LECTURE IX

(Start)

The immediate causes of the War of 1812 were the break with Napoleon. – The balance of forces of the warring parties and the war plan. - General course of military operations. – The mood of the army and people in Russia. – Napoleon’s position before Moscow and in Moscow. - Expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Emperor Napoleon in his study. Artist Jacques Louis David, 1814

You have seen what the position of Russia was in the years that followed the Peace of Tilsit and constituted the third period of Alexander’s reign. An alliance with Napoleon was unbearable for Russia not only because it contradicted the national consciousness and national pride, but also because it completely destroyed the economic strength and well-being of the Russian people and state. At the same time, Napoleon, forcing us to waste our forces fruitlessly on a war with England, Sweden, Turkey and, finally, Austria, himself raised the Polish question against Russia in the most aggravated and dangerous form for us. The attitude of the Poles towards Alexander continued to deteriorate. At the same time, the Poles, who were the only zealous and devoted allies of Napoleon in his war with Austria in 1809, at the conclusion of peace with the Austrians, after the Wagram defeat, received a significant territorial increase to the Duchy of Warsaw at the expense of Galicia (with a population of more than 1.5 million souls), while only the small Tarnopol region (with a population of 400 thousand souls) was annexed to Russia from the same Galicia. Of course, Alexander did not need any increase in the territory of Russia; but the Russian government could not be indifferent to the growth of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was very hostile to us, especially since secret report Duroc, obtained by Kurakin, it became fully acquainted with the hidden views and plans of Napoleonic diplomacy. Duroc definitely stated in this report that Napoleon's dominance in Europe will not be based on a strong and calm foundation until the Bourbons reign in at least one European state, until Austria is excluded from the German Empire and until Russia is weakened and thrown back for the Dnieper and Western Dvina. At the same time, Duroc just as definitely condemned the previous French government’s allowance of the division of Poland and recommended restoring it in its previous form (i.e., within the borders of 1772) as a necessary bulwark against Russia. It is clear that this report could not but arouse alarm in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; but since it was impossible to officially refer to the stolen document, the Russian government based its fears and complaints on the Polish issue on large territorial increments of the Duchy of Warsaw, which formally violated one of the articles of the Tilsit Treaty. To reassure Alexander on this side, Napoleon agreed to conclude a special convention with Russia, in which any possibility of restoring Poland as an independent state would be formally eliminated by the mutual guarantee of both emperors. But when Caulaincourt, under the authority of Napoleon, concluded such a convention with the Russian minister Rumyantsev, Napoleon refused to ratify this document, claiming that Caulaincourt allegedly exceeded his authority. This refusal immediately followed the rejection of Napoleon’s attempt to woo one of Alexander’s sisters, Anna Pavlovna, and some historians see an internal connection in both of these events. But, apparently, the point was not in this unsuccessful matchmaking, which was not even formally started, but in the fact that Napoleon did not at all want to change his policy on the Polish issue and simply wanted to stall for time, because, in view of his failures in Spain, was not ready for war with Russia. At the same time, he expelled Alexander's relative, Duke of Oldenburg, from his own possessions due to the Duke's insufficiently strict adherence to the continental system. Since the possessions of the Duke of Oldenburg went to the House of Oldenburg as the junior line of the Holstein-Gothorp house, after the refusal of the senior line, which reigned with Peter III in Russia, Alexander, as a representative of this house, considered himself personally offended and after unsuccessful negotiations to satisfy the offended Duke with other equal possessions sent a circular protest against Napoleon's actions to all European courts. Napoleon considered this protest a casus belli, and if he did not declare war immediately, it was only because he was still not ready for it. Finally, the violation of the continental system in Russia with the adoption of Speransky’s financial plan and in particular the customs tariff of 1810, which directly hit the pockets of French merchants and manufacturers, were the most significant circumstances with which Napoleon could not come to terms.

Thus, by the beginning of 1812 it was clear to everyone that war between Russia and France was inevitable.

It was also clear that Austria, and especially Prussia, not to mention the other states of the European continent dependent on Napoleon, could not remain neutral in this “last struggle” between Napoleon and Alexander. Prussia could take the side of Russia if Russia began to fight offensively and transferred its armies across the Neman before Napoleon gathered sufficient forces there. But Russia could not do this, because the Poles would have put up energetic resistance from the very first steps, and the Prussian fortresses had still remained in the hands of the French since 1806, and Napoleon could thus completely destroy Prussia before Alexander came to it for help. On the other hand, the Turkish war was not over until the spring of 1812, and in general the forces that we could move against Napoleon were significantly inferior to those that he could bring to the Vistula, not even counting the Austrian and Prussian troops. Therefore, an offensive war was unthinkable for Russia.

Before the start of the war, Napoleon experienced, however, two important diplomatic failures. He failed to attract either Sweden or Turkey to the coalition he formed against Russia.

He failed to win Sweden over to his side - despite the promise to return Finland and even the Baltic provinces to her - primarily because Sweden could not fight England, which, of course, immediately resumed its previous alliance with Russia as soon as Russia broke off with France; In addition, Napoleon's agents, with their impudent behavior in Swedish Pomerania, strongly armed the Swedes against France, and finally, Bernadotte, chosen by the Swedish crown prince, being Napoleon's original rival, did not want to enter into an alliance with him. On the contrary, in the summer of 1812, after a personal meeting with Alexander, he concluded a friendly agreement with him, securing only the Russian emperor’s promise to facilitate the annexation of Norway to Sweden in exchange for Finland. Thanks to this agreement, Alexander was able not only not to fear an attack from this side (which could ultimately threaten St. Petersburg), but also to withdraw all troops from Finland in order to use them against Napoleon.

As for Turkey, the new commander-in-chief of the army operating there, Kutuzov, managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Turks at the beginning of 1812, after which, and due to the internal unrest that continued in Turkey, the Turks could not continue the fight. In May 1812, Kutuzov concluded peace with the Turks in Bucharest, which could not have been more timely - two weeks before Napoleon’s army entered Russia. Although now it could no longer be a question of annexing Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, which Napoleon conditionally agreed to in Tilsit and Erfurt, nevertheless, according to this agreement, our territory was nevertheless increased by the annexation of Bessarabia along the Prut River. True, when concluding this agreement, Kutuzov neglected part of Alexander’s instructions: Alexander insisted that as an indispensable condition for peace, Kutuzov made Turkey conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, or at least ensure the free passage of Russian troops through Turkish possessions to Napoleon’s Illyrian lands. But the refusal of these demands is, of course, Kutuzov’s merit, for peace with Turkey was signed on May 12, and less than a month later Napoleon’s troops had already entered Russia.

For an experienced commander like Kutuzov, it was already quite clear that the upcoming war should be defensive and not offensive: it was not necessary to think about sending troops to Illyria, which Alexander and the ambitious admiral Chichagov, sent to the southern army instead of Kutuzov, dreamed of. , but about the concentration of all defensive forces against the enormous forces of the enemy, whom even then many considered possible to defeat only by luring him as deep as possible into Russia. The so-called “Scythian” war plan, which consisted in retreating without engaging in serious battles, but offering constant resistance, leaving the enemy areas devastated and devastated - such a plan before the start of the war of 1812 arose simultaneously in many heads, and Subsequently, many people, especially foreigners, each ascribed to themselves the honor of his invention. But, in essence, there was no invention here, since this method of war was known in ancient times (since the time of the Persian king Darius). But for its implementation it was necessary that the war first of all become a people’s war, since only the people themselves could burn their houses, and not the army, which, acting so contrary to the will of the population, would only acquire in the inhabitants a new enemy, or at least an ill-wisher.

Alexander understood this well. Realizing the danger and responsibility of the fight against Napoleon, but at the same time its inevitability, Alexander hoped that the war on Russian territory would become no less popular than in Spain. All the importance people's war Alexander understood, however, even before Napoleon’s Spanish failures: back in 1806, he tried, as you remember - and not without success - to arouse the population of Russia against Napoleon, without hesitating in the choice of means. However, the “Scythian” war was easy only for the Scythians; in a country that stood even at the level of culture on which Russia stood at that time, this kind of war was associated with terrible casualties. Moreover, the devastation had to begin from the western, most cultural and populated outskirts, relatively recently annexed to Russia. Finally, the necessity and inevitability of the “Scythian War,” despite its popularity, was not clear to everyone.

By the beginning of 1812, Napoleon was able, with the help of all his allies and vassals, to concentrate an army of up to 450 thousand people on the Russian border and could immediately move up to 150 thousand. We could deploy no more than 200 thousand on the western border. Already For this alone, an offensive war was completely impossible, not to mention the superiority of Napoleon's genius and the talents and experience of his generals. And yet Alexander did not lose hope of ultimately surviving this struggle. He openly told one of Napoleon's envoys just before the war, General Narbon, that he understood all the advantages of Napoleon, but thought that space and time were on his side; Subsequently, these words were justified, and “space and time,” together with the firmness and stability of his mood and the mood of all of Russia, really gave him complete triumph.

The original plan of the struggle was to slowly retreat in front of Napoleon with the main forces and hold him back with resistance in convenient positions, while at the same time trying to attack his flanks and rear. Therefore, our forces were divided into two armies, one of which, under the command of the Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, one of the heroes of the recent Finnish war, was supposed to retreat, defending itself in fortified camps, and gradually drag Napoleon into the interior of the country, and the other, under the command Bagration, Suvorov’s associate, was supposed to threaten and harm Napoleon’s flanks and rear. Therefore, Barclay’s army was concentrated to the north (in the Vilna province), and Bagration was concentrated to the south (south of Grodno). However, about half of Bagration’s army - up to 40 thousand soldiers - had to be sent at the same time against the Austrians and other allies of Napoleon, who invaded across the border of the Volyn province from Galicia. Barclay also had to separate a significant corps under the command of Wittgenstein for the defense of the Baltic provinces and the road to St. Petersburg. Therefore, in order to hold back Napoleon’s advance, Barclay’s forces, as it turned out, especially after the discovery of the unsuitability of the fortified Drissa camp on the Western Dvina, were completely insufficient.

After the separation of Wittgenstein's corps from Barclay and from Bagration of several divisions to strengthen Tormasov, Barclay had only 80 thousand left, and Bagration had less than 40 thousand, and Napoleon could, thus, breaking the communication between both Russian armies, destroy them separately one at a time another. His efforts were directed towards this goal after he set out from Vilna in early July. In view of this danger, the Russian armies needed, in a change from the original plan, to unite as soon as possible. Napoleon, hoping to prevent the connection of Russian armies, wanted to bypass Barclay near Vitebsk. On the contrary, Barclay, having foreseen this movement of Napoleon, sought to unite with Bagration at Vitebsk. Thanks to the speed of Barclay's movement from Drissa to Vitebsk and the courageous resistance of the small corps, gr. Osterman-Tolstoy, deployed to delay the movement of Napoleon's main forces, Napoleon's plan failed; but Barclay also failed to unite with Bagration in Vitebsk, who, due to the rapid onslaught of Davout on him, had to retreat to Smolensk, where the union of both armies finally took place. A significant bloody battle took place here, and the Russian army set out from Smolensk only after it was turned into a pile of flaming ruins by enemy cannonade. Immediately after Smolensk, Napoleon tried to push the Russian army back from the Moscow road to the north, cutting it off from the fertile southern provinces, but this attempt also failed, and he had to leave it after the bloody battle at Valutina Mountain on the Moscow road.

Battle of Smolensk in 1812. Painting by P. von Hess, 1846

Despite the rapid, impetuous advance of Napoleon's troops and the almost non-stop retreat of the Russians, accompanied by fires and devastation of the country left to the enemy, Napoleon's position became more difficult and more dangerous with every step. After the battle of Valutina Mountain, Napoleon even considered whether it would be better for him to stop and spend the winter near Smolensk; but his position in this devastated country would not be favorable, and he decided to go further to the heart of Russia - to Moscow, having reached which, he hoped to dictate his terms of peace to the defeated enemy. Meanwhile, his army was melting away. Already near Vilna he had up to 50 thousand patients. Napoleon's main army, which consisted of 300 thousand people by the allocation of the corps of Macdonald and Oudinot, later reinforced by the San-Cyr division and intended for an offensive towards St. Petersburg and the Baltic provinces against Wittgenstein's corps, was lost in various private battles by the time it entered Vitebsk and skirmishes with the enemy and from ongoing illnesses up to 100 thousand people, i.e. decreased by one third; and after Smolensk and Valutina Gora, no more than half of the original composition remained in service.

The Russian army retreated in order, fighting bitterly, not for life, but for death. The resistance that was provided in a number of private battles to the French troops of the gr. Osterman-Tolstoy, Konovnitsyn, gr. Palen, it cost both us and Napoleon dearly. Only in the mood that dominated our army at that time could Osterman, under the pressure of Napoleon’s enormous forces, in response to the question of the officers surrounding him what to do now, say: “Stand and die!” The heroic resistance shown during Bagration’s retreat by Neverovsky’s division, consisting of recruits, the entire cavalry of Murat, or the short but glorious defense of Smolensk by Raevsky against the main forces of Napoleonic army are known. It must be borne in mind that while Napoleon's losses were irreparable, the losses of Russian troops retreating into the interior of the country could be largely replenished by reserves.

If Alexander clearly understood the full responsibility of the war undertaken, then Napoleon foresaw all the difficulties ahead of him, especially in forage and provisions, and therefore, at the beginning of 1812, he collected in Danzig such a huge amount of supplies that should have been enough for his entire army for a whole year.

But it was precisely thanks to these reserves that Napoleon formed a huge convoy of 10 thousand wagons, which, of course, in itself represented a terrible burden for the armies when moving; in addition, this convoy constantly had to be protected from Russian Cossack patrols. Having prepared provisions for the soldiers, Napoleon, however, could not even begin the campaign until mid-May and stood motionless in front of the Russian border, not daring to start a campaign, since he did not have fodder for the horses, of which there were more than 120 thousand in his army. .heads; I had to wait until the second half of May, when pasture appeared. This inevitable delay cost him dearly later.

Thus, Napoleon had to face very significant difficulties and disasters from the very beginning. But all these difficulties and troubles were not unexpected for Napoleon, and he, aware of all the difficulties of the campaign, still expected to achieve his goal. And I must say, he achieved the goal that he set for himself: he took Moscow. But it was here that disappointment awaited him. He did not take into account the strength of popular resistance; He first realized this only in Moscow, when it was too late to take appropriate measures.

Now, looking at the campaign of 1812 and the outcome of this campaign through the eyes of a historian, it is easy to see that Napoleon’s chances began to fall from the very beginning and fell non-stop, but his contemporaries did not immediately understand this; they only saw that the Russian army was retreating and that Napoleon was rushing further into the interior of the country. This course of affairs gave rise to despondency and despair among the population and murmur among the troops, who were eager for a general battle. This murmur intensified because the troops were led by a German. At the same time, the generals intrigued against Barclay de Tolly: they even talked about his treason. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Bagration had seniority in rank over Barclay; after the joining of the armies, deep hostility began between both commanders, and although Bagration was formally subordinate to Barclay, he nevertheless commanded his army independently. Finally, Alexander, obeying popular opinion, decided to appoint a common commander-in-chief for all the armies. The general voice pointed to Kutuzov. Although Alexander personally found Kutuzov very unpleasant after Austerlitz and after his disobedience at the conclusion of the Bucharest Peace, he nevertheless considered it necessary to submit to the general opinion. Conscious of the need for the people's struggle against Napoleon, Alexander at this time - as I have already noted - listened sensitively to the voice of society and the people. That is why he betrayed Speransky with his head, appointed Admiral Shishkov, a true Russian patriot of the best quality, but not a statesman at all, as Secretary of State; for the same reason, he appointed the eccentric Rostopchin, known for his patriotic brochures and posters, as governor-general of Moscow. For the same reasons, he appointed Prince Kutuzov to the commander-in-chief of all armies.

At first, Alexander himself wanted to be with the army and went to see it in Vilna, but Shishkov, who was with him, noticed in time - and this is his merit - that the emperor’s presence in the army was a great inconvenience, constraining the actions of the commander-in-chief. He persuaded Adjutant General Balashov and gr. Arakcheev signed with him a special letter to Alexander, in which they convinced the sovereign to leave the army and go to Moscow to maintain and enhance national feelings.

Alexander reluctantly followed Shishkov’s advice, and, I must say, he did well. In Moscow, he was awaited by an explosion of enthusiasm in society and the masses, which exceeded all his expectations. The nobility of one Moscow province immediately donated 3 million rubles, a huge amount for that time, and volunteered to provide 10 recruits for every 100 souls, which amounted to almost half of the working population capable of bearing arms. The Moscow merchants donated 10 million rubles. The same unprecedented donations were given by the nobility of Smolensk, Estonia, Pskov, Tver, etc. By autumn, the total amount of donations exceeded 100 million rubles. Never before or since have such colossal sums been donated. The war really took on a popular character.

Kutuzov took command of the army at the village of Tsarev-Zaimishche, precisely in the very place where Barclay was thinking of finally giving a general battle to Napoleon, yielding to the convictions of his headquarters and the general desire of the army. However, after inspecting the positions by Bennigsen, who arrived with Kutuzov, it was decided to retreat further, and a general battle was fought 130 versts from Moscow near Borodino (10 versts from Mozhaisk).

The Russian Guard repels the attacks of the French cavalry. Fragment of the Borodino panorama. Artist F. Roubaud, 1912

The general course of this battle is known; I won't describe it. This is the bloodiest battle of all Napoleonic battles: both sides lost half of their armies, and more than two thousand officers were killed and wounded. Among our generals, Bagration, Tuchkov and others dropped out (more than 20 in total). Napoleon had 49 generals killed and wounded.

Military historians say that if Napoleon had moved his guards, he could have won the battle; but he did not want to risk his guard 3 thousand versts from France, as he himself stated during the battle in response to the advice of his entourage.

Kutuzov, despite the fact that he defended all positions, came, however, after examining his army after a two-day battle, to the conviction of the need to retreat and retreated to Moscow, then beyond Moscow, not finding a convenient position near Moscow for a new battle - first on Ryazan, and then to the Kaluga road. Moscow was left without a fight. Napoleon's army, “having crashed against the Russians,” as Ermolov put it, entered Moscow and settled in for a long rest. This stop led to the final disintegration and demoralization of Napoleonic troops. Fires started in Moscow, abandoned by residents, but there was nothing to extinguish it with - the pipes were prudently removed by Rostopchin. There was nothing to eat - the remaining supplies were soon plundered. Stunned by the sight of empty Moscow and fires instead of the expected convenient and well-supplied parking lot, Napoleon stood inactive for five weeks in the “conquered” city, among a pile of charred ruins. All his attempts to initiate peace negotiations were rejected. Five weeks later, Napoleon set out from Moscow, having one desire - to return home with his army. But Kutuzov blocked the road to the south, and Napoleon was forced to return along the old, devastated Smolensk road. A brutal guerrilla war began, frosts struck, which began this year earlier than usual, and the great army quickly turned into a huge hungry and frozen crowd, which was beaten and captured not only by peasants, but even by women. If Napoleon himself managed to gallop away in a wagon, tied with shawls and wrapped in fur coats, but without troops, then only thanks to the oversight of Admiral Chichagov, who let him go. In Warsaw, Napoleon himself said to those who met him: “From the great to the ridiculous there is only one step...”

The main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812 determined the victory of Russian troops over the enemy. The course of the campaign on the part of the Russian forces was determined at the first stage by the strategy of Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly, and at the second stage by Kutuzov’s plan to lure the enemy deep into the country in order to weaken his forces. At first, Napoleon's army was favored by success: in June of the year in question, his troops unexpectedly began an invasion of Russian soil. However, the very first major battle demonstrated the enormous potential of the Russian army, which, although initially retreating, managed to greatly weaken the enemy.

Battle near Smolensk

The list of “Main Battles of the Patriotic War of 1812” should begin with the first serious clash of opponents near this old and strategically important city. On August 4, the first French corps approached the walls and tried to attack them on the move, but soon retreated with considerable losses. In the middle of the day, the main forces of the French arrived and began shelling the fortifications, which, however, were not too badly damaged.

By the end of the day, additional forces approached the city. The commander set out to exhaust the enemy in battle and not allow him to cut off the Moscow road. On the first day of the battle, the Russians achieved victory, but on the second day the French began a massive bombardment of the walls, and the city caught fire. The enemy captured the suburb. Under these conditions, Barclay de Tolly gave the order to retreat in order to preserve the army. So, the main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812 began with the defense of Smolensk. Society and the authorities were dissatisfied with the withdrawal of Russian troops. After this battle, Emperor Alexander I appointed Kutuzov, who was very popular in the army, as commander.

Beginning of the Battle of Borodino

This was the most famous battle during the Russian war with Napoleon. It happened on August 26, in a village located 125 km from Moscow. The battle lasted 12 hours with varying success, and is therefore considered one of the bloodiest in history.

When studying the topic “The Main Battles of the Patriotic War of 1812” at school, one should dwell in particular detail on this event, since it determined the further course of the confrontation. The main attack of the French fell on the left flank and center. They managed to take possession of the village, but were unable to completely break through the defenses here.

Battle for flushes

The second strong onslaught came against Bagration’s earthworks. During the first attacks, the French were forced to retreat for some time due to heavy losses. After receiving reinforcements, they began a massive bombardment. Raevsky's battery took the brunt of the attack. The Russians launched a series of counterattacks, during one of which Marshal Murat himself was almost captured. There was a fierce struggle for flushes; they constantly changed hands. The Patriotic War of 1812, the main battles of which are the subject of this review, showed the boundless heroism and courage of Russian soldiers. During the eighth attack on the flashes, hand-to-hand combat ensued. Despite the fact that the French units were reinforced with artillery and guns, the advantage tilted towards the Russians. A tragic incident did not allow this success to be developed. At the height of the battle, Bagration, who led the counterattack, was wounded by a cannonball fragment. He was carried off the field, news of this quickly spread among the Russian soldiers, and this demoralized them, after which they began to retreat. After this, General Konovnitsyn gave the order to leave the flushes.

Battle for the mound

Of great importance for understanding the reasons for the victory of the Russian army is the study of how the main battles developed. Speaking about the main events, we should dwell in more detail on the battle of Borodino. After retreating from the flushes, fierce battles broke out for the Utitsky Kurgan. In this area, Kutuzov positioned an ambush regiment, which was supposed to attack the enemy from the rear during his attack on Bagration’s fortifications. However, the plan could not be implemented. However, after numerous attacks, the Russians still held the mound, but the commander of the army, Tuchkov, was killed.

Further course of the battle and result

The main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812, the results of which ultimately ensured the success of the Russian army, must be studied in particular detail. During the Battle of Borodino, the Cossack raid of Uvarov and Platov behind enemy lines played a great role. This was a very skillful maneuver that delayed the French attack by about two hours.

A particularly fierce battle ensued. Despite heavy fire and the continuous advance, the center maintained its position, and Napoleon was forced to abandon further advance. In Western European historiography, the opinion has been established that the French won the Battle of Borodino, although this statement is accepted with reservations. In modern Russian science, it is generally accepted that the battle ended in a draw, since neither side achieved its goal.

and on the Berezina

The skill of the Russian army was demonstrated by the main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812. The table of main battles is presented in this review in chronological order. On October 12, a new battle took place near Maloyaroslavets, which showed the readiness of the Russian army for a general battle.

Several times the small town fell to the enemy, but in the end Napoleon decided to retreat, since he himself was almost captured.

The significance of this maneuver by Kutuzov is difficult to overestimate: he did not allow the enemy to enter the southern provinces, forcing him to retreat along the devastated Smolensk road. The last major clash occurred at the end of November, when Napoleon was forced to hastily retreat from the country across the river.

During this retreat, the French suffered huge losses, and yet the emperor managed to preserve combat-ready parts of his army.

Chronology

In two lessons, it is advisable to study the topic “The main battles of the Patriotic War of 1812.” Briefly (the table below mentions some battles that were not listed in this work) this material It is better to present it concisely by date.

So, the battles of the Patriotic War of 1812 prove the strategic skill of the commanders of the Russian army and the courage of ordinary soldiers who achieved victory over Napoleon’s army, which was considered invincible.

The French invasion of Russia, also known as the Russian Campaign of 1812, was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. After the campaign, only a small part of their former military power remained at the disposal of France and the allies. The war left a huge mark on culture (for example, “War and Peace” by L.N. Tolstoy) and national identification, so necessary during the German attack in 1941-1945.

We call the French invasion the Patriotic War of 1812 (not to be confused with the Great Patriotic War, which is called the attack fascist Germany on ). In an attempt to gain the support of Polish nationalists by playing on their feelings of nationalism, Napoleon called this war the “Second Polish War” (“The First Polish War” was a war for Polish independence from Russia, Prussia and Austria). Napoleon promised to revive the Polish state in the territories of modern Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

Causes of the Patriotic War

At the time of the invasion, Napoleon was at the pinnacle of power and had virtually crushed the entire continental Europe under his influence. He often left local government in defeated countries, which earned him fame as a liberal, strategically wise politician, but all local authorities worked to benefit the interests of France.

None of the political forces operating in Europe at that time dared to go against the interests of Napoleon. In 1809, under the terms of a peace treaty with Austria, it undertook to transfer western Galicia under the control of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Russia saw this as an infringement of its interests and the preparation of a springboard for an invasion of Russia.

This is what Napoleon wrote in an attempt to enlist the help of Polish nationalists in his decree of June 22, 1812: “Soldiers, the second Polish war has begun. The first ended in Tilsit. In Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war with England. Today Russia is breaking its oaths. Russia is led by fate and the destined must be fulfilled. Does this mean that we must be degenerate? No, we will move on, we will cross the Neman River and start a war on its territory. The second Polish war will be victorious with the French army at its head, just as the first war was.”

The First Polish War was a war of four coalitions to liberate Poland from Russian, Prussian, and Austrian rule. One of the officially declared goals of the war was the restoration of an independent Poland within the borders of modern Poland and Lithuania.

Emperor Alexander the First took over the country in an economic hole, since the industrial revolution that was taking place everywhere bypassed Russia. However, Russia was rich in raw materials and was part of Napoleonic strategy to build the economy of continental Europe. These plans made it impossible to trade in raw materials, which was vitally important for Russia from an economic point of view. Russian refusal to participate in the strategy was another reason for Napoleon's attack.

Logistics

Napoleon and the Grande Armée developed the ability to maintain combat effectiveness beyond territories where they were well supplied. This was not so difficult in densely populated and agricultural central Europe with its network of roads and well-functioning infrastructure. The Austrian and Prussian armies were stymied by rapid movements, and this was achieved by timely supplies of fodder.

But in Russia, Napoleon's war strategy turned against him. Forced marches often forced troops to do without supplies, since supply caravans simply could not keep up with the fast-moving Napoleonic army. The lack of food and water in the sparsely populated and undeveloped regions of Russia led to the death of people and horses.

The army was weakened by constant hunger, as well as diseases caused by dirty water, as they had to drink even from puddles and use rotten fodder. The forward detachments received everything they could get, while the rest of the army was forced to starve.

Napoleon made impressive preparations to supply his army. Seventeen convoys, consisting of 6,000 carts, were supposed to provide the Grand Army with supplies for 40 days. A system of ammunition depots was also prepared in the cities of Poland and East Prussia.

At the beginning of the campaign there were no plans to take Moscow, so there were not enough supplies. However, the Russian armies, dispersed over a large area, could not oppose Napoleon's army, consisting of 285,000 thousand people, in one major battle separately and continued to retreat in an attempt to unite.

This forced the Grand Army to advance along muddy roads with bottomless swamps and frozen ruts, which led to the death of exhausted horses and broken wagons. Charles José Minard wrote that the Napoleonic army suffered most of its losses while advancing towards Moscow in the summer and autumn, and not in open battles. Hunger, thirst, typhus and suicide brought more losses to the French army than all the battles with the Russian army combined.

Composition of Napoleon's Grand Army

On June 24, 1812, the Grand Army, numbering 690,000 men (the largest army ever assembled in European history), crossed the Neman River and advanced towards Moscow.

The Grand Army was divided into:

• The army for the main attack numbered 250,000 men under the personal command of the emperor.
  The other two advanced armies were commanded by Eugène de Beauharnais (80,000 men) and Jerome Bonaparte (70,000 men).
• Two separate corps under the command of Jacques Macdonald (32,500 men, mostly Prussian soldiers) and Karl Schwarzenberg (34,000 Austrian soldiers).
• Reserve army of 225,000 people (the main part remained in Germany and Poland).

There was also a National Guard of 80,000 who remained to protect the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Including them, the number of French imperial army on the Russian border was 800,000 people. This huge accumulation of human power greatly thinned out the Empire. Because 300,000 French soldiers, along with 200,000 thousand Germans and Italians, fought in Iberia.

The army consisted of:

• 300,000 French
• 34,000 Austrian corps led by Schwarzenberg
• about 90,000 Poles
• 90,000 Germans (including Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians, Westphalians, Württembergers, Badeners)
• 32,000 Italians
• 25,000 Neapolitans
• 9,000 Swiss (German sources specify 16,000 people)
• 4,800 Spaniards
• 3,500 Croats
• 2,000 Portuguese

Anthony Joes, in the Journal of Conflict Research, wrote: Accounts of how many of Napoleon's soldiers served in the war and how many of them returned vary widely. Georges Lefebvre writes that Napoleon crossed the Niemen with more than 600,000 soldiers, and only half of them were French. The rest were mostly Germans and Poles.

Felix Markham claims that 450,000 soldiers crossed the Niemen on June 25, 1812, of whom less than 40,000 returned in some semblance of an army. James Marshall-Cornwall writes that 510,000 imperial soldiers invaded Russia. Eugene Tarle estimates that 420,000 were with Napoleon and 150,000 followed behind, making a total of 570,000 soldiers.

Richard K. Rhyne gives the following figures: 685,000 people crossed the Russian border, of whom 355,000 were French. 31,000 were able to leave Russia as a united military formation, while another 35,000 people fled individually and in small groups. The total number of survivors is estimated at approximately 70,000.

Whatever the actual exact numbers, everyone agrees that practically the entire Grand Army remained killed or wounded on Russian territory.

Adam Zamoyski estimates that between 550,000 and 600,000 French and Allied soldiers, including reinforcements, took part in the crossing of the Niemen. At least 400,000 soldiers died.

The infamous graphs of Charles Minard (an innovator in the field of graphical analysis methods) plotted the size of an advancing army on a contour map, as well as the number of retreating soldiers as temperatures dropped (temperatures that year dropped to -30 Celsius). According to these charts, 422,000 crossed the Niemen with Napoleon, 22,000 soldiers separated and headed north, only 100,000 survived the journey to Moscow. Of these 100,000, only 4,000 survived and joined with 6,000 soldiers from a collateral army of 22,000. Thus, only 10,000 of the original 422,000 soldiers returned.

Russian Imperial Army

The forces that opposed Napoleon at the time of the attack consisted of three armies totaling 175,250 regular soldiers, 15,000 Cossacks and 938 cannons:

• The First Western Army, under the command of Field Marshal General Michael Barclay de Tolly, consisted of 104,250 soldiers, 7,000 Cossacks and 558 cannons.
• The Second Western Army under the command of Infantry General Peter Bagration numbered 33,000 soldiers, 4,000 Cossacks and 216 cannons.
• The Third Reserve Army, under the command of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov, consisted of 38,000 soldiers, 4,000 Cossacks and 164 cannons.

However, these forces could count on reinforcements, which amounted to 129,000 soldiers, 8,000 Cossacks and 434 cannons.

But only 105,000 of these potential reinforcements could take part in the defense against the invasion. In addition to the reserve, there were recruits and militia, totaling approximately 161,000 men of varying degrees of training. Of these, 133,000 took part in the defense.

Although total number of all formations amounted to 488,000 people, but of these only approximately 428,000 thousand opposed the Grand Army from time to time. Also, more than 80,000 Cossacks and militias and about 20,000 soldiers garrisoned fortresses in the combat zone did not take part in the open confrontation with Napoleon’s army.

Sweden, Russia's only ally, did not send reinforcements. But the alliance with Sweden allowed 45,000 soldiers to be transferred from Finland and used in subsequent battles (20,000 soldiers were sent to Riga).

Beginning of the Patriotic War

The invasion began on June 24, 1812. Shortly before, Napoleon sent the last peace proposal to St. Petersburg on terms favorable to France. Having received no answer, he gave the order to advance to the Russian part of Poland. At first, the army did not encounter resistance and quickly advanced through enemy territory. The French army at that time consisted of 449,000 soldiers and 1,146 artillery pieces. They were opposed by Russian armies consisting of only 153,000 soldiers, 15,000 Cossacks and 938 cannons.

The central army of the French forces rushed to Kaunas and crossings were made by the French Guards, numbering 120,000 soldiers. The crossing itself was carried out to the south, where three pontoon bridges were built. The crossing location was chosen by Napoleon personally.

Napoleon had a tent set up on a hill from where he could watch the crossing of the Neman. The roads in this part of Lithuania were little better than just muddy ruts in the middle of a dense forest. From the very beginning, the army suffered, as supply trains simply could not keep up with the marching troops, and the rear formations experienced even greater hardships.

March on Vilnius

On June 25, Napoleon's army, crossing along an existing crossing, met an army under the command of Michel Ney. The cavalry under the command of Joachim Murat was in the vanguard along with Napoleon's army, Louis Nicolas Davout's First Corps followed. Eugene de Beauharnais with his army crossed the Niemen to the north, MacDonald's army followed and crossed the river on the same day.

The army under the command of Jerome Bonaparte did not cross the river with everyone and only crossed the river on June 28 in Grodno. Napoleon rushed to Vilnius, not giving rest to the infantry, languishing under the torrential rains and unbearable heat. The main part covered 70 miles in two days. Ney's Third Corps marched along the road to Suterva, while on the other side of the Vilnia River marched the corps of Nikola Oudinot.

These maneuvers were part of an operation whose purpose was to encircle the army of Peter Wittgenstein with the armies of Ney, Oudinot and Macdonald. But MacDonald's army was delayed and the opportunity for encirclement was missed. Then Jerome was assigned to march against Bagration in Grodno, and Jean Rainier's Seventh Corps was sent to Bialystok for support.

On June 24, Russian headquarters were located in Vilnius, and messengers rushed to notify Barclay de Tolly that the enemy had crossed the Neman. During the night, Bagration and Platov received orders to go on the offensive. Emperor Alexander I left Vilnius on June 26, and Barclay de Tolly took command. Barclay de Tolly wanted to fight, but assessed the situation and realized that there was no point in fighting, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy. Then he ordered the ammunition depots to be burned and the Vilnius bridge to be dismantled. Wittgenstein and his army advanced towards the Lithuanian town of Perkele, breaking away from the encirclement of MacDonald and Oudinot.

It was not possible to avoid the battle completely, and Wittgenstein’s detachments following behind nevertheless came into conflict with Oudinot’s advanced detachments. On the left flank of the Russian army, Dokhturov's corps was threatened by Phalen's third cavalry corps. Bagration was given the order to advance to Vileika (Minsk region) to meet the army of Barclay de Tolly, although the meaning of this maneuver remains a mystery to this day.

On June 28, Napoleon, almost without battles, entered Vilnius. Replenishment of fodder in Lithuania was difficult, since the land there was mostly unfertile and covered with dense forests. Forage supplies were poorer than in Poland, and two days of non-stop marching only made the situation worse.

The main problem was the ever-increasing distances between the army and the supply region. In addition, not a single convoy could keep up with the infantry column during the forced march. Even the weather itself became a problem. This is what historian Richard K. Rhine writes about it: Thunderstorms with lightning and heavy rains on June 24 washed out the roads. Some argued that there are no roads in Lithuania and there are bottomless swamps everywhere. Carts sat on their bellies, horses fell exhausted, people lost their shoes in puddles. Stuck convoys became obstacles, people were forced to go around them, and forage and artillery columns could not go around them. Then the sun came out and baked the deep potholes, turning them into concrete canyons. In these ruts, horses broke their legs and carts broke their wheels.

Lieutenant Mertens, a subject of Württemberg who served in Ney's Third Corps, wrote in his diary that the oppressive heat that followed the rain killed the horses and forced them to set up camp practically in the swamps. Dysentery and influenza raged in the army, despite field hospitals designed to protect against the epidemic, hundreds of people were infected.

He reported the time, place and events that took place with high accuracy. So on June 6 there was a strong thunderstorm with thunder and lightning, and already on the 11th people began to die from sunstroke. The Crown Prince of Württemberg reported 21 dead in the bivouac. The Bavarian corps reported 345 seriously ill people by June 13th.

Desertion was rampant in the Spanish and Portuguese formations. Deserters terrorized the population, stealing everything they could get their hands on. The areas where the Grand Army passed remained destroyed. A Polish officer wrote that people abandoned their houses, and the area was depopulated.

The French light cavalry were shocked at how vastly outnumbered they were by the Russians. The superiority was so noticeable that Napoleon ordered infantry to support his cavalry. This even applied to reconnaissance and reconnaissance. Despite thirty thousand cavalry, they were unable to locate Barclay de Tolly's troops, forcing Napoleon to send columns in all directions in the hope of identifying the enemy's position.

Chasing the Russian Army

The operation, which was intended to prevent the unification of the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Vilnius, cost the French army 25,000 dead from minor skirmishes with Russian armies and disease. Then it was decided to move from Vilnius in the direction of Nemencine, Mihalishka, Oshmyany and Maliata.

Eugene crossed the river at Prenn on June 30, while Jerome was leading his Seventh Corps to Bialystok along with units crossing to Grodno. Murat advanced to Nemenchin on July 1, pursuing Dokhturov's third cavalry corps on the way to Dzhunashev. Napoleon decided that this was Bagration's second army and rushed in pursuit. Only after 24 hours of infantry chasing the cavalry regiment, reconnaissance reported that it was not Bagration’s army.

Napoleon then decided to use the armies of Davout, Jerome and Eugene to catch Bagration's army between a rock and a hard place in an operation covering Oshmyana and Minsk. The operation failed on the left flank, where MacDonald and Oudinot did not make it. Dokhturov, meanwhile, moved from Dzhunashev to Svir to meet Bagration’s army, avoiding battles with the French army. 11 French regiments and a battery of 12 artillery pieces were too slow to stop him.

Conflicting orders and lack of intelligence almost brought Bagration's army between the armies of Davout and Jerome. But even here Jerome was late, stuck in the mud and experiencing the same problems with food supplies and weather as the rest of the Grand Army. Jerome's army lost 9,000 men during the four days of pursuit. Disagreements between Jerome Bonaparte and General Dominique Vandamme further aggravated the situation. Meanwhile, Bagration linked his army with Dokhturov's corps and had 45,000 men at his disposal in the area of ​​the village of Novy Sverzhen by July 7th.

Davout lost 10,000 men during the march to Minsk and did not dare to engage in battle without the support of Jerome's army. Two French cavalry corps were defeated, outnumbered by the corps of Matvey Platov, leaving the French army without intelligence. Bagration was also not sufficiently informed. So Davout believed that Bagration had about 60,000 soldiers, while Bagration believed that Davout's army had 70,000 soldiers. Armed with false information, both generals were in no hurry to engage in battle.

Bagration received orders from both Alexander I and Barclay de Tolly. Barclay de Tolly, out of ignorance, did not provide Bagration with an understanding of the role of his army in global strategy. This thread contradictory friends a friend of orders gave rise to disagreements between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly, which later had consequences.

Napoleon reached Vilnius on June 28th, leaving behind 10,000 dead horses. These horses were vital to supplying an army that so desperately needed them. Napoleon assumed that Alexander would sue for peace, but to his disappointment this did not happen. And this was not his last disappointment. Barclay continued to retreat to Verkhnedvinsk, deciding that the unification of the 1st and 2nd armies was the highest priority.

Barclay de Tolly continued his retreat and, with the exception of an accidental skirmish between the rearguard of his army and the vanguard of Ney's army, the advance took place without haste or resistance. The Grand Army's usual methods now worked against it.

Rapid forced marches caused desertion, starvation, forced troops to drink dirty water, there was an epidemic in the army, logistics trains lost horses in the thousands, which only aggravated the problems. The 50,000 stragglers and deserters became an unruly mob fighting the peasants in an all-out guerrilla war, which only worsened the supply situation for the Grande Armée. By this time, the army had already been reduced by 95,000 people.

March on Moscow

Supreme Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly refused to join the battle, despite Bagration's calls. Several times he attempted to prepare a powerful defensive position, but Napoleon's troops were too fast, and he did not have time to complete the preparations and retreated. The Russian army continued to retreat inland, adhering to tactics developed by Karl Ludwig Pfuel. Retreating, the army left behind scorched earth, which caused even more serious problems with forage.

Political pressure was put on Barclay de Tolly, forcing him to give battle. But he continued to reject the idea of ​​a global battle, which led to his resignation. The boastful and popular Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Despite Kutuzov's populist rhetoric, he continued to adhere to Barclay de Tolly's plan. It was obvious that attacking the French in open battle would lead to the pointless loss of the army.

After an indecisive clash near Smolensk in August, he finally managed to create a decent defensive position at Borodino. The Battle of Borodino took place on September 7th and became the bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic Wars. By September 8, the Russian army was halved and was again forced to retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered the evacuation of the city.

By this point, the Russian army had reached its maximum strength of 904,000. Of these, 100,000 were in the immediate vicinity of Moscow and were able to join Kutuzov's army.

Capture of Moscow

On September 14, 1812, Napoleon entered an empty city, from which, by order of Governor Fyodor Rostopchin, all supplies were removed. According to the classic rules of warfare of the time, aimed at capturing the enemy's capital, although the capital was St. Petersburg, Moscow remained the spiritual capital, Napoleon expected Emperor Alexander I to announce surrender on Poklonnaya Hill. But the Russian command did not even think about surrender.

As Napoleon prepared to enter Moscow, he was surprised that he was not met by a delegation from the city. When a victorious general approached, local authorities usually met him at the gates with the keys to the city in an attempt to protect the population and city from plunder. Napoleon sent his assistants to the city in search of official authorities with whom it would be possible to conclude agreements on the occupation of the city. When no one could be found, Napoleon realized that the city was unconditionally abandoned.

In a normal capitulation, city officials were forced to make arrangements to house and feed the soldiers. IN in this case the situation forced the soldiers to look for a roof over their heads and food for themselves. Napoleon was secretly disappointed at the lack of adherence to customs, as he believed it robbed him of his traditional victory over the Russians, especially after taking such a spiritually significant city.

Before the order to evacuate Moscow, the city's population was 270,000 people. After most of the population left the city, those who remained robbed and burned food so that the French would not get it. By the time Napoleon entered the Kremlin, no more than a third of its inhabitants remained in the city. Those who remained in the city were mainly foreign traders, servants and people who could not or did not want to evacuate. The remaining people tried to avoid the troops and the large French community, numbering several hundred people.

Burning of Moscow

After the capture of Moscow, the Grand Army, dissatisfied with the conditions of detention and the honors not given to the victors, began to plunder what was left of the city. The fires started that evening and only grew over the following days.

Two-thirds of the city was made of wood. The city was burned almost to the ground. Four-fifths of the city was burned, leaving the French homeless. French historians believe the fires were sabotaged by the Russians.

Leo Tolstoy, in his work War and Peace, states that the fires were not caused by Russian sabotage or French looting. The fires were a natural result of the fact that the city was filled with strangers during the winter season. Tolstoy believed that the fires were a natural consequence of the invaders lighting small fires for heating, cooking and other domestic needs. But they soon got out of control, and without an active fire service there was no one to put them out.

Retreat and defeat of Napoleon

Sitting in the ashes of a ruined city, having failed to receive Russian surrender and facing a rebuilt Russian army driving him out of Moscow, Napoleon began his long retreat by mid-October. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov was able to force the French army to use the same Smolensk road for retreat that they used to march to Moscow. The surrounding area had already been deprived of food supplies by both armies. This is often presented as an example of scorched earth tactics.

Continuing to blockade the southern flank to prevent the French from returning via another route, Kutuzov again deployed guerrilla tactics to constantly hit the French procession at its most vulnerable points. Russian light cavalry, including mounted Cossacks, attacked and destroyed the scattered French troops.

Supplying the army became impossible. The lack of grass weakened the already few horses, which were killed and eaten by starving soldiers back in Moscow. Without horses, the French cavalry disappeared as a class and were forced to march on foot. In addition, the lack of horses meant that the cannons and supply trains had to be abandoned, leaving the army without artillery support or ammunition.

Although the army quickly rebuilt its artillery arsenal in 1813, thousands of abandoned military trains created logistical problems until the end of the war. As fatigue, hunger, and the number of sick people grew, so did the number of desertions. Most of the deserters were captured or killed by the peasants whose lands they plundered. However, historians mention cases when soldiers were pitied and warmed up. Many remained to live in Russia, fearing punishment for desertion, and simply assimilated.

Weakened by these circumstances, the French army was beaten three more times in Vyazma, Krasnoye and Polotsk. The crossing of the Berezina River was the last disaster of the war for the Great Army. Two separate Russian armies defeated the remnants of Europe's greatest army in their attempt to cross the river on pontoon bridges.

Losses in the Patriotic War

In early December 1812, Napoleon finds out that General Claude de Male attempted a coup in France. Napoleon abandons the army and returns home on a sleigh, leaving Marshal Joachim Murat in command. Murat soon deserted and fled to Naples, of which he was king. So Napoleon's stepson Eugene de Beauharnais became commander-in-chief.

In the following weeks, the remnants of the Grand Army continued to dwindle. On December 14, 1812, the army left Russian territory. According to popular belief, only 22,000 of Napoleon's army survived the Russian campaign. Although some other sources claim no more than 380,000 dead. The difference can be explained by the fact that almost 100,000 people were captured and that about 80,000 people returned from side armies not under Napoleon's direct command.

For example, most Prussian soldiers survived thanks to the Taurogen Neutrality Convention. The Austrians also escaped, having withdrawn their troops in advance. Later, the so-called Russian-German Legion was organized from German prisoners and deserters in Russia.

Russian casualties in open battles were comparable to French ones, but civilian casualties greatly exceeded military casualties. In general, according to early estimates, it was believed that several million people died, but historians now believe that losses, including civilians, amounted to about a million people. Of these, Russia and France lost 300,000 each, about 72,000 Poles, 50,000 Italians, 80,000 Germans, 61,000 residents of other countries. In addition to the loss of life, the French also lost approximately 200,000 horses and over 1,000 artillery pieces.

It is believed that winter was the decisive factor in Napoleon's defeat, but this is not so. Napoleon lost half his army in the first eight weeks of the campaign. Losses were due to the abandonment of garrisons in supply centers, disease, desertion, and minor skirmishes with Russian armies.

In Borodino, Napoleon's army no longer numbered more than 135,000 people and the victory with losses of 30,000 people became Pyrrhic. Stuck 1000 km deep in enemy territory, having declared himself the winner after the capture of Moscow, Napoleon humiliatingly fled on October 19th. According to historians, the first snow that year fell on November 5th.

Napoleon's attack on Russia was the deadliest military operation that time.

Historical assessment

The Russian victory over the French army in 1812 dealt a huge blow to Napoleon's ambitions for European dominance. The Russian campaign was the turning point of the Napoleonic Wars, and ultimately led to Napoleon's defeat and exile on the island of Elba. For Russia, the term "Patriotic War" formed a symbol of national identity that had a huge influence on Russian patriotism in the nineteenth century. An indirect result of the Russian patriotic movement was a strong desire to modernize the country, which led to a series of revolutions, starting with the Decembrist uprising and ending with the February Revolution of 1917.

Napoleon's Empire was not completely defeated by the lost war in Russia. The following year he would assemble an army of some 400,000 French, supported by a quarter of a million French-allied soldiers, to contest control of Germany in an even larger campaign known as the War of the Sixth Coalition.

Although outnumbered, he won a decisive victory at the Battle of Dresden (August 26-27, 1813). Only after the decisive battle of Leipzig (Battle of the Nations, October 16-19, 1813) was he finally defeated. Napoleon simply did not have the necessary troops to prevent a coalition invasion of France. Napoleon proved himself to be a brilliant commander and still managed to inflict heavy losses on the vastly superior Allied armies at the Battle of Paris. The city was nevertheless captured and Napoleon was forced to abdicate in 1814.

However, the Russian campaign showed that Napoleon was not invincible, ending his reputation as an invincible military genius. Napoleon foresaw what this would mean, so he quickly fled to France before news of the disaster became known. Sensing this and enlisting the support of Prussian nationalists and the Russian Emperor, German nationalists rebelled against the Confederation of the Rhine and. The decisive German campaign would not have taken place without defeating the most powerful empire in Europe.

The attack on Russia was a continuation of Napoleon's hegemonic policy of establishing dominance over the European continent. By the beginning of 1812, most of Europe became dependent on France. Russia and Great Britain remained the only countries that posed a threat to Napoleonic plans.

After the Treaty of Tilsit Union on June 25 (July 7), 1807, Franco-Russian relations gradually deteriorated. Russia provided virtually no assistance to France during its war with Austria in 1809 and thwarted Napoleon's marriage project to Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna. For his part, Napoleon, having annexed Austrian Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1809, actually restored the Polish state, which directly bordered Russia. In 1810, France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the brother-in-law of Alexander I; Russia's protests had no effect. That same year, a customs war broke out between the two countries; Napoleon also demanded that Russia stop trading with neutral states, which gave it the opportunity to violate the continental blockade of Great Britain. In April 1812, Franco-Russian relations were practically interrupted.

The main allies of France were Prussia (treaty of February 12 (24), 1812) and Austria (treaty of March 2 (14), 1812). However, Napoleon failed to isolate Russia. On March 24 (April 5), 1812, she entered into an alliance with Sweden, which was joined by England on April 21 (May 3). On May 16 (28), Russia signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Ottoman Empire, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, which allowed Alexander I to use the Danube Army to protect the western borders.

By the beginning of the war, Napoleon's army (Grand Army) numbered 678 thousand people (480 thousand infantry, 100 thousand cavalry and 30 thousand artillery) and included the imperial guard, twelve corps (eleven multinational and one purely Austrian), Murat's cavalry and artillery (1372 guns). By June 1812 it was concentrated on the border of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; its main part was located near Kovno. Russia had 480 thousand people and 1600 guns, but these forces were scattered over a vast territory; in the west it had approx. 220 thousand, which made up three armies: the First (120 thousand) under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, stationed on the Rossiena-Lida line, the Second (50 thousand) under the command of P.I. Bagration, located in the interfluve of the Neman and Western Bug, and the Third, reserve (46 thousand) under the command of A.P. Tormasov, stationed in Volyn. In addition, the Danube Army (50 thousand) came from Romania under the command of P.V. Chichagov, and from Finland - the corps of F.F. Steingel (15 thousand).

Period I: June 12 (24) – July 22 (August 3).

June 10 (22), 1812 France declared war on Russia. On June 12–14 (24–26), the main forces of the Great Army crossed the Neman near Kovno; MacDonald's 10th Corps crossed at Tilsit, Eugene Beauharnais's 4th Corps crossed at Prena, and the troops of the Westphalian King Jerome crossed at Grodno. Napoleon planned to wedge himself between the First and Second Armies and defeat them one by one in pitched battles as close to the border as possible. The plan of the Russian command, developed by General K. Full, envisaged the retreat of the First Army to the fortified camp at Drissa on the Western Dvina, where it was to give a general battle to the French. According to this plan, Barclay de Tolly began to retreat to Drissa, pursued by Murat's cavalry. Bagration was ordered to join him through Minsk, but the 1st French Corps (Davout) managed to cut his path at the very end of June and force him to retreat to Nesvizh. Due to the numerical superiority of the enemy and the disadvantageous position at Drissa, Barclay de Tolly, instructing the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein (24 thousand) to cover the road to St. Petersburg, retreated to Vitebsk. On June 30 (July 12) the French took Borisov, and on July 8 (20) Mogilev. Bagration's attempt to break through to Vitebsk through Mogilev was thwarted by Davout near Saltanovka on July 11 (23). Having learned about this, Barclay de Tolly retreated to Smolensk; The heroism of the corps of A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, for three days - July 13-15 (25-27) - holding back the onslaught of the French vanguard near Ostrovnaya, allowed the First Army to break away from the pursuit of the enemy. On July 22 (August 3) it united in Smolensk with Bagration’s army, which carried out a wide outflanking maneuver from the south through the Sozh River valley.

On the northern flank, the 2nd (Oudinot) and 10th (MacDonald) French corps tried to cut off Wittgenstein from Pskov and St. Petersburg, but failed; nevertheless, MacDonald occupied Courland, and Oudinot, with the support of the 6th Corps (Saint-Cyr), captured Polotsk. On the southern flank, Tormasov's Third Army pushed back Reinier's 7th (Saxon) Corps from Kobrin to Slonim, but then, after a battle with superior forces of the Saxons and Austrians (Schwarzenberg) near Gorodechnaya on July 31 (August 12), it retreated to Lutsk, where it united with the approaching Danube army of Chichagov.

Period II: July 22 (August 3) – September 3 (15).

Having met in Smolensk, the First and Second Armies launched an attack to the northwest in the direction of Rudnya. Napoleon, having crossed the Dnieper, tried to cut them off from Smolensk, but the stubborn resistance of D.P. Neverovsky’s division on August 1 (13) near Krasnoye delayed the French and allowed Barclay de Tolly and Bagration to return to the city. On August 5 (17), the French began the assault on Smolensk; The Russians retreated under the cover of the heroically defending rearguard of D.S. Dokhturov. The 3rd French corps (Ney) overtook N.A. Tuchkov’s corps at Valutina Mountain on August 7 (19), but was unable to defeat it. The continuation of the retreat caused strong discontent in the army and at court against Barclay de Tolly, who exercised general leadership of military operations; Most of the generals, led by Bagration, insisted on a general battle, while Barclay de Tolly considered it necessary to lure Napoleon deep into the country in order to weaken him as much as possible. Disagreements in the military leadership and the demands of public opinion forced Alexander I to appoint M.I. Kutuzov as commander in chief on August 8 (20), who on August 26 (September 7) gave the French a general battle near the village of Borodino. The battle was brutal, both sides suffered huge losses, and neither achieved decisive success. According to Napoleon, “the French showed themselves worthy of victory, the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.” The Russian army retreated to Moscow. Its retreat was covered by the rearguard of M.I. Platov, who successfully repelled the attacks of Murat’s cavalry and Davout’s corps. At a military council in the village of Fili near Moscow on September 1 (13), M.I. Kutuzov decided to leave Moscow to save the army. On September 2 (14), the troops and most of the residents left the city. On September 3 (15), the Grand Army entered it.

III period: September 3 (15) – October 6 (18).

Kutuzov's troops first moved southeast along the Ryazan road, but then turned southwest and went along the old Kaluga highway. This allowed them to avoid persecution and cover the main grain provinces and arms factories of Tula. Murat's cavalry raid forced Kutuzov to retreat to Tarutino ( Tarutino maneuver), where the Russians set up a fortified camp on September 20 (October 2); Murat stood nearby, near Podolsk.

The balance of forces began to change in favor of the Russians. The fire of Moscow on September 3–7 (15–19) deprived the Grand Army of a significant part of forage and food. In the areas occupied by the French, a partisan movement developed, actively supported by the peasantry; The first partisan detachment was organized by hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Davydov. Napoleon tried to enter into peace negotiations with Alexander I, but was refused; he also failed to agree with the Russian command on a temporary cessation of hostilities. The position of the French on the flanks worsened: Wittgenstein’s corps was strengthened by Steingel’s corps and the St. Petersburg militia that arrived from Finland; The Danube and Third armies were united into one under the command of Chichagov, who took Brest-Litovsk on September 29 (October 11); a plan was developed according to which the troops of Wittgenstein and Chichagov were to unite in order to cut off French communications and lock the Grand Army in Russia. Under these conditions, Napoleon decided to withdraw it to the west.

Period IV: October 6 (18) – December 2 (14).

On October 6 (18), Kutuzov’s army attacked Murat’s corps on the river. Blackie and forced him to retreat. On October 7 (19), the French (100 thousand) left Moscow, blowing up part of the Kremlin buildings, and moved along the Novokaluga road, intending to get to Smolensk through the rich southern provinces. However, the bloody battle near Maloyaroslavets on October 12 (24) forced them to turn onto the ruined old Smolensk road on October 14 (26). The pursuit of the Great Army was entrusted to M.I. Platov and M.A. Miloradovich, who on October 22 (November 3) near Vyazma inflicted serious damage on its rearguard. On October 24 (November 5), when Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh, frosts struck, which became a real disaster for the French. On October 28 (November 9) they reached Smolensk, but did not find sufficient supplies of food and fodder there; At the same time, the partisans defeated Augereau’s brigade near the village of Lyakhovo, and Platov’s Cossacks severely battered Murat’s cavalry near Dukhovshchina, preventing it from breaking through to Vitebsk. A real threat of encirclement arose: Wittgenstein, having taken Polotsk on October 7 (19) and repelled the attack of the corps of Victor and Saint-Cyr on October 19 (31) near Chashniki, walked towards the Berezina from the north, and Chichagov, having pushed the Austrians and Saxons to Dragichin, rushed towards it from South. This forced Napoleon to leave Smolensk on November 2 (14) and hurry to the crossing near Borisov. On the same day, Wittgenstein defeated Victor's corps near Smolyanets. On November 3–6 (15–18), Kutuzov launched several attacks on the stretched out units of the Great Army near Krasnoye: the French suffered heavy losses, but avoided complete destruction. On November 4 (16), Chichagov took Minsk, and on November 10 (22), Borisov occupied it. The next day, Oudinot's corps knocked him out of Borisov and organized a false crossing there, which made it possible to divert the attention of the Russians and enabled the main French forces to begin crossing the Berezina upstream near the village on November 14 (26). Student; on the evening of November 15 (27), they were attacked by Chichagov on the western bank, and by Kutuzov and Wittgenstein on the eastern bank; nevertheless, the French managed to complete the crossing on November 16 (28), although they lost half of their personnel and all their artillery. The Russians actively pursued the enemy, who was retreating to the border. On November 23 (December 5), Napoleon abandoned his troops in Smorgon and left for Warsaw, transferring command to Murat, after which the retreat turned into a stampede. On November 26 (December 8), the remnants of the Great Army reached Vilna, and on December 2 (14) they reached Kovno and crossed the Neman into the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. At the same time, Macdonald withdrew his corps from Riga to Konigsberg, and the Austrians and Saxons withdrew from Drogichin to Warsaw and Pułtusk. By the end of December, Russia was cleared of the enemy.

The death of the Great Army (no more than 20 thousand returned to their homeland) broke the military power of the Napoleonic Empire and was the beginning of its collapse. The transition of the Prussian corps of J. von Wartenburg to the Russian side on December 18 (30), 1812 turned out to be the first link in the process of disintegration of the system of dependent states created by Napoleon in Europe, which, one after another, began to join the anti-French coalition led by Russia. Military operations were transferred to European territory (Foreign campaign of the Russian army 1813–1814). The Patriotic War developed into a pan-European war, which ended in the spring of 1814 with the surrender of France and the fall of the Napoleonic regime.

Russia withstood the most difficult historical test with honor and became the most powerful power in Europe.

Ivan Krivushin

Syabry, this year is the year 205 since Napaleon’s invasion of the Russian Empire. The topic of the Napoleonic wars is one of the least popular in the Belarusian city, like the First World War. Bo, with such inadequate propaganda, we know that all the time there was only one hell of a war, and Belarus appeared in 1945.

Belarus knows about the Napaleonic campaign only from Lermantav’s novel “Baradzino”, the comedy “The Hussar’s Ballad” and the raman “War and Peace”. The year no less than 1812 has been one of the most mythical in our and racial history.

If the wool does not absolve us from “Sviadomite fairy tales and fantasies,” we publish materials raceskaga mentor of history, curator of the topic “History” on the website TheQuestion.ru Vyachaslav Babaytsav.

“NATIONAL WINE OF 1812 YAK NAYVYALIKSHY MYTH IN RACIAL HISTORY”

Adzin from the latest myths in Russian history - this “National War” of the population of the Russian Empire and the supremacy of Napaleon in 1812. Known rightly to the French, Vyalikay Aichynnay was rapidly disintegrating, as soon as she was rescued on heralded projects from the last minute of the call of the citizens of the USSR and the fight against Nazism. Further, the Savetskaya autara actyna expressed this merkavanne. In connection with this, the scale of the guerrilla attacks in the Aichynaya War of 1812 was not oversized, and their character was shown to be abrasive ad sapraudnaga.

In our case, in the territories occupied by the French, the anosins of meat roasters and the Great Army were subject to inappropriate duties. I was in the midst of a hell of private capture and hidden nannying.

In advance, Napaleon declared a declaration of justice to his kingdom – the annexed sovereign Poland (Rechy Paspalitai). This warehouse was planned to include the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian lands, which were part of the Racial Empire and the rise of the land of Rachy Paspalitai in the 18th century. The new dirty pavina was the respect of your old neighbor.

Concessions from the Cherven of 1812 from the western provinces of the Russian Empire, the French troops sympathized with the side of the mass population. Zhikhar garad loudly sang with flowers and music. Amal all the Lithuanian-Belarusian gentry, who were sleeping in the adnaulnaya Rechy Paspalitai at the borders of 1772, suppressed the French, which caused the hell of a race of self-destruction. The Catalan, and in some months, the right-wing saints of the Taxes, conquered Napaleon.

This is what the Vilna Garad newspaper “Kurjer Litewski” wrote to the great sister of the Vyalika Army: “This day we had happy celebrations at the scenes of our capital, the French Emperor... the great Napaleon, at the beginning of his insurmountable army.”

Taksama said: “The whole city on the streets, all the mountains in the villages were covered with people who were the first to kill the French. Shmat hto z getai metai climbed on the ladies, the walls of the church and the celebrants. The heavy troops fled to the Kovno outpost, and the devil chalked up the French. "Everything was running away, stumbling around, gamanila, guessing adzin vyalіzny Varyak house."

Napaleon's Sustretcha in Vilna

Belarusian historians Uladzimir Krasnyanskiy letters, in Minsk and in the provinces of the province, the pausal was completed “The virtuous comrades of the French to the Catalan clergy and the ancestors of the city; Thick avatsy natoўpu, iluminatsiі ўvechars, super-extraordinary azhyўlennoe, what ўcarried pameshchyki, jumping from navakolnyh weights advocating, paabedatsy, parazmaulatsya pravennoy Poland.

Meat roasters diverted warehouses from the authorities and pockets, not giving surplus to their adjacent Russian units, and transferred these reserves to the Great Army. For example, in Vilejtsy, General P’er Dushy de Colbert-Shabanakh has 2 thousand quintals of flour, hell 30 and 40 thousand rations of dry goods and shmat aўsa.

The ancestral villages of the noble noble families provided good service to the great Napaleonian troops. At Vilna, Princess Karalina Radzivil gave the French spite 30 barrels of wheat flour and 2 barrels of cereal in a vase, and 10 barrels and 12 rams. In the eyes of the ancestors of other Dwaranian families, the dachshunds began to succumb to the rule of the French hospitals.

« Napaleon Square in Minsk » - In 1812, Freedom Square was renamed to the royalty of the French Emperor.

There is a special difference between the members of the Vyalikay army and the samaga of the class of the Russian Empire - the nobles. The Pershapachatkova passage of the French rural roasters sprayed the water and did not provide any support to them.

During the withdrawal of the Napalaonic troops from the western province, a large number of peasants began to disintegrate, which caused the hell of the jump, the administration of the dynasty and the panshchyna. The French rule was captured by all the early pavinnasts, and taxes from the peasants were imposed on them. Geta called out the passions of the rural population. The villagers were trying to fight the French, collect the army from the enemy, and provide the Napaleonian troops with food and food. Wealthy ladies slept and ransacked their supplies, and entire families went to waste. Senior lady of the Byarezinskaya padrefecture of Dambrouski pisa: « I’m making a riddle for everything, but I don’t think so, damn... On fire, there’s a fire, I’m afraid because of the misfortune of the Salayans.”

In some areas, the peasants began to resist the French rear of the samabarons and the transition and act of supratsi. Suprasi Suprasi Armii Dzeinilly Farmіravanni Syalyan Z Vyosak Polosella, Mazhany, Esmani і Cleski ў Barysa Pavets, Varonki ° Drsenskim Pavets, Farms ў Polaski Pavez Inshykh.

In particular attacks on the rural population, the support of the landowners was destroyed. Zhikhar sheragu vesak on Vitsebshchyna stopped falling into disrepair with their pavements, and Dvaran farmsteads began to work. In the case of the Abaran Ulasny Maytki, the Myastsovaya Shlyakhtsa went through a brutal operation thanks to the help of the French administration. We are glad to see the news, because in order to protect the army of the Russian Federation, there would be a need for a paradox to recuperate the rural meat industry. Thanks to the help of the French troops, the revolts of the peasants were suppressed.

In the future, the supratsi of the villages of the western provinces were not removed. Particular outbreaks of unease reached the village in regular French parts. There Cossack Ab Useagulnay Syalyanskaya Partisanskaya Vine would be wrong.

The established and Vyalika army began to change, Kaliya began to pursue further claims in the province, where the Russian population was vitally important. Yashche ў Vіtsebsk Napaleon ў trіmlіvaў informed ad patrols and foragers in the pre-Race mood of the zharoў on the outcome of hell Rudnya and Chervonaga. Captain Victar Castelan writes: « We will always be with Russia, just as we will be with Spain.”. The French Emperor himself well understood that by guarding the fact that the Vyalika Army was in exchange for the old border of Rechy Paspalitay and the concession to the Territory of Smalenszczyna, the pharmaceutical campaign would cease to be a war for the annexed Poland. However, due to the fact that Napaleon did not attempt to destroy the Russian army and fight for the spoils and damage of the most profitable peace of the ladies, he would have suffered ruin in the future, if the promusic supernika could give a general fight.

Napaleon at Smalensku

On June 18, 1812, the Vyalika Army occupied Smalensk while shepherding heavy three-point firing pins. The formation here contrasted with the striking advances on the former Polish lands. The city, which was filled with fire, was drilled and burned by fire, and the streets were littered with corpses and abandoned paramilitaries. French officer Viscount Louis Guihem de Puybusque writes: “The whole dead are piled up in piles, right there, slaughtering the dying, on the doors and in the gardens; There is no need to cry, no hands to bury them in the ground. The Yans suffered terrible misfortunes; There is a lot of confusion in all the streets, it is even more painful for the hell of the Garad warriors, even now there are piles of dead bodies piled up, and so many dead horses are covering the streets and around the city. All these madnesses, which were in the streets and in the courtyard, destroyed Smalensk to the most unbearable people on earth.”

Since then, the historical acupation of Smalenshchyna has seen the most recent episodes of the Russian Vaisk army, which has fallen into the army, a good response to the Napaleonian administration. Such attacks were not bad, but they were okay.

The measures taken to prepare the French troops for the outcome of the act of supremacy of the peasants. The Vaiskians who escaped from the Russian army and the friendly hunters from the meat roasters were members of the Arganization of Atrads and the Barons themselves. The Salayan farming community is based on special military parties and attacks, including French foragers and maradzers. Major General Benckendorff writes: “Pameschki and sprauniki ўzbroіlі salayan і patіlі ... zaynichatsya supratsa agulnaga enemy. I didn’t try any more than what happened in Belarus.”

Minsk hour of Napaleon

It must be said that the reaction of the rural population and the Central Race to the passage of the Great Army was far from positive. Often the peasants swam away and the French jumped and captured Napaleon. Senator Pavel Kaveryn at the throne of Alexander I: “In response to the enemies of the busy months ... the agul memory of the peasants is being dissipated, the success of the non-independence of the Greater Race and their undated history and their settlements may have stifled their minds, but often not which in the Smalensk province were secreted for unprofitable purposes from the waste of fodder and the sunk Maya, and others, from the ladies with him, the gentle ladies began to work ». It was reported that in the Raslaul and Elninsky pavest “enemies, like passers-by, and maradzers, who were caught... packed, assemblies and peasants, wisely independents”, and ў Yukhnovskiy pavets “The villagers of some pastoral hell of vain thought are beginning to forget the death of the Gaspadars of their own and the fall of the French in this month, and this hell is fearing.”

Because in the spring of 1812 the French came to Maskwu, the next month of Maskwu province suffered from misfortune. The villagers, who were hiding from the passages of the French, jumped into action, voluntarily left the paddock of the bags. They decided to withdraw the soldiers and place the ranks. The Salayans said that the Tsalkas were now free, “there is Banaparte at Maskve, and that means he is their sovereign”.

Napaleon looked at the magic of the admen to the jumper. It is clear that this measure will help to jump on the side of the Great Army, the mass of Russian nobility and the course of the campaign. However, the French emperor does not dare to realize his plans, fearing a violent surge in the territories occupied by his troops. Napaleon Kaza: “I could fall suprat yago most of the population, abvyastsіўshi called workers... Ale kali I know about the rude norms of the getag shmatlikaga class of the Russian people, I admovіў hell getay measures, what kind of justice there would be many families and deaths, the development of the most terrible torments" .

As a matter of fact, not all the fires of those employed by the French are their enemies. This is important in the western provinces, including the national kingdoms, the Garadzhans and parts of the clergy, who believed that the independence of the Republic of Paspalitai would be adnoulena, the enemy of Napaleon. The villagers in these regions are far from giving up on the weak army with the rulers and the races. “The cudgel of the people’s war” fell to full extent only in the wake of the fall of Smalensk. At the same time, a part of the rural population in the Central Race looked at Napaleon as if it were a hell of a jumper. The Salayan tortures of chalk were of great importance for the French administration. Veragodna, if Napaleon had attacked the Admena jumper, he would have been able to distinguish between the karennas with a peralom at the vine of Rasiej. Let the French Emperor grow up and not snarl.

Hell, the editors are aware that the government did not dismantle the right project for the advent of ON, like the moon in Napaleon’s plans. Ale pra geta, we will tell you more about the offensive publications. Friends, this year marks 205 years since Napoleon’s campaign against the Russian Empire. The topic of the Napoleonic Wars is one of the least popular in Belarusian society, just like the First World War. After all, thanks to inadequate propaganda, we know that there was only one war in the world, and Belarus appeared in 1945.

The average Belarusian knows about the Napoleonic campaign only from Lermontov’s work “Borodino”, the comedy “The Hussar Ballad” and the work “War and Peace”. Nevertheless, the year 1812 is one of the most mythological in our and Russian history.

To prevent the Vatans from declaring us in “Svyadomitsk fairy tales and fantasies,” we publish the material Russian history teacher, curator of the “History” topic on the TheQuestion.ru project Vyacheslav Babaytsev.

“THE NATIONAL WAR OF 1812 AS THE BIGGEST MYTH IN RUSSIAN HISTORY”

One of the biggest myths in Russian history is the “national war” of the population Russian Empire against Napoleon in 1812. The idea of ​​mass resistance to the French spread widely during the Great Patriotic War, when it was necessary to call on the citizens of the USSR to fight Nazism using heroic examples from the past. Subsequently, this point of view was actively replicated by Soviet authors. In this regard, the scale and nature of the actions of partisan detachments in Patriotic War 1812 were unreasonably exaggerated and embellished.

In fact, in the territories occupied by the French, the attitude of local residents towards the Great Army was extremely ambiguous. It ranged from welcoming delight to outright hatred.

On the eve of the invasion, Napoleon declared one of the main goals of his campaign - the restoration of sovereign Poland (Rzeczpospolita). It was planned to include Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian lands, which entered the Russian Empire as a result of the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 18th century. The new state was supposed to become a counterweight to its eastern neighbor.

Having entered the western provinces of the Russian Empire in June 1812, French troops met with sympathy from local population. The townspeople solemnly greeted them with flowers and music. Almost the entire Lithuanian-Belarusian gentry, who counted on the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772, perceived the French as liberators from the Russian autocracy. Catholic priests, and in some places Orthodox hierarchs, also supported Napoleon.

This is how the city newspaper Kurjer Litewski described the meeting of the Great Army in Vilna: “ On this day we were honored to see within the walls of our capital the Emperor of the French... the great Napoleon, at the head of his invincible army».

It was also reported: " The whole city was out in the open, all the surrounding mountains were completely covered with people, eager to be the first to see the French. Many climbed onto the roofs of houses, church towers and bell towers for this purpose. Huge crowds ran behind the Kovno outpost, where the French were expected. All this was running, colliding, noisy, generally reminiscent of one huge madhouse».

Meeting of Napaleon in Vilna

Belarusian historian Vladimir Krasnyansky wrote that in Minsk and the district towns of the province, “ ceremonial meetings of the French with Catholic clergy and city representatives; noisy applause from the crowd, evening illuminations, the unusual excitement brought by the landowners who came from the surrounding villages to celebrate, dine, and talk about the restored Poland».

Local residents took control of warehouses with provisions and feed, not allowing them to be destroyed by the retreating Russian units, and transferred these supplies to the Great Army. For example, in Vileyka, Brigadier General Pierre Davi de Colbert-Chabanet received from the townspeople 2 thousand quintals of flour, from 30 to 40 thousand rations of crackers and a lot of oats.

Representatives of noble gentry families voluntarily provided financial assistance Napoleonic troops. In Vilna, Princess Caroline Radziwill donated 30 barrels of rye flour and 2 barrels of cereal along with carts, as well as 10 oxen and 12 rams to the French hospital. Following her example, representatives of other noble families also began to donate food to French hospitals.

“Napoleon Square in Minsk” - in 1812, Freedom Square was renamed in honor of the French Emperor

Separately, it is worth highlighting the relationship between the Great Army and the most numerous class of the Russian Empire - the peasantry. Initially, the villagers reacted with restraint to the arrival of the French and did not offer any resistance to them.

When Napoleonic troops entered the western provinces, rumors about liberation from serfdom, the abolition of quitrents and corvee began to actively spread among the peasants. But the French authorities retained all the previous duties, and fees from peasants were even increased. This led to passive resistance from the rural population. The peasants refused to enter into trade deals with the French, to harvest crops in the fields, or to supply Napoleonic army with food and fodder. They burned their own houses and barns with supplies, and entire families went into the forests. The chief of police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “ I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from... There is a lot of grain in the fields, not harvested due to the disobedience of the peasants».

In some areas, the rural population began to create self-defense units in the French rear and move on to active resistance. Formations of peasants from the villages of Staroselye, Mozhany, Esmany and Klevki in Borisov Povet, Voronki in Drissen Povet, Zhartsy in Polotsk Povet and others acted against the Great Army.

In some cases, the indignation of the rural population was directed against their own landowners. Residents of a number of villages in the Vitebsk region stopped obeying their landowners and began looting and plundering noble estates. To protect their estates, the local gentry had to turn to the French administration for help. The new authorities agreed to help, since order in the occupied countryside was necessary to provide the army with provisions. With the help of French troops, the peasant revolts were suppressed.

In general, the armed resistance of rural residents of the western provinces was not of a massive nature. Individual outbreaks of discontent were quickly pacified by regular French units. Therefore, it would be incorrect to talk about a general peasant guerrilla war.

Attitudes towards the Great Army began to change rapidly as it advanced further into the provinces, where the Russian population predominated. While still in Vitebsk, Napoleon received reports from patrols and foragers about the pro-Russian sentiments of residents east of Rudny and Krasny. Captain Victor Castellan wrote: " When we are completely in Russia, it will be like in Spain" The French emperor himself well understood that after the Grand Army crossed the old border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and entered the territory of the Smolensk region, the campaign would formally cease to be a war for the restoration of Poland. However, since Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army in border battles and achieve a profitable peace, he was forced to move on in order to force a general battle on the enemy.

Napoleon in Smolensk

On August 18, 1812, after heavy three-day battles, the Great Army occupied Smolensk. The atmosphere here contrasted sharply with the ceremonial reception in the former Polish lands. The city, which almost all the inhabitants had abandoned, was destroyed and engulfed in flames, and its streets were littered with corpses and abandoned wounded. The French officer Viscount Louis Guillaume de Puybusc wrote: “ Dead bodies are piled up, right next to the dying, in courtyards and gardens; there are no spades or hands to bury them in the ground. They have already begun to rot; the unbearable stench in all the streets, it increases even more from the city ditches, where large heaps of dead bodies are still piled up, as well as many dead horses covering the streets and environs of the city. All these abominations, in fairly hot weather, made Smolensk the most unbearable place on the globe».

At the same time, in the history of the occupation of the Smolensk region by the Great Army, there are episodes when Russian military personnel who were captured voluntarily helped the Napoleonic administration. Such cases were few in number, but they did occur.

As French troops advanced east, resistance from the rural population intensified. Russian military personnel who escaped from captivity and volunteers from among local residents took the initiative to organize self-defense units. Peasant formations tracked down individual enemy parties and detachments and destroyed French foragers and marauders. Major General Benckendorff wrote: “ The landowners and police officers armed the peasants and began... to act against the common enemy. The phenomena that took place in Belarus were no longer repeated».

Minsk during the time of Napoleon

It must be said that the reaction of the rural population of the provinces of Central Russia to the arrival of the Great Army was not always negative. Often, influenced by rumors about the abolition of serfdom by the French, peasants openly supported Napoleon. Senator Pavel Kaverin, in a letter to Alexander I, reported: “ The suggestion of the enemy in the places he occupied... scattered everywhere among the villagers, the confidence that they no longer belonged to Russia and that the power of the landowners was inviolable to them could shake their minds, from which some in the Smolensk province assisted the enemy in finding fodder and hidden property, and others, communicating with him , they even indulged in robbing master’s houses.” It was reported that in Roslavl and Elninsky districts “passing enemies and remaining marauders ... sowed, especially among the peasants, the concept of independence,” and in Yukhnovsky district “the peasants of some villages, out of freethinking, begin to kill their masters to death and lead the French to those places where they hiding from fear».

After the French entered Moscow in September 1812, riots broke out in a number of places in the Moscow province. The peasants, who hoped for the abolition of serfdom with the arrival of the French, voluntarily left their subordination to the landowners. They refused to bear duties and pay rent. The peasants declared that they were now completely free " because Bonaparte is in Moscow, and therefore he is their sovereign».

Napoleon considered the possibility of abolishing serfdom. He hoped that this measure would help win over the millions of Russian peasants to the side of the Great Army and turn the tide of the campaign. However, the French emperor did not dare to implement his plans, fearing a major social explosion in the territories occupied by his troops. Napoleon said: " I could have raised up most of her own population against her by proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves... But when I learned the brutality of the morals of this large class of the Russian people, I abandoned this measure, which would have doomed many families to death, plunder and the most terrible torment».

As you can see, not all residents of the territories occupied by the French saw them as enemies. This is especially noticeable in the example of the western provinces, where the national nobility, townspeople and part of the clergy, who hoped for the restoration of the independence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, willingly supported Napoleon. Peasants in these regions also did not always meet the Great Army with pitchforks and spears. The “club of the people’s war” rose to its full extent only after the fall of Smolensk. However, even in the regions of Central Russia, part of the rural population looked at Napoleon as a deliverer from serfdom. The peasant question was of great importance for the French administration. Probably, if Napoleon had decided to abolish serfdom, he could have counted on a radical turning point in the war with Russia. But the French emperor chose not to take risks.

In contact with