War in Prussia 1945. The first assault on East Prussia. Long-term plans of the enemy
Chapter five.
New plans, new tasks
After the end of active hostilities of our troops at the end of October 1944, the formations of the 11th Guards Army, together with other armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went over to the defense on the achieved lines. We knew that defense was not an end in itself for us, not that it was only an operational pause, a temporary respite.
The general military-political situation by the beginning of 1945 was developing in favor of the Soviet Union. The entire territory of our country, with the exception of Courland, was liberated from the enemy. The Red Army transferred military operations to the territory of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The workers of the Soviet rear increased the pace of military production every day - the army received a large amount of the latest military equipment at that time.
Position fascist Germany worsened. She lost almost all of her allies - Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania. A national liberation movement developed in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other European countries. Protest against the war unleashed by the fascist clique grew in Germany itself. Severe defeats at the front, which led to huge human and material losses, caused new “total” mobilizations both for the front and for the construction of defensive structures. The deterioration of the financial situation of the working population, poor nutrition, and most importantly - the obvious futility of the war - all this gave rise to decadent moods.
The Hitler clique, no longer hoping for the effectiveness of its propaganda, intensified its punitive actions, trying to support the “victorious spirit” of the Germans through bloody terror. The fascist newspaper “Schwarze Kor” openly called for drowning in blood everyone who “...whines, grumbles, grumbles and extols the views and principles of the enemy...” (246)
However, despite the unfavorable situation for Nazi Germany, it still had quite powerful armed forces capable of persistently resisting in all main directions of the Soviet-German front, including on the territory East Prussia. Army Group Center, thrown back during the fighting towards the Baltic Sea, switched to a strong defense on the front from the mouth of the Neman to the Vistula (north of Warsaw) with a length of 555 km.
Our troops in the northwestern direction reached the Gulf of Riga, blocked the main forces of Army Group North from land on the Courland Peninsula, and in the Gumbinnen area they invaded East Prussia to a depth of 60 km, forming a wide protrusion in its territory stretching up to 100 km.
North of the Masurian Lakes, on the front from Sudarga (on the Neman River) to Augustow with a total length of up to 170 km, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front operated, which by the beginning of 1945 had six armies - the 39th, 5th, 28th and 31st combined arms , 2nd and 11th Guards. Five of them were in the first operational echelon of the front, and the 2nd Guards, arriving from the 1st Baltic Front in the area south of Stallupenen, was in reserve.
To the right, from the mouth of the Neman to Sudarga, the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front were defending, hanging over the northern flank of the East Prussian enemy group. To the left, from Augustow to Serock (30 km north of Warsaw), are the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front.
After the Gumbinnen operation of 1944, the troops of the 11th Guards Army put themselves in order, received reinforcements with people and equipment, and engaged in intense combat training. At the same time, detailed reconnaissance of the enemy’s defenses was carried out, in particular, continuous aerial photography of fortified areas and defensive lines up to and including Koenigsberg.
The troops celebrated the New Year of 1945 in an atmosphere of high political upsurge. Everyone understood that this year the fascist beast would be finished off. Of course, we didn’t know exactly when this would happen. But one thing was extremely clear - the fascist army, even with all the “total” and “super-total” mobilizations, would not last long, although fierce battles lay ahead.
Army Group Center, which the Nazi command entrusted with the defense of East Prussia, consisted of one tank and two field armies (34 infantry, 3 tank, 4 motorized divisions and 1 brigade). It consisted of 580 thousand soldiers and officers, 200 thousand Volkssturm troops, 8,200 guns and mortars, about 700 tanks and assault guns, 515 aircraft (247). Army Group Center was commanded by Colonel General G. Reinhardt.
These troops occupied the following sections of the front: the 3rd Tank Army defended along the left bank of the Neman from the sea to Sudarga and further south to Stallupenen, i.e. on the northeastern and eastern approaches to East Prussia; 4th Field Army - east of the Masurian Lakes at the Stallupenen - Novogrud line; 2nd Army - along the river. Narew and the mouth of the Western Bug, from Novogrud to the Vistula. The reserve of Army Group Center consisted of the SS Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland (two motorized divisions), the SS Motorized Division Brandenburg, the 23rd Infantry Division and the 10th Scooter Fighter Brigade. The last three formations were located in the Letzen area.
The enemy had a dense network of highways in the rear, along which he could quickly transfer troops. But it was not this fundamental advantage of the Germans that presented the greatest difficulty for us. The main thing was that they relied on previously prepared defensive lines and lines. The troops of the first echelon of our front had to break through one fortified position after another without entering the operational space. In other words, they had to overcome a seemingly continuous defensive area, which did not allow them to maneuver their forces.
The enemy had another advantage. His group was supported from the sea by significant naval forces based in close proximity to the area of operations of the East Prussian group. During this period, large surface ships of our Red Banner Baltic Fleet, due to the difficult mine situation in the Gulf of Finland, were based in the eastern ports and could not have a significant influence on the course of events. True, his submarines and a naval aviation strike group were actively operating in the southern part of the sea, delivering powerful blows to the enemy’s navy. Thus, in January alone, pilots of two divisions destroyed 11 transport ships and several patrol boats (248).
However, despite all these difficulties, the balance of forces against the East Prussian group was undoubtedly in our favor by the new year. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 2.8 times, in artillery by 3.4 times, in tanks by 4.7 times, and in aviation by 5.8 times (249). Hitler's generals in their memoirs, while quite reliably showing the numbers of our divisions, often “forget” to point out their quantitative difference with the Germans in manpower and equipment. Such tricks with calculating forces can be easily found in the memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Blumentritt, Friesner and other authors.
Directly in front of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, formations of the 3rd Tank Army and part of the formations of the 4th Army were defending. In the tactical defense zone, the enemy had the 9th and 26th Army Corps, the Hermann Goering parachute tank corps and the 41st Panzer Corps. They consisted of 13 infantry and one motorized divisions. In addition, the fascist German command had in this direction 6 brigades and 4 divisions of assault guns, 7 separate artillery regiments of the RGK, a brigade of six-barreled mortars, a rocket artillery regiment, a separate tank regiment and up to 30 separate battalions for various purposes (sapper, construction, security and etc.)(250) . The main enemy forces (8 out of 14 divisions) were located in front of the front of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies, which were supposed to deliver the main blow. In addition to the first line divisions, in this sector there were reserves of the 3rd Panzer and 4th Armies: the 5th Panzer Division in the Kraupishken area, the 1st Parachute Tank Division in the Gumbinnen area and the 18th Motorized Division in the Treuburg area (251 ) . The overall operational density of the German defense averaged one division per 12 km. The greatest density was created in the Tsilkallen - Gumbinnen sector (the site of our breakthrough), where it reached one division at 6–7 km. In the same direction the enemy held big number reinforcement parts.
However, the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, when planning the operation in the first ten days of December 1944, had slightly different information about the enemy. Based on intelligence data received during the preparation for the offensive, he believed that there were not 15 defending in the front zone (including the reserve 5th tank division), and 24 divisions, including 7 tank, 5 tank brigades. 6 brigades of assault guns and other reinforcement units. Of these, according to the front headquarters, the first line contained 15 infantry, reinforced with artillery, tanks and assault guns, and the second line contained all tank divisions and brigades. According to rough estimates, the tank and assault formations had up to 1,000 tanks and 900 assault guns (252).
Taking these data into account, a front-line operation plan was drawn up and submitted to the General Staff on December 12, 1944. Inflated information about the composition of the enemy forces obviously influenced the plan and decision of the front commander. Despite the latter’s instructions from December 12 to December 31 to “clarify the numbering of formations in front of the front and find out the intentions of the German command,” the armies of the first echelon and the front intelligence department were unable to do this.
The German defense in the Insterburg-Konigsberg direction was very developed in engineering terms: powerful defensive lines echeloned to a considerable depth and consisting of field defensive positions and a system of long-term fortified areas (253).
The front edge of the main defense line, which the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to break through, ran along the line west of Sudarga - Pilkallen - Walterkemen - Goldap. In the direction of the main attack, this zone had two fortified positions up to 10 km deep.
30–40 km from the main strip was the Ilmenhorst fortified area (its front line of defense ran along the Tilsit - Gumbinnen - Lissen line), which covered the distant approaches to Konigsberg. The area had three field-type defensive zones. The closest approaches to Koenigsberg from the east and southeast (at the turn of the Daime - Tapiau - Friedland - Heilsberg river) were protected by the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area. It included on average up to 5, and on the main directions up to 10–12 pillboxes per 1 km of front.
After our offensive in October 1944, the fascist German command began to more intensively build and improve engineering defensive structures on the territory of East Prussia. Field engineering filling was created between the pillboxes (trenches, communication passages, wire barriers), minefields were laid, anti-tank ditches were cleared and strengthened, and barriers (hedgehogs and obstacles) were installed. In the Koenigsberg direction, the enemy created nine defensive lines, located 12–15 km from one another. Each line consisted of two or three lines of trenches (254). Gumbinnen and Insterburg were turned into powerful defense nodes, which, in cooperation with the Tilsit and Darkemen nodes, formed the basis of defensive structures.
As Infantry General O. Lash, who was subsequently captured, told us, “defensive construction was carried out at a feverish pace. Guderian (255) and the Gauleiters constantly intervened in the management of the work... In December 1944, General Guderian gave the order: “The main forces from the line on Daime should be transferred to the Königsberg area...” The Gauleiters protested because they believed that construction had to be completed on the distant approaches to the city. Guderian was forced to agree... Still, it must be admitted,” Lasch said in conclusion, “that a lot had been done in the area of strengthening East Prussia before January 1945” (256).
Thus, the fascist German command created a deeply echeloned defense in the Insterburg-Konigsberg direction. The lull that came on this section of the Soviet-German front at the end of October 1944 was used by Hitler’s propaganda to instill in his troops the idea that, given their resilience, the Red Army would not be able to overcome the impregnable fortifications of East Prussia, that enormous forces were concentrated on the territory of the latter due to the creation of the Volkssturm, that new weapons are about to appear in the units. The message about the German offensive in the West (in the Ardennes), which German propaganda presented as a miracle that amazed the world, also had an encouraging effect on the soldiers.
The power of this propaganda should not be underestimated. Krauthoser, a prisoner of war soldier from the 349th Infantry Division, stated on January 9: “Despite talk of a possible Russian offensive, the mood of the soldiers was calm. I have never heard panicked conversations yet. Officers, in conversations with soldiers, constantly set the task of steadfastly holding the occupied lines and said that we have enough equipment to accomplish this task. Most soldiers believed in Germany's victory. They said: “It doesn’t matter that we retreated back - we still won. When and how is the Fuhrer’s business” (257).
It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of the enemy troops defending here consisted of natives of East Prussia, mostly volunteers (258). The Germans’ fear of severe retribution for crimes committed in the Soviet Union could not be discounted: “... the brutal repressions of the Gestapo command and authorities, unbridled chauvinistic propaganda - all this allowed the enemy to strengthen discipline and raise the morale of the troops. The bulk of Hitler’s soldiers and officers were determined to fight decisively for East Prussia” (259).
The calls of the Nazi leadership to defend East Prussia to the last strength came from the general strategic task - to delay in every possible way the final collapse of the fascist military machine. The East Prussian group hung over the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts, creating a real threat to the plans of the Soviet command during decisive operations in the Berlin direction. The fascist German command planned to launch a strong counterattack on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front if it went on the offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction (260). Therefore, it sought to hold East Prussia until the last possible opportunity. The plan developed by the command of Army Group Center took into account the experience of the defense of East Prussia in 1914 and provided for the maximum use of the Masurian lakes and powerful defensive fortifications. In an effort to clarify the forces and means of our strike group in the Insterburg direction and to unravel the direction of the main attack, the fascist German command intensified its air and ground reconnaissance. At the beginning of January 1945, it launched a private offensive operation against the troops of the 39th Army with up to one infantry division with 50–60 tanks in the Pilkallen area, which ended unsuccessfully for it (261). Later, the enemy repeated an equally unsuccessful operation in the Filipuv area on the front of the 31st Army.
But, like all other Nazi plans, the plan for the defense of East Prussia had significant shortcomings. Firstly, he underestimated the ability of the Red Army to successfully advance simultaneously in the East Prussian and Warsaw-Berlin directions; secondly, he overestimated the fortifications of East Prussia and its geographical conditions - a vast lake-marsh region extended to the east; thirdly, the plan did not take into account the great capabilities of our mobile formations attacking fortified areas.
The preparation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front for an offensive was no secret to the fascist German command. Thus, in the operational report of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army for January 11, 1945, it was noted that “the enemy will be ready for offensive actions in 2-3 days” (262). The next report from this headquarters the next day stated that “the enemy’s preparations for an offensive in front of the front of the 3rd Tank Army are apparently completed” (263). The fascist German command took urgent measures to repel our attacks. To preserve manpower and military equipment from the initial strike, the combat formations of the troops were dispersed in depth, and firing positions were changed in the artillery units.
This was later confirmed by the prisoners. The commander of the infantry division during the interview reported that on the evening of January 12, the commander of the 4th Army informed him of a possible Russian offensive on the night of January 13 and that he needed to be prepared to repel it. The commander of the 4th Army proposed echeloning personnel in depth (264). A prisoner of the 6th Company, 1099th Infantry Regiment stated on January 13:
Knowing about your offensive, the company's battle formations were reorganized before artillery preparation. One platoon was left in the first trench as if in combat guard, the rest of the company was in the second line. The company was supposed to provide the main resistance in the Kattenau area (265).
In the conditions of the lake-swampy area, which is the East Prussian bridgehead, it was not difficult for the fascist German command to determine the most likely directions of the main attacks of our troops. The most convenient terrain for combat operations of all types of troops was the Insterburg direction. Advancing here, bypassing the Masurian lakes, from the north, it was possible to cut the Tilsit-Insterburg group into pieces. Therefore, it was from here that the fascist German command expected our main attack and already at the beginning of January began intensively sending infantry and tanks to the Pilkallen-Gumbinnen section to replenish the divisions on the defensive (266). In the Darkemen direction and in the area of the Masurian Lakes, as expected by the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the enemy also created a strong group of infantry and tanks, intending to launch a powerful counterattack from the south if our units break through north of Gumbinnen.
The fascist German command positioned its forces and assets in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, taking into account the importance of directions and terrain conditions. So, in the Tilsit direction, in the area from the river. The Neman to Pilkallen, up to 40 km wide, was defended by three infantry divisions (one division for 13 km). In the Insterburg direction, in the Pilkallen-Goldap sector, 55 km wide, seven infantry divisions defended (one division per 8 km). In the Angerburg direction, in the Goldap-Augustow sector, 75 km wide, only four infantry divisions were defending (an average of one division per 19 km) (267).
Thus, the enemy, at the expense of the Tilsit and Angerburg directions, created a denser group in the Insterburg direction. With an overall average operational density of one division per 12 km in the Insterburg direction, it was 1.5 times less. The average tactical density per 1 km was 1.5–2 infantry battalions, up to 30 guns and mortars and up to 50 machine guns. The main forces of tanks and assault guns were also concentrated in the central, Insterburg direction. Of the 367 tanks and assault guns (268) located in the front line, 177 were concentrated in the area of the upcoming breakthrough, which amounted to 7.4 armored units per 1 km of front.
Knowing that at the beginning of the operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 11th Guards Army would have to operate in the second operational echelon, we, taking into account the above information, made the following conclusions. Our advancing troops will encounter a highly developed, deeply echeloned enemy defense, whose resistance will increase significantly as they move forward, since the enemy is defending on his own territory. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare troops to act with exceptional determination. Further. Due to the fact that the command of Army Group Center and the army command, as we then believed, had significant reserves in the depths of the defense, one could expect strong counterattacks by tank formations and infantry from the most dangerous Insterburg and Darkemen directions no later than on the second day operations.
And one last thing. To achieve success, it was necessary to prevent the enemy from retreating in an organized manner to intermediate lines and gaining a foothold on them. In other words, it was necessary to advance at a high pace and continuously - day and night, bypassing populated areas and individual reinforced concrete structures from the flanks and rear and forcing the enemy to fight surrounded.
We were all well aware that overcoming a deeply layered defense was only possible if there was clear and continuous interaction between our army and the neighboring armies of the front and its tank corps, all branches of the army among themselves, as well as reliable fire support from artillery of all calibers of the advancing infantry and tanks.
Aviation played an important role in ensuring the successful offensive of the front forces. Its powerful air strikes were supposed to paralyze the enemy’s reserves and artillery, disrupt its movement along highways and railways, disorganize troop command and control, and create conditions for the advancing troops to successfully overcome defensive lines. But will there be summer weather?
Decision of Headquarters and Front Commander
The general plan of the Supreme High Command in the East Prussian operation was to cut off East Prussia from the central regions of Germany with a strike on Marienburg and at the same time deliver a deep frontal attack on Koenigsberg from the east. Then it was planned to dismember the East Prussian group into parts, surround them and destroy them.
To this end, the Headquarters planned two coordinated attacks from the areas north and south of the Masurian Lakes: the first - by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Wehlau - Königsberg direction, the second - by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front along the southern border, bypassing the Masurian Lakes and the most important fortifications of East Prussia on Mlawa - Marienburg.
Based on this, the Supreme High Command, in its directive of December 3, 1944, set the 3rd Belorussian Front the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg group of the enemy and, no later than the 10th–12th day of the operation, capturing the line Nemonin - Zhargillen - Norkitten - Darkemen - Goldap, after why develop an attack on Koenigsberg on both banks of the river. Pregel, having his main forces on its southern bank. The main blow should be launched from the area north of the Stallupenen-Gumbinnen line in the general direction of Mallvishken, Velau with the forces of four combined arms armies and two tank corps. Break through the enemy's defenses in one sector stretching 18–19 km along the front with troops of the 39th, 5th and 11th Guards armies. To support them, attract three breakthrough artillery divisions. Create a density of artillery and mortars (from 76 mm and above) of at least 200 guns per 1 km of front.
It was proposed to use the second echelon of the front - the 2nd Guards Army and Tank Corps - after the breakthrough to build up the attack on the main direction.
The actions of the main group of troops were supported from the north, from the river. Neman, the defense of one rifle corps of the 39th Army and the offensive of its main forces towards Tilsit, from the south - the troops of the 28th Army, part of the forces advancing in the general direction of Darkemen. The 31st Army was ordered to firmly defend its zone south of Goldap under all conditions (269).
Neighbor on the right - “The 1st Baltic Front was ordered to assist the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy’s Tilsit group, concentrating at least 4-5 divisions on the left wing of the 43rd Army for an offensive along the left bank of the Neman” (270).
As can be seen from the directive, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to, in order to defeat the Tilsit-Insterburg group of Germans, launch a deep frontal attack in the Koenigsberg direction while simultaneously expanding the breakthrough front with supporting attacks on Tilsit and Darkemen. It was necessary not to allow the fascist German command to maneuver its forces to counter the 2nd Belorussian Front.
During the offensive, the front forces had to overcome the strongest fortifications, protected by a dense enemy group. Opportunities for operational maneuver in this direction were somewhat limited. The operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front was designed to bypass the East Prussian fortifications from the south. Therefore, in addition to seven combined arms armies, it included such mobile formations and formations as a tank army, two tank corps, a mechanized and cavalry corps.
When the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, introduced us, the army commanders, to the instructions of Headquarters and asked our opinion on the nature of the upcoming actions, we made some general and specific proposals.
“I’ll think about it,” said Ivan Danilovich and released us into his armies, demanding that they strengthen their combat training.
After consulting with the chief of staff of the front, Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky and a member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, he soon outlined his plan, which was somewhat different from the plan of Headquarters. By the end of the war, J.V. Stalin gave more initiative to the front commanders, who knew the situation better, and did not reproach them for some changes in the balance of forces. At first, the 11th, 5th and 39th armies were supposed to attack in the first echelon. Having assessed the grouping of enemy troops and analyzed the directive of the Headquarters, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 39th, 5th, 28th and 11th Guards Armies (including the second echelon of the front), reinforced by two tank corps, and break through the enemy’s defenses on the section (claim) Wilthauten - Kalpakin (24 km).
IN in this case the intention was to break through the enemy’s defenses with one powerful blow in the very first days of the operation, to inflict such a defeat on him that would ensure that the front troops would complete their assigned task. In the first echelon there were the 39th, 5th and 28th armies, and they decided to use our 11th Guards, as the strongest, and two tank corps in the second echelon (271) to build up the attack of the first echelon. On the second day of the operation, this was to be done from the Kussen-Radshen line by the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps in cooperation with the 5th Army, and on the fifth day - from the river line. Inster 11th Guards Army and 1st Tank Corps, to which the center of efforts of the front’s strike group was later transferred.
I think that I. D. Chernyakhovsky made the right decision. It saved the front from the complex regrouping of two armies and the reassignment of a number of units and formations, which was highly undesirable to do before a serious operation. This operational formation corresponded to the previously outlined plan and combat training of the armies. And the most valuable thing in the decision of the front commander was that, having placed the 11th Guards Army in the second echelon, he retained its striking force to develop the success of the first echelon.
Chernyakhovsky aimed our army at the junction between the 5th and 28th armies, which also testified to his creative approach to solving the problem. Deploying it in the Gumbinnen-Insterburg direction was impractical, primarily because on this section of the front there were very strong long-term fortifications, which would undoubtedly slow down the pace of advance of our army, which was capable of making a deeper and faster breakthrough into the depths of the enemy’s defenses. In addition, as the experience of previous battles has shown, the second-echelon army must be ready, if the situation requires, to change the direction of the attack and regroup its forces to a new area of entry into battle. This capability is especially important when you have to break through several defensive lines.
True, the GHQ directive designated the 2nd Guards Army for the second echelon. But she was numerically somewhat weaker than us. In addition, the process of transferring it from another front had not yet been completed. Chernyakhovsky did not know this army, but he knew our army well. Therefore, his decision was clear to me. Headquarters did not object either.
General Chernyakhovsky expanded the breakthrough front to 24 km instead of 18–19 km prescribed by Headquarters. And this decision of the front commander was justified, since when the armies were rearranged, the number of troops in the strike group increased and the density of battle formations, determined by Headquarters, almost did not decrease.
When the operation plan developed by the front command was approved by Headquarters, Ivan Danilovich sequentially called each army commander and set the task. He began the conversation with me with a brief summary of the plan for the entire front-line operation.
The idea of the operation,” he said, pointing to his working map, “is to defeat the enemy’s Tilsit-Insterburg grouping. At the first stage, within five days it is necessary to destroy the Tilsit group operating south of the river. Neman, and, having advanced 45–50 km, reach the Tilsit - Insterburg line. After solving this problem, the right wing and the center of the front’s strike group will gain freedom of maneuver and should be ready to complete the complete defeat of the Tilsit-Insterburg group within two days and, having advanced up to 30 km, reach the Nemonin-Norkitten-Darkemen line (272). Thus, the total depth of the offensive will be 70–80 km with an average rate of advance of up to 12 km per day, but the front headquarters is planning the first stage of the operation in detail, for only five days. Then we will develop the offensive towards Velau - Koenigsberg.
Having finished presenting the plan of operation, General Chernyakhovsky continued:
We will break through the enemy's defenses north of Gumbinnen in a 24 km wide area with the forces of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies... We will deliver the main blow in the 5th Army zone in the general direction of Mallvishken, Gross Skysgirren. The army’s immediate task is to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Shaaren-Kishen sector (9 km front), in cooperation with the troops of the 39th Army, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Tilsit group and further develop success on Goldbach, on the river. Daimyo(273) .
On the right flank of the front, the 39th Army will advance in the general direction of Pilkallen, Tilsit, having its main forces (six divisions) on its left flank. Its task is, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Army, to defeat the enemy’s Tilsit group and capture the city of Tilsit (274). To the south, the 5th - 28th Army strikes north of the Stallupenen - Gumbinnen highway towards Insterburg, having the main forces (six divisions) on its right flank. In cooperation with the 5th, it must defeat the Gumbinnen group of Germans, after which, together with the 11th Guards Army, capture the city of Insterburg and develop an offensive in the direction of Gerdauen (275).
We plan to introduce your army into battle from the second echelon on the morning of the fifth day of the frontal operation with the task of striking, in cooperation with the first tank corps, in the direction of Grosse Ponnau - Wehlau. By the end of the fifth day, your army, part of its forces, in cooperation with the 28th, should capture Insterburg (276).
Ivan Danilovich informed me in more detail about some of the details of the operation plan, since the 11th Guards Army was to attack in the second echelon. He listed the forces that were entrusted with supporting the advancing armies of the first echelon - the 1st and 2nd Tank Corps, the 1st Air Army and other front formations.
Then the chief of staff of the front, General A.P. Pokrovsky, introduced me to the plan for the interaction of our army with its neighbors, both when entering a breakthrough, and especially when advancing deep into enemy defenses. As already noted, the 5th and 28th armies were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses with a strong blow from their adjacent flanks and, with a rapid offensive in the directions given by them, ensure the entry of the second echelon army into the battle. The approach of the 11th Guards Army to the deployment line and its subsequent fighting must take place in close coordination with the formations of the first echelon of the front.
After the capture of Tilsit, it was planned to withdraw the 39th Army to the front reserve, and the 43rd Army, which the front commander asked from Headquarters (277) right now, in order to better coordinate its actions with the 39th, would be entrusted with the task of liberating the lower reaches of the Neman and the coast from the enemy Baltic Sea.
This decision, in the opinion of the front headquarters, was determined by the presence of a strong and active enemy group in the offensive zone, as I have already said.
With reaching the Nemonin-Darkemen line, it was meant to regroup the troops and continue the attack on Velau and further on Konigsberg on both banks of the river. Pregel. Success could only be achieved if the troops of the left wing of the strike group (28th and 2nd Guards Armies) not only repelled possible enemy counterattacks, but also captured large centers of resistance - Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Darkemen (278).
When studying the plan of the operation, the thought arose that the front command, when planning it, apparently believed that if one launched a deep frontal strike in the direction of Stallupenen - Insterburg - Wehlau, then developing the operation in depth could create a real threat of powerful enemy counterattacks on both flanks of the advancing troops. Therefore, one must assume, the decision was made to smash the Tilsit-Insterburg group of Germans consistently. It seemed to me then that it would be more expedient to deliver one powerful deep cutting strike in the direction of Insterburg - Wehlau with a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses in a more or less narrow area (18-19 km, as Headquarters indicated) with the subsequent development of a strike in the main direction. Having reached the Velau area and separated the enemy group, using the river boundaries of Pregel, Daime and Alle, it was necessary, in my opinion, to destroy it in parts, north and south of the river. Pregel.
When General Pokrovsky finished his explanations, a member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General Makarov, determined the direction of party political work. Vasily Emelyanovich especially emphasized that it is necessary to convincingly propagate among the troops the international tasks of the Red Army, designed to liberate the enslaved peoples of Europe from Hitler’s tyranny.
We are already fighting on foreign territory,” he said in conclusion, “but we are fighting not with the German people, but with the fascist army.” We came here not to take revenge on the German working people for the atrocities of the Nazis on Soviet soil, but to completely defeat fascism and give freedom to the peoples, including the working people of Germany.
When saying goodbye to me, the front commander warned that the task of the 11th Guards was not easy and required careful preparation. At the same time, Ivan Danilovich spoke approvingly of our army, but did not forget to remind us of the shortcomings in the October battles of 1944. He did not reproach or scold us, he spoke calmly and simply, but he structured his phrases in such a way that even praise was perceived by me with a great bias in side of criticism of shortcomings. Yes, General Chernyakhovsky knew how to speak with his subordinates in a non-official language! Of course, I assured him that our army would fight like a guard, that we would do everything in accordance with the letter and spirit of his order. Ivan Danilovich smiled and shook my hand.
To this day, I am deeply convinced that the decision of the front commander was significantly influenced by inflated data about the enemy’s forces. Anyone in Chernyakhovsky’s place, knowing that he was opposed by 7 tank divisions, 5 tank and 6 assault brigades, i.e. up to approximately 1000 tanks and 900 assault guns, would have made just such a decision. A talented and brave commander, Ivan Danilovich was, above all, a tank driver and understood perfectly well what such a number of armored units meant in the hands of an experienced enemy. After the war, according to captured documents, it was established that the 3rd German Tank Army had 224 assault guns and 64 tanks, i.e. almost 6 times less than was assumed when developing the front-line operation plan (279).
The front's combat operations were supported by the 1st Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin, which had 1,416 combat aircraft (280). It was planned to carry out up to 1,300 sorties on the night before the offensive and during the first day 2,575 sorties to bomb German positions, mainly in front of the front of the 5th Army (281). A total of 12,565 sorties were planned for the first four days of the operation, but the weather did not allow this.
By the beginning of the East Prussian operation, some changes had occurred in the leadership of the armies participating in it. Colonel General N.I. Krylov returned to the 5th Army after illness. Lieutenant General P. G. Shafranov took command of the 31st Army. The 2nd Guards Army, which arrived as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front, was commanded by Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze.
Having received instructions from the front headquarters, I returned to my place in high spirits. We were given greater means of reinforcement. We must now think about how to use them more expediently when introducing an army into battle, taking into account the lessons of the Gumbinnen operation. It was also necessary to review all plans and programs for combat and political training in the light of the task received.
Arriving at the command post, I called my closest assistants and, without giving any deadlines, outlined to them the task of our army. In conclusion, I said that the 11th Guards should immediately surrender the defended sector of the 2nd Guards Army and concentrate in the initial area southeast of Stallupenen in preparation for an offensive in the second echelon of the front.
On December 28, 1944, the regrouping of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. Relocating about half a million soldiers and officers with all their military equipment was far from an easy task.
By January 3, 1945, the armies of the shock group took the following starting position for the offensive: the 39th Army deployed its main forces at the Wilthauten-Shaaren line, having on the left flank a strike group of four rifle divisions in the first line and two in the second echelon of corps; The 113th Rifle Corps of this army was preparing for an offensive to the north, in the Shillenen-Vilthauten sector, and the 152nd UR (fortified area) was stretched out on the right flank of the army on a wide front to the river. Neman; The 5th Army occupied its initial position at the Shaaren-Kishen line. In its first line there were five and in the second echelons of the corps there were four rifle divisions. The 28th Army, with two rifle corps, occupied its initial position on the Kishen-Kalpakin line, with a third corps to the south, on a wide front. He had to go on the offensive with part of his forces on his right flank, and pin down the enemy in the rest of the sector with active actions. The army's shock group consisted of three rifle divisions in the first line and two in the second echelons of the corps.
The 11th Guards Army concentrated in the Stallupenen - Vishtynets - Eidtkunen area in readiness to develop the success of the armies of the first echelon of the front.
The 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was located behind the battle formations of the 5th Army in the area northwest of Eidtkunen. 1st Red Banner Tank Corps - behind the 28th Army in the area south of Stallupenen.
This decision by the front commander made it possible to achieve a significant density of troops, especially in breakthrough areas. On average, the first line division in the breakthrough area accounted for up to 2 km, and in the 5th Army, which delivered the main blow, up to 1.5 km.
In total, 30 rifle divisions (out of 54), 2 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 7 tank and 13 self-propelled artillery regiments. Of the 1,598 tanks and self-propelled artillery units (282) that the 3rd Belorussian Front had, 1,238, 4,805 field artillery guns and 567 PC (283) units were concentrated in the breakthrough area. There were from 160 to 290 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. The operational density of tanks and self-propelled artillery units was 50 armored units (284). This is what the country gave us to quickly defeat the enemy and end the war with victory. Behind these thousands of trunks stood the Motherland, its mighty working people, the gigantic organizational work of our party, and the advantages of the socialist economy.
As a result of the regrouping, a powerful strike force was created. In the breakthrough area (24 km), which made up only 14.1% of our front line (170 km), 55.6% of all rifle divisions, 80% of tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 77% of artillery were concentrated (285). Consequently, most of the front troops were involved in breaking through the German tactical defense zone in the main direction, a significant number of which were intended to build up the strike and develop success in operational depth (40% of rifle divisions). The remaining troops were used to carry out supporting attacks in auxiliary directions - on Tilsit and Darkemen - and for defense on a wide front on the flanks.
The group created by General I. D. Chernyakhovsky ensured superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough area: in manpower by 5 times, in artillery by 8 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 7 times (286). It was art. But at the same time, the front commander took some risks, although justified. It was necessary to create a decisive superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough area, especially since the enemy also held most of his forces in the proposed breakthrough area. This did not happen because the Germans found out our intentions. Everything was much simpler: on the other side of the front, smart people were also sitting in the headquarters. Based on the relief and general state of the area, it was not difficult to determine where we were going to deliver the main blow. And the concentration of our troops provided a clear guideline. If, say, the 31st Army was stretched over 72 km, and our 11th Guards, 28th and 5th occupied a front of only 56 km, then the fascist German command understood where we were thinking of attacking. Of course, even after the regrouping, the Germans did not have much difficulty establishing the concentration of our troops. Reconnaissance in force almost always made it possible to clarify who was opposing the leader of the battle. And both sides carried out a lot of such reconnaissance in force. Even the very fact of the rapid liquidation by front troops of the January private offensive operation in the sector of the 39th Army, which I have already mentioned, showed the fascist German command the superiority of our forces in this direction.
At the army headquarters
At the beginning of January, the headquarters of the 11th Guards Army received a front directive dated December 29, 1944 on the preparation and conduct of an offensive front-line operation. It contained the decision, already known to me from a conversation with General Chernyakhovsky, to attack in the second echelon behind the battle formations of the 5th and 28th armies in a strip about 20 km wide: on the right - Kussen, Warkau, Popelken; on the left - Gumbinnen, Georgenburg, Norkitten, Allenburg. By the end of the fourth day of the operation, turn around at the turn of the river. Inster and on the Gaidzhen - Neunishken - Trakinnen section (about 18 km) and on the morning of the fifth day, in cooperation with the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, launch a swift attack in the direction of Gross Ponnau - Wehlau. Part of the forces, together with the 28th Army, will capture Insterburg by the end of the same day (287).
Thus, the 11th Guards Army had to build up its attack from the depths, build on the success of the first echelon and launch a rapid offensive along the river. Pregel to disunite the enemy’s Tilsit-Insterburg group, and then, together with his neighbors, complete its defeat piece by piece.
The directive provided that by the end of the second day of the front-line operation, our army would be assigned the 2nd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, and the entry of the army into battle would be ensured by the artillery of the 5th and 28th armies.
The 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, with the beginning of the offensive of the 11th Guards Army, was supposed to move behind its battle formations and, by the end of the fourth day, concentrate in the forest of Staats Forst Tpullkinen, with the expectation of being ready to rapidly advance in the direction of Neunishken - Taplakken (288).
Aviation support for the breakthrough and support was entrusted to the 1st Air Army. It is worth noting that the line where the 11th Guards Army entered the battle was chosen behind the enemy’s main line of defense, approximately 30–40 km from the front line. There were no large river barriers here, which made it possible to separate the Insterburg and Tilsit groups in the very first days of the operation. In addition, the line allowed the use of the second echelon of the front, depending on the situation: in the north - against the Tilsit group or in the south - against the main Insterburg group. We assumed that during the offensive of the first echelon armies, the integrity of the enemy’s defenses would be significantly disrupted and the enemy’s resistance would weaken. But so far this was only an assumption, although based on reality.
Yes, General Chernyakhovsky was right: the 11th Guards Army had to solve a task that was far from easy, especially at the pace of the advance of the first day. In the morning we bring the army into battle, and by the end of the day, together with the troops of the 28th Army, we already take Insterburg - a heavily fortified node in which everything is intended for long-term defense. But the order of the front commander is the law. Of course, we will take Insterburg, we have enough strength for this. But the pace!? After all, the process of introducing an army through the battle formations of troops of other armies is far from a simple matter. It will take a certain amount of time - not minutes, hours! And it is unlikely that the front of the first echelon armies will advance so close to Insterburg that we will immediately get involved in street battles. It's good if everything goes according to the optimal option. What if it is necessary to further break through the defenses? In general, you need to be prepared for different input options.
Thinking through the task received, assessing the situation, consulting with members of the Army Military Council (289) and staff members, I came to the conclusion that during the upcoming operation we need to consistently solve two tasks: the immediate one - to destroy the enemy at the entry line, defeat his suitable reserves, capture the main defensive line of the Ilmenhorst fortified area with army units reaching the Popelken-Virtkallen line by the end of the eighth or ninth day of the frontal operation, i.e., to a depth of 20–25 km; further - to quickly pursue the retreating enemy, destroy his operational reserves, force the river. Pregel. On the 11th–12th day of the offensive, capture the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area in the Tapiau-Velau sector, which was located 50–60 km from the line where the army entered the battle.
Based on these considerations, it was necessary to make a decision and develop a plan for the army offensive operation, to detail what was generally indicated in the directive of the front commander.
In making our decision, we proceeded from two options for bringing the army into battle, understanding that everything would ultimately depend on the success of the troops of the first echelon of the front’s strike group, especially on the main direction. If they completely defeat the opposing enemy units, then we will immediately, directly from the starting areas, in marching or dismembered formations, introduce the army into battle on the lines determined by the front headquarters. If the fascist German command, having pulled up reserves, manages to create a continuous front at the turn of the river. Inster or somewhat deeper, at the Popelken-Insterburg line, and will offer stubborn resistance to the first echelon of front troops, then the entry of our army into the breakthrough will be possible only after its troops occupy the starting position and preliminary artillery and aviation preparation. In this case, it was planned to replace units of the first echelon of the front at the entry line, then break through the defenses with a powerful frontal attack and, having defeated the opposing units, by introducing the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps into battle, quickly develop success, trying to reach the right flank to the river line. Daimyo - Tapiau - Welau.
The second option seemed to us then the most likely, therefore, when planning the introduction of formations into the breakthrough, we were guided precisely by it.
Thus, the entry of the 11th Guards Army into the battle was envisaged with the expectation of a breakthrough in the depths of the enemy’s organized defense, with the main efforts on the right flank - in the general direction of Velau.
The experience of the army's combat operations in October 1944 showed that during the developing front-line operation, various regroupings of the first echelon troops and redirection of the second echelon to areas where there was success were possible. Therefore, army troops must be ready to regroup in a new direction as soon as possible.
We began planning the operation immediately after receiving the front directive and thoroughly studying it. Drawing up such a plan - creative process. It began to be composed by a relatively small group of army staff officers led by Major General I. I. Lednev. And I still needed to listen to the thoughts of my closest assistants and corps commanders.
In the process of preparing the decision for the army operation, we carefully studied the enemy, clarifying and supplementing the data that we received from front headquarters. Our difficulty was that the army no longer had direct contact with the enemy, so we had to use data from the front headquarters and first-echelon formations. The intelligence agencies of our headquarters, having collected and summarized information about the enemy, established that in front of the front of the 39th Army (up to 40 km) the 9th Army Corps (561, 56th and 69th Infantry Divisions) was defending with an average density of one division at 13 km. To the south, in front of the front of the 5th and the right flank of the 28th armies at the Pilkallen - (claim) Kishen line (12 km), the 1st and 349th infantry divisions of the 26th Army Corps, reinforced by 49, 88, 1038, defended m and Insterburg reserve of the main command of artillery regiments, the 227th brigade, the 1061st and 118th assault gun divisions, the 2nd regiment of rocket launchers, the 60th and 1060th anti-tank divisions, seven battalions for various purposes (3rd assault, 11th penal, 644th fortress, 62nd and 743rd sapper, 79th and 320th construction).
In the offensive zone of the 28th Army at the Kishen-Gertschen line (24 km), the 549th Infantry Division of the 26th Army Corps, the 61st Infantry Division, subordinate to the Hermann Goering parachute-tank corps, and the 2nd Parachute Division were defending. motorized division of this corps. The density here reached one division per 8 km. These formations were reinforced by the 302nd assault gun brigade, the 664th, 665th and 1065th anti-tank artillery divisions, a brigade of six-barreled mortars (18 installations), the 27th assault, 13th, 268th, 68th and 548th engineer battalions . In addition, the 279th and 299th assault gun brigades (290) were located in the Gumbinnen area.
Thus, by the beginning of the offensive we knew the opposing German group. It was much more difficult to obtain important information for us about the enemy’s forces in operational depth and about engineering defensive fortifications, especially about their saturation with weapons. Reconnaissance and aerial photography yielded meager results. Therefore, during the planning of the operation, much remained unclear to us. With the beginning of the offensive of the troops of the first echelon of the front, information about the enemy began to arrive more intensively, although it contained contradictory data. But ultimately, by January 16–18, the reporting maps of formations and army headquarters showed the enemy as he really was. Therefore, when, due to the current situation, the army was redirected to another direction - to the junction of the 5th and 39th armies, the headquarters did not require much effort to obtain information about the enemy in the new zone.
In the second half of December 1944, commanders of all levels began reconnaissance of advance routes to new areas. Together with the chief of staff, the artillery commander and a group of staff officers, we conducted a reconnaissance of the initial area of the army's location, as a result of which the final decision was made on the location of the divisions before the start of the offensive, and the line for entering the army into battle was clarified. From December 25, 1944 to January 11, 1945, reconnaissance was carried out by the commanders of corps, divisions and regiments.
During the reconnaissance, the starting points for the advance of formations and units, the routes of their movement, the order of march, places requiring restoration work were determined, the areas of location of each battalion, regiment, division were identified with the calculation of careful camouflage of personnel and transport, the locations of rear institutions were determined, ammunition and food warehouses.
In order to fully coordinate our actions with the armies of the first echelon, Lieutenant General I.I. Semenov went to the headquarters of the 5th and 28th armies to clarify their plans and operational formation of troops at the first stage of the operation - before our army entered the breakthrough. The commanders of our corps also linked their actions with the corps of these armies. Before the start of hostilities, the commanders of the divisions located in the first echelon of our army sent operational groups of officers from the operational and reconnaissance departments to the divisions in front of the 5th and 28th armies to maintain communications and mutual information.
Operation plan
When starting planning, we primarily proceeded from the nature of the fortifications in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, the saturation of his defensive lines with long-term structures. The second factor that we took into account was the experience gained in the Gumbinnen operation of 1944.
Analyzing with General I. I. Semenov and our main assistants the initial draft of the operation plan drawn up by the operational department of the army headquarters, we drew attention to the fact that it provided for the actions of the troops in stages and in detail by day, i.e., as it is was planned in the Gumbinnen operation, when the 11th Guards attacked in the first echelon. But then the task of the army was different - it was making a breakthrough, and therefore during the day at each stage of the battle it had to destroy certain part enemy battle formation. In the upcoming operation, she had to build up her attack and develop success in depth, and the drafters of the plan should have taken this into account:
General Semenov looked reproachfully at the head of the operations department. But I immediately noticed that it was the first time the army was performing such a task, and gave instructions to plan the operation so that the commanders and headquarters of the formations would not act according to a cheat sheet, scheduled by day, but would fight based on the current situation. By knowing the end goal of the operation phase, they could exercise creative independence and initiative. When planning, it is not always possible to foresee in detail the course of the upcoming operation, changes in the situation and the development of combat operations for each day, just as it is unreasonable in these conditions to develop a plan of action in advance. Such a scheme is a template, and a template, as is known, limits the capabilities of the command staff and fetters its actions. It is most advisable to plan the operation in stages, determining the sequence of tasks of the army. In this case, the troops will act more purposefully and focused.
The army headquarters again began to develop a plan for the operation, which they decided to carry out in two stages. Starting work, the headquarters once again checked the latest information about the enemy, since in the directive itself it was very brief. Now we have allocated a significant amount of time - more than 20 days - for preparation for the operation, dividing this preparatory stage into two periods. The first is combat training and regrouping of troops in a new direction, replenishment of all means of logistical support for the troops. The second is the approach of troops to the entry line and deployment there. By this time, division commanders with regiment commanders and assigned reinforcements, and later regiment commanders with battalion commanders, had to go to the observation posts of formations and units operating ahead, from where they could clarify their lanes and sectors on the ground, and, together with the commanders of the replacement units, outline the routes of movement. units to their starting positions.
In order to hide from the fascist German command the direction of the army's entry into the battle and thereby ensure surprise of the attack, the concentration area of the 11th Guards was chosen southeast of the intended direction, 12–20 km from the front edge of the German defense. Such a removal in the conditions of 1945 allowed the troops not only to reach the entry line in a timely manner, but also to do this in a calmer environment. In addition, the chosen concentration area minimized the likelihood of a counterattack from the south, which the enemy could launch to disrupt our offensive, given that the main front grouping was moved forward.
To advance the army to the line of entry into battle, a strip 14–18 km wide with six routes was assigned. This made it possible for each corps to have a 6-kilometer strip with at least two routes for movement and maneuver, which undoubtedly ensured the timely entry of troops to the line and their simultaneous deployment.
We envisaged a sequential approach to the entry line, in accordance with the advance of the troops of the first echelon of the front, but at the same time in such a way that by the end of the fourth day of the frontal operation, we would change the formations of the first echelon and begin the combat mission on the night of the fifth day. The replacement of the operating units of the 5th and 28th armies ended the preparatory stage of the operation as a whole.
During the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 11th Guards were supposed to destroy the enemy at the entry line and, using the success of the tank corps, begin pursuing the retreating enemy. Then they had to capture the defensive zone of the Ilmenhorst fortified area in the Popelken - Podraien - Georgenburg section and reach the Popelken - Wirtkallen line, i.e. to a depth of 20–25 km. Four days were allotted for all this (the fifth to eighth days of the front-line operation) at an advance rate of 5–10 km per day.
The plan also provided for another option: if the tank corps did not completely solve its problem, carry out artillery and air preparation for the offensive, break through the German defenses with combined arms formations, and then re-introduce the tank corps into battle (291).
In the four days allotted by the plan for the second stage of the operation, the troops of the 11th Guards Army were, as already mentioned above, to defeat the reserves brought into battle by the enemy, capture the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area in the Tapiau-Velau sector and seize crossings across the river. Pregel in the areas of Taplakken, Simonen, Norkitten. The depth of the offensive reached 50–60 km, the pace was 12–15 km per day.
Operational formation of army troops and tasks for corps
We outlined the operational formation of the army taking into account the experience of the October battles of last year. All three corps (8th, 16th, 36th) were built into one operational echelon with a depth of 15–20 km. The battle formation of the corps was built in two or three echelons. The second echelons of the corps were located in depth at a distance of 4–6 km, the third - at 10–15 km. The main efforts were concentrated on the right flank in the zones of the 8th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps in the area of 7–8 km. When the army entered the battle, it was supposed to have four divisions in the first echelon (26, 31, 18 and 16), in the second - three (5, 11 and 84), in the third - two (83rd and 1st). Rifle regiments, as a rule, were built in two echelons.
When operating in depth, the operational formation of the army's troops was intended to be left unchanged. When breaking through the defensive line of the Ilmenhorst fortified area, it was planned to additionally advance the 11th Guards Rifle Division into the first line of formations of the 16th Corps to build up the attack. When breaking through the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area on the Daim and on the borders of the Pregel and Alle rivers, push forward the second echelon divisions, and bring out the first echelon divisions in their place.
What was the reason for this particular operational formation of the troops of the 11th Guards Army?
We proceeded from the fact that the operational formation of the troops of the second echelon army depends on the depth of the upcoming operation, the width of the entry line into battle, the nature of the enemy’s defense and terrain, as well as the role and place of the army in the front-line operation. The deep formation of corps in this case made it possible to continuously build up forces from the depths of the battle formations both to break through a significant number of defensive lines, and to expand this breakthrough to the flanks and timely repel enemy counterattacks. During a battle, the need often arises to maneuver forces and means, to change the direction of action. And this is much easier to do from the depths of the battle formations than at the expense of the first echelon troops.
Each corps received its own offensive zone, the direction of the main attack and the timing of combat operations in certain areas.
The 8th Guards Rifle Corps, led by Lieutenant General M.P. Zavadovsky, was to advance on the right flank of the army. By the end of the fifth day he was supposed to reach the Waldfrieden-Jaquin line. In the corps' offensive zone, it was planned to introduce the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, whose formations were to, together with the advanced mobile detachments of the rifle divisions, capture the strong stronghold of Popelken. On the sixth day, and with the unsuccessful actions of the tankers on the seventh or eighth day, the 8th Guards Corps had to continue the offensive in the general direction of Buchkhov, Lindenberg and by the end of the eighth day reach the Paggarschwinnen area (292). At the second stage, the task of this corps was to pursue the retreating enemy in the direction of Tapiau and on the 11th–12th day of the operation after crossing the river. The daimyo took possession of the Tapiau region - (historical) Velau.
At the center of the army's operational formation was the 16th Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General S.S. Guryev. His formations were to bypass the forest of Staats Forst Padroin from the south, continue the offensive in the general direction of Kamputschen, by the end of the fifth day reach the Auxkallen - Kamputschen line with the main forces, and with an advanced mobile detachment, together with units of the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, capture the Sprakten area. After this, building on the success of the tank corps, the rifle divisions were supposed to break through the line of the Ilmenhorst fortified area and on the sixth - eighth day of the operation reach the Paggarschwinnen - Wartenburg line. At the second stage of the operation, pursue the retreating enemy and on the 11th–12th day, crossing the river. Pregel, take possession of the Velau region, securing a crossing at Taplakken.
On the left flank of the army, an offensive was planned by the 36th Guards Rifle Corps, whose formations were to reach the Georgenburg area by the end of the fifth day of the operation. One division of the corps had to cross the river. Pregel in the area of the city dv. Nettinen and with a blow from the west, together with his neighbor on the left, take control of Insterburg. On the sixth - eighth day of the operation, the 36th Corps, like other corps of our army, was to continue the offensive in the general direction of Puzberskallen and capture the Virtkallen area. At the second stage, the corps formations were supposed to pursue the retreating enemy and on the 10th–11th day of the operation reach the Schönwiese - Zimonen line, after which, securing the left flank of the army and holding the crossings across the river. Pregel at Simonen, Norkitten and Gross Bubainen, advance towards Klein Hyp - Allenburg (293).
The 36th Guards Rifle Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Pyotr Kirillovich Koshevoy. He arrived in the army on January 6, i.e. a week before the start of the operation. This circumstance worried the Army Military Council. Will Koshevoy be able to master the corps and prepare it for battle in such a short time? But at the very first meetings, the general impressed me as an energetic commander. Truly, in the shortest possible time, he was able to study the state of connections, parts and master the control of the hull. Strong-willed, decisive and brave, Pyotr Kirillovich showed himself in the operation to be well prepared in operational and tactical terms, a fully formed military leader.
In accordance with the directive of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the operation plan of the 11th Guards Army, the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps concentrated in the forest of Staats Forst Tpullkinen in readiness to go into battle on the morning of the fifth day in the sector of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps. Interacting with units of the latter, he had to attack the enemy, then break away from him and, rapidly moving forward, on the sixth day of the operation (i.e., on the second day after entering the battle) cross the Daime and Pregel rivers and capture the cities of Tapiau and Velau. The rate of advance for the corps was 25–30 km per day. The reader already knows that in case of failure, we envisaged the withdrawal of the tank corps from the battle, the breakthrough of the Ilmenkhorst fortified area with rifle formations and the re-introduction of the corps in this direction with the same task.
When planning the operational formation of the 11th Guards Army and assigning tasks to the corps, we sought to avoid a template, but at the same time we were concerned about the conformity of the formation with the general plan of the operation. Of course, we had in mind to introduce the army unexpectedly for the enemy, which we subsequently completely succeeded in doing. The Germans searched for a long time for the 11th Guards after it was brought into the second echelon, and were able to find it only on the eighth day of the front-line operation, when it was brought into battle. The suddenness of our actions ensured a large superiority of forces in the right direction.
Thus, the idea behind the operation of the 11th Guards Army and the operational formation of its troops was to, by entering a breakthrough in the main direction, create a superiority of forces that would make it possible to turn a tactical breakthrough into an operational one. We understood that it was impossible to do this without achieving surprise. At the same time, the concentration and deployment of such large forces as an army, with the indispensable condition of maintaining surprise, required high skill from senior commanders (corps and divisions). The operation plan provided for marches only at night, the dispersal of troops along the front and in depth, and other measures.
The Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front, to which we presented our plan on January 5, 1945, approved it. General Chernyakhovsky noted the great and friendly work of the army headquarters team. And it seemed to us that we were on the right path.
Many years have passed since then, and, retrospectively analyzing past events, I cannot help but dwell on some of the shortcomings of the operation plan we developed.
The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command provided for the defeat of the enemy's Tilsit-Insterburg group to a depth of 70–80 km within 10–12 days (294), i.e., with an average rate of advance of 7–8 km per day. The headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front planned a higher pace: for the troops of the first echelon of the front - 10–12 km (295) and for the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps - 25–30 km (296), which was more consistent with the current situation.
If such a tempo of operation was required from the front troops, then, naturally, the second echelon army, interacting with the tank corps, should have determined a higher tempo. Meanwhile, with the total depth of the 11th Guards Army operation being 60–70 km, the plan we developed outlined the completion of the task within seven to eight days, i.e., at a rate of 8–9 km per day. If such a pace met the requirements of the Headquarters directive, then it was completely inconsistent with the decision of the front commander, not only for the second echelon, but even for the first.
What is the reason for this calculation? We, the authors of the plan and participants in the operation, pose this question to ourselves almost 25 years after it. And we answer: apparently, we somewhat overestimated the enemy’s strength, his defensive structures and fortifications, his moral and combat qualities. Thus, we underestimated the capabilities of our troops. It is no coincidence that the plan provides for the most probable course of action in the event of failure of the first echelon of the army, as well as the 1st Tank Corps (297), i.e., in essence, the troops aimed at breaking through the enemy’s positional defense.
But this, I repeat, is a retrospective analysis. We thought differently then.
Everyone is preparing for the operation
To provide artillery support for the combat operations of the 11th Guards Army, regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups, as well as air defense artillery groups, were created. They included (without means of strengthening the front) 825 guns and mortars, including in the artillery groups of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 235, in the 16th Guards Rifle Corps - 215, in the 36th Guards Rifle Corps - 270, in the army - 105 large-caliber guns. The main artillery grouping was located on the right flank and in the center, i.e., where the main blow was delivered. We also took into account that the artillery of the 5th and 28th armies was entrusted with ensuring the entry of our army into the breakthrough.
The 1st Red Banner Tank Corps was reinforced with howitzer, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The artillery units were assigned the following tasks.
Using targeted fire and the method of sequential concentration of fire, suppress manpower and destroy enemy firing points at the line where the army enters the breakthrough. Using fire from direct-fire guns that followed in infantry combat formations, destroy German firing points, tanks, assault guns and armored personnel carriers. Suppress active enemy artillery batteries. Using the method of consistently concentrating fire, suppress the enemy’s fire weapons and manpower in the movement zone of our infantry that are interfering with the advance. By setting up a fire fencing on the flanks and consistently concentrating fire, suppress the enemy’s fire weapons and manpower and thereby ensure the entry of the 1st Tank Corps into the breakthrough and its actions in depth. Prevent the approach of reserves and counterattacks of German infantry and tanks, especially from the directions of Gillen, Aulovenon, Popelken and Insterburg. Cover the battle formations of infantry and tanks in the initial position and during battle in depth from enemy aircraft.
Aviation support for the armies' actions occupied a large place in the operation plan. The front headquarters outlined the plan to allocate us 12 air divisions for various purposes with a large resource of sorties and a significant bomb load. On the first day of the operation, it was intended to carry out 1,200 night and 1,800 day sorties, during which 1,817 tons of bombs would be dropped (298). It was also envisaged to allocate the necessary resource for assault sorties in the interests of the 1st Tank Corps.
The engineering assets that the army had at its disposal (and it was additionally assigned the 9th assault engineer brigade) were distributed by us in accordance with the tasks performed. Thus, the 16th and 36th Guards Corps received one engineer battalion each, and the 1st Tank Corps received two, since it had to operate in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps. Parts of our army engineering brigade were allocated to build bridges for second echelons, artillery and tanks, command and observation posts, to restore hydraulic structures on the Inster, Daime, Pregel and Alla rivers, to strengthen the army's anti-tank reserve and other work.
We carefully thought through the plan for the logistics of the operation in order to meet all the needs of the troops during the operation, including medical support, as well as correctly solve the natural problems of road service, transportation and evacuation in this case. If in the Gumbinnen operation of 1944 the army’s communications, or, as they say, “the supply arm,” were shortened, now, in the conditions of a maneuver operation, they will increase, and this cannot but affect the nature of the work of all rear organs. The army was based on the Kozlova Ruda - Marijampol railway section. Its main supply station and army base is Marijampol, its main unloading station is Verzhbolovo. After the army entered the breakthrough and reached the Popelken-Virtkallen line, it was planned to relocate the supply station and main warehouses to Stallupenen, and to deploy divisional exchange points and medical battalions on the Kussen-Gumbinnen line.
By the beginning of the offensive, divisional rear units were pulled up to their starting lines and placed in accordance with the requirements of the operational situation. The divisional exchange offices were fully supplied with material and technical equipment.
To fully ensure the offensive operation with all types of material supplies, troops and army warehouses had to accumulate 5.5 rounds of ammunition, 15 daily food dachas, 22 daily forage dachas and 4 fuel refills. All this was delivered, with the exception of some types of food that were delivered during the operation. The fact that the hospitals had a 10-day supply of food for the regular number of beds ensured uninterrupted nutrition for the wounded and the independence of the hospitals during their redeployment.
The sanitary service of the 11th Guards Army had 16 hospitals for various purposes, one automobile and two cavalry sanitary companies. When planning medical support for the operation, we provided for four hospitals in the first line, ten in the second echelon and two in reserve. By the beginning of the offensive, the medical battalions were cleared of the wounded and sick who were subject to evacuation, and were prepared to receive the wounded; all medical institutions were fully equipped with medical supplies, equipment, medicines and dressings. Everyone who had suffered frostbite in the past was first and foremost provided with felt boots as a preventive measure.
The presence in the army at the beginning of the operation of 85–90% (of the regular strength) of motor transport generally met the needs of the troops. For transportation and evacuation, it was planned to equip the Gumbinnen-Insterburg highway as the main road and an additional route for each building.
By the end of the Gumbinnen offensive operation, i.e. at the beginning of November 1944, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army did not count 5-6 thousand people each. Organizational structure units and units was significantly disrupted. Only four divisions retained 27 companies, the rest - 18–21 companies. Each company had from 30 to 65 people left. Therefore, the most important task of the army headquarters in the process of preparing the January offensive was the restoration of the main combat units - rifle, machine-gun and mortar companies, artillery batteries, staffing them with personnel and weapons.
From November 1, 1944 to January 20, 1945, about 20 thousand marching reinforcements arrived in the army, including 40% who were mobilized in the liberated territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, 35% were conscripts, 15% were participants in the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War, returned from hospitals, and up to 10% are conscripts from the reserve. All of them, except those who participated in the battles of this war, although they spent three to four months in reserve units of military districts, had insufficient training. They knew small arms, but they were poorly trained in operations as part of a platoon and company and, of course, had no combat experience. Much better prepared were the reinforcements from the resources of the army and the front. These fighters had well-known combat experience and good combat training. All this should have been taken into account when assembling connections.
But both those who were drafted into the army for the first time and those who returned to duty after healing their battle wounds had a high political and moral state and a cheerful mood. People were eager to fight, trying to finish off the fascist beast, liberate the peoples of Europe and, having victoriously ended the war, return to creative work.
By January 10, the strength of each guards rifle division was 6,500–7,000 people. All rifle, machine gun and mortar companies were restored in all regiments. Each rifle company consisted of 70–80 people.
In November and December, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front conducted defensive operations and active reconnaissance of all types. At the same time, they were engaged in intense combat training.
At first, we prepared our army units for a breakthrough. But when, in the first half of December 1944, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky guided me about the nature of the use of our army in the upcoming operation, I had to change the direction of its combat training. We knew that actions in operational depth are characterized by great maneuverability, uncertainty and variability of the developing situation, and a variety of forms. In such conditions, speed and decisiveness, clarity and consistency in the use of all types of troops, and the ability to flexibly maneuver forces to create superiority over the enemy in the main directions are needed. All these requirements had to be brought to the attention of every commander and chief, to ensure their deep understanding of the combat mission with all its features.
December 13 at the next training session commanders of corps and divisions, analyzing the Gumbinnen operation, I carefully analyzed the battles conducted, the strengths and weaknesses in the actions of the troops. Some people were clearly uncomfortable with this particular analysis. But nothing can be done here - war requires harsh assessments of all shortcomings, otherwise they cannot be avoided in the future. In conclusion, they delivered to the audience specific tasks on combat training of formations in accordance with the plan of the upcoming operation.
The main efforts in the combat training of army troops were aimed mainly at studying the types of combat in the tactical and operational depths of the enemy’s defense. This was explained not only by the essence of the upcoming task, but also by the fact that the army troops had much more experience in breaking through enemy defenses than in developing success in tactical and operational depth. Previous operations showed that our units always managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, no matter how strong they were, successfully, but the actions of units and formations in the depths of the defense in a number of cases did not produce the expected results. The rifle units, encountering resistance from approaching enemy reserves, sharply reduced the pace of the offensive, lingered at intermediate defensive lines and eventually stopped. Therefore, rifle, tank and artillery units should have been taught to break through intermediate defensive lines on the move, the ability to conduct a counter battle and relentlessly, decisively and boldly pursue and destroy the retreating enemy, block and destroy long-term fire installations, skillfully and quickly consolidate the achieved success, repel counterattacks of tanks and infantry and other types of combat. It was necessary to teach the troops the ability to perform precisely those tasks that would arise during the operation.
I will not list the methods of study - they are well known. One has only to pay attention to such an important detail as a thorough study of the terrain of the upcoming military operations. We trained the troops of the 11th Guards Army on terrain similar to the one in which they were to operate. The enemy's territory was also studied very carefully. In addition to maps, the troops had large-scale plans prepared by aerial photography. These plans, of course refined with the help of intelligence, were of great benefit for the proper organization of the battle.
In order to conduct an offensive continuously, both day and night, in order to prevent the enemy from organizing a defense on intermediate defensive lines, divisions specially trained advanced mobile detachments capable of conducting night combat and pursuing the enemy. These detachments consisted of a rifle battalion with motor vehicles, an artillery battalion with mechanical traction, and other special units. Such detachments were, as a rule, headed by deputy division commanders. The advanced mobile detachments were supposed to to some extent compensate for the insufficient mobility of rifle units at that time.
About 40% of all tactical training was conducted at night or during the day with limited visibility. Considering that troops will have to cover considerable distances to approach the initial area, we paid attention to training units and formations to carry out marches, especially at night.
It goes without saying that we did not forget for a minute such an important issue as the organization and implementation of interaction between all branches of the military and aviation. Without this, not a single tactical exercise was conducted.
Analyzing the practice of all types of past battles, we came to the conclusion that success in them was usually achieved both by the courage and training of unit personnel, and by the good training of officers. It should be said that there have always been many staunch and courageous people in our army, but, as a rule, there were not enough good battle organizers - many of them were lost in battles. Such officers had to be trained systematically and persistently, sparing neither effort nor time. And we did it. A strong-willed, proactive, courageous and decisive commander is especially needed in conditions of fighting in the depths of the enemy’s defense, when units will often act in isolation from one another.
The army command conducted classes with division and corps commanders, chiefs of staff, commanders of military branches and service chiefs on organizing and implementing the introduction of second echelons - large formations - into battle. These classes discussed the nature of combat operations of formations and units in the tactical and operational depth of enemy defense. As lesson leaders, we also involved the commander of the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces V.V. Butkov and the deputy commander of the 1st Air Army, Major General of Aviation E.M. Nikolaenko, who read reports on the use of tanks and aviation in the upcoming operation and in group classes they showed their possible actions.
We mainly taught the headquarters of units and formations how to organize and control combat when entering a breakthrough, during an offensive, and especially in the depths of the enemy’s defense. Taking into account the upcoming task, at the end of December 1944, the army command conducted a staff exercise with corps headquarters.
I was also concerned about the preparation of army headquarters, commanders and staffs of corps and divisions. At the same time, I wanted to test our views on the methods of action of the army when introducing it into battle and combat operations in the operational defense of the enemy. Therefore, on January 3–5, an army three-stage command and staff exercise was held on the ground with communications equipment on the topic “Introducing the second echelon army into a breakthrough and its actions to develop success.” This kind of exercise in military conditions, directly at the front, is an unusual thing, nevertheless, we agreed to it, having, naturally, received the permission of General Chernyakhovsky. We moved the army headquarters, corps and division headquarters (with the exception of the operational groups remaining in place) to the rear 60–80 km, to the Alytus area.
The exercise was conducted against the backdrop of the specific operational situation that had developed by that time in front of the first echelon armies.
The exercise helped clarify the Organization and some elements of the development of the operation, work out methods of command and control, organization of interaction, and material support. The headquarters of the corps and divisions compiled all the necessary documents for the march, the change of units of the first echelon, plans for interaction, plans for occupying the starting position, introducing formations into battle, developing success in the depths of enemy defenses, and others. But, unfortunately, it was not possible to complete the teaching. In the first days of January, the enemy sharply increased reconnaissance. On January 4, he launched a short attack on the 31st Army in the Filipuv direction. We had to return the headquarters to their areas.
Thus, intense training covered the entire 11th Guards Army, from private to commander. Despite being extremely busy, I carved out hours and minutes for personal preparation: I studied the offensive of Russian troops in the Gumbinnen operational direction at the beginning of the 1914 war, and deeply and critically analyzed my experience accumulated over almost four years of war.
Of particular concern to all of us was the training of new recruits who joined the army a month or two before the start of the offensive. Not only was some of it insufficiently prepared, many of the younger soldiers had not experienced the difficulties that the army had to overcome.
Thus, as a result of enhanced and purposeful combat training and organizational measures, the level of overall combat readiness and combat capability of army units and formations has significantly increased.
Party political work
No one will object to the fact that the combat training of soldiers and sergeants, military art Generals and officers play an important role in achieving success on the battlefield. But no victory is unthinkable without a high morale and fighting spirit of the troops, without their organization and conscious discipline. The high moral qualities of a Soviet soldier are his most powerful weapon. Many memoirists, historians and military commentators in the capitalist world speak about him with respect. True, not all of them correctly understand the ideological origins of this weapon, but almost everyone recognizes its power.
The Military Council and the Political Department of the 11th Guards Army never forgot about the moral training of the troops. And in this case, they gave detailed instructions to commanders and political workers on the organization of party political work in the troops during the preparation of the operation and during it. We did not forget that the formations and units of our army had to advance through territory prepared for long-term defense, defended mainly by Prussian volunteers collected from all over Germany. Here, more than ever, the mobilization of all the forces and moral capabilities of the troops was required.
I would not like to repeat myself, describing the common forms and methods of party political work: rallies, meetings, meetings with veterans, conversations about the history of units, propaganda of military traditions, discussion of the appeal of the Military Council of the front and the army. These forms did not change, but the content of the work expanded significantly. We began to pay more attention to the international education of soldiers.
An hour before the start of artillery preparation, an appeal from the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front was read out in all units. “Today the Motherland calls you to new feats of arms,” it said, “to storm the fascist den, to decisive battles with the enemy... Crush all resistance of the Nazi invaders! Don't give them a single minute of respite! Pursue, surround, exterminate the fascist evil spirits without any mercy!” (299) And then the address spoke about natural concepts for our warrior - about dignity Soviet man, about a humane attitude towards the civilian population of Germany, towards prisoners and wounded enemies, about the great liberation mission of the Soviet Union in Europe. And it should be noted that our Soviet soldiers and officers carried the banner of proletarian internationalism with honor.
During the preparatory period of the operation, our political agencies created full-fledged company party and Komsomol organizations, did a lot to improve internal party work, raise the ideological and political level of soldiers and commanders and ensure a high level of combat training.
By January 1, 1945, in the troops of the 11th Guards Army there were 1,132 company and equal party organizations (300), which included 24,261 communists (17,254 members and 7,007 party candidates) (301). In most rifle companies and artillery batteries, party organizations had 10–15 party members and candidates, Komsomol organizations - up to 25 Komsomol members (302). Thus, the party layer in combat units at the beginning of the offensive amounted to almost 15–20%, and together with Komsomol members - up to 45% of total number personnel. It was a huge force cementing the ranks of the army.
As always before an offensive, the communists gathered and discussed how best to fulfill the tasks of their formations, units, and subunits in the operation. They demanded that all party members show in battle a personal example of following the orders of their commanders, military skill, courage, fearlessness, and most importantly, the strictest vigilance, an irreconcilable fight against carelessness and roteness, since military operations were transferred to enemy territory.
Experienced warriors - fighters, sergeants and officers - spoke before the fighters, especially those from the new recruits. In the 97th Regiment of the 31st Guards Rifle Division, for example, Private Shesterkin, awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Patriotic War and the Medal “For Courage” (303), repeatedly spoke to Komsomol members.
We had another very successful form of propaganda, which greatly helped to unite the personnel. If it happened to appoint new commanders of rifle, machine-gun and mortar companies, the unit lined up and the new commander talked about himself and his combat life, about the fighters he had previously commanded, and called on the personnel to beat the enemy like a guard, until he was completely destroyed.
Commanders and political workers told the soldiers about the violence, robberies and murders committed by the Nazis on our land. In the 252nd Regiment of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division alone, the Nazis killed and tortured close relatives of 158 soldiers, drove the families of 56 military personnel to Germany, the families of 152 soldiers were left homeless, the Nazis plundered property of 293 people and stole livestock, etc. d.(304)
We told everyone who came to serve in the 11th Guards Army about the immortal feat of our guardsman, Hero of the Soviet Union, private of the 77th Regiment of the 26th Guards Rifle Division, Yuri Smirnov.
The Military Council invited the hero's mother, Maria Fedorovna Smirnova. She visited many units, talked about her son, called for merciless destruction Nazi troops in their lair, to take revenge on them for the atrocities on Soviet soil.
When the troops received the order to attack, rallies and meetings were held in all units and divisions, at which soldiers, sergeants and officers vowed not to spare their lives in order to put an end to the fascist beast forever.
The party-political work carried out in the troops of the 11th Guards Army was of great importance in the mobilization of all personnel: the moral and political state of the troops strengthened, their consciousness and understanding of the tasks at hand rose even higher. But what made us all especially happy was the warriors’ desire to Communist Party, which strengthened the party organizations of the units. The closer the start of the operation approached, the more soldiers submitted applications for admission to the party. This is what it looked like, for example, in the 31st Guards Rifle Division:
“I want to go into battle as a communist” - these words coming from the heart were repeated in hundreds of statements.
In the tenth of January, I reported to the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front that the 11th Guards Army was ready for operation.
East Prussian operation
As a result of “Stalin’s ten strikes,” by the end of 1944, Soviet troops reached the borders of Nazi Germany, liberating Soviet territory from the Nazi invaders. The Soviet Army was given a new task to complete the defeat of the Nazi army, finish off the fascist beast in its own lair and hoist the banner of victory over Berlin. However, looming over the troops preparing to storm Berlin was a large enemy group entrenched in East Prussia, without the destruction of which an attack on Berlin would have been very risky.
According to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the overall goal of the operation was to cut off the troops of Army Group Center from the rest of the forces, press them to the sea, dismember and destroy them in parts, completely clearing the territory of East Prussia and Northern Poland from the enemy.
The German command attached great importance to the retention of East Prussia. There have long been powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the Red Army's winter offensive in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg.
During this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlawa-Elbing, Heilsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops located there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, dissect them and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan.
They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributsa. 
The offensive was initially scheduled for January 20, but was launched ahead of schedule, since it was necessary to save our then allies from the catastrophic situation that had created for them in connection with the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes. 
prisoners in the Ardennes
The first to go on the offensive on January 13 were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Despite careful preparation, it was not possible to keep an event of such a large scale completely secret. The enemy, who became aware of the time of the front's offensive, on the night of January 13, hoping to prevent the systematic development of further events, began heavy artillery shelling of the battle formations of the front's strike group. However, the enemy's artillery was soon suppressed by retaliatory strikes from artillery and night bombers. As a result, the enemy was unable to prevent the front troops from taking their initial positions and going on the offensive according to plan.
At 6 o'clock in the morning, successful actions of the advanced battalions began. Having rushed to the front line, they found that the first trench was occupied by only minor forces, the rest were withdrawn to the second and third trenches. This made it possible to make some adjustments to the artillery preparation plan, which lasted from 9 to 11 o’clock.
Since there was thick fog over the battlefield and the sky was covered with low clouds, planes could not take off from the airfields. The entire burden of suppressing enemy defenses fell on the artillery. In two hours, the Soviet forces had expended a large amount of ammunition: the 5th Army alone had fired more than 117,100 shells. But the increased consumption of ammunition did not ensure the complete suppression of enemy defenses. 
After artillery preparation, infantry and tanks, supported by artillery fire, went on the attack. The Nazis offered fierce resistance everywhere. In conditions of poor visibility, they brought tanks to close range, and then made extensive use of faust cartridges, anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and repelling his continuous counterattacks, formations of the 39th and 5th armies by the end of the day wedged 2-3 km into the enemy’s defenses; The 28th Army of General A.A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, advancing up to 7 km.
The fascist German command, trying at all costs to delay the offensive Soviet troops, during the 13th and on the night of January 14, it transferred two infantry divisions from unattacked areas to the breakthrough site, and brought up a tank division from the reserve.
Individual points and centers of resistance changed hands several times. Reflecting counterattacks, the front troops persistently moved forward. On January 14, the weather cleared up somewhat and the planes of the 1st Air Army made 490 sorties: they destroyed enemy tanks, artillery and manpower, and conducted reconnaissance to the Ragnit, Rastenburg line. 
IL-2 on attack
By the end of the next day, the troops of the front’s strike group, having broken through the main line, wedged 15 km into the enemy’s defenses.
The wedging of Soviet troops into the enemy’s defenses created a threat of encirclement of his group, which was defending between the Neman and Inster rivers. The commander of Army Group Center was forced to allow the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General E. Rous, to withdraw the 9th Army Corps from this area to the right bank of the Inster River. 
On the night of January 17, the formations of the 39th Army operating here, having established the beginning of the enemy's retreat, proceeded to pursue him. The troops of the main group of this army also intensified the pressure. In the morning, with a strong blow, they completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and began to develop an offensive in the northwest direction. At the same time, the advance of the troops of the 5th and 28th armies slowed down, as the fascist German command, trying to hold the second line of defense at all costs, continuously reinforced its units with tanks, assault guns and field artillery.
The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, taking into account the current situation, decided to immediately use the success of the 39th Army to introduce a second echelon.
Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky
First, the 1st Tank Corps of General V.V. Butkov, and then the formations of the 11th Guards Army under the command of General K.N. Galitsky, were first deployed to this direction. A powerful blow to strongholds and concentrations of enemy infantry and tanks was delivered by aviation, which carried out 1,422 sorties that day. 
PE-2 in a dive
On January 18, the 1st Tank Corps entered a breakthrough on the left flank of the 39th Army. Destroying scattered enemy groups along the way, formations of the tank corps reached the Inster River and captured bridgeheads on its right bank. Using the success of the corps, the troops of the 39th Army advanced 20 km in a day. By the end of the day, its advanced units reached the Inster River.
On January 14, the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive from bridgeheads on the Narew River, north of Warsaw, in the Mława direction. At 10 o'clock a 15-minute artillery preparation began.
The advanced battalions of the first echelon divisions, deployed on the Ruzhany bridgehead, energetically attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense and broke into the first trench. Developing their success in depth, by 11 o'clock they had captured the second and partially the third trenches, which made it possible to reduce artillery preparation and begin the period of artillery support for the attack with a double barrage of fire to the entire depth of the second position.
On the very first day, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army of General I.I. Fedyuninsky advanced 3-6 km, and the formations of the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 48th Army of General N.I. Gusev advanced battles 5-6 km.
Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky
Alexander Vasilievich Gorbatov Nikolai Ivanovich Gusev
The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, with the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula of Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, the Germans themselves launched converging attacks from Fischhausen and Königsberg (Operation West Wind) against units of the 39th Army of General I. Lyudnikov with the forces of several infantry and 5th tank divisions, as a result of which the land connection between Zemland and Koenigsberg and thwarted the Soviet offensive. 
On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A. M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows. 
Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the surrounded groups sequentially, starting with the strongest - the Heilsberg one.
Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aircraft. These difficulties were added to by the spring thaw and flood. Despite difficult conditions and stubborn German resistance, Soviet troops reached Frisch Gaff Bay on March 26. The German command began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula in advance. Of the 150 thousand German soldiers and officers who defended southwest of Koenigsberg, 93 thousand were destroyed and 46 thousand were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Heilsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Heilsberg operation, six armies were freed from the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Königsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the reserve of Headquarters, beginning a regrouping in the Berlin direction. 
On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Königsberg operation. After a powerful artillery barrage, infantry and tanks attacked the German positions. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome stubborn enemy resistance, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days became decisive, when flying weather settled in. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, dropped 3,742 large-caliber bombs on the fortress on the evening of April 7 alone within 45 minutes. Other air armies, as well as naval aviation, also took part in the massive raids. It is necessary to note the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K. A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E. D. Bershanskaya, pilots from the night bomber regiment fought bravely U-2
. Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy. 
The commandant of the Koenigsberg fortress, General O. Lasch, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to help the Königsberg garrison with a strike from the peninsula to the west, but Soviet aviation thwarted these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were sandwiched in the center of the city and in the morning they found themselves under crushing artillery fire. .png)
Soldiers began to surrender in thousands. On April 9, Lasch ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death by hanging.
Otto von Lasch
On April 9, the Königsberg garrison capitulated. Lasch himself surrendered, which saved him from Hitler’s sentence. Together with Lasch, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers from the fortress garrison died. 
General Müller was removed from his position as commander.
In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their strength. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. The trophies included about 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1,442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment. The loss of large forces and a militarily-economically important area accelerated the final defeat of Germany. 
in defeated Königsberg
medal “For the capture of Königsberg”
One of the most significant operations carried out by the Red Army in 1945 was the storming of Königsberg and the liberation of East Prussia.
Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, Oberteich bastion after capitulation/
Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, Oberteich bastion. Courtyard.
Troops of the 10th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front occupy the city of Mühlhausen (now the Polish city of Mlynar) during the Mlawa-Elbing operation.
German soldiers and officers captured during the assault on Konigsberg.
A column of German prisoners walks along Hindenburg Strasse in the city of Insterburg (East Prussia), towards the Lutheran Church (now the city of Chernyakhovsk, Lenin Street).
Soviet soldiers carry the weapons of fallen comrades after a battle in East Prussia.
Soviet soldiers learn to overcome barbed wire barriers.
Soviet officers inspect one of the forts in occupied Konigsberg.
An MG-42 machine gun crew fires near the railway station of the city of Goldap in battles with Soviet troops. 
Ships in the frozen harbor of Pillau (now Baltiysk, Kaliningrad region of Russia), late January 1945.
Königsberg, Tragheim district after the assault, damaged building.
German grenadiers are moving towards the last Soviet positions in the area of the railway station in the city of Goldap.
Koenigsberg. Kronprinz Barracks, tower.
Koenigsberg, one of the inter-fort fortifications.
The air support ship Hans Albrecht Wedel receives refugees in Pillau harbor.
Advanced German troops enter the East Prussian town of Goldap, which was previously occupied by Soviet troops.
Koenigsberg, panorama of the ruins of the city.
The corpse of a German woman killed by an explosion in Metgethen in East Prussia.
The Pz.Kpfw tank belonging to the 5th Panzer Division. V Ausf. G "Panther" on the street of the city of Goldap.
A German soldier hanged on the outskirts of Königsberg for looting. The inscription in German “Plündern wird mit-dem Tode bestraft!” translated as “Whoever robs will be executed!”
A Soviet soldier in a German Sdkfz 250 armored personnel carrier on one of the streets of Koenigsberg.
Units of the German 5th Panzer Division move forward for a counterattack against Soviet forces. Kattenau region, East Prussia. Ahead is a Pz.Kpfw tank. V "Panther".
Koenigsberg, barricade on the street.
A battery of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns is preparing to repel a Soviet tank attack. East Prussia, mid-February 1945.
German positions on the approaches to Koenigsberg. The inscription reads: “We will defend Koenigsberg.” Propaganda photo.
The Soviet self-propelled gun ISU-122S is fighting in Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front, April 1945.
A German sentry on a bridge in the center of Königsberg.
A Soviet motorcyclist passes by German StuG IV self-propelled guns and a 105 mm howitzer abandoned on the road.
A German landing ship evacuating troops from the Heiligenbeil pocket enters Pillau harbor.
Koenigsberg, blown up by a pillbox.
Damaged German self-propelled gun StuG III Ausf. G in front of the Kronprinz Tower, Königsberg.
Koenigsberg, panorama from the Don Tower.
Koenisberg, April 1945. View of the Royal Castle
A German StuG III assault gun destroyed in Königsberg. In the foreground is a killed German soldier.
German equipment on Mitteltragheim street in Königsberg after the assault. To the right and left are StuG III assault guns, in the background is a JgdPz IV tank destroyer.
Grolman upper front, Grolman bastion. Before the capitulation of the fortress, it housed the headquarters of the 367th Wehrmacht Infantry Division.
On the street of Pillau port. Evacuated German soldiers throw their weapons and equipment before loading onto ships.
A German 88-mm FlaK 36/37 anti-aircraft gun abandoned on the outskirts of Königsberg.
Koenigsberg, panorama. Don Tower, Rossgarten Gate.
Koenigsberg, German bunker in the Horst Wessel Park area.
Unfinished barricade on Herzog Albrecht Alley in Königsberg (now Thälmann Street).
Koenigsberg, destroyed German artillery battery.
German prisoners at the Sackheim Gate in Königsberg.
Koenigsberg, German trenches.
German machine gun crew in position in Koenigsberg near the Don Tower.
German refugees on Pillau Street pass by a column of Soviet SU-76M self-propelled guns.
Koenigsberg, Friedrichsburg Gate after the assault.
Koenigsberg, Wrangel Tower, fortress moat.
View from the Don Tower on Oberteich (Upper Pond), Königsberg.
On the street of Koenigsberg after the assault.
Koenigsberg, Wrangel Tower after the surrender.
Corporal I.A. Gureev at his post at the border marker in East Prussia.
A Soviet unit in a street battle in Koenigsberg.
Traffic police officer Sergeant Anya Karavaeva on the way to Konigsberg.
Soviet soldiers in the city of Allenstein (currently the city of Olsztyn in Poland) in East Prussia.
Artillerymen of the guard of Lieutenant Sofronov are fighting on Avider Alley in Konigsberg (now Alley of the Brave).
The result of an airstrike on German positions in East Prussia.
Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets on the outskirts of Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front.
Soviet armored boat No. 214 in the Koenigsberg Canal after a battle with a German tank.
German collection point for faulty captured armored vehicles in the Königsberg area.
Evacuation of the remnants of the "Gross Germany" division to the Pillau area.
German equipment abandoned in Konigsberg. In the foreground is a 150 mm sFH 18 howitzer.
Koenigsberg. Bridge over the moat to the Rossgarten Gate. Don Tower in the background
An abandoned German 105-mm howitzer le.F.H.18/40 at a position in Konigsberg.
A German soldier lights a cigarette near a StuG IV self-propelled gun.
A damaged German Pz.Kpfw tank is on fire. V Ausf. G "Panther". 3rd Belorussian Front.
Soldiers of the Grossdeutschland division are loaded onto homemade rafts to cross the Frisches Huff Bay (now Kaliningrad Bay). Balga Peninsula, Cape Kalholz.
Soldiers of the Grossdeutschland division in positions on the Balga Peninsula.
Meeting of Soviet soldiers on the border with East Prussia. 3rd Belorussian Front.
The bow of a German transport sinking as a result of an attack by Baltic Fleet aircraft off the coast of East Prussia.
The observer pilot of the Henschel Hs.126 reconnaissance aircraft takes pictures of the area during a training flight.
A damaged German StuG IV assault gun. East Prussia, February 1945.
Seeing off Soviet soldiers from Koenigsberg.
The Germans inspect a damaged Soviet T-34-85 tank in the village of Nemmersdorf.
Tank "Panther" from the 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht in Gołdap.
German soldiers armed with Panzerfaust grenade launchers next to an MG 151/20 aircraft cannon in the infantry version.
Column German tanks The Panther is moving towards the front in East Prussia.
Broken cars on the street of Königsberg, which was taken by storm. Soviet soldiers in the background.
Troops of the Soviet 10th Tank Corps and the bodies of German soldiers on Mühlhausen Street.
Soviet sappers walk down the street of burning Insterburg in East Prussia.
A column of Soviet IS-2 tanks on a road in East Prussia. 1st Belorussian Front.
A Soviet officer inspects the German Jagdpanther self-propelled gun that was knocked out in East Prussia.
Soviet soldiers sleep, resting after the fighting, right on the street of Königsberg, which was taken by storm.
Koenigsberg, anti-tank barriers.
German refugees with a baby in Konigsberg.
A short rally in the 8th company after reaching the state border of the USSR.
A group of pilots of the Normandie-Niemen air regiment near a Yak-3 fighter in East Prussia.
A sixteen-year-old Volkssturm fighter armed with an MP 40 submachine gun. East Prussia.
Construction of defensive structures, East Prussia, mid-July 1944.
Refugees from Königsberg moving towards Pillau, mid-February 1945.
German soldiers at a rest stop near Pillau.
German quad anti-aircraft gun FlaK 38 mounted on a tractor. Fischhausen (now Primorsk), East Prussia.
Civilians and a captured German soldier on Pillau Street during garbage collection after the end of the fighting for the city.
Boats of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet undergoing repairs in Pillau (currently the city of Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad region of Russia).
German auxiliary ship "Franken" after an attack by Il-2 attack aircraft of the Baltic Fleet Air Force.
Bomb explosion on the German ship Franken as a result of an attack by Il-2 attack aircraft of the Baltic Baltic Fleet Air Force
A gap from a heavy shell in the wall of the Oberteich bastion fortifications of the Grolman upper front of Koenigsberg.
The bodies of two German women and three children allegedly killed by Soviet soldiers in the town of Metgethen in East Prussia in January-February 1945. German propaganda photo.
Transportation of the Soviet 280-mm mortar Br-5 in East Prussia.
Distribution of food to Soviet soldiers in Pillau after the end of the fighting for the city.
Soviet soldiers pass through a German settlement on the outskirts of Konigsberg.
A broken German StuG IV assault gun on the streets of Allenstein (now Olsztyn, Poland.)
Soviet infantry, supported by the SU-76 self-propelled gun, attacks German positions in the Konigsberg area.
A column of self-propelled guns SU-85 on the march in East Prussia.
Sign "Motorway to Berlin" on one of the roads in East Prussia.
Explosion on the tanker Sassnitz. The tanker with a cargo of fuel was sunk on March 26, 1945, 30 miles from Liepaja by aircraft of the 51st mine-torpedo air regiment and the 11th attack air division of the Baltic Fleet Air Force.
Bombing of German transport and port facilities of Pillau by Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force aircraft.
The German hydroaviation mother ship Boelcke, attacked by an Il-2 squadron of the 7th Guards Attack Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force, 7.5 km southeast of Cape Hel.
However, after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Germans began to realize that soon the rear status of East Prussia could be replaced by a front-line one, and they began to prepare it for defense by building fortifications. As the front approached the borders of the region, these works became more and more intense. East Prussia was turned into a huge fortified area with a defense depth of 150-200 km. Koenigsberg was located behind many lines of fortifications (from three to nine in different directions).
The first battles on German soil
Soviet troops, represented by the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, reached the borders of East Prussia in September 1944 as a result of the triumphant Operation Bagration (by far the best strategic operation of the Soviet army during the entire Great Patriotic War) and the Baltic offensive operation (also quite successful). The Germans were going to defend East Prussia to the last possible opportunity, not only and not so much for military reasons, but for political and psychological reasons - this region meant too much to them in historical terms. Nevertheless, the Soviet command planned to capture East Prussia before the end of 1944.
The first offensive against East Prussia began on October 16, 1944. Two days later, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered the territory of this region for the first time, i.e. to the territory of Germany, which they have been striving for since June 41st.
However, from the first moment the operation turned into a frontal “gnawing through” of a very powerful German defense. Therefore, on October 27, the offensive was stopped. It cannot be called unsuccessful - the troops advanced 50-100 km deep into East Prussia. However, its complete capture was out of the question, and Soviet losses were twice as large as those of the enemy (80 thousand versus 40 thousand). But a bridgehead on enemy territory was created, and important experience was gained.
On the second try
The second attempt was made already in 1945. To carry out the East Prussian operation, the Soviet army concentrated 1.7 million people, 25.4 thousand guns, 3.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 3.1 thousand aircraft against approximately 800 thousand people, 8.2 thousand guns, 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 800 aircraft as part of the German Army Group North (former Army Group Center).
The Soviet offensive by the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts began on January 13 in two directions - through Gumbinnen to Königsberg (from a bridgehead captured in October 1944) and from the Narev area to the Baltic coast.
Unlike the Vistula-Oder operation that began at the same time and was developing triumphantly (already on January 31, troops crossed the Oder, only 70 km remained to Berlin), the offensive in East Prussia proceeded extremely slowly and in this sense resembled the offensive operations of the first half of the war. The reason for this was the well-prepared, deeply echeloned defense of the Germans and the fire of German ships. It was thanks to the fire of the ships (pocket battleships Lützow and Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, about 20 destroyers, destroyers and floating batteries) that the Germans regularly launched counterattacks, which in other sectors of the front by this time was almost unthinkable . In addition, the German fleet managed to transfer as many as eight divisions from the Courland bridgehead to East Prussia; the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force could not prevent this.
By the beginning of February, despite fierce resistance, Soviet troops cut the German group into three parts. However, final victory was very far away. Thanks to the support of naval artillery, the largest of the German groups, the Heilsberg group (south of Königsberg), launched a successful counterattack and reconnected with the Königsberg group. During these battles, on February 18, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Army General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, died (he was only 38 years old).
What was happening in East Prussia led to the fact that the 1st Belorussian Front, under the command of Zhukov, stopped the attack on Berlin and turned north, launching an attack on East Pomerania together with the 2nd Belorussian Front.
Thus, the defense of Königsberg delayed the fall of Berlin, i.e. the end of the war for at least two months.
At the same time, in Eastern Pomerania, Soviet troops faced the same problem - crushing fire from German naval artillery, which made the ground offensive very difficult.
The German group in Eastern Pomerania and the Heilsberg group in East Prussia were eliminated only by the end of March. At the same time, Danzig fell, which led to the final isolation of German troops in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German fleet was forced to shift its efforts to the west, first to the area of the Bay of Danzig, then to Eastern Pomerania. The departure of the German ships, which the Baltic Fleet was never able to cope with, facilitated the actions of the ground forces in East Prussia.
Capture of Königsberg
Objectively speaking, after this, the remnants of German troops in East Prussia did not pose any threat to the Soviet army; they could simply be ignored, throwing maximum forces at Berlin. However, this was not our rule. Now the target was the regional capital. Ahead was the battle for Königsberg.
The defense of Königsberg consisted of three lines and included 12 large and 5 small forts, plus many other defensive structures. The city was defended by a 134,000-strong German garrison. The assault on Königsberg began on April 6. Before this, for four days, artillery and aviation preparations were carried out in the capital of East Prussia, in which 5 thousand guns and 1.5 thousand aircraft were involved. This is what decided the outcome of the battle, especially since the shelling and bombing of the city continued during the assault itself.
Even the powerful German fortification could not withstand the amount of metal that fell on it. Koenigsberg fell very quickly - already on April 9, 92 thousand German troops surrendered, including the commander, General Lasch.
After the capture of Königsberg, there was absolutely no need to fight in East Prussia, but the Soviet command did not think so. The last German group remained in the western part of East Prussia, on the Samland Peninsula. It was captured on April 25, and Pillau fell at the same time (note that at that time there were already battles in the center of Berlin!). The remnants of the German troops (22 thousand people) retreated to the Frische-Nerung spit, now bearing the name Baltic, where they surrendered on May 9.
Results of the East Prussian operation
Of all the operations last year During the war, it was in East Prussia that Soviet troops suffered the greatest losses - almost 127 thousand people. killed, 3.5 thousand tanks, almost 1.5 thousand aircraft. The Germans lost at least 300 thousand people killed. To the Soviet losses directly in East Prussia, one must add significant additional losses during the assault on Berlin at the end of April (at the beginning of February it was quite possible to take it “on the move”).
Thus, the “citadel of German militarism” cost us extremely dearly, although the assault on Königsberg itself was carried out almost flawlessly.
The reasons for this are indicated above - the extreme saturation of East Prussia with defensive lines and the complete inability of the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force to neutralize German ships (all of them were sunk by British aircraft in April-May 1945, but by that time they had already done their “dirty deed”).
However, it is not a fact that the East Prussian operation should have been carried out at all. In fact, the Stalingrad mistake was repeated here when, while finishing off the “cauldron”, a much larger German group was missed from the Caucasus. Moreover, there was no need to finish off - Paulus’s army was doomed to death from cold and hunger. Two years later, the German group in East Prussia was also doomed and no longer had any opportunity to strike the flank and rear of the Soviet troops advancing on Berlin; it could simply be restrained by fairly limited forces without any assaults. Then Berlin would inevitably fall in February, which would end the war. But alas.
In the winter of 1945, a large-scale offensive by the Soviet Union was carried out along the entire front. The troops launched powerful attacks in all directions. The command was exercised by Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Chernyakhovsky, as well as Ivan Bagramyan and Vladimir Tributs. Their armies faced the most important tactical and strategic task.
On January 13, the famous East Prussian operation of 1945 began. The goal was simple - to suppress and destroy the remaining German groups in and northern Poland in order to open the road to Berlin. In general, the task was extremely important not only in the light of eliminating the remnants of resistance. Today it is generally accepted that the Germans had already been practically defeated by that time. This is wrong.
Important prerequisites for the operation
Firstly, East Prussia was a powerful defensive line that could quite successfully fight back for many months, giving the Germans time to lick their wounds. Secondly, high-ranking German officers could use any respite to physically eliminate Hitler and begin negotiations with our “allies” (there is a lot of evidence of the existence of such plans). Neither of these scenarios could be allowed to happen. The enemy had to be dealt with quickly and decisively.
Features of the region
The eastern tip of Prussia itself was a very dangerous region, with a developed network of highways and many airfields, which made it possible to quickly transfer a huge number of troops and heavy weapons across it. This area seems to have been created by nature itself for long-term defense. There are many lakes, rivers and swamps, which greatly complicate offensive operations and force the enemy to go along targeted and fortified “corridors.”
Perhaps the offensive operations of the Red Army outside the Soviet Union have never been so complex. Since the time of the Teutonic Order, this territory was full of many of which were very powerful. Immediately after 1943, when the course of the war of 1941-1945 was turned at Kursk, the Germans for the first time felt the possibility of their defeat. Everything was spent on work to strengthen these lines. working population and a huge number of prisoners. In short, the Nazis were well prepared.
Failure is a harbinger of victory
In general, the winter offensive was not the first, just as the East Prussian operation itself was not the first. 1945 only continued what the troops had started in October 1944, when Soviet soldiers were able to advance about a hundred kilometers deep into fortified areas. Due to the strong resistance of the Germans, it was not possible to go further.
However, it’s hard to consider this a failure. Firstly, a reliable bridgehead was created. Secondly, the armies and commanders gained invaluable experience and were able to sense some of the enemy’s weaknesses. In addition, the very fact of the beginning of the seizure of German lands had an extremely depressing effect on the Nazis (although not always).
Wehrmacht forces
The defense was held by Army Group Center, commanded by Georg Reinhardt. In service were: the entire third tank army of Erhard Routh, the formations of Friedrich Hossbach, as well as Walter Weiss.
Our troops were opposed by 41 divisions at once, as well as a large number of detachments recruited from the most defensible members of the local Volkssturm. In total, the Germans had at least 580 thousand professional military personnel, as well as about 200 thousand Volkssturm soldiers. The Nazis brought 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 500 combat aircraft and approximately 8.5 thousand large-caliber mortars to the defensive lines.
Of course, the history of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945. I also knew more combat-ready German formations, but the area was extremely convenient for defense, and therefore such forces were quite sufficient.
The German command decided that the region should be held, regardless of the number of losses. This was completely justified, since Prussia was an ideal springboard for the further offensive of Soviet troops. On the contrary, if the Germans had managed to recapture previously captured areas, this would have allowed them to attempt a counteroffensive. In any case, the resources of this area would make it possible to prolong Germany's agony.
What forces did the Soviet command have at its disposal to plan the East Prussian operation of 1945?
USSR forces
However, military historians from all countries believe that the battle-worn fascists had no chance. Soviet military leaders fully took into account the failures of the first assault, in which the forces of the Third Belorussian Front alone participated. In this case, it was decided to use the forces of an entire tank army, five tank corps, two air armies, which, in addition, were strengthened by the 2nd Belorussian Front.
In addition, the offensive was to be supported by aviation from the First Baltic Front. In total, more than one and a half million people, more than 20 thousand guns and large-caliber mortars, about four thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as at least three thousand aircraft were involved in the operation. If we recall the events of the Great Patriotic War, the assault on East Prussia will be among the most significant.
Thus, our troops (not taking into account the militia) outnumbered the Germans three times in terms of people, in artillery by 2.5 times, in tanks and aircraft by almost 4.5 times. In breakthrough areas, the advantage was even more overwhelming. In addition, Soviet soldiers were fired upon, powerful IS-2 tanks and ISU-152/122/100 self-propelled guns appeared in the troops, so there was no doubt about victory. However, as well as in high losses, since natives of Prussia were specially sent to the ranks of the Wehrmacht in this sector, who fought desperately and to the last.
The main course of the operation
So how did the East Prussian operation of 1945 begin? On January 13, the offensive was launched, which was supported by tank and air strikes. Other troops supported the attack. It should be noted that the beginning was not the most inspiring; there was no quick success.
Firstly, it was impossible to keep D-Day a secret. The Germans managed to take preemptive measures, pulling the maximum possible number of troops to the intended breakthrough site. Secondly, the weather was a let down, which was not conducive to the use of aviation and artillery. Rokossovsky later recalled that the weather resembled a continuous piece of damp fog, interspersed with thick snow. Air sorties were only targeted: full support for the advancing troops was not possible. Even the bombers sat idle all day, as it was simply impossible to discern enemy positions.
Such events of the Great Patriotic War were not uncommon. They often overrode carefully thought-out staff directives and promised additional casualties.
"General Fog"
The artillerymen also had a hard time: visibility was so bad that adjusting the fire was impossible, and therefore they had to shoot exclusively with direct fire at 150-200 meters. The fog was so thick that even the sounds of explosions were lost in this “mess,” and the targets being hit were not visible at all.
Of course, all this had a negative impact on the pace of the offensive. The German infantry on the second and third lines of defense did not suffer serious losses and continued to fiercely snarl fire. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out in many places, and in a number of cases the enemy launched a counter-offensive. Many settlements changed hands ten times a day. Extremely bad weather persisted for several days, during which the Soviet infantrymen continued to methodically break down the German defenses.
In general, Soviet offensive operations during this period were already characterized by careful artillery preparation and extensive use of aircraft and armored vehicles. The intensity of the events of those days was in no way inferior to the battles of 1942-1943, when ordinary infantry bore the brunt of the fighting.
The Soviet Army acted successfully: on January 18, Chernyakhovsky’s troops were able to break through the defenses and create a corridor 65 kilometers wide, penetrating 40 kilometers into enemy positions. By this time, the weather had stabilized, and therefore heavy armored vehicles poured into the resulting gap, supported from the air by attack aircraft and fighters. Thus began a large-scale offensive by (Soviet) troops.
Consolidating success
On January 19, Tilsit was taken. To do this, we had to cross the Neman. Until January 22, the Instersburg group was completely blocked. Despite this, the Germans resisted fiercely, and the fighting was protracted. On the approaches to Gumbinnen alone, our fighters repelled ten massive enemy counterattacks at once. Ours held out, and the city fell. Already on January 22, we managed to take Insterburg.
The next two days brought new successes: they managed to break through the defensive fortifications of the Heilsberg region. By January 26, our troops approached the northern tip of Koenigsberg. But the assault on Koenigsberg then failed, because a strong German garrison and five of their relatively fresh divisions settled in the city.
The first stage of the most difficult offensive was successfully completed. However, the success was partial, because our troops were unable to encircle and destroy two tank corps: the enemy’s armored vehicles retreated to pre-prepared defensive lines.
Civilians
At first, our soldiers did not meet civilians here at all. The Germans hastily fled, as those who remained were declared traitors and were often shot by their own people. The evacuation was organized so poorly that almost all property remained in abandoned houses. Our veterans recall that East Prussia in 1945 was more like an extinct desert: they had the opportunity to relax in fully furnished houses, where there were still dishes and food on the tables, but the Germans themselves were no longer there.
Ultimately, the tales of “wild and bloodthirsty barbarians from the East” played a bad joke on Goebbels: the civilian population left their homes in such a panic that all railway and road communications were completely loaded, as a result of which the German troops found themselves shackled and could not quickly change your positions.
Offensive development
The troops commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky were preparing to reach the Vistula. At the same time, an order came from Headquarters to change the vector of attack and shift the main efforts to quickly finishing off the East Prussian enemy group. The troops had to turn north. But even without support, the remaining groups of troops successfully cleared enemy cities.
Thus, Oslikovsky’s cavalrymen managed to break through to Allenstein and completely defeated the enemy garrison. The city fell on January 22, and all fortified areas in its suburbs were destroyed. Immediately after this, large German groups were under threat of encirclement, and therefore began to hastily retreat. At the same time, their retreat proceeded at a snail's pace, since all roads were blocked by refugees. Because of this, the Germans suffered heavy losses and were captured en masse. By January 26, Soviet armor had completely blocked Elbing.
At this time, Fedyuninsky’s troops broke through to Elbing itself, and also reached the approaches to Marienburg, seizing a large bridgehead on the right bank of the Vistula for the subsequent decisive push. On January 26, after a powerful artillery strike, Marienburg fell.
The flanking detachments of troops also successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them. The area of the Masurian swamps was quickly overcome, it was possible to cross the Vistula on the move, after which the 70th Army broke into Bydgoszcz on January 23, simultaneously blocking Torun.
German throwing
As a result of all this, Army Group Center was completely cut off from supplies and lost contact with German territory. Hitler was furious and then replaced the group's commander. Lothar Rendulic was appointed to this position. Soon the same fate befell the commander of the Fourth Army, Hossbach, who was replaced by Müller.
In an effort to break the blockade and restore land supplies, the Germans organized a counteroffensive in the Heilsberg area, trying to get to Marienburg. In total, eight divisions took part in this operation, one of them was tank. On the night of January 27, they managed to significantly push back the forces of our 48th Army. A stubborn battle ensued, lasting four days in a row. As a result, the enemy managed to break through 50 kilometers deep into our positions. But then Marshal Rokossovsky came: after a massive blow, the Germans wavered and rolled back to their previous positions.
Finally, by January 28, the Baltic Front completely took Klaipeda, finally liberating Lithuania from fascist troops.
Main results of the offensive
By the end of January, most of the Zemland Peninsula was completely occupied, as a result of which the future Kaliningrad found itself in a semi-ring. The scattered units of the third and fourth armies were completely surrounded, which were doomed. They had to fight on several fronts simultaneously, defending with all their might the last strongholds on the coast, through which the German command still somehow delivered supplies and carried out evacuation.
The position of the remaining forces was greatly complicated by the fact that all Wehrmacht army groups were cut into three parts at once. On the Zemland Peninsula there were the remnants of four divisions, in Königsberg there was a powerful garrison and an additional five divisions. At least five almost defeated divisions were located on the Braunsberg-Heilsberg line, and they were pressed to the sea and had no opportunity to attack. However, they had nothing to lose and were not going to give up.
Long-term plans of the enemy
They should not be considered loyal fanatics of Hitler: they had a plan that included the defense of Königsberg with the subsequent pull-up of all surviving units to the city. If successful, they would be able to restore land communication along the Koenigsberg-Brandenburg line. In general, the battle was far from over; the tired Soviet armies needed a respite and replenishment of supplies. The degree of their exhaustion in fierce battles is evidenced by the fact that the final assault on Koenigsberg began only on April 8-9.
The main task was completed by our soldiers: they were able to defeat the powerful central enemy group. All powerful German defensive lines were broken and captured, Koenigsberg was in a deep siege without the supply of ammunition and food, and all the remaining Nazi troops in the area were completely isolated from each other and severely exhausted in battle. Most of East Prussia, with its most powerful defensive lines, was captured. Along the way, warriors Soviet army liberated areas of Northern Poland.
Other operations to eliminate the remnants of the Nazis were entrusted to the armies of the Third Belorussian and First Baltic Fronts. Note that the 2nd Belorussian Front was concentrated in the Pomeranian direction. The fact is that during the offensive, a wide gap formed between the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky, into which they could strike from Eastern Pomerania. Therefore, all subsequent efforts were aimed at coordinating their joint strikes.
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