknown
433,037 non-refundable, 891,786 sanitary	330,000 non-refundable, 450,000 sanitary

The fighting of Soviet and German troops during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the area of ​​the Rzhev salient from January 8, 1942 to March 31, 1943, with interruptions from one and a half to three months. They included four offensive operations of the Soviet troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts against the German Army Group Center, which were aimed at defeating the main forces of the Center, liberating the cities of Rzhev, Sychevka, Vyazma and thereby eliminating the Rzhev salient. It ended with the liquidation of the Rzhev salient.

Origin of the term

IN modern historiography the term was introduced by Russian historians S. A. Gerasimova, O. Kondratiev and others. In Soviet historiography, the events of 1942-1943 on the Rzhev salient were viewed as a series of independent Soviet offensive operations. In modern Russian historiography, the fighting on the Rzhev salient is assessed as an independent strategic operation of the Red Army.

In the memory of the Soviet soldier and Soviet citizens, the Rzhev salient and the Rzhev Bulge remained the “Rzhev meat grinder”, the “breakthrough”.

We advanced on Rzhev through corpse fields. During the Rzhev battles, many “valleys of death” and “groves of death” appeared. It is difficult for anyone who has not been there to imagine what a stinking mess under the summer sun is, consisting of thousands of human bodies covered with worms. Summer, heat, calm, and ahead is such a “valley of death.” It is clearly visible and under fire from the Germans. There is no way to bypass or bypass it: a telephone cable is laid along it - it is broken, and at any cost it must be quickly connected. You crawl over the corpses, and they are piled in three layers, swollen, teeming with worms, and emitting a sickening, sweet smell of decomposition of human bodies. This stench hangs motionless over the “valley.” The explosion of a shell drives you under the corpses, the ground shakes, the corpses fall on you, showering you with worms, and a fountain of noxious stench hits your face. But then the fragments fly by, you jump up, shake yourself off and move forward again. P. A. Mikhin, We died to win

In people's memory, the battles near Rzhev remained the most terrible. In the villages of many areas around Rzhev, there is an expression “they drove to Rzhev.” Also, German veterans remember with horror the battles in the “great space of Rzhev.”

Stages of the Battle of Rzhev

Over the course of 17 months, Soviet troops carried out four major offensive operations, one after another, with a total duration of 8 months. All this time, the German side tried to maintain a strategically advantageous bridgehead in the center of the Eastern Front.

• Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation of the Kalinin and Western fronts (January 8 - April 20, 1942).
• At the same time, the Bolkhov operation was carried out by troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front.
• Defensive operation of the troops of the group of General P. A. Belov of the Western Front (May - June 1942).
• Defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in the area of ​​​​the city of Bely (July 2-27, 1942).
• The first Rzhev-Sychevsk (Gzhatsk) offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (July 30 - October 1, 1942).
• The second Rzhev-Sychev offensive operation (“Mars”) of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (November 25 - December 20, 1942).
• Simultaneously: Velikolukskaya operation of part of the forces of the Kalinin Front (November 24, 1942 - January 20, 1943).
• Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts (March 2 - March 31, 1943).
• Simultaneously: the offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and Central fronts.

German battles

• Capture of Rzhev (October 1941).
• Winter battle for Rzhev (January - February 1942).
• Operations Hanover I and Hanover II (May - June 1942).
• Operation Seydlitz (July 2 - 12, 1942).
• Summer battle for Rzhev (late July - mid-October 1942).
• Winter battle around the 9th Army block (November 25 - December 15, 1942).
• Operation Buffel (German) Büffel- “Buffalo”) (February 1943).
• The sixth battle for Rzhev (March 1943).

Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1942

Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942) - an offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin (commander - Colonel General I. S. Konev) and Western (commander - Army General G. K. Zhukov) fronts, carried out with the assistance of the North Western and Bryansk fronts.

The operation was an integral part of the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-1942 and was intended to complete the defeat of the German Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal G. von Kluge). Despite its incompleteness, the operation was important during the general offensive of the Red Army. Soviet troops pushed the enemy back 80-250 kilometers to the west, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, and liberated many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

The losses of Soviet troops in the operation, according to official data, amounted to 776,889 people, of which irrevocable - 272,320 people, or 25.7%, sanitary - 504,569 people.

First Rzhev-Sychevsk operation

The first Rzhev-Sychev operation, or the Second Battle of Rzhev (July 30 - October 1, 1942) - combat operations of the Kalinin (commander - I. S. Konev) and Western (commander and leader of the entire operation - G. K. Zhukov) fronts with the goal of defeating the German 9th Army (commander - Colonel General V. Model), defending in the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge.

The total losses of Soviet troops in the operation amounted to about 300,000 people, or 60% of the size of the Red Army group at the beginning of the operation. Partial losses in tanks amounted to about 1085 units. Direct losses of the 30th Army amounted to 99,820 people.

The losses of the German side are unknown.

Second Rzhev-Sychevsk operation

The second Rzhev-Sychev operation, or operation “Mars” (November 25 - December 20, 1942) - a new operation of the Kalinin (commander - M. A. Purkaev) and Western (commander - I. S. Konev) fronts with the goal of defeating the German 9 th army. The operation was led by Army General G.K. Zhukov.

According to the American historian D. Glantz, during the three weeks of Operation Mars Soviet troops Lost about 100 thousand soldiers killed and missing and 235 thousand wounded.

A. S. Orlov gives other figures: irretrievable losses amounted to 70.4 thousand people, 1366 tanks were lost.

The losses of the German side amounted to about 40 thousand people and 400 tanks and assault guns.

Liberation of Rzhev

In the winter of 1943, the German 9th Army of V. Model left the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. The operation to withdraw troops to previously prepared positions was called “Buffalo” (German. Bffel). The tactically competent actions of the German command made it possible to preserve the German troops and remove them from the threat of encirclement. Having gone on the offensive, the Red Army troops found an empty city, in which only the rearguard of the 9th Army remained, creating the appearance of the presence of German troops.

Soon the headquarters of the German 9th Army led the troops on the northern front of the Kursk salient.

Soviet troops of the Kalinin (commander - M.A. Purkaev) and Western (commander - V.D. Sokolovsky) fronts began pursuing the enemy. This pursuit, which lasted from March 2 to March 31, was called the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1943 and pushed the front line away from Moscow by another 130-160 kilometers.

On March 4, in a personal message, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill congratulated I.V. Stalin on the capture of Rzhev:

Results

The battles near Rzhev became one of the bloodiest episodes of the Great Patriotic War. According to a study by historian A.V. Isaev, conducted on the basis of the archives of the Ministry of Defense, losses in operations in the arc encircling Rzhev, 200-250 kilometers long, from January 1942 to March 1943 amounted to: irrevocable - 392,554 people; sanitary - 768,233 people. The irretrievable losses include prisoners, some of whom returned home after the war. 50,000 people were captured from the 39th, 22nd, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps. 13,700 people were captured during the Rzhev-Gzhatsk offensive operation July 30 - September 30, 1942.

According to the statistical study of historian G. F. Krivosheev “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century,” irretrievable losses (killed, died from wounds and missing, including those captured) in 1942-1943 in operations in the western direction amounted to 433,037 people, of which:

• Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942) - 272,320 people.
• First Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942) - 51,482 people.
• Second Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation (November 25 - December 20, 1942) - 70,373 people.
• Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation (March 2 - 31, 1943) - 38,862 people.

In 1942, total losses on the Western and Kalinin fronts (including the Rzhev Bulge) were:

• Western Front - 244,574 people killed and died from wounds and 44,996 people missing.
• Kalinin Front - 221,726 people killed and died from wounds and 55,826 people missing.

In total, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet army, including prisoners, during the Battle of Rzhev in 1942-1943 amounted to 605,984 people.

As a result of the fighting during the 17 months of occupation, Rzhev, as well as neighboring cities and villages, were almost completely destroyed, including by artillery and aviation of the Red Army during attempts to liberate them.

Of the 20 thousand people who found themselves under occupation, on the day of liberation, March 3, 1943, 150 people remained, together with the region - 362 people. Of the 5,443 residential buildings in Rzhev, only 297 survived. The total material damage caused to the city and region during the fighting, as determined by the Extraordinary State Commission, amounted to one and a half billion rubles.

Memory

By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 2, 1978, the city of Rzhev was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, for the courage shown by the city’s workers in the fight against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War and the successes achieved in economic and cultural construction.

“For the courage, fortitude and mass heroism shown by the city’s defenders in the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland,” by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1345 of October 8, 2007, the city of Rzhev was awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory.” The wording of the decree caused a lot of controversy among historians, since the city was defended by Wehrmacht troops, and the Red Army acted as the attacking party. However, the invaders were precisely the Wehrmacht troops.

The famous poem by A. T. Tvardovsky “I was killed near Rzhev” is dedicated to the “Rzhev meat grinder”. War participant, writer and author of the novel “Cursed and Killed” V.P. Astafiev gave a categorical assessment of what happened: “We filled them with rivers of blood and piled up mountains of corpses.”

On February 23, 2009, the NTV channel premiered Alexey Pivovarov’s documentary film “Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov." The film caused a wide response from the audience and discussion in the press.

In culture

In prose

• Vyacheslav Kondratyev- “Sashka” and other stories.

In verse

• Alexander Tvardovsky- “I was killed near Rzhev.”

In songs

• Mikhail Nozhkin- “Near Rzhev.”

On February 23, 2009, on Defender of the Fatherland Day, the NTV channel showed a film by journalist A. Pivovarov “”. The film was dedicated to the battles on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky salient in 1942-1943. The film received full approval from the “democratic public” of Russia, as further proof of the crime and bloodthirstiness of the “damned Stalinist regime”, the “mediocrity” of Soviet military leaders, and so on. The main conclusions after watching this film can be drawn as follows:

– the Red Army did not know how to fight;

– I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov were mediocre and cruel;

- abandoning your soldiers is a typical practice in the Red Army (using the example of General I. I. Maslennikov);

- there were only a few cases when they did not abandon their soldiers (using the example of General M. G. Efremov);

– a soldier’s life was worth nothing throughout the Great Patriotic War;

- near Rzhev we are the enemy “filled with corpses and covered in blood.”

There were memories of German veterans in the film. Statements that were particularly offensive. One of them stated: “ We defended our Motherland." What kind of homeland did the Germans defend thousands of kilometers from Germany, having occupied the ancient Russian city of Rzhev? Well, the height of tactlessness was quoting an interview with German veteran Herbert Hohmeier: « We Germans did not understand why living people were driven like cattle to slaughter» ... Well, it’s clear to this Hitlerite underdog that he would like – at least in decades, at least in words – to reduce the Soviet soldiers who beat him to the status of cattle. But how could the authors insert this phrase into the film?! And if they inserted this phrase, then why didn’t they ask this German why the Wehrmacht lost the war, and the Red Army ended it in Berlin? And why, when the Red Army was advancing on Berlin, were teenagers and old people thrown against it, just like cattle for slaughter, the so-called “Volkssturm”? Where was the vaunted and “invincible” Wehrmacht? And why did the remnants of the Wehrmacht shamefully capitulate in May 1945? Why didn’t they tell us how the Germans actually piled up our troops with corpses like cattle, feverishly trying to defeat them and turn the tide of the war at Stalingrad, Kursk, on the Dnieper, in Belarus, the Baltic states, East Prussia, near Berlin?

The fighting in the film is not shown in full, many moments are missed, half of the film is devoted to the Rzhev-Vyazma operation that took place in January-April 1942, the remaining operations are spoken of in tongue twisters, references are often made to completely unauthorized sources, many mistakes were made.

Here is the opinion of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union, colonel, famous historian V.V. Karpov about the film: “With indignation, on Defender of the Fatherland Day, I saw on NTV the “work” of journalists from this channel, called “ Rzhev. The unknown battle of Marshal Zhukov"and dedicated to the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation. The battles for Rzhev are truly a dramatic page of the Great Patriotic War, but how tendentiously the film was shot cannot help but amaze. In my opinion, the goal was to discredit the actions of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov at all costs, to prove that we fought incompetently and the victory was achieved only because we overwhelmed the enemy with the corpses of our soldiers. It's a lie! And why is the assessment of the actions of our troops expressed not by competent military historians, but by some ladies against the backdrop of bookshelves?”

In a word, this film caused an outburst of indignation among our veterans, which they considered an insult.

So what actually happened near Rzhev from January 1942 to March 1943? What significance did these events have on the course and outcome of the Great Patriotic War? What losses did the parties suffer in the Rzhev confrontation? I will try to answer these and other questions in this article.

Background to the confrontation near Rzhev.

First, it must be said that the entire military epic near Rzhev, which lasted 14 months, was not something integral - like the Battle of Stalingrad or Kursk. There were a number of military operations that were carried out in different situations and with different goals.

How did the confrontation near Rzhev begin?

At the end of November - beginning of December 1941, the Red Army carried out a series of counterattacks near Moscow (in the area of ​​​​Dmitrov, Aprelevka, Kashira), including with reserves arriving from the east of the country. Seeing that the Germans' resources were running out, the Soviet command decided in early December to launch a counteroffensive near Moscow. Without a numerical superiority, Soviet soldiers had a higher morale and a strong desire to defend their capital and defeat the invaders. The Germans were experiencing a crisis associated with the collapse of hopes for easy victories, fighting in unusual, harsh conditions, and heavy losses. In addition, the German troops near Moscow, stretched out on a front stretching 1,000 km, actually did not have a prepared line of defense behind them and sufficient reserves. The balance of forces on the eve of the counteroffensive is shown in the table.

The Moscow offensive operation (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942) began without an operational pause, which made it possible to ensure the factor of surprise. By January 7, Soviet troops advanced 150-200 km. 11 tank, 4 motorized and 23 infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht were defeated. But the Red Army was unable to completely defeat the German troops. The lack of forces (especially tanks and artillery) and the same problems of the winter offensive that the Germans had previously faced had an impact.

In addition, the German command took decisive measures to strengthen the discipline of its troops. Hitler introduced merciless punishments for surrendering positions (death penalty, transfer to a penal battalion, etc.). German tribunals convicted 62,000 soldiers and officers for desertion, unauthorized withdrawal, and disobedience. These measures had an impact on the German units, stopping their panicky retreat. The German defense, replenished with reserves, became stable.

In addition, as a result of failures on the Eastern Front, 35 senior Wehrmacht commanders were dismissed, including the commander of the ground forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, the commander of Army Group Center von Bock, the commander of Army Group South von Rundstedt and the Wehrmacht tank general G. Guderian.

On December 17, 1941, Field Marshal H. G. Kluge was appointed commander of Army Group Center. Due to the transfer of reinforcements, the Germans continued to maintain a numerical advantage.

However, the Wehrmacht suffered a heavy defeat and suffered heavy losses. German troops lost 500,000 soldiers and officers, but there is evidence that in the Battle of Moscow, the Germans lost 615,000 people in killed alone, as well as a lot of military equipment.

The Soviet offensive near Moscow resumed with the start of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942). That is, this operation component The Battle of Moscow, and not a separate battle, was where the confrontation between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army near Rzhev began.

Confrontation near Rzhev.

Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation.

Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation- offensive operation of Soviet troops at the final stage of the Battle of Moscow. It was carried out by the forces of the Kalinin (General I.S. Konev) and Western (General G.K. Zhukov) fronts from January 8 to April 20, 1942 against Army Group Center (Field Marshal H. G. Kluge). By the beginning of the offensive, Soviet troops experienced a serious shortage of reserves and offensive means. They continued to be outnumbered by Army Group Center (as in the film Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov"was not noted at all). Thus, on January 1, 1942, the troops of the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts numbered 1,200,000 people, about 8,700 guns and mortars, 571 tanks. The army group “Center” opposing them had 1,500,000 people, about 13,000 guns and mortars, and 110 tanks.

The operation was aimed at encircling the main forces of Army Group Center with flank attacks. The offensive was carried out from the north by the Kalinin and from the southeast by the Western fronts along converging directions to Vyazma, through which the troops defending in the Moscow direction were supplied. The forces of the Northwestern Front (General P.A. Kurochkin) were also involved in the offensive. They (4th Shock Army) were tasked with deep envelopment of Army Group Center from the north.

At the beginning of the operation, the greatest success fell to the 4th Shock Army (General A.I. Eremenko). Secretly concentrated in the forests near Lake Seliger, it struck at the junction of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. Advancing waist-deep in snow and skillfully using ski connections, the army of A. I. Eremenko, in 40-degree frost, made a 250-kilometer throw in 2 weeks and reached the approaches to Smolensk from the north. As a result, the northern flank of the Soviet offensive hung like a block over the Moscow-Minsk highway, the main supply artery of the German troops.

However, it was not possible to successfully complete the breakthrough and cut the highway of the 4th Army. Troops, exhausted from the winter march and running low on ammunition, fuel and food, approached Smolensk. A. I. Eremenko’s army no longer had enough strength for the final blow. However, its deep breakthrough forced the German command to withdraw its troops in the center to the new defense line Rzhev - Gzhatsk - Yukhnov.

By February 1, units of the Kalinin Front advanced 250 km, the Western Front - 80-100 km. As a result of their offensive, the so-called Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge was formed, where the 4th Panzer (General R. Ruoff) and 9th (General V. Model) German armies were concentrated. At this point, the winter breakthrough of the Red Army was stopped. Its persistent attempts in February - March to encircle the Rzhev-Vyazma group with attacks from the north and southeast, closing the ring at Vyazma, ended in failure. The breakthrough into the Vyazma area by the advanced units of the Western Front (33rd Army, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) resulted in stubborn positional battles and did not bring success. To develop it, the largest Soviet airborne assaults during the war years (over 10 thousand people) were landed in this area, but they were unable to change the situation.

For such a gigantic encirclement operation on a front more than 1 thousand km long, the Red Army did not have the necessary resources. First of all, tank and motorized formations. With their shortage, it was necessary to widely use cavalry (cavalry corps), which did not have sufficient striking capabilities. In addition, the advancing troops lacked ammunition. Their consumption rate was reduced to 1-2 shots per day. As a result, two German machine gunners were enough to stop the advance of an entire battalion.

As G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ In general, the resources of our country at that time were extremely limited. The needs of the troops could not yet be satisfied as the tasks and the situation required. It got to the point that every time we were called to Headquarters, we literally begged the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for anti-tank rifles, PPSh machine guns, 10-15 anti-tank guns, the minimum required number of shells and mines. Everything that could be obtained in this way was immediately loaded into vehicles and sent to the armies most in need.

The situation with ammunition was especially bad. Thus, of the ammunition planned for the first ten days of January, our Western Front was provided with: 82-mm mines - 1 percent; artillery shots - 20-30 percent. In general, in January there were 50-mm mines - 2.7 percent, 120-mm mines - 36 percent, 82-mm mines - 55 percent, artillery shots - 44 percent. The February plan was not fulfilled at all. Of the planned 316 cars for the first ten days, not a single one was received. Due to the lack of ammunition for rocket artillery, it had to be partially withdrawn to the rear.

It is probably difficult to believe that we had to set the consumption rate... of ammunition at 1-2 rounds per gun per day. And this, mind you, during the offensive period! The report from the Western Front addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief dated February 14, 1942 stated:

“As combat experience has shown, the lack of shells does not make it possible to carry out an artillery offensive. As a result, the enemy’s fire system is not destroyed, and our units, attacking the weakly suppressed enemy defenses, suffer very heavy losses without achieving adequate success.”

Moreover, the conditions of a winter offensive in deep snow and off-road conditions limited the capabilities of the Soviet troops. With a stubborn defense and a lack of powerful breakthrough means, such an offensive resulted in heavy losses and did not bring significant results.

The Germans, having received reinforcements from Western Europe (12 divisions and 2 brigades), were able not only to defend the strongholds of the Rzhev-Vyazma border (Rzhev, Sychevka, Vyazma, Olenine), but also, with the help of counterattacks, to encircle the Soviet formations that reached Vyazma (unit 33 1st Army, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, etc.). In March and April, troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts repeatedly attacked the enemy. Having failed to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, the Red Army went on the defensive on April 20.

Its offensive capabilities were running out. The troops were overworked during the almost continuous four-month offensive. In addition, the spring thaw began, sharply reducing the maneuverability of the formations. And due to the difficulties of basing Soviet aviation lost operational dominance in the air. At the same time, the enemy managed to create strong defenses everywhere. On April 20, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to transfer the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to the defensive.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the actions of Soviet troops behind enemy lines. As mentioned above, the 33rd Army, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, and paratroopers operated in the rear of the enemy group. About the paratroopers, it is worth saying that during the period of the Rzhev-Vyazma operation, within its framework, the Vyazma airborne operation was carried out - the largest airborne operation in history.

In film " Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov“The main attention was paid to the 33rd Army, however, not only in the film, but also in military-historical literature, too much attention is paid to this army. At the same time, the authors of the film briefly mentioned the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and said absolutely nothing about the Vyazma airborne operation.

Indeed, the 33rd Army, its commander M.G. Efremov, acted bravely, skillfully and died heroically. This is beyond any doubt. But still, too much attention is paid to this army (by the way, its strength was 12,780 people). And because of this, there is often absolutely no mention of the actions of cavalrymen and paratroopers at the same time.

The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was commanded by General P. A. Belov.

This is how the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, writes about the actions of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. Eg: " 11 June 1942... The liquidation of the enemy in the rear of the 4th Army is proceeding successfully. Unfortunately, the main forces of Belov's cavalry corps and the 4th airborne brigade are leaving to the south... June 15... At the front of Army Group Center, the troops of the Russian General Belov again broke through in the direction of Kirov. This does us no credit! ...June 17... Belov's cavalry corps is now operating west of Kirov. After all, he diverted a total of 7 German divisions to himself.”

At full strength, which Belov never had since the beginning of the war, the cavalry corps had up to 19,000 people, and German division- 16.000. That is, Belov fought with an enemy six times superior to him in strength. Such an assessment as P.A. Belov, Halder does not give not only a single general of the enemy troops (and the Poles and French were already defeated, in Africa the Germans drove the British into Egypt), but also not a single German corps or division commander.

Now about the actions of the paratroopers.

On the night of 18 and 19 January In 1942, a parachute landing in the amount of two battalions of the 201st Airborne Brigade was dropped southeast of Vyazma in the village area Desire. They cleared the landing site of snow, to which over the next three nights an entire regiment (1,600 people) was flown in; more than 100 machine guns, 90 mortars and 45 mm guns. Losses were insignificant, although the Germans bombed and bombarded the landing area from the air every day from the very beginning of the landing. Both parachute battalions under the command of Captain Surzhik attacked and captured a number of settlements on January 20-22, in particular the villages of Klyuchi, Petrishchevo, Tynovka and others, after which on January 23 they linked up with the broken through cavalry corps. Meanwhile, the infantry regiment delivered by plane developed an offensive in the direction of the city of Glukhov, and on February 4 linked up with units of the 239th Infantry Division.

In mid-February 1942 An exceptionally difficult situation developed in the 29th Army's combat zone in the Rzhev direction. The army headquarters and a number of its units found themselves cut off from the main group. To provide assistance to this surrounded and extremely battle-weary group, on the night of February 17, a parachute assault force of about 400 people was dropped, under the command of Senior Lieutenant P.L. Belotserkovsky.

At the landing site (the village of Okorokovo), the area where the surrounded Soviet troops were located was an area of ​​8 by 7 km. All of it was under enemy fire. Immediately at the time of the landing there were battles for the village. Nevertheless, immediately after being released from the parachutes, the paratroopers entered the battle on the move in small groups. When the day came, they distributed ammunition and food to those surrounded and raised their morale. In the evening of the same day, units of the 29th Army made a breakthrough and by February 22 broke out of encirclement. The paratroopers fought in the most dangerous areas, showing miracles of heroism.

However, the largest airborne operation carried out during this period should be called Vyazemskaya, during which the entire 4th Airborne Corps was landed behind enemy lines, from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, commanded by Major General A.F. Levashov.

The purpose of the airborne operation was to assist the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts in completing the encirclement of the enemy Army Group Center. To do this, it was planned to deploy the main forces of the corps in the area southwest of Vyazma with the task of cutting off enemy communications between Vyazma and Smolensk. The start of the landing was scheduled for January 21. However, the delay in the concentration of corps units in the initial area forced the landing date to be postponed to January 27.

The operation took place in difficult conditions, especially since Major General A.F. Levashov died at the very beginning of the operation. But the paratroopers acted very successfully, showing miracles of heroism and military skill. Not very generous with praise, G.K. Zhukov sent a radiogram on February 11, 1942 to P.A. Belov and M.G. Efremov: “The 8th airborne brigade (airborne brigade) with partisans occupied the Marmonovo, Dyaglevo area on February 9. The paratroopers destroyed the headquarters of the 5th Tank Division... I set the airborne brigade as an example to all troops.” And Halder had high hopes for this division!

Often paratroopers and cavalrymen acted side by side.

Thus, as part of the Vyazma airborne operation, several large landing forces were launched, a number of which either had independent tasks or began independent actions in connection with the change in the situation.

Summing up the results of the largest airborne operation carried out by the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, it should be noted that in almost six months of heavy fighting behind enemy lines, the paratroopers destroyed 15,000 enemy soldiers and officers and liberated about 200 settlements from the invaders. During the period of intense battles for Moscow, the paratroopers managed to pull back and pin down a significant part of the forces of the four German army corps of Army Group Center in the area of ​​Vyazma and Yukhnov, thereby limiting the ability of the Germans to launch counterattacks on the advancing units of the Red Army.

The German officer von Nowe wrote this about his wallpaper with paratroopers after the war: “Russian paratroopers controlled the forest for many days and, lying on branches thrown directly onto the snow, repelled our attacks. Only after the arrival of tanks and dive bombers from the front was it possible to clear the roads of them.”

As mentioned above, on April 20, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to transfer the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to the defensive. The Soviet command no longer saw the need to keep the troops of generals M. G. Efremov, P. A. Belov and airborne units behind enemy lines. And they received the order to break through to their own.

The 33rd Army, unfortunately, was unable to break through and died; Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov shot himself.

The fate of the cavalrymen and paratroopers was different. On June 4, 1942, the command of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 4th Airborne Corps reported to front headquarters a plan for breaking out of encirclement. The breakthrough began on June 14 in the area south of Yelnya near the settlements of Chetkoye, 1st Buikovo and Amsharovo. The breakthrough was made only on June 23 in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Zhilino. The lagging units left the encirclement for several more days.

It is worth mentioning such a mistake by the authors of the film “ Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov“When it was said that in order to destroy the command of the 33rd Army, the Brandenburg regiment, which was formed from ... Soviet traitors, was abandoned. Firstly, the Brandenburg-800 regiment was the elite of the German special forces and consisted exclusively of Germans; later, due to heavy losses, representatives of other nationalities were included in it, but Aryan, and not Slavic. How could one even say that this regiment was one of Soviet traitors? Secondly. This regiment did not receive the task of destroying or capturing Soviet commanders during the Rzhev-Vyazma operation. This task was given to a unit actually formed from traitors. But it was the so-called “Russian National People's Army” (RNNA). The RNNA received its baptism of fire precisely in May 1942 in an operation against the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General P. A. Belov, who was operating in the German rear in the area of ​​Vyazma and Dorogobuzh. RNNA groups dressed in Soviet uniforms tried to penetrate the corps' location and capture its headquarters. As a result, out of 300 fighters, more than 100 went over to the Soviet side, 70 were destroyed and only 120 returned back, along with a small number of Red Army soldiers who joined them.

Summing up the Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation, it must be said that the Soviet troops failed to completely defeat the enemy group, but nevertheless, in the final operations of the battle near Moscow, Soviet troops inflicted a new defeat on the enemy. 16 of his divisions and one brigade were destroyed. The enemy was driven back 250 km in the Vitebsk direction, in Gzhatsk and Yukhnovsk. - at 80 - 100 km. The Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions were liberated.

But, having defended this line, the German command maintained a convenient springboard for a new attack on Moscow and threatened to deeply envelop the area where Soviet troops were stationed between Lake Seliger and Velikiye Luki from the south.

In the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation, Soviet troops lost 776,889 people; German troops lost 333,000 people (this is only for the period from January 1 to March 30).

Heavy battles with the enemy in this area lay ahead. In the area of ​​the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge.

On this ledge, created during the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, there were troops of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal H. G. Kluge . From here the Germans continued to threaten Moscow, being 150-200 km from it. In the Rzhevsko-Vyazemsky region, a classic positional front was created with a developed system of fortifications and strongholds along the perimeter of the salient. The key points of the German defense system were the cities of Rzhev - Sychevka - Olenin - Bely, which the Germans turned into powerful bastions. The basis of the defense of the ledge was formed by units of the 9th German Army (General W. Model). To eliminate the bulge in 1942, the Soviet command developed a plan for a summer offensive operation by forces of the Western and Kalinin fronts.

However, the German command managed to worsen the conditions for the Soviet summer offensive. From July 2 to July 12, 1942, the Germans carried out Operation Seydlitz to encircle units of the 39th Army (General I. I. Maslennikov) occupying the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge (between Bely and Sychevka). German troops managed to destroy the encircled Soviet group, capturing over 30,000 prisoners, which is clearly exaggerated, since the total losses of the 39th Army amounted to 23,647 people. But, nevertheless, during Operation Seydlitz, a major defeat was inflicted on the troops of the Kalinin Front.

When the army was surrounded, its commander, General I. I. Maslennikov, was evacuated. The general is reproached for this episode. However, the general in this case is not the master of his own destiny. He is a person in public service, and he is obliged to take advantage of the planes sent after him. It was an order. Staying with your troops until the end is an understandable, but not always advisable decision from a long-term perspective.

The evacuation was shown incorrectly in the film " Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov" It showed how the general, slowly, with a suitcase in his hand, boarded the plane and flew away. But the authors did not say that General I. I. Maslennikov, in addition to carrying out the order, he was also wounded. This is how Lyudmila Zhukova, the daughter of the pilot who evacuated the general, describes the evacuation of the general in Literaturnaya Gazeta dated May 6-12, 2009, No. 19-20.

Here's what she had to say: The pilot who took the general out was my father! His memories of those flights to the encirclement were published in the first issue of the collection “The Word of a Soldier of Victory” (2005)

Father, who flew to them and the partisans not for the first time, always carried the shag, newspapers, notebooks and ink pencil for letters collected by the regiment.

“The soldiers are walking with anti-tank rifles on their shoulders. They barely glanced at the plane that made its way towards them for the first time. " Brothers! To me! He brought gifts - tobacco, newspapers, paper. Drop me a letter, I'll drop it...»

They came up, wrote down a few lines, folded them into triangles: “ Thank you, brother!"And they ran. " Where are you going, brothers?“- the father was taken aback. " Do you hear the gunfire? The battle is on. The guys are waiting for us!"... And no barrage detachments with machine guns drove them into battle!

« There is no panic, no confusion, everyone is calm and behaves with dignity", the father recalled. The commander arrived on horseback. It was hard to cry with the help of General Bogdanov and his nurse daughter. Leaning on a gnarled stick, he limped to the plane, giving his final orders in a quiet voice. His father handed him a balaclava - a cap would not work on a plane open to all the winds and rains. " Are you flying, Comrade General?“- asked Bogdanov’s father. “No, I’m staying in the army. We will break through. If you take the commander, he's in danger of gangrene. Tell Gromov - since you broke through, you can establish air communication: ammunition to us, and the wounded back."

This is how it really happened.

Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation

At the end of July 1942, the troops of the German Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge) continued to hold the so-called Rzhev ledge - a section of the front that wedged itself into the Soviet defense, from where one of the shortest routes to Moscow opened. The enemy had a strongly fortified defense on this bridgehead advantageous for the offensive.

The configuration of the front and the location of the Soviet troops, which occupied an enveloping position in relation to the German 9th Army defending the Rzhev salient, contributed to the offensive operation. Such an operation was all the more necessary for the Soviet command in order to pin down the troops of the “Center” group in the Moscow direction and not allow the enemy to transfer its formations to the southern sectors of the front to strengthen their troops advancing on the Volga and the Caucasus.

According to the plan of the Soviet command, the troops of the left wing (30th and 29th armies) of the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General I. S. Konev) of the right wing (31st and 20th armies) of the Western Front (commander - Army General G.K. Zhukov) had to strike in the Rzhev and Sychevsky directions, defeat the main forces of the 9th Army, capture the cities of Rzhev and Zubtsov, reach the line of the Volga and Vazuza rivers and thus eliminate the Rzhev ledge. The main blow was delivered by the troops of the Western Front, supported by the 3rd and 1st Air Armies.

The offensive began on July 30 on the Kalinin Front. The 30th Army was able to break through the first line of enemy defense, but encountered stubborn resistance and was drawn into protracted battles at Polunino. The 29th Army was not successful.

The troops of the Western Front went on the offensive on August 4. On the morning of the next day, they overcame the enemy’s main line of defense and by the end of August 5 they had expanded the breakthrough to 30 km along the front and 25 km in depth. To develop and consolidate the success, on August 6, a mobile front group consisting of two tank and one cavalry corps was introduced into the battle.

The command of Army Group Center took measures to hold the Rzhev ledge: it reinforced the 9th Army with three tank and two infantry divisions and launched a counterattack from the Sychevka and Karmanovo areas in the general direction of Pogoreloe Gorodishche.

On both sides, significant masses of troops were brought in on a small section of the front, and from August 7 to 10, a major counter battle unfolded on the approaches to the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers, in which up to 1,500 tanks and almost all the troops of the 9th German and two Soviet armies took part. intended for operations in the Zubtsovsky, Sychevsky and Karmanovsky directions.

“Just think,” said the commander of our 20th Army, General M.A. Reiter, “a year ago, two such German tank corps broke through from the Desna to the south beyond Romny, cutting off the communications of the Southwestern Front. Later, similar enemy forces broke through from Orel to Tula. And now two full-blooded tank corps have been defeated by the relatively equal forces of our army and are hastily going on the defensive and burying themselves in the ground. Moreover, the enemy tank corps were defeated in the summer, when, according to the assurances of the German command, the Germans had no equal! »

But in the end, the troops of the 9th Army managed to hold the defense. During this period, the Germans already had effective anti-tank artillery (for example, 76-mm guns), which caused a sharp increase in the losses of Soviet tanks.

On August 8, in the area north of Bykovo, the 5th Army of the Western Front was also introduced into the battle with the task of advancing in the general direction towards the village of Karmanovo and connecting with the left flank units of the 20th Army.

The Soviet troops did not achieve significant territorial successes, but through active actions they managed to thwart the enemy’s counterattack and force him to go on the defensive. Subsequently, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front continued fighting to expand the bridgeheads on the left banks of the Vazuza and Gzhati and on the approaches to Karmanov and Bykov. Taking advantage of the success of the Western Front, the 30th and 29th armies reached the approaches to Rzhev in the 2nd half of August. On August 23, troops of the 31st Army, with the participation of units of the 29th Army, liberated Zubtsov, and troops of the 20th Army liberated Karmanovo. At this point, the Soviet troops exhausted their offensive capabilities and went on the defensive.

The losses of the Red Army in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation exceeded 193,683 people.

During the battles, Soviet troops inflicted significant losses on the enemy: 3 tank and several infantry divisions were completely exsanguinated; 10 infantry, 3 tank and 3 motorized divisions lost from 50 to 80% of their personnel. In enemy tank divisions, the number of combat vehicles was reduced from 150-160 to 20-30.

Let's do the calculations. The strength of the German tank division is 16,932 people; the strength of the infantry division is 16,000 people. The Germans always kept the number of their divisions at this level. 16 enemy divisions lost from 50 to 80% of their personnel. But we will take the minimum figure - 50%. Of the 16 divisions - 10 infantry - 160,000 people; 3 tank divisions - 50,796 people; 3 motorized – 48,000. Together – 258,796 people. Losses 50% - 129,398 people. 3 tanks and 3 infantry were completely drained of blood, i.e. 90% loss. Their number is 98,796 people. Losses 90% - 88,914 people. The total loss of German troops was 218,312 people. Tank losses were at least 700 units.

The losses of Soviet troops in killed amounted to 26%, i.e. 51.482; German casualties are obviously no less than this coefficient, that is, approximately 56,000.

And this is not surprising. If the enemy defends, this does not mean that he gets away with it. In film " Rzhev. The unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov“The description of the battles is at the everyday level. That is, the Germans are shooting, with complete impunity, waves of Soviet infantry. In fact, the impact went on both sides. Here are the memories of German veterans.

For example, August von Kageneck in the book “ War in the East. History of the German regiment, 1941-1944." writes the following about the summer battle for Rzhev: “The enemy attack was of unprecedented force, the most intense since the very beginning of the campaign... We moved towards the front line in loose formation. Hellish fire from enemy artillery and mortars rained down on our positions. It’s unimaginable, the number of artillery batteries and rocket launchers of all kinds, the indescribable sound of “Katyushas”. At least 40 to 50 “Stalinist organs” fired simultaneously. Bombers and fighter-bombers came and went with the sharp sound of their engines. We have never seen this before in Russia. God knows that we already had a difficult past behind us. But it seems that the worst was yet to come. We run from crater to crater to take cover from shell fragments. Another 500 meters to the first trench. The wounded are wandering towards us. They say that it is very bad ahead. Very big losses. The Russians destroyed our equipment and weapons, leveled our positions to the ground.”

That is, even if this or that point was not taken during the assault, I repeat, this does not mean that its defenders came out unscathed.

The Germans also had to carry out counterattacks under the fire of concentrated Soviet artillery to break through the defense. The biographer of Field Marshal Model S. Newton cites in his book an episode concerning the use of the “Greater Germany” division in the battles for Rzhev: The division was forced to carry out a series of bloody counterattacks with minimal support from other divisions. On September 30, the officers and soldiers of this elite division almost mutinied.” The result of such counterattacks was predictable - hundreds of soldiers and officers of “Greater Germany” died. Rzhev was a meat grinder for both attackers and defenders.

Or SS Obersturmbannführer P. Schmidt under the pseudonym P. Karel in his book “Eastern Front” provides the following data on the losses of German troops in the USSR:

“...On the evening of February 16, 60 people remained in the 2nd battalion of the 113th motorized infantry regiment. Sixty out of 600. Things were little better for the 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment, or “Leibstandarte”. At roll calls in companies there were up to ten, at most twelve. Company and platoon commanders were killed or wounded. The same picture is observed in engineering units and a tank regiment - 12 “Panthers” and several T-s are combat-ready IV ...

...The 394th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division was reduced to two rifle companies. Many officers of all units died in battle. Only eighty men remained in Captain Deichen's reconnaissance battalion, and in the 331st Grenadier Regiment of the 167th Infantry Division - two hundred. Things were similar in other parts of the 11th Corps. Fifteen vehicles remained in the 6th Tank Division, nine in the 503rd Tiger Battalion, and twenty-four in the three assault gun divisions together...

...When Chief Corporal Fitschen arrived with a group of stragglers to the 6th company, out of 12 people he found only two soldiers and one non-commissioned officer. The company was reduced to 75 combat-ready people. Until seventy-five! Ten days ago in France, 240 people boarded a train...

...At midday on October 27, the 73rd Infantry Division reported that they had 170 men left - one hundredth of its previous composition. And this is in a division that was transferred to the 6th Army only on October 4. The 111th Infantry Division was reduced to 200 men. Heavy weapons of divisions and corps were lost by 60%. The entire army had only 25 combat-ready tanks and assault guns..."

In the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, for the first time during the war, Soviet troops stormed such a strong enemy defense, built on the basis of the latest German defensive battle tactics. G.K. Zhukov demanded the most careful preparation of the operation, taking into account the latest German defensive battle tactics. He explained to all commanders in an order dated July 12 that the enemy was now building battle formations dismembered and in depth. The reason is clear: the Nazis had already experienced the power of Soviet artillery many times. “It is necessary to counter the enemy’s deep defense and counterattacks with a deep formation of offensive formations” - ordered by G.K. Zhukov.

The German troops, who had suffered heavy losses at the front, took their anger out on the civilian population. G.K. Zhukov considers it necessary to bring to I.V. Stalin information about the unprecedented atrocities of the Nazis: “The German punitive detachment burned the village of Krasnitsa, all the inhabitants were shot, 600 people were killed, 146 were wounded. The workers’ village of Vstremka was burned. The reason for the execution was connection with the partisans.”

As already mentioned, during the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, the offensive of the Red Army thwarted German offensive plans to launch converging attacks from the areas of Demyansk and Rzhev with the aim of defeating the North-Western and Kalinin fronts, or rather did not thwart, but forced them to attack in unfavorable conditions. It was Operation Smerch.

The day after the defeat of the German tank corps at Rzhev on August 10, on August 11, by order of Hitler, the Second Tank Army launched Operation Smerch at Sukhinichi. The operation failed, the Germans suffered an unprecedented beating.

With a feeling of great satisfaction and pride, G. K. Zhukov reports to I. V. Stalin on August 21: “After unsuccessful attempts to break through the front in the direction of Dregovo-Kozelsk, the enemy transferred his main efforts to the Sukhinichi direction. 19-20.8.42. the enemy attacked with infantry and tanks... The forces of the 16th Army and the 9th Tank Corps repelled all enemy attacks... During the battles, the enemy lost up to 300 tanks, 25-30 thousand killed soldiers and officers. Our troops fight with exceptional tenacity."

G. K. Zhukov bled Army Group Center, although during these battles it was provided with an additional 12 divisions, including some from the south. Then he could not know how the battle in August 1942 near Rzhev and Sukhinichi resonated with the top leadership of Germany.

When, after August 9-10, Hitler ordered the Smerch to be unleashed on the Russians, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, protested: the divisions allocated for him - 500 tanks - should be given back to “save” the 9th Army at Rzhev. At least to fight back, and not dare to attack, Hitler refused. Kluge exclaimed pathetically: « Then, my Fuhrer, the responsibility is yours!»

English historian D. Irving, break German archives, in the book " Hitler's War"(1977) thus restored further events at Hitler's headquarters in The Wolf's Lair. The “Tornado” broke out on August 11 against Russian fortifications in swampy forests, where minefields were hidden everywhere. Kluge allowed the divisions to diverge; they suffered horrific losses. The operation was unsuccessful. On August 22, a disappointed Hitler again summoned Kluge to the Wolf's Lair and ordered that Operation Tornado be converted into a purely defensive one. This first serious defeat in 1942 depressed Hitler.”

Meanwhile, Model’s 9th Army at Rzhev was already bleeding. Hitler moved the motorized division "Grossdeutschland", which was transferred from Army Group A. However, at a stormy staff meeting on August 24, Halder demanded that Model be allowed to retreat, because the army could no longer afford such heavy losses. In one of the regiments, for example, eight commanders changed in a week.

A new Soviet offensive in this area began on November 25, 1942. The operation, codenamed “Mars”, was aimed at defeating the troops with attacks from two fronts - Western (General I. S. Konev) and Kalinin (General M. A. Purkaev) Army Group Center, defending the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. The total number of troops on the Kalinin and Western fronts exceeded 1,300,000 people; they had 1,718 tanks for the offensive. G. K. Zhukov coordinated the actions of the fronts.

And if the relevant officials had promptly declassified the documents of this battle, revealing the feat of our soldiers, then the very reason for distorting the historical truth regarding Operation Mars would have disappeared.

It is worth saying more about disinformation activities. Soviet intelligence played a big role here. A junior officer, Alexander Demyanov, who allegedly was an agent of German intelligence, served on the General Staff. In fact, he was a Soviet intelligence officer, through whom Soviet intelligence supplied the German command with a significant amount of disinformation. On November 4, 1942, Alexander Demyanov supplied “information” to the Wehrmacht leadership that the Red Army would deliver the main blow to the enemy on November 15 near Rzhev.

From the memoirs of General Pavel Sudoplatov: “ ...In accordance with the legend we developed, we hired Demyanov to the position of junior communications officer at the General Staff of the Red Army...

...Disinformation sometimes had strategic significance. So, on November 4, 1942, “Heine” - “Max” reported that the Red Army would strike the Germans on November 15 not near Stalingrad, but in the North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were expecting an attack near Rzhev and repelled it. But the encirclement of the Paulus group at Stalingrad came as a complete surprise to them.

Unaware of this radio game, Zhukov paid a high price - thousands and thousands of our soldiers under his command were killed in the offensive near Rzhev. In his memoirs, he admits that the outcome of this offensive operation was unsatisfactory. But he never found out that the Germans were warned about our offensive in the Rzhev direction, which is why they sent so many troops there.”

Here we see that the Soviet leadership decided to play it safe. Do everything for sure.

Thus, the Supreme Command Headquarters sacrificed operational success in the West for strategic success in the South.

As a result, such a large-scale strategic offensive by Soviet troops near Stalingrad turned out to be completely unexpected for the Wehrmacht: the effect of surprise was achieved.

« We had absolutely no idea about the strength of Russian troops in this area. There was nothing here before and suddenly a blow of great force was struck, which was of decisive importance.”- wrote General Jodl.

Overall, the Red Army failed to gain the upper hand. And it is worth mentioning the immediate reasons for the not very successful actions of the Soviet troops. This is the reason already mentioned. The fact that one of the big problems of “Mars” was that it was not prepared by G.K. Zhukov himself. During the period of preparation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts for “Mars”, he was engaged in planning and preparation of Operation “Uranus”.

Also, one of the reasons for the not very successful actions of the Soviet troops was the neglect of assault operations, as required by G.K. Zhukov.

And we find an example of successful assault operations in Operation Mars. In the 879th Infantry Regiment of the 158th Infantry Division operating in the Molodoy Tud area, differentiated training of units was carried out with the formation of a leading battalion: “The regiment commander decided to train the 1st rifle battalion as an assault battalion. The number of communists and Komsomol members in the battalion was increased to 35% of all personnel. To replace sick and elderly soldiers, 40 young people from other units arrived. The battalion was withdrawn from the front line of defense and concentrated in the rear, where it began intense combat training. The main emphasis in the process of combat training was placed on mastering the combat order in the offensive in accordance with the requirements of the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 306 of October 8, 1942 and on working out the issues of organizing interaction with artillery and tanks. To this end, several tactical exercises were conducted, and a platoon of T-34 tanks took part in these exercises over three days.” The 879th Infantry Regiment achieved good results in the offensive and advanced faster than the neighboring 881st Infantry Regiment of the same division, which did not use assault tactics.

Yes, it was an unsuccessful offensive operation, but it was not a catastrophic defeat. Moreover, this cannot be called a defeat of G.K. Zhukov, who, in connection with Battle of Stalingrad, as we see, visited the western direction on short visits. It was he who, having made sure that the strategic task of pinning down up to 30 German divisions in the Rzhev direction and forcing the Wehrmacht command to further strengthen its grouping with the reserves of Army Group Center and OKH (4 tank, 1 motorized division and 2 brigades) had been resolved, ordered the end of what had already become unnecessary Operation Mars.

But, nevertheless, a number of territorial successes were achieved, there were penetrations into the German defense and the Germans made attempts to eliminate them on December 23, 30 and 31, but were unsuccessful. On January 1, 1943, the commander of the 9th Army, V. Model, ordered the attacks to stop.

The German troops suffered significant damage. Losses of the Red Army - 70,373 killed; 145,301 wounded. Wehrmacht losses, according to the most conservative data, are 40,000 killed; 100,000 wounded. However, as the German historian Brent Wicker states: « German losses in the Rzhev direction were enormous».

And the last ones. As for David Glantz. For people like him, slandering Russians, Russia, the USSR is a matter of livelihood, but why do a number of Russian historians repeat his speculations. Moreover, he is not one of the authoritative historians in the West. Let him better explore the shame of the American army in Italy or in the Ardennes. And we will study our history ourselves.

Velikolukskaya operation.

During the preparation for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the Soviet command took various measures to comprehensively disinformation the enemy. It tried to mislead the German command about its strategic plans and convince it that the western direction would become the main direction of Soviet actions.

For this purpose, the concentration of troops that were to attack at Stalingrad was carried out secretly, and openly the troops were transported to the Kalinin and Western fronts, where the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation was being prepared. There were also leaks of relevant “secret” information. According to Soviet intelligence, all these efforts achieved their goal. The German command came to the conclusion that the Red Army was unable to conduct large offensive operations in the fall and winter of 1942. Only the possibility of individual offensive operations between Rzhev and Velikiye Luki was allowed. To strengthen Army Group Center, 16 divisions were transferred from Germany and other sectors of the front to the area of ​​Smolensk and Vitebsk. In order to pin down as many forces as possible of Army Group Center and prevent their transfer to Stalingrad, the original plan of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation was changed and it was decided to launch another auxiliary strike in the Velikiye Luki direction. The operation was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Shock Army, part of the forces of the 43rd Army, other formations and units from the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General M.A. Purkaev) and the Headquarters Reserve.

The enemy will defend in well-prepared positions. The first line of German defense was two or three kilometers from Velikiye Luki. The second line included the outskirts of the city and the settlements adjacent to them. Many buildings in the city itself were also adapted for defense.

The operation began on November 24 when the advanced detachments of the Soviet troops began to operate. The next day the main forces entered the battle. Advancing in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, Soviet troops overcame fierce enemy resistance and on November 28 surrounded his group in Velikiye Luki. Continuing the offensive, by December 10 they advanced 25-30 km and in two sections south and north of Novosokolniki they cut the railway connecting the German army groups “North” and “Center”. The German command transferred several formations to the Velikiye Luki direction and made attempts to relieve the troops encircled in Velikiye Luki. For a month, the enemy launched counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing Soviet troops and was eventually able to advance up to 15 km on narrow sections of the front and reach the approaches to the city, but he was unable to connect with the encircled group.

To avoid bloodshed, the Soviet command, through parliamentarians, conveyed a proposal to surrender to the head of the German garrison, Lieutenant Colonel von Sas. It was rejected, and Soviet troops began to eliminate the enemy. On January 17, 1943, after heavy fighting, the remnants of the 7,000-strong German garrison were finally destroyed and Velikiye Luki was liberated. On January 20, 1943, the Velikiye Luki operation, which lasted about 2 months, ended.

In the general system of strategic actions carried out in the western and northwestern directions, the Velikiye Luki operation played a major role. With the liquidation of the Velikiye Luki bridgehead, for which German troops fought fiercely, the Demyansk and Rzhev-Vyazma ledges lost their significance. Through active actions, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts pinned down up to 30 enemy divisions, preventing them from being transferred to Stalingrad, and thereby made a significant contribution to the victorious outcome of the Great Battle of the Volga.

This operation is usually not mentioned when studying the confrontation near Rzhev, but in vain. It was an integral part of it and was carried out by the forces of the Kalinin Front.

Losses: Red Army - 31,674 killed; 72,348 wounded. Wehrmacht - 40,000 killed; 3,000 prisoners.

Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation.

So, during a series of offensives in the western direction carried out by Soviet troops in the winter of 1941 - 1942, German troops managed to hold a ledge up to 200 km wide and up to 160 km deep. The front line here ran west of Bely, north and east of Rzhev, west of Yukhnov, east of Spas-Demensk. The German command attached particular importance to holding the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, considering it as a springboard for an attack on Moscow. During 1942, approximately 2/3 of the forces of the entire Army Group Center operated in this sector of the front.

In the spring of 1943, the position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front deteriorated significantly. The offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts in the Oryol and Sevsky directions, which began in February 1943, forced the German command to begin transferring its troops from the Rzhev-Vyazma salient to strengthen the Oryol group.

In connection with the retreat of the enemy, the Western Front (commander - Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky) and the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General M.A. Purkaev), whose troops occupied an enveloping position in relation to the Rzhev-Vyazma salient, were given the task begin pursuing the enemy, disrupt the retreat of the enemy group, defeat it, liquidate the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead and develop an offensive in the general direction of Smolensk.

On March 2, front troops, following orders, launched an offensive. The enemy widely used various kinds of barriers, and, retreating, left barriers at previously prepared defensive positions. Along with the strong spring thaw, this sharply reduced the rate of advance of the Soviet troops and hampered the maneuver of mobile units. As a result, the pace of pursuit was only 6-7 km per day and the front troops were unable to go behind enemy lines and cut off their escape routes.

On March 15-31, they reached a pre-prepared and heavily fortified line northeast of Dukhovshchina, Yartsev, and Spas-Demensk. Here the enemy offered strong resistance and the Soviet troops were forced to stop.

Despite the fact that the main task - the elimination of a large German group - could not be completed, noticeable damage was inflicted on the enemy, and in this direction he was pushed back from Moscow 100-120 km. The cities of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Sychevka, Bely, and Vyazma were liberated. Thanks to the reduction of the front line, the Soviet Supreme High Command was able to withdraw two armies and one corps into reserve.

The direct threat to Moscow was eliminated. For the German leadership this was a heavy loss. It is known that Hitler wished to personally hear by telephone the explosion of the Rzhev bridge across the Volga during the withdrawal of German units.

Results and significance of the confrontation near Rzhev.

Let's start with the losses of the parties: in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation, the Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operation, two Rzhev-Sychevsk operations and the Velikolukskaya operation, the total losses of the Red Army were 1,468,845, of which irrevocable losses were 467,711. taking into account other operations and battles, the losses of the Red Army can be increased by approximately 200,000.

Wehrmacht losses amounted to at least 1,100,000 killed, wounded and prisoners. In the Rzhev-Vyazemsk strategic offensive operation - according to incomplete data, the Germans lost 333,000 people, in the first Rzhev-Sychevsk operation - at least 218,000, in the second - 140,000, in the "Smerch" - at least 30,000 killed only, in the Velikiye Luki operation - 43,000 killed and captured. This is mainly based on German data, and as you know, they have a lot of “cunning” methods for calculating losses, and therefore German losses are very underestimated. Thus, according to the most conservative estimates, the Wehrmacht’s losses at Rzhev were at least 1,100,000 people.

As you know, there are “famous” wars and military operations and there are “unfamous” ones. For example, the “famous” includes the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River, especially the Great Patriotic War, especially such operations of this war as the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk, the Belarusian and Vistula-Oder offensive operations, the capture of Berlin and the liberation of Prague, etc., “famous” "and the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945, etc. Indeed, beautiful and quick victories that radically change the strategic situation, the scale and scope of the listed wars and operations, all this makes us write and talk about them. It's interesting and bright. And then there are “unfamous” operations. These include operations near Rzhev. Here we do not see the same brightness as in the above operations. But nevertheless, the confrontation near Rzhev was very important. The soldiers there did the grunt work, defending Moscow and helping the soldiers at Stalingrad. It was near Rzhev, as we were convinced, that a situation was created near Stalingrad, which is called “food is served” and the threat to Moscow was finally removed. The writer and historian V. Kozhin summed up the Rzhev confrontation best of all.

“Such a long (14 months) persistent enemy resistance in the Rzhev district is a very significant chapter in the history of the war,” said Vadim Kozhin. -...These battles represented, in essence, the only unconditionally worthy action of our troops for almost the entire 1942 - between the victory near Moscow at the very beginning of this year and the victory at Stalingrad at the end. Moreover: without the heroic - and tragic - confrontation near Rzhev, the situation at Stalingrad would have developed differently... To be convinced of the paramount, exceptional significance of the confrontation near Rzhev, it is enough to look at one of the most important sources on the history of military operations in 1941-1942 - “War Diary” by the then Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Franz Halder: Rzhev has literally been the center of attention here since January 3, 1942... Thus, there was an objective meaning in the Rzhev confrontation both for us and for the enemy - however, a radically different meaning: by resisting near Rzhev, the enemy was delaying his defeat, and by attacking him, we were bringing our victory closer.

However, some other historians share the same opinion: “If there had been no Rzhev, there would have been no Stalingrad. It was the losses that the enemy suffered near Rzhev that helped defend Stalin’s city.”

“Nowadays - in accordance with the general trend - many authors condemn Stalin in the harshest terms for the fact that he gave orders for more and more attacks on this section of the front, increasing the terrible losses. But now, in hindsight, it is easy to solve such problems. Let’s just imagine that the enemy then needed only 12-15 minutes (even at low speeds compared to current airspeeds) to fly from Rzhev to Moscow...” writes Vadim Kozhin. And further: “We have to say that the publishers drew the figure 1 million 109 thousand 149 from the already mentioned statistical study published in 1993 entitled “ The secrecy has been removed" But they - wittingly or unwittingly - encourage their readers to believe that this figure refers to those killed in the mentioned "...three strategic operations." Meanwhile, as is clear from this study, we are talking about soldiers who were out of action for one reason or another, including those who were wounded, sick, or frostbite. As for “irretrievable losses,” that is, soldiers who died or were captured, in the Rzhev operations there were no more than a million of them, but more than three times less - 363,664 people. Of course, this figure is terrible, but speaking about our losses, it would be appropriate to raise the question of the enemy’s losses.”

Indeed, the significance of Rzhev is enormous. And it would be fair to award it the title “Hero City”.

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Seventy-five years ago, one of the bloodiest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War turned over - the Battle of Rzhev, which is also called the “Rzhev meat grinder,” ended. It’s terrible to imagine, but the soldiers fought literally on the “killing fields”, suffocating from the corpse smell of their own dead fellow soldiers. There was no possibility of burial - the Germans were shooting through the fields. Memories of veterans are scarier than any horror movie.

At the same time, the attack on Rzhev, occupied by the Germans, is one of the most controversial operations in the history of the war. Some historians believe that the huge losses of the Red Army - about 400 thousand people - were to blame for the incompetent Soviet command and Stalin personally, who feared that the Germans would again launch an attack on Moscow. Therefore, he mercilessly threw Siberian units under the fire of the German Army Group Center.

But the task was completed. The Germans left Rzhev, and the so-called Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, or bridgehead, which the Germans were going to use to attack Moscow, ceased to exist. The Nazis did not have any reserves left to transfer troops to Stalingrad, where another great battle was going on at the same time.

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But at what cost was this achieved? Four offensive operations were choked in blood. Later, veteran and historian Pyotr Mikhin will write that if instead of six unsupported operations, “in each of which a little was missing for victory,” one or two crushing ones had been carried out, there would have been no Rzhev tragedy.

The Nazis were better armed and provided with the latest military equipment. Soviet artillerymen often had several shells, which they saved for tanks and saved ammunition when the infantry advanced.

The Germans were supported by PzKpfw IV tanks and SdKfz 25 armored personnel carriers. At that time, these were the most modern vehicles. But the T-34-76 still required improvement, but they were not enough. By the way, during the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the summer of 1942, one of the largest tank battles of World War II took place. 1.5 thousand vehicles took part in it on both sides.

The Germans had better communications during the battles. Using the radio, they promptly called for aviation and adjusted artillery fire. The Red Army will have all this. But after. During the "Rzhev meat grinder" the Red Army soldiers fought as if in hell. The losses were immediately replaced by new recruits - mostly untrained villagers who had to learn directly in battle. There was nowhere to retreat. Behind them stood the fighters of the barrier detachments, armed with machine guns and machine guns, which were so lacking on the front line.

Veterans remember how battles took place literally for every hillock. Some details are even hard to believe. The Boynya River near Rzhev turned red with blood. Sometimes the soldiers began to be overcome by indifference, and they died by the thousands in the swamps, forests and fields of the Tver region.

At the same time, the Battle of Rzhev was not a beating; it was not only the Russians who attacked, as is sometimes presented in articles and films. German veteran August von Kageneck, in his book “War in the East,” wrote about the offensive of the 18th Wehrmacht Infantry Regiment, which was stifled by crushing Soviet artillery fire in August 1942. Everyone ended up in the meat grinder.

“The number of artillery batteries and rocket launchers of all kinds, the indescribable sound of the Katyusha rockets is unimaginable. At least 40 to 50 were firing at the same time. Bombers and fighter-bombers came and went with the sharp sound of their engines. We have never seen anything like this in Russia,” - writes the historian.

One of the most secret operations was "Mars", or the Rzhev-Sychevsk strategic operation, which was personally led by Georgy Zhukov. The legendary military leader was given the goal of defeating the 9th German Army, which formed the basis of Army Group Center.

According to some historians, the Germans learned about the impending offensive, and the Kremlin deliberately decided to “surrender” Zhukov in order to then unexpectedly encircle Paulus’s army at Stalingrad.

On November 4, 1942, the Soviet intelligence officer “Heine-Max,” who, according to legend, was an emissary of the pro-German organization “Throne,” sent a radiogram to the Germans about the upcoming operation. Thus, the Nazis learned about the impending attack and repelled it.

The Russians never defeated the Ninth Army, and the losses were enormous. According to American historian David Glantz, during the three weeks of Operation Mars, Soviet troops lost about 100 thousand killed and missing, and 235 thousand were wounded. According to official Soviet data, the Red Army lost 42 thousand people. Historian Alexander Orlov gives other figures: 70 thousand people killed. It is not known exactly who is closer to the truth. But in any case, this is one of the most terrible episodes of the “Rzhev meat grinder”.

On December 20, 1942, Zhukov ordered the offensive to be stopped. To be fair, it should be said that he knew nothing about the “radio game” of the scouts and tried to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief.

The Germans also suffered serious losses. The Wehrmacht decided to leave Rzhev and retreat to previously prepared positions. The Nazis took away equipment and military property. They drove thousands of civilians supposedly “at their own request” to the west.

Having gone on the offensive, the Red Army troops found only the rearguard of the 9th Army, which created the appearance of the presence of the main part of the troops. The city was returned. But there was no question of a complete defeat of the Germans - they retreated in an orderly manner. However, Moscow announced the success of the operation. Stalin was personally congratulated by British Prime Minister Churchill.

It is symbolic that on March 5, after the liberation of Rzhev, Stalin was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. And in August 1943, the commander-in-chief himself arrived in the city, from where the Germans were planning to storm Moscow for the second time.

The Battle of Rzhev is still a subject of debate among historians. Some of them believe that if not for the sacrifice of the Soviet people, Stalingrad would not have survived, and the Germans would have firmly established themselves in the Caucasus. Others believe that the Soviet command committed a real crime against its own people by ineptly organizing an attack on Rzhev. But there is still no exact data on the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in this battle. German dugouts and the remains of soldiers are still found in battle sites.

On January 5, 1942, Joseph Stalin gave the order to liberate Rzhev from the Nazis within a week. It was completed only after 14 months

Rzhev was occupied by German troops on October 24, 1941. The city was liberated from January 1942 to March 1943. The battles near Rzhev were among the most fierce, groups of fronts carried out offensive operations one after another, losses on both sides were catastrophic.

The Battle of Rzhev, despite its name, was not a battle for the city itself; its main task was to destroy the main forces of the German group on the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead 150 km from Moscow. The fighting took place not only in the Rzhev region, but also in the Moscow, Tula, Kalinin, and Smolensk regions.
There was no way to push back the German army, but Hitler was unable to transfer reserves to Stalingrad.

The Battle of Rzhev is the bloodiest in the history of mankind. “We flooded them with rivers of blood and piled up mountains of corpses,” this is how writer Viktor Astafiev characterized its results.

Was there a battle

Official military historians have never acknowledged the existence of the battle and avoid this term, arguing for the lack of continuous operations, as well as the fact that it is difficult to separate the end and results of the Battle of Moscow from the Battle of Rzhev. In addition, introducing the term “Battle of Rzhev” into historical science means recording a major military tactical failure.

Veteran and historian Pyotr Mikhin, who went through the war from Rzhev to Prague, in the book “Artillerymen, Stalin gave the order! We died to win” claims that it was he who introduced the term “Battle of Rzhev” into public use: “Now many authors talk about the Battle of Rzhev as a battle. And I am proud that I was the first to introduce scientific circulation concept “Battle of Rzhev”.

He considers this battle the main failure of the Soviet command:

“If it weren’t for Stalin’s haste and impatience, and if instead of six unsupported offensive operations, in each of which just a little bit was missing for victory, one or two crushing operations had been carried out, there would not have been the Rzhev tragedy.”

In popular memory, these events were called “Rzhev meat grinder”, “breakthrough”. The expression “they drove us to Rzhev” still exists. And the very expression “driven” in relation to soldiers appeared in popular speech precisely during those tragic events.

“Rus, stop dividing crackers, we’ll fight”

At the beginning of January 1942, the Red Army, having defeated the Germans near Moscow and liberated Kalinin (Tver), approached Rzhev. On January 5, the draft plan for the general offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1942 was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Stalin believed that it was necessary to launch a general offensive in all main directions - from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea. An order was given to the commander of the Kalinin Front: “in no case, no later than January 12, capture Rzhev. ... Confirm receipt, convey execution. I. Stalin.”

On January 8, 1942, the Kalinin Front began the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation. Then it was not only possible to interrupt the German defense 15–20 km west of Rzhev, but also to free the inhabitants of several villages. But then the fighting dragged on: the Germans fought back fiercely, the Soviet army suffered huge losses, and the continuous front line was torn apart. Enemy aircraft almost continuously bombed and shelled our units, and at the end of January the Germans began to encircle us: their advantage in tanks and aircraft was great.

Rzhevit resident Gennady Boytsov, who was a child at the time of those events, recalls: back in early January, a “corn farmer” arrived and dropped leaflets - news from his native army: “From the text of the leaflet, I forever remembered the following lines: “Mash your beer, kvass - we’ll be with you on Christmas " The villages were agitated and agitated; Residents' hopes for a quick release after Christmas gave way to doubts. They saw Red Army soldiers with red stars on their caps on the evening of January 9.”

Writer Vyacheslav Kondratiev, who took part in the battles: “Our artillery was practically silent. The artillerymen had three or four shells in reserve and saved them in case of an enemy tank attack. And we advanced. The field along which we walked forward was shot from three sides. Tanks, who supported us were immediately put out of action by enemy artillery. The infantry was left alone under machine-gun fire. In the very first battle, we left a third of the company killed on the battlefield. From unsuccessful, bloody attacks, daily mortar attacks, bombings, the units quickly melted away. We did not there were even trenches. It’s hard to blame anyone for that. Because of the spring thaw, our food supply was bad, hunger began, it quickly exhausted the people, the exhausted soldier could no longer dig the frozen ground. For the soldiers, everything that happened then was difficult, very difficult, but still everyday life. They didn’t know that it was a feat.”

The writer Konstantin Simonov also spoke about the difficult battles at the beginning of 1942: “The second half of winter and the beginning of spring turned out to be inhumanly difficult for our further offensive. And repeated unsuccessful attempts to take Rzhev became in our memory almost a symbol of all the dramatic events experienced then.”

From the memoirs of Mikhail Burlakov, a participant in the battles for Rzhev: “For a long time, instead of bread, we were given crackers. They were divided as follows - they were laid out in equal piles. One of the soldiers turned around and was asked who, pointing to this or that pile. The Germans knew this and so that To make a joke in the morning, they used to shout at us over the loudspeaker: “Rus, stop dividing crackers, we’ll fight.”

For the Germans, holding Rzhev was very important: from here they planned to make a decisive push towards Moscow. However, while holding the Rzhev bridgehead, they could transfer the remaining troops to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Therefore, it was necessary to block as many German troops as possible west of Moscow, wearing them down. Decisions on most operations were made personally by Stalin.

Armament and training

Good technical equipment gave the Germans a multiple advantage. The infantry was supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, with which there was communication during the battle. Using the radio, it was possible to call and direct aircraft, and adjust artillery fire directly from the battlefield.

The Red Army lacked either communications equipment or the level of training for combat operations. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead became the site of one of the largest tank battles of 1942. During the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, a tank battle took place, in which up to 1,500 tanks took part on both sides. And during the autumn-winter operation, 3,300 tanks were deployed on the Soviet side alone.

During the events in the Rzhev direction, a new fighter created in the Polikarpov design bureau I-185 was undergoing military tests. In terms of the power of a second salvo, later modifications of the I-185 were significantly superior to others soviet fighters. The speed and maneuverability of the car turned out to be quite good. However, it was never adopted into service in the future.

Many outstanding military leaders attended the Rzhev Academy: Konev, Zakharov, Bulganin... Western Front until August 1942 Zhukov commanded. But the Battle of Rzhev became one of the most inglorious pages in their biographies.

"The German could not stand our stupid stubbornness"

The next attempt to capture Rzhev was the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation - one of the most fierce battles of the war. Only the top leadership knew about the offensive plans, radio and telephone conversations and all correspondence were prohibited, orders were transmitted orally.

The German defense on the Rzhev salient was organized almost perfectly: each settlement was turned into an independent defense center with pillboxes and iron caps, trenches and communication passages. In front of the front edge, 20–10 meters away, solid wire barriers were installed in several rows. The arrangement of the Germans could be called relatively comfortable: birch trees served as railings for stairs and passages, almost every department had a dugout with electrical wiring and two-tier bunks. Some dugouts even had beds, good furniture, dishes, samovars, and rugs.

Soviet troops were in much more difficult conditions. A participant in the battles on the Rzhev ledge, A. Shumilin, recalled in his memoirs: “We suffered heavy losses and immediately received new reinforcements. Every week new faces appeared in the company. Among the newly arriving Red Army soldiers there were mainly villagers. There were also city employees among them, the most minor ranks. The arriving Red Army soldiers were not trained in military affairs. They had to acquire soldiering skills during battles. They were led and hurried to the front line. ... For us, trench soldiers, the war was not fought according to the rules and not according to conscience. The enemy was armed "to the teeth ", had everything, and we had nothing. It was not a war, but a massacre. But we climbed forward. The German could not stand our stupid stubbornness. He abandoned villages and fled to new frontiers. Every step forward, every inch of land cost us, the trenchmen, many lives."

Some soldiers left the front line. In addition to a barrier detachment of about 150 people, special groups of machine gunners were created in each rifle regiment, tasked with preventing the withdrawal of fighters. At the same time, a situation arose that the barrier detachments with machine guns and machine guns were inactive, since the soldiers and commanders did not look back, but the same machine guns and machine guns were not enough for the soldiers themselves on the front line. Pyotr Mikhin testifies to this. He clarifies that the Germans dealt with their retreating no less cruelly.

“We often found ourselves without food and ammunition in deserted swamps and without any hope of help from our own people. The most offensive thing for a soldier in war is when, with all his courage, endurance, ingenuity, dedication, dedication, he cannot defeat a well-fed, arrogant, well-fed armed, occupying a more advantageous position of the enemy - for reasons beyond his control: due to a lack of weapons, ammunition, food, aviation support, remoteness of the rear,” writes Mikhin.

A participant in the summer battles near Rzhev, writer A. Tsvetkov, in his front-line notes, recalls that when tank brigade, in which he fought, was transferred to the near rear, he was horrified: the entire area was covered with the corpses of soldiers: “There is a stench and stench all around. Many are sick, many are vomiting. The smell from smoldering human bodies is so unbearable for the body. A terrible picture, having been born like this I haven't seen..."

Mortar platoon commander L. Volpe: “Somewhere ahead, to the right, we could guess [the village] Cheap, which we got at an extremely high price. The entire clearing was littered with bodies... I remember the completely dead crew of an anti-tank gun, lying near its cannon turned upside down in a huge crater. The commander of the gun was visible with binoculars in his hand. The loader with a cord clutched in his hand. The carriers, forever frozen with their shells that never hit the breech."

“We advanced on Rzhev through corpse fields,” Pyotr Mikhin exhaustively describes the summer battles. He says in the book of memoirs: “Ahead is the “valley of death.” There is no way to bypass or bypass it: a telephone cable is laid along it - it is broken, and at all costs it must be quickly connected. You crawl over the corpses, and they piled in three layers, swollen, teeming with worms, emitting a sickening sweetish smell of decomposition of human bodies. A shell explosion drives you under the corpses, the soil shakes, the corpses fall on you, showering with worms, a fountain of putrid stench hits your face... It’s raining, there’s water in the trenches knee... If you survived, keep your eyes open again, hit, shoot, maneuver, trample on the corpses lying under the water. But they are soft, slippery, stepping on them is disgusting and regrettable."

The offensive did not bring much results: it was possible to capture only small bridgeheads on the western banks of the rivers. The commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, wrote: “In general, I must say, the Supreme Commander understood that the unfavorable situation that developed in the summer of 1942 was a consequence of his personal mistake, admitted when approving the plan of action for our troops in this year’s summer campaign.”

Fights "for a tiny tubercle"

The chronicle of tragic events is sometimes shocking with amazing details: for example, the name of the Boynya River, along the banks of which the 274th Infantry Division was advancing: in those days, according to the participants, it was red with blood.

From the memoirs of veteran Boris Gorbachevsky “The Rzhev Meat Grinder”: “Not taking into account the losses - and they were huge! - the command of the 30th Army continued to send more and more battalions to the slaughter, this is the only way to call what I saw on the field. And the commanders , and the soldiers understood more and more clearly the senselessness of what was happening: whether the villages for which they laid their heads were taken or not, this did not help in the least to solve the problem, to take Rzhev. More and more often, the soldier was overcome by indifference, but they explained to him that he was wrong in his too simple trenches reasoning..."

As a result, the bend of the Volga River was cleared of the enemy. From this bridgehead, our troops will begin pursuing the fleeing enemy on March 2, 1943.

Veteran of the 220th Rifle Division, teacher of the Vesyegonsk school A. Malyshev: “There was a dugout right in front of me. A burly German jumped out towards me. Hand-to-hand combat began. Hatred increased tenfold my not at all heroic strength. Indeed, we were then ready to gnaw the throat of the Nazis. And then there’s a comrade died."

On September 21, Soviet assault groups broke into the northern part of Rzhev, and the “urban” part of the battle began. The enemy repeatedly launched counterattacks, individual houses and entire neighborhoods changed hands several times. Every day German aircraft bombed and shelled Soviet positions.

Writer Ilya Erenburg in his book of memoirs “Years, People, Life” wrote:

“I won’t forget Rzhev. For weeks there were battles for five or six broken trees, for the wall of a broken house, and a tiny hillock.”

The summer-autumn offensive ended with street fighting in mid-October on the outskirts of Rzhev in 1942. The Germans managed to hold the city, but it could no longer be used as a supply base and railway junction, as it was constantly under artillery and mortar fire. The lines conquered by our troops excluded the possibility of an offensive by German troops from Rzhev to Kalinin or Moscow. Moreover, in the attack on the Caucasus, the Germans managed to concentrate only 170 thousand soldiers.

Hundreds of thousands of square kilometers captured by the Germans in the southern direction were not provided with troops capable of holding these territories. And at exactly the same time a group of millions stood against the Western and Kalinin fronts and could not move anywhere. According to a number of historians, this is precisely the main result of the Battle of Rzhev, which only outwardly represented a long positional struggle for insignificant spaces.

Pyotr Mikhin: “And when our troops, having encircled Rzhev in a semicircle, went on the defensive, our division was sent to Stalingrad. The decisive battle of the entire war was brewing there.”

City under occupation

The 17-month occupation of Rzhev is the greatest tragedy in its centuries-old history. This is a story of the resilience of the human spirit, and of meanness and betrayal.

The occupiers stationed three companies of field gendarmerie, secret field police and an anti-espionage department in the city. The city was divided into four districts with police stations in which traitors served. There were two labor exchanges, but the Germans had to use military forces to attract the population to work. Gendarmes with guns and police with whips went door to door every morning and drove everyone able to work to work.

But labor discipline was low. According to Rzhev resident Mikhail Tsvetkov, who worked at the depot, “they banged with hammers while the Germans were watching, but they didn’t see, we stood there and did nothing.”

The Nazis attached great importance to propaganda - for this purpose the newspapers “New Way” and “New Word” were published. There was a propaganda radio - cars with loudspeakers. In the “Manual on Our Propaganda Work,” the Germans called for fighting rumors: “What should we tell the Russian population? The Soviets tirelessly spread various rumors and give false information. The Soviets are suffering heavy losses in manpower, they are increasing terribly, as their command is forcing their troops to attack well-fortified German positions. It is not the Germans, but the Soviets who are in a hopeless situation. The German army in all its decisions and activities has in mind only the good of the civilian population entrusted to it. Therefore ... expects full support for all measures taken, which have the ultimate goal of destroying the common enemy - Bolshevism."

With every day spent under occupation, a slow and painful death from hunger became more and more real for thousands of townspeople and villagers. Food supplies, including grain from the train that had not been transported from Rzhev before the occupation, could not be extended for a long time. The grocery store sold only gold; the Germans took most of the harvest. Many were forced to sew, wash floors, do laundry, and serve in exchange for a can of clogged grain.

The Rzhev city concentration camp operated in the city. The writer Konstantin Vorobyov, who went through the hell of the camp, wrote: “By whom and when was this place cursed? Why is there still no snow in December in this strict square, framed by rows of thorns? The cold fluff of the December snow has been eaten with crumbs of earth. The moisture has been sucked out of the holes and grooves on throughout the entire expanse of this damned square! Patiently and silently waiting for the slow, cruelly inexorable death from hunger, Soviet prisoners of war..."

The head of the camp police was Senior Lieutenant Ivan Kurbatov. Subsequently, he not only was not accused of treason, but also served in the counterintelligence department of the 159th Infantry Division until 1944. Kurbatov facilitated the escape of several Soviet officers from the camp, helped scouts survive in the camp, and hid the existence of an underground group from the Germans.

But the main tragedy of Rzhev was that residents died not only from backbreaking labor in the construction of enemy defensive fortifications of the city, but also from shelling and bombing of the Soviet army: from January 1942 to March 1943, the city was shelled by our artillery and bombed by our aircraft. Even the first directive from Headquarters on the tasks of capturing Rzhev said: “to smash the city of Rzhev with might and main, without stopping in the face of serious destruction of the city.” The “Plan for the Use of Aviation...” in the summer of 1942 contained: “On the night of July 30-31, 1942, destroy Rzhev and the Rzhev railway junction.” Having been a major German stronghold for a long time, the city was subject to destruction.

"Russian human skating rink"

On January 17, 1943, the city of Velikiye Luki, 240 kilometers west of Rzhev, was liberated. The threat of encirclement became real for the Germans.

The German command, having used up all its reserves in winter battles, proved to Hitler that it was necessary to leave Rzhev and shorten the front line. On February 6, Hitler gave permission for the withdrawal of troops. One can make assumptions whether the Soviet troops would have taken Rzhev or not. But the historical fact is this: on March 2, 1943, the Germans themselves abandoned the city. For the retreat, intermediate defensive lines were created, roads were built along which military equipment, military equipment, food, and livestock were exported. Thousands of civilians were driven to the west, allegedly of their own free will.

Commander of the 30th Army V. Kolpakchi, having received intelligence information about the withdrawal Nazi troops, for a long time did not dare to give the order for the army to go on the offensive. Elena Rzhevskaya (Kagan), staff translator: “Our offensive was broken so many times by Rzhev, and now, after the victory in Stalingrad, when all the attention of Moscow was focused here, he could not miscalculate and hesitated. He needed guarantees that this time the conspiracy Rzhev will succumb, will be taken... Everything was resolved by a night call from Stalin. He called and asked the army commander whether he would soon take Rzhev... And the army commander replied: “Comrade Commander-in-Chief, tomorrow I will report to you from Rzhev.”

Leaving Rzhev, the Nazis drove almost the entire surviving population of the city - 248 people - into the Intercession Old Believer Church on Kalinin Street and mined the church. For two days in hunger and cold, hearing explosions in the city, the residents of Rzhevites expected death every minute, and only on the third day did Soviet sappers remove explosives from the basement, find and clear a mine. The released V. Maslova recalled: “I left the church with a 60-year-old mother and a two-year-seven-month-old daughter. Some junior lieutenant gave his daughter a piece of sugar, and she hid it and asked: “Mom, is this snow?”

Rzhev was a continuous minefield. Even the ice-bound Volga was densely strewn with mines. Sappers walked ahead of the rifle units and subunits, making passages in the minefields. Signs began to appear on the main streets with the words "Checked. No mines."

On the day of liberation - March 3, 1943- in a city destroyed to the ground with a pre-war population of 56 thousand, 362 people remained, including prisoners of the Intercession Church.

At the beginning of August 1943, a rare event happened - Stalin left the capital for the only time towards the front. He visited Rzhev and from here gave the order for the first victorious salute in Moscow in honor of the capture of Orel and Belgorod. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to see with his own eyes the city from where the threat of a new Nazi campaign against Moscow had been coming for almost a year and a half. It is also curious that the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded to Stalin on March 6, 1943, after the liberation of Rzhev.

Losses

The losses of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Rzhev have not been truly calculated. But it is obvious that they were simply gigantic. If Stalingrad went down in history as the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War, then Rzhev - as a bloody struggle of attrition.

According to various historians, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet army, including prisoners, during the Battle of Rzhev ranged from 392,554 to 605,984 people.
From the book of memoirs of Peter Mikhin:

“Ask any of the three front-line soldiers you met, and you will be convinced that one of them fought near Rzhev. How many of our troops were there! ... The commanders who fought there were bashfully silent about the battles of Rzhev. And the fact that this silence crossed out the heroic efforts, inhuman trials, the courage and self-sacrifice of millions of Soviet soldiers, the fact that this was a violation of the memory of almost a million victims - this, it turns out, is not so important."