Bashkir uprisings in the 17th and 18th centuries, table. Bashkir uprising (1704-1711). We are from the rebellion

Colonization of Bashkortostan and the struggle of the Bashkirs for rights and freedoms. There are many historical documents of a normative nature that are to one degree or another connected with the Bashkir uprisings. Some of them were adopted hot on the heels of the armed uprisings of the Bashkirs in order to “pacify” them and confirm the conditions for joining the Russian state.

But most of them have the goal of “curbing the region”, suppressing the resistance of the Bashkirs through illegal actions of the government. However, often such measures served as the cause of other Bashkir uprisings, which were suppressed with particular cruelty.

The period from 1662 to 1798 is the most dramatic for the Bashkir people. It was the events of this time that allowed V. Vitevsky to assert that “Russia acquired this region at a high price; a lot, even a lot, of foreign and Russian blood was shed in this space before it was included in the Russian state. For more than two centuries, with short interruptions, the stubborn struggle of the Russian government continued with the foreign population of this region, especially with its main inhabitants - the Bashkirs"226.

But if V. Vitevsky, like A. Donnelly and other supporters of the concept of the conquest of Bashkortostan, reports on the fall of Kazan, then we accept 1662 as the conditional date of the beginning of the “transitional” stage, or period - the date of the first major armed uprising of the Bashkirs against the illegal government policies. This period is designated “transitional”, since it occupies an intermediate position between the periods of autonomy and class status of the Bashkirs, sharply distinguishing itself from them by the nature of historical events and the political situation in the region. A similar position was taken by Portal Roger, who wrote: “The main reasons for the hundred-year conflict, marked by five uprisings (the last of which, the Pugachevschina, was especially serious), were phenomena of an economic and social order. The protectorate, in which the social structure of the Bashkir people remained intact, was only a transitional stage to the complete enslavement of the Bashkirs during industrialization and the settlement of the region by alien peoples”227. In reality, there were more uprisings and wars and the conflict ended not with enslavement, but with the transfer of Bashkirs into military service

estate. Deprived of access to archival primary sources,228 the researcher nevertheless managed to correctly determine the chronological framework and essence of the “heroic era in the history of the Bashkir people, the social and economic structure of which underwent profound changes during the 18th century. The Bashkir aristocracy, which took the most active part in the uprisings, was destroyed... At the same time, inter-tribal ties were weakening, Bashkir society was losing its solidity, in impoverished villages only individual families went to summer camps..."229.

The phenomenon of Bashkir wars and uprisings of the 17th-18th centuries has always been the object of close attention of historians, and sufficient research has been devoted to it.

but a lot of scientific works. Unfortunately, in state legal science this issue was not raised as an object of study, as was the special “transitional” period of 1662-1798 in the history of the Bashkir people.

During 1662-1798, 6 wars-rebellions occurred: 1662-1665, 1681-1684, 1705-1711, 1735-1740, 1755-1756, 1773-1775.

It is the frequency of these conflicts, which occurred on average every 20 years, that allows us to state the existence of a special period in the history of the Bashkir people, during which the struggle for the preservation of rights and freedoms was carried out. (There were armed conflicts before 1662: 1572, 1581, 1616, 1645, but the participation of Bashkirs in them was not widespread.)

The first war-rebellions (1662-1665, 1681-1684, 1705-1711) ended in peace negotiations, which is explained not only by the weakness of the government in the region, but also by the military power of the Bashkirs. (Researchers believe that in the 16th-17th centuries the Russian army had not yet reached the military level of mounted nomads230.)

War-rebellion 1662-1665. The reasons were: the illegal seizure of Bashkir lands, the foundation of the Zakamsk line of fortresses, the government’s demands for the return of military booty captured during the war with the Kalmyks, the latter’s support in the dispute over the possession of the southwestern Bashkir lands (the Bashkirs were the “older” vassals of the Moscow Tsar and considered , that Moscow had to take a pro-Bashkir position), abuses of officials in collecting yasak and actions to return military booty.

The conflict in central Bashkortostan ended in 1663 with the reconciliation of the parties; ambassadors from the Bashkirs of the Nogai Road were received by the tsar. The conditions for the Bashkirs to join the Moscow state were once again confirmed. The Ufa governor A.M. Volkonsky, who did not suit the Bashkirs, was removed from his post.

But the legal status of the Siberian Road remained ambiguous. The fact is that the entry of the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road into the Russian state took place in the process of conquering the Siberian Khanate. A number of Bashkir tribal organizations (Tabyntsy, Synryantsy, Myakotitsy, etc.) actively supported the Kuchumovichs. The attitude of the Russian government towards the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road was appropriate. Thus, yasak from the inhabitants of the Siberian Road was paid not from a certain territory, but from each tribal unit, which, from a legal point of view, made it similar to tribute. Naturally, the recognition of the suzerainty of Moscow by the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road was of an extremely formal nature. As the events of the “Tyumen War”231 show, state authorities were in a state of permanent war with the tribal organizations of the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road, military detachments of the Kuchumovichs, as well as Nogais and Kalmyks.

The essence of the conflict is also connected with the pre-Mongol political heritage. According to the label given by Genghis Khan, it is clear that Muyten Biy controlled the territory, which included a significant part of the later Siberian Khanate. Of course, with the establishment of Mongolian rule and the advent of tribal organizations associated with the Mongols, the Bashkirs had to “make room”, but on the whole they did not lose their dominant position in the region, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that the environment of one of the last Kukumu-

Vichi - Kanaya and Azim were Bashkirs-Tabynts.

It should be taken into account that the main income of the Siberian Khanate was the yasak of furs, collected mainly from politically passive local peoples: Voguls, Komi, etc. The Bashkir elites of the Siberian Road, forming the support of the Khan’s power, also received their share from this income.

The Osinskaya road arose as a result of the migration of part of the Bashkir tribal organizations to the north, away from the Mongolian administration. And it would be naive to believe that the warlike Bashkirs did not take the opportunity to explain to the local population.

And now the established system of relations is broken by Russian expansion. The Moscow Tsar demands payment of yasak in his own favor. The political elites of the Siberian Khanate (including the Bashkir elites) are fiercely resisting the aggressor. And even after the collapse of the Siberian Khanate, they do not give up attempts to revive it. Obviously, the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road could not so easily come to terms with the current situation, the payment of yasak, Russian expansion, etc., and were interested in restoring the Siberian Khanate.

The Bashkirs of the Nogai road only benefited from the events associated with joining the Moscow state, since they occupied the lands freed from the departed Nogais. The government has not yet begun to colonize the road, so the interests of the Bashkirs and the state here do not contradict each other. And the spontaneous migration of various nationalities, as well as peasants from the central regions of the country, which the government tried to stop, only strengthened the Bashkirs (the settlers became tenants of Bashkir patrimonial lands). Relations with neighboring peoples (Kalmyks, Kazakhs), on the contrary, were strained, since there was a direct conflict over the possession of border nomads.

The more active role of the Bashkirs of the Kazan Road is explained by the fact that they were the first to sense the negative aspects of government policy in the region (land for the construction of the Zakamsk line of fortresses was confiscated from them).

The foreign policy sympathies of part of the elite Bashkirs of the Nogai and Kazan roads were traditionally given to the Crimean Khanate and Turkey (the pro-Crimean party was also strong in the Kazan Khanate)232. And, judging by Crimean sources, the Bashkirs intensified their diplomatic activities, counting on help, and subsequently, possibly, a change in suzerainty in favor of the Crimean Khan233.

Connections with the Kalmyks were also established. But the position of the Kalmyks was not consistent: some supported the Russians, some supported the Bashkirs234.

However, among the Bashkir elite the positions of the pro-Moscow party were also strong. We should not forget that without its presence, the peaceful entry of the Bashkirs into the Moscow state would have been impossible. Adherents of the pro-Moscow party, participating in wars and uprisings, only demanded that the government comply with all its obligations when the Bashkirs entered the state. After government representatives declared these intentions, adherents of the pro-Moscow party, as a rule, advocated ending the conflict and starting peace negotiations, and offered their services as mediators. A. Donnelly includes the activities of this party among the main reasons that led to the cessation of the conflict32-.

Taking into account the above, the war-uprising of 1662-1665 should be considered as an attempt by the Bashkirs of the Siberian and Osinsk roads to restore the Siberian Khanate. This statement is supported by the fact that at the beginning of 1663, Tsarevich Kuchuk3 appeared in the disposition of the armed forces of the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road. According to sources, “Tsarevich Kuchyumov from the Kalmaks and from the Tatars and from the Bashkirs... and Tobolsk they want to take and beat the service people; and they agreed that Tsarevich Kuchyumov should be in Tobolesku and own all of Siberia, and pay tribute from all Siberian cities to that Tsarevich Kuchyumov”235. It is obvious that the Bashkirs of the Siberian Road, having renounced Moscow suzerainty, called for the rightful heir to the rulers of the Siberian Khanate. »

However, in the winter of 1665, after negotiations, the conflict was resolved. The inconsistency of the Bashkirs in supporting the Kuchumovichs is explained by the fact that, navigating the current political situation, they were well aware that plans to restore the Siberian Khanate were ephemeral. Apparently, the Bashkir elites simply used the Kuchumovichs to achieve their goals. The presence of a prince made the movement politically more significant, which helped attract more supporters, provided additional advantages in negotiations with the Moscow government, etc.

So, the first war-uprising ended generally favorably for the Bashkirs. The parties returned to their previous relations. The government officially confirmed the conditions for entry and pledged to stop the violations that had taken place.

War-uprising of 1681-1684236 Reason: attempt at forced Christianization, abuses by representatives of local government authorities, illegal seizure of Bashkir lands. As already noted, according to the legal tradition of the region, it was considered unacceptable for authorities to interfere in the spiritual life of their subjects, especially to demand that they change their religion or customs.

Any sources about the nomination of any of the leaders of the movement as a pan-Bashkir khan or the invitation of a khan from outside

not available, although there is information that the Bashkirs intensified di-

diplomatic relations with the Crimean Tatars.

The Bashkirs acted in alliance with the Kalmyks, and the movement acquired such a scale that the Kazan governor Sheremetev, having 5.5 thousand troops at his disposal, did not dare to go on a campaign in Bashkortostan and asked for additional forces. However, in 1682, the Streltsy rebelled and, although it was suppressed, it was not possible to use them against the Bashkirs.

On July 8, 1682 and in October of the same year, the government addressed the Bashkirs with official letters condemning Christianization and land seizures, and replaced the Ufa governor Korkodinov. Peace negotiations begin.

The conflict finally ended in 1684, after the diplomatic success of the government: the Kalmyks broke the alliance with the Bashkirs and their attacks on their former allies.

War-uprising 1705-1711. Reason: the government’s attempt to establish illegal fees from the Bashkirs (the activities of “profit makers”). This war-uprising took place at the height of the Northern War of 1700-1721, which is no coincidence: it was military spending that forced the government to increase fiscal oppression throughout the country, including in the Bashkir region.

The Bashkirs were particularly indignant at the brutal reprisal of Commissar Sergeev against elected officials from the Bashkirs of the four roads. When the leader of the Bashkirs of the Kazan Road, Dumey Ishkeev, who had gone to Moscow for negotiations, was taken under escort to Kazan and hanged there, the movement acquired an all-Bashkir scale. The deception of a trustee or the murder of an ambassador, and this is how the actions of the Russian government were qualified, were subject to revenge both according to customary law and according to the norms of the Great Yasa, which had not lost authority in the region, and according to international law of that time they provided a formal reason for declaring war.

The All-Bashkir kurultai elects Sultan Murat, a relative of the Karakalpak ruler, as khan.’28 But Khan Murat, having gotten involved in a war with the Kalmyks, loses the support of the Bashkirs and, in search of military assistance, travels to Crimea and Turkey. Not having received it, on the way home he starts an uprising in the Caucasus, but is defeated and taken prisoner237.

The next khan appears to be the Bashkirs of the Nogai Road, Khaziy Akuskarov. However, the real policy of the Bashkirs was determined by the most influential elders - the leaders of the largest tribal organizations, such as Aldar Isyangildin, Urakai Yuldashbaev, Kusum Tyulekeev, Dumey Ishkeev and others. The khans played a predominantly “tactical role”238.

In the conflict that began, the Bashkirs found themselves part of a broad anti-Russian coalition, including Sweden, Turkey, Crimea, and also opposed the imperial government on the side of Ukraine led by Hetman Mazepa and the Don Cossacks led by Kondraty Bulavin. Naturally, all its participants had different legal status and did not have a common leadership.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the Bashkirs acted completely autonomously. In addition to traditional ties with Turkey and Kryl, as well as related peoples of the region (Karakalpaks, Nogais, etc.), the connection between the Don Cossacks and the Bashkirs is well known. Sources informed that “and he, Bulavin, by God’s grace is in alliance with bash-zz!

kirami".

The union of the Bashkirs and Don Cossacks, directed against the central government, is very significant in state and legal terms. And he wasn't the only one. Bashkirs and Cossacks became allies in the war of 1773-1775, the Bashkirs participated in the actions of Razin and others. The fact is that the legal status of the Bashkirs and Cossacks was similar. The only significant difference was the ethnicity of the Bashkirs and Cossacks: if the former were “foreigners” for Moscow, the latter were their own, and accordingly the attitude towards them during the hostilities was different (the families of the rebel Cossacks were not subjected to physical destruction, mass distribution as serfs, etc. . P.).

Almost until 1707, the Don Cossacks enjoyed autonomy, which was postulated in two succinct formulas: “There is no extradition from the Don” and “We bow to no one except the Lord.” Recognizing the suzerainty of Moscow, the Cossacks did not tolerate any interference in internal affairs. And it was precisely the abuses of Peter’s officials that caused the Bulavin uprising.

Thus, we can state the fact of transformation of the state-legal paradigm of the Russian state. The Moscow kingdom develops into the Russian Empire. The unity of the empire is ensured not by the consensus of the elites, but by the state mechanism. Recruitment of elites begins to be carried out according to the “service” model33-. The peculiarity of the emerging vertically integrated bureaucracy is that it does not accept the idea of ​​legal personality of other organizations other than its own. Therefore, the stability of the system as a whole can only be achieved by maximizing the expansion of this recruitment model so that it covers all structural parts of the empire.

This war-uprising is one of the most significant military actions in scope: the Bashkirs came very close, 30 versts, to Kazan and, according to rumors, intended to move on Moscow3"3.

Great merit in the military defeat of the Bashkirs and the Don Cossacks allied to them, according to JI. Gumilyov, belongs to the Kalmyks239. In 1710, the Kalmyks attacked the Bashkirs from the rear, and the latter, unable to fight a war on two fronts, laid down their arms. Thus, with the help of some vassals, Moscow pacified others333.

War-uprising 1735-1740. Reason: actions of the Orenburg expedition, continued illegal seizures of land and abuses of power. The organization of the Orenburg expedition, despite the declared protest of the Bashkirs, meant the government’s refusal of the conditions for the Bashkirs to join the Russian state. Bashkir leaders, fully aware that the new policy of the center is aimed at openly colonizing the region, decided to oppose the construction of Orenburg at a number of all-Bashkir yiyns. The reason for the start of the speech was the brutal execution of the Bashkir ambassadors sent to Ki-

Rilov - head of the Orenburg expedition.

During this war-uprising, a change in the government's attitude towards the Bashkirs was evident. Decrees are issued that directly violate the conditions for the Bashkirs to join the Moscow state and are aimed at infringing on their rights and freedoms.

Thus, according to the Decree “On measures to completely stop the rebellion of the Bashkirs and on the prohibition of general gatherings without the presence of military officials,” the activities of all-Bashkir yiyyns are significantly limited and placed under the control of government officials.”38 According to the Decree “On the failure to conduct a census of the Bashkirs...” it is imperative it was recommended to stop the practice of electing petitioners from the entire people and sending them from each volost separately.These measures are the first step towards the elimination of political autonomy and the breakdown of the traditional political system of the Bashkirs.

The massive illegal seizure of Bashkir lands begins. The decree “On the incontinence of fugitives and on the punishment of Bashkirs...”240 by lifting the ban on the purchase and sale of Bashkir lands actually legalizes the illegal (from the point of view of legislation) seizure of land for factories, etc. Also, according to this decree, Meshcheryaks and other “ The lands they occupied became the property of the faithful "tenant peoples of the Bashkir lands."

According to A. Akmanov, who specifically studied the issue of state land policy in the region, the decree of February 11, 1736 “did not abolish the patrimonial right of the Bashkirs to land, but meant a significant limitation of it. This was a violation of Ivan’s letters of complaint

Grozny. Thus, a legal basis was created for the mass confiscation of Bashkir estates. The seizure of land began to be carried out not only through the founding of fortresses, factories, distribution to settlers from the central regions, but also in the form of strengthening the general control of the state over the entire territory of the region. Some joint possessions of Bashkir volosts, or “roads”, and located mainly on the outskirts of Bashkiria were classified as “vacant”, “idle”.

Since that time, the term “state land” appears in official documentation regarding part of the Bashkir territory.<...>Thus, 30-90s. The 18th century constituted a new stage in the land policy of Russian tsarism in the region, which led to major socio-economic and political changes. Despite the preservation of patrimonial rights, the Bashkirs lost over 50% of their possessions”241. From a legal point of view, these changes in the government’s understanding of the legal status of the Bashkir region are indicative. The Bashkirs as a people are actually denied the right to their own territory, that is, the Bashkirs lose their legal personality and autonomy.

Bashkirs are prohibited from having forges and firearms, and the import and sale of any weapons to them is also prohibited. As a result, guns that were used in military operations back in 1662 and had guns in each

In the yard "panser, spear, bow, and saber, also a gun...", by 1812, Bashkir warriors were forced to fight with archaic weapons, while showing miracles of courage and heroism.

However, the most reactionary was the Decree “On sending troops to Bashkiria and the speedy cessation of the Bashkir revolt” of February 16, 1736, which openly sanctioned the genocide of the Bashkirs.

These decrees were also aimed at further dividing the newcomer population and the Bashkirs and contrasting them. For these purposes, firstly, they encouraged those Meshcheryak servicemen who, while remaining loyal to the tsarist government, took part in the suppression of the Bashkir uprisings. The Bashkir lands were provided to them free of charge, forever and without debt.

Secondly, the Teptyars and Bobyls, following the example of the Meshcheryaks, were subject to “renunciation from Bashkir obedience” and were exempted from paying dues to the Bashkirs-patrimonial people. They had to pay only the previous yasak to the treasury. Thirdly, the newly baptized were assigned to the Cossack service for their loyalty and were exempted from tribute. Fourthly, the Bashkirs and Kazan Tatars could enter into matchmaking only with the permission of the Kazan governor. For each wedding, a dragoon horse was taken for the benefit of the treasury, and from those persons who married without permission, three dragoon horses were taken. Fifthly, the Tatar Murzas who remained faithful were exempted from ship work and capitation payments, and the Kazan Yasash Tatars who supported the Bashkirs bore the burdens of ship service and capitation taxes.

On the basis of the Decree “On sending troops to Bashkiria and the speedy cessation of the Bashkir revolt” of February 16, 1736, along with regular government troops, punitive detachments were staffed from among the service Meshcheryaks, Kazan Murzas and Tatars, Kalmyks, Eggs to suppress the Bashkir uprising of 1735-1740 - some Cossacks and palace peasants.

According to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decree of February 11, 1736, persons who detained Bashkirs with a gun were entitled to the horse of the person caught, and the perpetrators were subject to exile.

The above-mentioned decree (clause 13) also limited the self-government of the Bashkirs. In each volost, instead of the volost elders, two or three elders were elected, who had to perform their duties in turns. The elders were responsible for the crimes and performances of the Bashkirs in the volost. Iiyyns were allowed to be held only once a year with the permission of the tsarist administration only in the Chesnokovka area.

Clause 14 of the decree in question also regulated spiritual life. Each road was allowed to have only one ahun, four in total. Akhuns were appointed to the position by the royal administration and at the same time took a special oath of allegiance to the authorities. Akhuns prohibited the conversion of persons from other faiths to the Muslim religion. The construction of schools and mosques was allowed only on the basis of special decrees.

In order to increase the influx of newcomers, mainly Russians, paragraph 16 of the decree lifted the ban on the sale of Bashkir lands.

Many provisions of the above-mentioned decrees provide for measures to organize new military garrisons in Bashkiria and further colonization of the region, as well as for the construction of the Zakamskaya line (Orenburg and “other towns” in order to isolate Bashkortostan from the external Turkic world and turn it into internal Russia).

On the basis of the Senate decree of March 17, 1738, the Meshcheryaks as a class as a whole, “for their current loyalty,” could subsequently own the Bashkir lands that they were using at that time, without rent in favor of the Bashkir patrimonial owners343.

The tsarist government especially made sure that the rebel Bashkirs could not “spread their roguish plans in their homes.”<...>right-

subjects of the Kazan Murzas and Tatars." For this purpose, on the basis of a decree of September 26, 1755, “in order to pacify and eradicate<...>villainous Bashkirs”, a detachment of 5,000 people was created on a voluntary basis from among the serving Murzas and Kazan Tatars. They were allowed to keep and also sell within Russia “... captured minors and females” and “estates” of the Bashkirs242.

In the war of uprising of 1735-1740, the Bashkirs suffered a complete military defeat. There were no peace negotiations, and the swearing-in was forced. But the Bashkirs did not consider themselves bound by obligations taken under threat of arms, as the events of 1755 clearly showed.

The phenomenon of “faithful” Bashkirs requires special consideration. The Bashkirs who did not take part in hostilities against the government were considered “loyal.” Some of them participated in wars and uprisings on the side of the government. A. S. Donnelly writes with surprise that “by 1740, approximately 40% of the Russian military contingent under the command of the Bashkir Commission were the so-called loyal Bashkirs”243.

The idea that the basis of the “faithful” Bashkirs was the aristocracy, or the so-called feudal lords, is completely inconsistent with the truth. Without delving into the analysis of elite formation and the structure of Bashkir society, we note that out of 770 Tarkhanov called in 1735 to participate in the Orenburg expedition, only 160 appeared, and the reason for non-appearance was not fear or pressure from the “rebellious masses.”

The presence of a pro-Moscow party was mentioned above, but in connection with the events of 1735-1740, it can be considered that there were no sincere supporters of the government among the Bashkirs. The tsarist government tried in every possible way to win over the Bashkirs. Thus, in the empress’s personal decree of September 1, 1755, the Bashkirs who had gone to the Kazakh steppes after the uprising with their families were asked to return within six months and “voluntarily bring their guilt.” Otherwise, as prescribed in the decree, “their homes, lands, lands and all other accessories will be distributed to those Bashkirs who remain in all loyalty to Us”244.

But, having abandoned Russian suzerainty, the Bashkirs found themselves in a difficult geopolitical situation. Although large government forces were distracted by the Russian-Turkish War of 1735-1739, the Bashkirs fought the war in complete isolation, surrounded by Kazakhs and Kalmyks, with whom relations were never good. The government's policy of pitting the peoples who are tenants of Bashkir lands (Meshcheryaks, Teptyars, Bobyls, etc.) against the Bashkir owners allowed the formation of a “fifth column” in the Bashkir region itself. Under these conditions, after defeats in 1735-1737, a number of Bashkir leaders in 1738 decided to call on the Kazakh khans as new overlords, expecting to receive military assistance from them. Thus, Bepenya Toropberdin, one of the most famous leaders of the Bashkirs, in a letter to the Khan of the Small Horde Abulkhair addressed him as “our king,” demanding the fulfillment of his obligations245. However, for a significant part of the Bashkirs, recognition of Kazakh suzerainty was completely unacceptable. For example, according to Kirilov’s report, only in 1734 the Bashkirs, led by Taimas Batyr, repelled the ten thousandth army of the Khan of the Middle Horde, who tried to invade Bashkortostan246. As a result, a split occurs, and since 1737, the anti-government war-uprising actually develops into a civil war between supporters and opponents of continuing the struggle, under conditions of a real threat of physical destruction of the nation247.

Thus, the actions of Taimas-Tarkhan and other so-called faithful Bashkirs cannot be considered a betrayal either from a legal or from a moral and ethical point of view. Each tribal organization was considered sovereign and independently chose a suzerain and carried out other actions. And the Bashkirs, who stubbornly continued the struggle and stopped futile resistance, were right in their own way; they all defended their people as they saw fit. Political elites had to make a difficult choice between loss of autonomy and physical

ical survival of the people. And the non-support of the new all-Bashkir khan Karasakal by the majority of Bashkirs suggests that the point of view of Taimas Batyr prevailed.

War-uprising of 1755-1756. Reason: the Bashkirs did not accept defeat in the war-uprising of 1735-1740. The government continued its illegal policies: Bashkir lands were confiscated, the construction of new mosques and schools was prohibited,248 the state monopoly on salt was extended to the Bashkirs,249 etc. Various abuses by officials did not stop. The abolition of yasak (which was replaced by a much heavier250 monopoly on salt) was regarded by the Bashkirs as an attempt by the government to equate their legal status with peasants. According to the legal ideas of the Bashkirs, the payment of yasak served as confirmation of the relationship of vassalage and the rights and freedoms arising from it.

The leaders of the Bashkirs of the Burzyan volost began to secretly prepare an open revolt. However, the organization of the movement was negatively affected by the consequences of the government’s actions to eliminate the traditional structure of self-government of the Bashkir people (the ban on all-Bashkir yiyyns). As a result, the war-uprising of 1755-1756 took the form of a guerrilla war.

The continuation of the policy of genocide, expressed in the physical destruction of the Bashkirs without determining guilt, the distribution of wives and children, etc.251, forced the Bashkirs to seek refuge with the Kazakhs. According to approximate data, up to 50 thousand Bashkirs went to the Kazakh steppes252. However, the Kazakhs, on the recommendation of the government, begin to rob refugees, as a result - 357

Tata the Bashkir-Kazakh warrior breaks out.

The ideology of the movement is of state and legal interest253. It took on a national character, expressed in the triad “one country - one people - one state”. Therefore, the movement of 1755-1756 should be considered national liberation.

War-uprising 1773-1775. Reason: the factors causing the Bashkirs to reject the imperial government remained the same. The catalyst for the movement was the performance of the Yaik Cossacks led by Pugachev. In his appeals and decrees to the Bashkirs, Pugachev promised to grant them land, waters, forests, etc., freedom of religion for their support, that is, he actually confirmed the initial conditions for the Bashkirs to join the Moscow state, which

violated by the imperial government. As a result, the absolute majority of Bashkirs joined Pugachev""60.

The overwhelming number of researchers consider the uprising led by Pugachev to be a peasant war. However, the basis of its military strength were the Bashkirs and Cossacks (an analysis of the reasons that led to the military alliance of the Cossacks and Bashkirs in a number of wars against the central government was carried out above). Only at Pugachev’s headquarters there were up to 10 thousand Bashkirs254, the total number of Bashkirs participating in Pugachev’s movement is estimated at 50 thousand warriors255.

This war-uprising for the Bashkirs was neither “anti-feudal”, much less class, etc. (Characteristically, of Pugachev’s 39 Bashkir colonels, 16 were volost foreman, 1 was a marching foreman, 2 were centurions256.) It was only another, albeit the most significant, war of the entire Bashkir people for national rights and freedoms, restoration and preservation of political autonomy.

So, the cause of numerous conflicts were gross violations by the central government of the conditions for the Bashkirs to join the Russian state, expressed in various illegal actions (increasing the fiscal burden, seizure of land, attempts at forced Christianization, etc.).

The legal assessment of armed conflicts by the government and the Bashkirs differed. Naturally, the Russian central government viewed these conflicts as an armed rebellion. Thus, the leaders of the war of 1773-1775 were branded with the letters “Z”, “B”, “I”, which meant “villain”, “rebel”, “traitor” and expressed the official government point of view on this issue.

The Bashkirs considered resistance to illegal actions of any persons, including the government, their inalienable right. The right to revolt as a concept (in the understanding enshrined in the French Declaration) did not exist in the legal culture of the Bashkirs and the peoples of the region (the Bashkirs, speaking against the government, did not consider that they were raising an uprising). According to customary law, a tribal entity never lost its sovereignty (while the people, according to the theory of the social contract, transferred their rights to the sovereign) and could always refuse one or another overlord. Accordingly, any violent actions on the part of the former overlord were perceived as a declaration of war. This concept is known in scientific literature as “free vassalage.” On this issue, R. G. Kuzeev noted: “... there are compelling and documented reasons to believe that among the main reasons for the numerous uprisings of the Bashkirs in the second half of the 16th-18th centuries. there was a different understanding of the nature of the annexation (as “nationality” - in Moscow, as a “free vassalage” - in Bashkortostan) and violation on the part of tsarism of the terms of “agreements, treaties””257. Of course, the discrepancy in views on the nature of entry in itself did not give rise to conflict. The conflict was generated by specific actions of the government, which, according to the Bashkirs, were illegal. The Bashkirs always, before taking actions that were significant in a legal sense (renunciation of suzerainty), sought to find out the official position of the government regarding the offenses that took place. And only after exhausting all peaceful means of resolving the conflict and making sure that the central government supported illegal actions (that is, that this was not an excess of the perpetrator - local state officials), the Bashkirs began military

new actions against government troops.

As we noted above, the largest conflicts of 1662-1665, 1705-1711 and 1735-1740 were accompanied by the Bashkirs’ renunciation of Russian suzerainty, which, according to the international law of that time and the region, meant that these conflicts in legal terms were wars. This circumstance explains the participation in conflicts on the side of the Bashkirs Kuchumovichs, Kalmyk Taishas, ​​Karakalpaks and other persons counting on the role of the Bashkir overlord.

Taking into account the above, in state legal science, to denote the complex phenomenon known as “Bashkir uprisings”, the term “wars-uprisings” should be used, since it more fully reveals its legal content. 57.

Bashkir genocide. According to modern legal concepts, the definition of genocide includes actions aimed at the complete or partial destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing members of this group, causing serious harm to their health, forcibly preventing childbearing, forcibly transferring children, forcibly relocating or otherwise creating life conditions designed to bring about the physical destruction of members of this group. The state policy and actions of the armed forces of the Russian government during individual wars and uprisings, of course, need to be qualified.

to act like genocide.

In line with a purposeful, documented policy, not only direct participants in hostilities, but also the civilian population were subjected to physical destruction, children were distributed, etc. - almost all actions that, in modern law, are part of the international crime of genocide. It should be noted that the consequences of this policy still have a heavy impact on the demographic situation of the Bashkirs.

It must be emphasized that the genocide was carried out not (only) as a result of the excesses of the perpetrator - independent actions of the Russian troops, but as a state policy sanctioned by the highest leadership of the state. For example, the Decree “On sending troops to Bashkiria and the speedy cessation of the Bashkir rebellion” dated February 16, 1736 ordered the troops to carry out pogroms and burn villages “in the months of March and April, while the Bashkirs and horses are without food,” and “to execute the caught rebels by death, and others... send into exile; those fit for service - to the Baltic regiments and the navy, and those unfit - to work in Rogervik, and distribute young children and females for settlement in Russian cities"258.

In pursuance of the decree, government troops during military operations destroyed both the armed forces of the Bashkirs and the civilian population, burned villages, confiscated livestock and food supplies. It is not possible to accurately estimate the losses of the Bashkirs; we can only talk about approximate figures. According to incomplete data, during the struggle of 1735-1740 alone, the Bashkirs lost over 40 thousand people (not counting those who died from hunger)259. But this figure is greatly underestimated. In a famous report of 1739 to the Empress Tatishchev, the head of the Orenburg Commission, reported: “...the two most dangerous ones - the Kazan and Nagai roads were so ruined that barely half remained, and the rest - the Ufa (Osinskaya) and Siberian roads - although not so many people disappeared, however “Everyone’s horses and cattle disappeared, the villages were destroyed, and, having no food, many died of hunger.”260 Thus, in addition to enormous human losses, the Bashkirs suffered catastrophic material losses. For example, from June to September 1740 alone, government troops burned 725 villages of the Siberian and Nogai roads261 (for comparison: in 1743, there were only 578 villages in the Siberian and Nogai roads3). That is, at least 90 thousand Bashkirs (if you count that 120 people lived in each village) were left without shelter and means of subsistence. As a result of the actions of government troops, a terrible famine broke out in Bashkortostan. From the reports of Russian officers to the command it followed that the Bashkirs “are dying of hunger, and the remaining dogs and cats are eating, and they lack that, and because of their powerlessness

and are forced by despair to abandon the dead.”

Executions of Bashkirs who returned to Islam after forced baptism through public burning were also widespread. So, on March 14, 1739, General Soimonov signed a confirmation in the case of Kisyabika Bayrasova: “A caught Bashkir woman, who was baptized and given the name Katerina, for three escapes to Bashkiria and that she, having left the Christian Law, became insane, for this, if you please, order fear of executing others by death - burning, so that in the future, depending on that, others will be executed"262.

Genocide was carried out in other ways. For example, the organization of the border service of the Bashkirs, according to Kirilov, should have led to a limitation of the birth rate: “... wives without a child will be left behind, and whoever is killed will not return at all”263.

At the end of the first decade of the 18th century. A powerful movement unfolded that embraced the Cossacks of the Don, partly the Zaporozhye Sich and the peoples of the Volga region. It was caused by an active attack by the state on the autonomy and self-government of the Don, demands for the return of fugitives, which violated the unwritten laws of life of the Cossacks. The reason for the riot was the actions of the expedition of Prince Yu. V. Dolgoruky, sent to search for and return the fugitives. In October 1707, one of Dolgoruky’s detachments was defeated by “newly arrived people” led by the ataman of the Trekhizbyanskaya village, Kondraty Bulavin, who became the leader of the “walking people”. By the spring of 1708, the movement expanded, covering Kozlovsky and Tambov districts, and the Pristansky town on Khoper became its center. In the capital of the Don Army, Cherkassk, the rebel army of Cossacks and peasants was divided into several detachments, one of which went to meet the tsarist troops, the other two to the Volga region. The main forces, together with Bulavin, moved to Azov. However, such a dispersal of forces backfired on the rebels. In July 1708, after two unsuccessful attempts to take Azov, a Cossack foreman from the “household Cossacks” attacked Bulavin’s kuren and ended his life,

In 1709-1710 Peasant uprisings swept through Voronezh, Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vladimir and other provinces, but punitive forces prevailed everywhere. The anti-government movement of 1707-1710, which involved a large mass of the lower social classes, did not outgrow the scale of the Cossack revolt in its nature; its goal was mainly to restore the class privileges of the Cossacks.

Bashkir uprising (1705-1711)

In the first decade of the 18th century. Among the small peoples of the Volga region and the Urals, unrest continuously arose due to the unheard-of arbitrariness of Peter's administration, the seizure of the best lands, as well as the forced introduction of Orthodoxy. The uprising of the Bashkirs was caused by the introduction of new taxes in 1704 and the demand for the supply of horses for the army. The struggle against the authorities unfolded with particular force in 1705-1711. in Bashkiria. The reason for the uprising was the appearance of royal profit-makers in Bashkiria, who came to Ufa in 1704 to collect new taxes and conscript thousands of people into military service. The spontaneous indignation was used by the local Bai elite for their own interests. The uprising was led by large Bashkir bais Aldar Isekeev and Kuchuk Tyulekeev, who wanted to create their own khanate using the slogans of the Muslim religion. There were frequent cases of Bashkirs inciting hatred towards the Russian population living in the Urals: Russians were killed or sold into slavery. With great difficulty, by 1711 the tsarist authorities, with the help of troops, managed to suppress the uprising.

The case of Tsarevich Alexei

One of the most dramatic conflicts during the time of Peter I was associated with the name of Tsarevich Alexei, the heir to the throne. Being under the strong influence of his confessor Yakov Ignatiev, he condemned his father’s behavior and the reforms he carried out in the country. At the end of 1716, when relations between father and son reached a dead end, Alexei secretly fled from Russia to Austria under the patronage of Emperor Charles VI. In 1717, succumbing to the persuasion of Peter the Great's emissaries P. P. Tolstoy and A. I. Rumyantsev and believing in the tsar's promise to forgive his guilt, Alexei returned home, where he was taken into custody. The investigation revealed the prince's hostile plan towards Peter, which was to eliminate most of the reforms and return to old traditions. In June 1718, the Extraordinary Supreme Court, consisting of 127 people, sentenced Alexei to death, but the prince died in the casemate of the Peter and Paul Fortress before the sentence was carried out, apparently unable to withstand the terrible torture.

In the 18th century, the Russian Empire more than once became the scene of powerful social upheavals, among which the Bashkir uprising of 1705-1711 occupied a significant place. These events, separated from us by more than three centuries, clearly demonstrate the disastrous results that short-sighted and sometimes criminal policies pursued by local authorities can lead to. We will try to understand in this article what the specifics of the Bashkir uprising were and what were its causes.

Detonator for social explosion

Over the course of a long historical period, covering the entire previous 17th century, dissatisfaction grew among the population of Bashkiria with the attempts of the Russian authorities to instill Christianity among them in every possible way to the detriment of the national religion - Islam. Indignation was also caused by illegal extortions arranged by tsarist officials. Sometimes the situation became so tense that the Bashkirs took up arms.

This happened again in 1705, and the detonator for the social explosion was the decree of local tax officials M. Dokhov and A. Zhikharev. At a general meeting of representatives of the Bashkir clans, they announced the introduction of 72 new taxes, most of which were illegal and were supposed to fill their own pockets.

The last straw in the cup of patience

In addition, officials presented local residents with a number of religious demands. Thus, their decree stated that from now on all mosques should be built on the model of Christian churches, and mullahs must enter into marriages and record deaths in the presence of Orthodox priests. The Bashkirs were especially outraged by the requirement to pay a tax for each visit to prayer meetings.

Such claims were perceived as preparation for the forced Christianization of the people. To top it all off, they were obliged to supply 20 thousand horses and 4 thousand recruits for the needs of the army of Peter I, who was then fighting the Northern War. All these demands, the fulfillment of which was an unbearable burden for the bulk of the population, became the cause of the Bashkir uprising, which broke out in 1705 and raged for almost six years.

Social explosion

The beginning of events was also provoked by the arrival of Colonel A.S. Sergeev, notorious for his cruelty, in the Ufa district. Having gathered the elected elders, he put them in the position of hostages, announcing that he would execute everyone if 5 thousand horses were not handed over to him as soon as possible. Fearing the death of their compatriots, the Bashkirs submitted, but the arbitrariness of the authorities did not stop there. The collection of horses resulted in outright robbery of the already impoverished population.

As a result, residents driven to despair generally refused to obey local officials, stopped paying taxes and, as had happened more than once, took up arms. The place where the Bashkir uprising began was the Nogai Daruga (an administrative-territorial unit of those years), but very soon it covered the entire space from Kungur in the north to the Yaika River in the south, and from the Volga in the west to Tobol in the east.

A reckless step by the sovereign

The rebels were led by a resident of Ufa, Dumey Ishkeev. His troops carried out a number of attacks on the Zakamsky fortresses and were active in the area of ​​the city of Solevarenny. It should be noted that, despite the military successes of the first stage of the Bashkir uprising, its organizers tried with all their might to avoid bloodshed, and for this purpose in the summer of 1706 they sent a petition to Peter I with a list of their grievances.

Ishkeev himself took her to St. Petersburg. The most respected representatives of the people went with him to the banks of the Neva. However, the sovereign not only did not consider it necessary to consider their demands, but ordered Ishkeev to be hanged, and the rest to be imprisoned as criminals and rebels. This clearly short-sighted step of his gave impetus to the continuation of the Bashkir uprising.

Separatist tendencies

The movement acquired its most widespread character in 1707, when residents of the Kazan and Nagai darugas united their efforts to defeat the military units of General P. S. Khokhlov sent to suppress the unrest, and then, having crossed the Kama, attacked the cities of Vyatka and Kungur districts.

At the same time, the feudal elite of the region announced their renunciation of Russian citizenship and attempted to create the Bashkir Khanate. In her endeavor, she counted on the help of the Crimean and Turkish khans, to whom ambassadors were immediately sent.

Broken Promises

At the beginning of the next 1708, new military units led by Prince P. I. Khovansky were sent to the areas affected by the uprising from the capital. His task was complicated by the fact that by that time the Bashkirs were closely interacting with the peasants and Cossacks of the Don, just like them, who had rebelled against bureaucratic arbitrariness. Realizing that full-scale military action would only aggravate the situation, the government, through its representative Khovansky, announced its readiness to make concessions.

In particular, it was promised to cancel illegal taxes imposed by local officials, as well as to consider all previously filed complaints. In response to this, the rebels agreed to lay down their arms, but since in reality the authorities did not fulfill any of their promises, their struggle continued.

War in Trans-Urals

In 1709, the center of military operations moved to the Trans-Urals, where local Karakalpaks joined the rebel detachments led by Urakai Yuldashbaev and Aldar Isyangildin. With their combined efforts, they carried out daring attacks on villages, factories, monasteries and forts located in the basins of the Techa, Iset and Miass rivers.

The chronicle of the events of the Bashkir uprising shows that at a certain stage, many Russian residents of the region joined the various ethnic groups that participated in the rebellion. Some of them had real reasons to hate the authorities, while others simply took the opportunity to take part in the robberies. But one way or another, their presence created additional difficulties for government troops.

Completion of large-scale military operations

In order to finally put an end to the rebels and normalize the situation, in 1710 the sovereign sent 2 fresh regiments to the Trans-Urals under the command of General I. Ya. Yakushin. The general, who by that time had quite a wealth of experience in pacifying rebellions, managed to attract local Kalmyks and even several thousand Bashkirs who wished to remain loyal to the tsarist government to suppress the uprising. Thanks to this, a significant superiority of forces was on his side. In addition, volunteer helpers from among the local residents had excellent knowledge of the terrain and with a high degree of probability could foresee the further actions of their rebellious compatriots.

As a result, the Bashkir uprising began to decline, and in the summer of 1710 the bulk of the rebels laid down their arms. Only their isolated isolated groups continued to resist, the liquidation of which did not pose a serious problem for government troops.

Concessions from the authorities

The last weak surge of anti-government activity was observed in 1711, when a small group of local residents tried to resume the fight in the central part of Bashkortostan. Their rebellion was also suppressed, but in order to prevent further protests, the authorities considered it advisable to make real concessions.

Thus, by decree of the tsar, the patrimonial rights of the Bashkirs were confirmed and a significant part of the previously established taxes was abolished. In addition, meeting with elected representatives of the population, the tsar's emissaries, on his behalf, condemned the violence and arbitrariness previously committed by the local authorities.

To top it all off, an open trial was held against tax officials Zhikharev and Dokhov, who, with their illegal actions, pushed the until then peaceful residents of the region to revolt. Both of them were sentenced to death, which greatly served to restore peace and tranquility.

However, the Bashkir uprising of 1705-1711. caused great human and material losses on both sides. Yesterday’s rebels regained Russian citizenship only in 1725, swearing allegiance to the widow of Peter the Great, Empress Catherine I.

Regarding the objective factors that prevented the rebels from achieving success, researchers point primarily to their ethnic heterogeneity. This uprising went down in history as the Bashkir one only because representatives of this ethnic group were its instigators and made up the majority of the participants. However, along with them, Karakalpaks, Kalmyks and a number of other peoples took an active part in the events of those years, each of whom pursued their own goals.

In addition, the fragmentation of individual rebel detachments and the almost complete absence of centralized leadership of military operations played into the hands of the tsarist troops, which largely reduced their effectiveness. And besides, the rebels, who were poorly armed and had not undergone any military training, were in many ways inferior to well-trained and sufficiently equipped government units.

In the first decade of the 17th century. Among the small peoples of the Volga region and the Urals - the Bashkirs, Mari, Tatars and Chuvashs - there was continuous unrest associated with the unheard-of arbitrariness of Peter the Great's administration, the displacement of the local population from their inhabited places, the seizure of the best lands, as well as the forcible introduction of Orthodoxy. The struggle against the authorities launched by the Bashkirs in 1705-1711 was particularly powerful.

The immediate cause of this uprising was the appearance of royal profit-makers in Bashkiria, who came to Ufa in 1704 to exact new taxes and conscript thousands of people for military service. The spontaneous indignation was used by the local Bai elite in their own interests: they sought to break away from Moscow and become subject to the Turkish Sultan or Crimean Khan, using the slogans of the Muslim religion. There were frequent cases of Bashkirs inciting hatred towards the Russian population living in the Urals - as a result, Russians were killed, maimed, and sold into slavery. With great difficulty, the tsarist authorities, with the help of regular troops, managed to suppress the uprising by 1711.

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