Eastern European socialism as a social model. Formation of the socialist camp. Eastern European socialism as a social model After 1945, the socialist system was established in
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1945-2000
However, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimean Conference, the process of forming a government of national unity also began in Poland. It included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), as well as the Ludovtsy Party and the Social Democratic Party. In June 1945, the coalition government was headed by E. Osubka-Morawski. Due to the same decisions of the Crimean Conference, a political dialogue began between the internal forces of the Resistance and the emigration anti-fascist forces in Yugoslavia.
The National Liberation Committee, created on the basis of the pro-communist National Liberation Front, reached an agreement in March 1945 with the emigration government of Šubasic to hold general free elections to the Constituent Assembly (Constituent Assembly). The undivided predominance of pro-communist forces remained during this period only in Albania.
The reason for the cooperation of completely heterogeneous political forces, which was so unexpected at first glance, was the unity of their tasks at the first stage of post-war transformations. It was quite obvious to communists and agrarians, nationalists and democrats that the most pressing problem was the formation of the very foundations of a new constitutional system, the elimination of authoritarian governance structures associated with previous regimes, and the holding of free elections. In all countries the monarchical system was eliminated (only in Romania this happened later, after the monopoly power of the communists was established).
In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the first wave of reforms also concerned the solution of the national question and the formation of a federal state. The primary task was the restoration of the destroyed economy, the establishment of material support for the population, and the solution of urgent social problems. The priority of such tasks made it possible to characterize the entire stage of 1945-1946. as a period of "people's democracy". However, the consolidation of political forces was temporary.
If the very need for economic reforms was questioned, then the methods of their implementation and the ultimate goal became the subject of the first split in the ruling coalitions. As the economic situation became stable, a further reform strategy had to be determined. The peasant parties, the most numerous and influential at that moment (their representatives, as mentioned above, headed the first governments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary), did not consider accelerated modernization and priority development of industry necessary.
They also opposed the expansion of state regulation of the economy. The main task of these parties, which was generally accomplished already at the first stage of reforms, was the destruction of latifundia and the implementation of agrarian reform in the interests of the middle peasantry. Liberal democratic parties, communists and social democrats, despite political differences, were united in their focus on the model of “catch-up development”, the desire to ensure a breakthrough for their countries in industrial development, to get closer to the level of the leading countries of the world. Without having a big advantage individually, all together they formed a powerful force capable of achieving a change in the political strategy of the ruling coalitions.
A turning point in the balance of political forces occurred during 1946, when peasant parties were pushed out of power. Changes in the highest echelons of public administration also led to adjustments in the reform course. The implementation of programs for the nationalization of large industry and the banking system, wholesale trade, the introduction of state control over production and elements of planning began. But if the communists viewed these reforms as the first step towards socialist transformations, then the democratic forces saw in them a natural process for the post-war MMC system of strengthening the state element of the market economy.
Determining a further strategy turned out to be impossible without final ideological “self-determination.” The objective logic of post-war economic transformations also became an important factor. “Catch-up development”, which had already gone beyond the period of economic recovery, the continuation of accelerated reforms in the field of large-scale industrial production, structural and sectoral restructuring of the economy required huge investment costs. There were no sufficient internal resources in the countries of Eastern Europe. This situation predetermined the inevitability of the growing economic dependence of the region on external assistance. The choice had to be made only between the West and the East, and its outcome depended not so much on the alignment of internal political forces, but on events on the world stage.
Eastern The political fate of Eastern Europe was Europe and began to be the subject of active discussion at the Crimean and Cold Potsdam Allied Conferences. The agreements reached in Yalta between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill reflected the actual division of the European continent into spheres of influence. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania formed the “area of responsibility” of the USSR. Subsequently, Soviet diplomacy invariably maintained the initiative during negotiations with former allies on various aspects of a peace settlement in Eastern Europe.
The signing by the Soviet Union of bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (with Czechoslovakia in 1943, with Poland and Yugoslavia in 1945, with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 1948) finally formalized the contours of these paternalistic relationships. However, the immediate formation of the Soviet bloc did not occur so rapidly.
Moreover, the conference in San Francisco in April 1945 adopted the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe,” where the USSR, USA and Great Britain equally committed themselves to supporting democratic changes in all countries liberated from the Nazis, guaranteeing freedom of choice, for their further development. Over the next two years, the USSR strove to strictly follow the proclaimed course and not force the geopolitical split of the continent. Real influence in the Eastern European region, based on the military presence and authority of the liberating power, allowed the Soviet government to repeatedly make demarches in order to demonstrate its respect for the sovereignty of these countries.
Stalin's unusual flexibility even extended to the holy of holies—the ideological realm. With the full support of the highest party leadership, academician E. Varga formulated in 1946 the concept of “democracy of a new type.” It was based on the concept of democratic socialism, built taking into account national specifics in countries liberated from fascism. The idea of "people's democracy" - social order, combining the principles of social justice, parliamentary democracy and individual freedom - was indeed extremely popular then in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was considered by many political forces as a “third way”, an alternative to individualistic Americanized capitalism and Soviet-style totalitarian socialism.
The international situation around the Eastern European countries began to change in mid-1946. At the Paris Peace Conference in August 1946, the American and British delegations began active attempts to intervene in the process of forming new government bodies in Bulgaria and Romania, as well as in the establishment of special judicial structures for international control over the observance of human rights in the countries of the former Hitlerite bloc. The USSR resolutely opposed such proposals, justifying its position by observing the principle of sovereignty of the Eastern European powers. The aggravation of relations between the victorious countries became especially obvious at the III and IV sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at the end of 1946 - beginning of 1947 and devoted to resolving issues of borders in post-war Europe and the fate of Germany.
In March 1947, Truman's presidential address proclaimed a new US foreign policy doctrine. The American leadership announced its readiness to support all “free peoples” in resisting external pressure and, most importantly, the communist threat in any form. Truman also stated that the United States is obliged to lead the entire “free world” in the fight against already established totalitarian regimes that undermine the foundations of international law and order.
The proclamation of the “Truman Doctrine,” which declared the beginning of a crusade against communism, marked the beginning of an open struggle between the superpowers for geopolitical influence anywhere globe. Eastern European countries felt a change in the international situation already in the summer of 1947. During this period, negotiations took place on the terms of providing economic assistance from the United States to European countries under the Marshall Plan. The Soviet leadership not only resolutely rejected the possibility of such cooperation, but also issued an ultimatum demanding that Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had shown obvious interest, refuse to participate in the project.
The remaining countries of the Eastern European region prudently held preliminary consultations with Moscow and responded to the American proposals with a “voluntary and decisive refusal.” The USSR offered generous compensation in the form of preferential supplies of raw materials and food. But the very possibility of a geopolitical reorientation in Eastern Europe had to be eradicated, that is, to ensure monopoly power in these countries for the communist parties.
Education The formation of pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern European countries followed a similar scenario. The first step on this path was the consolidation of the Soviet course of the communist parties of the national democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.” The Romanian Communist Party was the first to make the corresponding decision - back in October 1945, the RCP was the weakest politically of the Eastern European communist parties and was not connected with the mass Resistance movement.
The leadership of the party, which was dominated by representatives of national minorities, was disorganized by the conflict between its leader G. Gheorghiu-Dej and representatives of the Moscow Buppe of Romanian communists A. Pauker and V. Luca. In addition, Georgiu-Deja brought charges of complicity with the occupiers against the Secretary of the Party Central Committee S. Foris, who was arrested after the arrival of Soviet troops and hanged without a court decision. The adoption of the radical program was associated with an attempt to gain additional support from the Soviet leadership and did not correspond to the political situation in the country.
In most countries of the Eastern European region, the decision to transition to the socialist stage of social transformation was made by the leadership of the communist parties already in 1946 and was not associated with a radical restructuring of the highest echelons of government. In April, the Plenum of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted a corresponding decision, and in September, the Third Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In October 1946, after elections in Bulgaria, the Dimitrov government came to power, declaring the same goal; in November, the newly formed bloc of Polish parties PPR and PPS (“Democratic Bloc”) announced a socialist orientation.
In all these cases, the consolidation of the course towards socialist construction did not lead to an escalation of political violence and the inculcation of communist ideology. On the contrary, the idea of socialist construction was supported by a wide range of left-of-center forces and aroused confidence among a wide variety of segments of the population. For them, socialism was not yet associated with the Soviet experience. The communist parties themselves successfully used bloc tactics during these months.
Coalitions involving communists, social democrats and their allies, as a rule, received an obvious advantage during the first democratic elections - in May 1946 in Czechoslovakia, in October 1946 in Bulgaria, in January 1947 - in Poland, in August 1947 - in Hungary. The only exceptions were Yugoslavia and Albania, where, on the crest of the liberation movement, pro-communist forces came to power in the first post-war months.
In 1947, the new center-left governments, using the already open support of the Soviet military administration and relying on state security agencies created under the control of the Soviet intelligence services based on communist cadres, provoked a series of political conflicts that led to the defeat of the peasant and liberal democratic Yartiy. Political trials took place against the leaders of the Hungarian PMSH Z. Tildy, the Polish People's Party Nikolajczyk, the Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union N. Petkov, the Romanian Ceranist Party A. Alexandrescu, the Slovak President Tiso and the leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party that supported him. In Romania, this process coincided with the final liquidation of the monarchical system. Despite King Michael’s demonstrative loyalty to the USSR, he was accused of “seeking support among Western imperialist circles” and expelled from the country.
A logical continuation of the defeat of the democratic opposition was the organizational merger of the communist and social democratic parties with the subsequent discrediting and, subsequently, the destruction of the leaders of social democracy. In February 1948, the Romanian Workers' Party was formed on the basis of the RCP and SDPR. In May 1948, after the political purge of the leadership of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, it merged with the BCP. A month later in Hungary, the CPSU and SDPV were united into the Hungarian Working People's Party. At the same time, Czechoslovak communists and social democrats united into a single party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In December 1948, the gradual unification of the PPS and PPR ended with the formation of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). At the same time, in most countries in the region, the multiparty system was not formally eliminated.
So, by 1948-1949. In almost all countries of Eastern Europe, the political hegemony of communist forces became obvious. The socialist system also received legal recognition. In April 1948, the Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic was adopted, proclaiming a course towards building the foundations of socialism. On May 9 of the same year, a constitution of this kind was adopted in Czechoslovakia. In 1948, the course towards socialist construction was consolidated by the V Congress of the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party, and in Hungary the beginning of socialist transformations was proclaimed in the constitution adopted in August 1949. Only in Poland was the socialist constitution adopted a little later - in 1952, but already the “Small Constitution” of 1947 established the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as the form of the Polish state and the basis of the social order.
All constitutional acts of the late 40s - early 50s. were based on a similar legal doctrine. They consolidated the principle of democracy and the class basis of the “state of workers and toiling peasants.” The socialist constitutional and legal doctrine denied the principle of separation of powers. In the system of state power, the “omnipotence of the Soviets” was proclaimed. Local Councils became “bodies of unified state power”, responsible for implementing acts of the central authorities on their territory. Executive bodies of power were formed from the composition of Councils at all levels. Executive committees, as a rule, acted according to the principle of double subordination: to a higher governing body and the corresponding Council. As a result, a rigid power hierarchy took shape, supervised by party bodies.
While maintaining the principle of popular sovereignty (democracy) in the socialist constitutional and legal doctrine, the concept of “people” was narrowed to a separate social group - the “working people”. This group was declared the supreme subject of legal relations, the true bearer of sovereignty. The individual legal personality of the person was actually denied. The individual was viewed as an organic, integral part of society, and its legal status as derived from the status of a collective social and legal subject (“working people” or “exploiting classes”).
The most important criterion for maintaining the legal status of an individual became political loyalty, which was viewed as recognition of the priority of the interests of the people over individual, selfish interests. This approach opened the way for the deployment of large-scale political repressions. Those persons who not only carry out certain “anti-national actions”, but also simply do not share the prevailing ideological postulates could also be declared “enemies of the people”. The political revolution that took place in Eastern European countries in 1947-1948 strengthened the influence of the USSR in the region, but did not yet make it overwhelming.
In the victorious communist parties, in addition to the “Moscow” wing - that part of the communists who went through the school of the Comintern and possessed precisely the Soviet vision of socialism, an influential “national” wing remained, focused on the ideas of national sovereignty and equality in relations with the “big brother” ( which, however, did not prevent many representatives of the idea of “national socialism” from being more than consistent and rigid supporters of totalitarian statehood). To support the “correct” political course of the young communist regimes of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership took a number of energetic measures. The most important of them was the formation of a new international communist organization - the successor of the Comintern.
The idea of creating a coordination center for the international communist and labor movement arose in Moscow even before the start of active confrontation in the West. Therefore, initially the Soviet leadership took a very cautious position, trying to maintain the image of an equal partner of the Eastern European countries. In the spring of 1947, Stalin invited the Polish leader W. Gomulka to take the initiative to create a joint information periodical for several communist parties. But already in the summer of the same year, during the preparatory work, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took a much tougher position. The idea of constructive dialogue between different currents of the international labor movement was replaced by the desire to create a platform for criticism of “non-Marxist theories of the peaceful transition to socialism”, the struggle against the “dangerous enthusiasm for parliamentarism” and other manifestations of “revisionism”.
In the same vein, a meeting of delegations of the communist parties of the USSR, France, Italy and Eastern European states was held in September 1947 in the Polish city of Szklarska Poreba. The Soviet delegation, led by A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov, actively supported the most harsh speeches about the “exacerbation of the class struggle” and the need for a corresponding adjustment of the course of the communist parties. This position was expressed by V. Gomulka, the leaders of the Bulgarian and Hungarian delegations V. Chervenkov and J. Revai, as well as the Secretary of the Communist Party of Human Rights R. Slansky. The speeches of the Romanian leader G. Gheorgheu-Dej and the Yugoslav representatives M. Djilas and E. Cardel turned out to be more restrained.
Moscow politicians were even less interested in the position of the French and Italian communists, who advocated maintaining the course of consolidating all left forces in the fight against “American imperialism.” At the same time, none of the speakers proposed strengthening the political and organizational coordination of the international communist movement - they were talking about the exchange of “internal information” and opinions. A surprise for the meeting participants was Zhdanov’s final report, where, contrary to the initial agenda, the emphasis was shifted to political tasks common to all communist parties and the conclusion was made about the advisability of creating a permanent coordination center.
As a result, the meeting in Szklarska Poreba decided to create a Communist Information Bureau. True, remembering all the vicissitudes that accompanied the struggle with the Trotskyist-Zinoviev and Bukharin leadership of the old Comintern, and not wanting to receive a new opposition in the person of the Cominform in the struggle for autocracy in the communist movement, Stalin extremely narrowed the field of activity of the new organization. The Cominform was supposed to be only a political platform for the leadership of the P(b) to present the “correct vision of the ways to build socialism.”
In accordance with the proven political recipes of the 20s. The Kremlin tried, first of all, to discover a potential enemy among its new allies and roughly punish the “disobedient” one. Judging by the documents of the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, W. Gomulka was initially considered for this role, who recklessly spoke at a meeting in Szklarska Poreba against the creation of a political coordination center instead of the planned joint printed publication. However, the “Polish problem” was soon overshadowed by a more acute conflict with the Yugoslav leadership. Gomułka, without further ado, was removed from the post of General Secretary of the PPR in 1948 and replaced by B. Bierut, who was more loyal to the Kremlin.
Yugoslavia, at first glance, of all the Eastern European countries, provided the least grounds for ideological exposure and political confrontation. Since the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has become the most influential force in the country, and its leader Joseph Broz Tito has become a national hero. Since January 1946, a one-party system was legally enshrined in Yugoslavia, and the implementation of broad programs for the nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture began. Forced industrialization, carried out according to the Soviet model, was considered as a strategic line for the development of the national economy and the social structure of society. The authority of the USSR in Yugoslavia during these years was indisputable.
The first reason for disagreements to arise between the Soviet and Yugoslav leadership was the negotiations on the disputed territory of Trieste in 1946. Stalin, not wanting to aggravate relations with the Western powers at that time, supported plans for a compromise settlement of this problem. In Yugoslavia this was considered a betrayal of the interests of an ally. Disagreements also arose on the issue of the participation of the USSR in the restoration and development of the Yugoslav mining industry. The Soviet government was ready to finance half of the costs, but the Yugoslav side insisted on full financing from the USSR, contributing only the cost of minerals as its share.
As a result, economic assistance to the USSR was reduced only to supplies, equipment and dispatch of specialists. But the real reason for the conflict was political. More and more irritation in Moscow was caused by the desire of the Yugoslav leadership to present their country as a “special” ally of the USSR, more significant and influential than all other members of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia considered the entire Balkan region as its zone of direct influence, and Albania as a potential member of the Yugoslav federation. The paternalistic and not always respectful style of relations on the part of Soviet politicians and economic specialists, in turn, caused discontent in Belgrade. It intensified to a particular extent after the start in 1947 of a large-scale operation by the Soviet intelligence services to recruit agents in Yugoslavia and create an intelligence network there.
From mid-1947, relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia began to rapidly deteriorate. Official Moscow reacted sharply to the joint statement of the governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria dated August 1, 1947 on the initialing (coordination) of a treaty of friendship and cooperation. This decision not only was not agreed upon with the Soviet government, but also preceded the ratification of the peace treaty between Bulgaria and the leading countries anti-Hitler coalition. Under pressure from Moscow, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders then admitted a “mistake.” But already in the fall of 1947, the Albanian question became a stumbling block in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Taking advantage of differences in the Albanian government, in November Yugoslavia brought accusations of unfriendly actions to the leadership of this country.
The criticism mainly concerned the Minister of Economy N. Spiru, who headed the pro-Soviet wing of the Albanian government. Soon Spiru committed suicide, and the Yugoslav leadership, ahead of a possible reaction from the Kremlin, itself initiated a discussion of the issue of the fate of Albania in Moscow. The negotiations that took place in December-January only temporarily reduced the intensity of the confrontation. Stalin explicitly hinted that in the future the accession of Albania to the Yugoslav Federation could become quite real. But Tito’s demands for the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albanian territory were harshly rejected. The denouement came in January 1948 after the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leadership unveiled plans to deepen Balkan integration.
This project received the harshest assessment in the Soviet official press. At the beginning of February, the “rebels” were summoned to Moscow. Bulgarian leader G. Dimitrov hastened to abandon his previous intentions, but the reaction of official Belgrade turned out to be more restrained. Tito refused to personally go to the “public flogging”, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, after the report of Djilas and Kardel, who returned from Moscow, decided to abandon plans for Balkan integration, but to increase diplomatic pressure on Albania. On March 1, another meeting of the Central Committee of the Yugoslavia took place, at which very harsh criticism of the position of the Soviet leadership was voiced. Moscow's response was the decision made on March 18 to withdraw all Soviet specialists from Yugoslavia.
On March 27, 1948, Stalin sent a personal letter to J. Tito, which summarized the accusations brought against the Yugoslav side (however, it is significant that the leaders of the communist parties of other Cominform member countries also received copies of it). The contents of the letter show the real reason for the break with Yugoslavia - the desire of the Soviet leadership to clearly show how “socialism should not be built.” Tito and his associates were reproached for criticizing the universality of the historical experience of the USSR, dissolving the Communist Party in the Popular Front, abandoning the class struggle, and patronizing capitalist elements in the economy.
In fact, these reproaches had nothing to do with the internal problems of Yugoslavia - it was chosen as a target only because of its excessive willfulness. But the leaders of other communist parties, invited to participate in the public “exposure” of the “criminal Tito clique,” were forced to officially admit the criminality of the very attempt to find other ways to build socialism.
On May 4, 1948, Stalin sent a new letter to Tito with an invitation to the second meeting of the Cominform and a lengthy presentation of his vision of the principles of the “correct” construction of the foundations of socialism. It was about the universality of the Soviet model of social transformation, the inevitability of an intensification of the class struggle at the stage of building the foundations of socialism and, as a consequence, the uncontested dictatorship of the proletariat, the political monopoly of communist parties, the irreconcilable struggle with other political forces and “non-labor elements”, the priority programs of accelerated industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. Tito, naturally, did not respond to this invitation, and Soviet-Yugoslav relations were actually severed.
At the second meeting of the Cominform in June 1948, formally devoted to the Yugoslav question, the ideological and political foundations of the socialist camp were finally consolidated, including the right of the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of other socialist countries and recognition of the universality of the Soviet model of socialism. The internal development of the countries of Eastern Europe now took place under the strict control of the USSR. The creation in 1949 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which assumed the functions of coordinating the economic integration of socialist countries, and later (in 1955) of the military-political bloc the Warsaw Pact Organization, completed the formation of the socialist camp.
Monina Elena.
At the origins of the socialist community.
The history of the emergence in the mid and second half of the 1940s of the “socialist camp”, renamed the “socialist commonwealth”, was the subject of intense falsifications of communist regimes. This was especially true of the portrayal of the core factor in the formation of the “camp-commonwealth” relations between the USSR and Eastern European countries. Their nature was displayed completely distorted.
The Soviet historiography of this problem is not at all great. Why?
1. A striking gap between the slogan’s interpretation of history and historical reality.
2. Complete absence of a real source base.
At the origins of the concept of the socialist camp. The October Revolution was carried out under the slogans of unleashing a world socialist revolution. The focus on world revolution continued even after it became clear that European countries would not follow Russia’s example. Hitler's attack on the USSR posed a new externally political task for its leadership - the creation of a broad anti-fascist coalition = "change in the positions of the Comintern: (main) = "The USSR is not going to impose its socialist system on anyone + tried to pursue a differentiated course in relation to individual countries and groups of countries in depending on their position and the balance of forces in each of them and in the international arena.
After the turning point in WW2, the Soviet leadership decided to dissolve the Comintern = “The USSR sought to remove all the fears of the Western powers on the way to strengthening cooperation with them.
This step by Stalin was the first organizational measure on the path to more concrete formation of plans for a post-war settlement. It was obvious that the system of states that emerged as a result of WW1 in Europe would continue after WW2=”a severe limitation.
The Comintern was formally dissolved = "the process of the formation of the concept of the "socialist camp" + the beginning of its implementation. The problem was its theoretical justification; It is based on the idea of the onset of stage 2 of the crisis of capitalism. At the same time, the Soviet leadership resolutely opposed Western plans, which were viewed in Moscow as contrary to the interests of the USSR (capable of preventing the spread of the “sphere of socialism” to other countries) = “the expectation that in the Eastern European states it would be possible to provide conditions for the communists to come to power, or establishing regimes in which they would play a significant role = "in this regard, the main problem =" Poland and Yugoslavia: what political regime will be established in these countries after liberation from fascist occupation. The struggle on these issues until the summer of 1944 was of a diplomatic nature, but when Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR, the situation changed. The military factor came into force.
Phenomena that received the political and propaganda name in Soviet literature as the “liberation mission of the Soviet armed forces"was complex. On the one hand, the majority of soldiers and officers of the Soviet armed forces sincerely believed that they were bringing liberation from the fascist yoke to the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, and significant sections of the population of these countries greeted the Soviet troops as liberators. But this is only part of the truth. After all, along with the Red Army, its political system began to go beyond the borders of the USSR. The liberation mission was accompanied by the rise to power of the communist parties. Soviet punitive agencies followed the troops. The shadow of totalitarianism immediately hung over the political system of the just emerging “people's democracy.”
The concept of the socialist camp was realized in the conclusion of treaties of friendship and post-war cooperation. Already at the turn of war and peace, one can state on the world stage a group of countries that essentially became a real military-political bloc. The basis of the relationship is the relationship between the communist parties and the USSR.
The emergence of “people's power” in Poland.
The events in Poland are indicative from this point of view. The rapid development of offensive operations of the Soviet armed forces raised the question: “Who will come to power in Poland at the time of its liberation?”
There are 2 camps within the country:
civil and military structures representing the Polish exile government;
forces associated with the Home Radova Narodova - dominant PRP (Polish Workers' Party).
Lack of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Polish governments,
The emigrant government was recognized by England and the USA =” hence the international resonance.
The USSR acted in relation to P using the method of fait accompli, while trying not to irritate its Western allies too much. For the PCNO (Polish Committee of National Liberation) created on July 21, 1944, Stalin personally considered candidates for future members.
The most important events related to the decision of the post-war fate of Poland were the visit of Mikolajczyk (premier of the Polish émigré government) to Moscow and the Warsaw Uprising. M wanted to negotiate with the government of the USSR only about the settlement of joint*[Soviet(?)] relations. Stalin insisted that the PKNO and the Polish émigré government must first come to an agreement among themselves. In his opinion, only on this basis was it possible for representatives of the emigrant government to participate in the implementation of Soviet-Polish relations. The negotiations ended without result. During M's visit to Moscow, Deligatur* and the command of the Home Army raised an uprising in Warsaw.
This decision is based on 2 factors:
1) creation of the PKNO and the beginning of its activities in the liberated territory,
2) the rapid approach of Soviet troops to Warsaw.
Goal: to force the USSR to recognize the Polish government in exile as the legal representation of the Polish people.
In historiography, there are 2 approaches: 1) (Western historians) Soviet troops could have liberated Warsaw in August 1944 and only political motives forced Stalin to stop the offensive; 2) (Soviet military leaders) the spacecraft units that reached the Vistula, weakened by offensive operations, could not liberate the Polish capital immediately, but only after lengthy preparation.
It seems that priority still belonged to decisions made not at military headquarters, but in the Kremlin and based on political considerations. A sharp tightening of the new government's policy towards its opponents occurred in October 1944. The main factor - 2 months of the existence of the Lublin committee showed that a significant part of the underground associated with the Polish government in London did not intend to stop its activities, despite the order of the authorities. The fragility of the new government and its lack of broad support in society (the restrained attitude of the majority of the Polish peasantry towards the implementation of the PCNO decree on agrarian reform) became increasingly obvious.
The moment of highest tension was mid-October 1944, when Mikolajczyk, who sought to find a formula for a compromise with the Lublin committee, resigned. With his departure, the last real hopes for the participation of the exile government in deciding the fate of the country disappeared. Arushevsky's new cabinet was forced to limit itself to official protests against decisions concerning Poland made without his knowledge.
In the conditions of the division of Europe by the great powers into spheres of influence, the foundations of which were laid even before Yalta and Potsdam, Poland was part of the zone of interests of the USSR. Therefore, despite all the opportunistic fluctuations in the political line of the Soviet government, its plans did not include the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Polish government that existed before April 43. Thus, P became a country in which external factors played a decisive role in deciding who would come to power at the time of liberation from fascist occupation.
A story that was left behind the scenes of diplomacy.
Until recently, the problems of Soviet-Romanian relations were considered largely settled, since the thesis about “a consistently ascending line of development of friendly relations between the USSR and Romania after WW2” did not cause disagreement among pro-Marxist-minded historians.
The 1989 revolution in Romania put on the agenda the question of the origins that predetermined the country’s development in the direction of “building socialism.”
The starting point, according to Havel, should be sought in the processes of political reorganization that took place in Russia in 44–47 years, carried out under the auspices of the USSR.
On September 12, 1944, in Moscow, Russia signed an armistice act with the 3 allied states. As part of the agreement, to monitor the implementation of the obligations imposed on R, the Allied Control Commission (UCC) was established, operating under the leadership of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. Term of office - until the entry into force of the peace treaty between Russia and the UN. But! With the approval of the Western allies, Stalinism gave itself a free hand in Russia, exercising not only control over state power and public life of the country, but also directly leading the Romanian Communist Party. The role of the Soviet factor increased in the development of internal processes of the policy of transformation from the end of 1944. King Michael tried to change this situation by turning to Roosevelt with an accusation against the USSR regarding its interference in the internal affairs of Romania. The hopes of the Romanian ruling circles for receiving support from the Western powers dried up when it became known about the joint agreements of the leaders of the allied states at the Yalta Conference. The USSR, in turn, brought to the attention of King Mihai its demands for the removal of Prime Minister Radescu and the approval of a new government led by the representative of the People's Democratic Front, Petru Groza.
On March 6, 1945, Mihai was forced to approve the NDF government. The village was waiting for land reform, and the Groza government passed a law on its implementation based on the radical expropriation of landowners' lands. The USSR responded by restoring the Romanian administration in Transylvania and even awarded King Mihai the highest Soviet order of victory for Romania’s contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. In opposition circles (National Lib and Nationalist parties), as relations between the allies worsened, the hope grew that the United States and Great Britain would not give up Russia so easily. The London meeting, which ended in vain, left the Romanian question open. At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministries of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in December 1945, Stalin agreed to a compromise decision to give the Romanian king and the Groza cabinet recommendations to include in the government one member from the opposition parties and to quickly prepare free party elections.
Example P shows that even in the first period, when hopes remained for the implementation of the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, the formation of a new regime took place under the full control of the Soviet* administration.
The winners did not consider it necessary to take care of the constitutional and legal formalization of the most important state act, changing the very system of supreme power: the abdication of King Michael was not carried through parliament during an emergency session of the Chamber of Deputies. Only in the parliamentary report for January 20, 1948 did information appear about the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies held on December 30, 1947, at which Groza read out the document on Mihai’s abdication of the throne, and the deputies were presented with a draft law on the proclamation of a republic in the Republic.
The country has entered a new path in its history. December 1989 showed what this led to.
From unbreakable friendship to merciless struggle.
Among the Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia was the first where a regime emerged entirely under the leadership of communists. Moreover, it did not arise after the entry of Soviet troops. By the time KA units entered the South in September 1944, this regime already had a significant path behind it as a kind of rebel statehood. With the success of the People's Liberation Movement, the revolutionary statehood received increasingly clear outlines, and on November 29, 1943 it was constituted.
The relations that developed between the South and the USSR were the first practical embodiment of the model of relations that then began to form between the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp.
This system included 3 components:
1) the fundamental unity of the socio-political goals of the regime that existed in the USSR and the communist parties in Eastern European countries; 2) partial discrepancy between some specific interests of each of the parties - they were limited in their manifestations; 3) hierarchical relations within the camp: the USSR is the leading center.
The relationship between the socialist camp* and the Yu is characterized by a strong manifestation of one factor, because the KPO, more than other Eastern European communist parties, gravitated towards the then Soviet model. This could not be disrupted by the conclusion of an agreement in November 1944 between the new Yugoslav and emigrant governments, as a result of which a united Yugoslav government was formed in March 1945 with the participation of several emigrant representatives. But already at the elections to the assembly on November 11, 1945, these figures were completely eliminated from political life countries.
The political and ideological monopoly of the regime was combined with measures establishing a similar monopoly in the socio-economic sphere. In general, Yu gained a reputation as the No. 1 Soviet ally.
At the same time, there was also a second component in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Moscow demanded more flexible tactics from the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, taking into account not only the situation in the South, but also the Soviet policy of strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition. Everything was absorbed by the 3rd factor - the question of Trieste, which previously belonged to Italy, but then Yu made claims on it, the USSR supported Yu, but at the same time approached this problem within the framework of its global policy.
The hierarchical nature of relations in the socialist camp was to some extent even beneficial to Yu, since Belgrade often appealed to Moscow in case of its claims against other countries. The Yugoslavs had a special patronizing role in Albania. Moscow, in general, supported the emerging relations between A and S (between the USSR and A through S). However, as direct Soviet-Albanian cooperation was established, the Yugoslav side began to show concern about the possibility of the emergence of a serious counterbalance to A’s orientation toward Yu. After all, Yu planned to “swallow” A.
After receiving formal approval of this project, on January 19, 1947, Yu began implementing a plan to station its troops in A.
Two versions: 1) (Yugoslav historians) A was the initiator of the deployment of Yugoslav troops, asking Yu about it; 2) (modern point of view) Tito’s plan at the turn of 47-48 to strengthen the position of Yu in A.
This decision was made without consultation with Moscow=” Moscow responded with a sharp telegram. However, Moscow did not limit itself to Tito’s complete retreat and summoned the Yugoslavs to an informal meeting in Moscow, also inviting the Bulgarians. Protocols were signed with obligations to strictly observe mutual consultations on foreign policy issues. As for Yugoslav-Albanian relations, the Kremlin master spoke in favor of the full rapprochement of Yu and A, and Stalin also raised the question of first forming a federation of Yu and Bulgaria, and then accessing A as the 3rd member. Yu deviated from a direct answer, and upon returning from Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it was decided not to agree to a federation with B. The Kremlin’s reaction surpassed all previous ones. The Soviet government notified Belgrade, considers such actions as an act of distrust towards Soviet workers in the South and, in view of this, gave orders to recall all Soviet workers from the South.
The direct conflict began to quickly escalate on the Soviet side. The USSR accused Belgrade of revising the provisions of Marxism-Leninism. In an effort to break the Yugoslav leadership, Moscow involved in its efforts the entire structure of the socialist camp it controlled: the Cominform, the Eastern European people's democracies. During April 1948, the governing bodies of all five fraternal powers expressed solidarity with the Soviet position, without finding out anything from the Yugoslavs. The USSR used this conflict as a precedent for tightening the screws more in relation to its Eastern European charges. At a meeting of the Cominform, which took place without the participation of the Yugoslavs, they were declared apostates, and the decision to eliminate them was the result of the logic of subordination to Moscow, an inevitable consequence of the very model of the socialist camp.
Continuation.
(Abridged version).
Kuznetsova Elena.
Czechoslovakia.
WW2 entered its final stage, the head of the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad, E. Benes, the government in exile had to ensure the implementation of 2 main tasks:
Restoration of the Czechoslovak state within pre-Munich borders;
Creation of foreign policy guarantees against the German threat through an alliance with the USSR.
The specificity of solving these problems was that Benes and his supporters, who had already suffered defeat in the days of Munich, were terribly afraid of Germany, deeply distrusted the Big Three countries and felt their own insignificance in the political game of the great powers = "these conditions pushed Ch into the arms of Stalin and resulted in the conclusion on December 12, 1943 of a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the USSR.
“From now on, the foreign policies of both countries must be coordinated.”
The Czech Republic had the most advantageous positions among the Central European countries; it was enough for the USSR to have a number of states on its borders, linked to it by alliance treaties. But this model began to crumble already at the end of 44, when, as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops, the liberation of Ch from the fascist occupation began: with the active participation of the Soviet military administration, authorities and people's committees headed by communists were created.
At the beginning of November 1944, rallies organized by communists were held in the cities and villages of Transcarpathia, at which resolutions and appeals to the Soviet government were adopted asking for “reunification with Soviet Ukraine.”
By exchanging letters between Stalin and Benes, the problem of Transcarpathia in relations between the two states was actually resolved. Legal formalization was delayed until the end of the war. The agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the accession of Transcarpathia to the USSR was signed in Moscow on June 29, 1945.
In July 1947, Stalin, contrary to the desire of Benes and the majority of members of the Czech government to participate in the Marshall Plan, rudely imposed a ban on participation. Thus, the Kremlin clearly demonstrated who really determines Ch.’s policy.
The prestige of the USSR among the broad masses was falling. For some time it was possible to raise it in connection with grain supplies from the USSR - in fact, this was payment for Ch’s non-participation in the Marshall Plan.
In the fall of 1947, when it became clear to almost everyone that “Day X” of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia was close, American diplomats in Prague sounded the alarm and asked Washington to do at least something in favor of the Czech democratic forces. At the initiative of the US Ambassador to China, the State Department surprisingly quickly prepared drafts of 2 agreements, on economics and culture, but it was too late.
On February 24, 1948, a general strike was held throughout the republic, organized by a congress of factory councils. February 25 - committees completely control the situation in the country. Finally broken, Benes agreed to the resignation of 12 ministers and signed decrees appointing a new Gottwald cabinet, consisting of communists and their supporters in other parties and public organizations.
The Soviet Empire already demanded in 1947 the unification of political, social, economic, that is, systemic, and Ch was still not unified, remaining a weak link in the camp of “peace, democracy and socialism.”
Thus, February 48 was the conclusion of the absorption of Ch by the Soviet bloc.
Bulgaria.
The situation in B by August - September 1944 was characterized by significant radicalization of the masses under the influence of events on the Eastern Front. The victories of the spacecraft and its entry into the borders of B significantly strengthened Russophile sentiments in society, hopes for a break with G, and fundamental changes in the country.
History B indicates that the course taken by the Communist Party in the autumn of 1947 to intensify the revolutionary process turned on the mechanism and quite quickly stimulated a turn to the Stalinist model of socialism. This process can essentially be regarded as a rapid transition from attempts to modernize society to preparing conditions for its revolutionary transformation, to rapid adaptation and assimilation of the universal Soviet model of socialism in Bulgarian conditions.
Turning to the study of the transition period of Bulgarian society in the 2nd half of the 40s allows us to state a relatively high degree of its predisposition to authoritarian regimes of the left type, which largely determined the prospects for the adoption of the Soviet (Stalinist) model of socialism in the country.
In this situation, the temptation to perceive the Soviet experience of building socialism, which could, as it was believed, give a gain in time, sharply increased, in contrast to the evolutionary parliamentary path of transition.
In addition, the special perception of Russia by the Bulgarians, for whom the example of the “big brother” was strengthened by a sense of gratitude, was of no small importance.
Hungary.
When in the summer of 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the question of the prospects for the democratic development of the Eastern Europe countries under Soviet occupation was raised, Stalin assured his recent allies in the anti-Hitler coalition: “We do not and cannot have such goals as imposing our will and our regime on the people E, those who want help from us. We would change our ideology, we would disorganize the ranks of our party, if we did not respect small nations, if we did not respect their rights, their independence, if we tried to interfere in their internal affairs.”
Numerous facts of that time testify to the strengthening of anti-German tendencies in the public consciousness of Hungarians. However, the role of Soviet culture in this regard was not limited to the role of a counterweight to pro-German orientations.
The new balance of power in the international arena after 1945 and the strengthening of the USSR’s position in the region made the task of becoming familiar with Soviet culture even more urgent.
“Much in this world depends on the superpowers... Every nation, if it wants to preserve itself, must take into account the point of view of these countries,” noted the magazine of the Hungarian-Soviet cultural society.
“In any of our actions we cannot ignore the interests of the USSR, which means we cannot do without knowledge of the neighboring power.”
The Soviet side, reacting to the Hungarians’ recognition of cultural cooperation, never forgot about its basic political guidelines: the dissemination of Soviet spiritual products was primarily intended to strengthen the position of the USSR in this country, as well as in other states of the Eastern European region.
Western observers repeatedly pointed out this circumstance in those years: “Communists know how to benefit from the actual achievements of Russian culture in the past in order to increase their own prestige and make the propaganda of their ideology more effective.”
In parallel with the sharp increase in the intensity of Soviet cultural influence, the scale of other, more traditional cultures for Hungary narrowed just as sharply. The corresponding decree banned the showing of modern Western films, the work of societies for cultural relations with Western countries was curtailed, theater repertoires and book publishing plans were revised.
The Sovietization of Hungarian culture meant not only and not so much its Russification, but rather its very definite ideologization.
In September 1947, an important event took place in the Polish town of Szklarska Poreba - a meeting of representatives of the communist parties of the USSR, six Eastern European countries (Yugosl, Bolg, Rum, Hungarian, Pol, Czech) + Fr and It.
At a meeting convened in accordance with the plan of the Soviet leadership, an international communist center was re-created (after the dissolution of the Comintern) - the information bureau of the communist parties.
The documents adopted at the meeting were based on the provisions of Zhdanov’s program report: a thesis was formulated about the formation of 2 camps on the world stage: the camp of imperialism and anti-democracy, on the one hand, and the camp of anti-imperialism and democracy, on the other. The USA and its supporters, Vel and Fr., were dubbed the leading force of imperialism. The main goals of the imperialist camp were recognized as strengthening reactionary regimes and preparing a new imperialist war directed against socialism.
They considered their main task to be the worldwide strengthening of the “anti-imperial and democratic camp” led by the USSR.
The formation of the Information Bureau (Cominform) and the decisions made at the meeting of 9 parties meant a further tightening of the Stalinist line of confrontation with the West, the unification of the Eastern European countries of “people's democracy” under Soviet leadership.
The successful offensive of the spacecraft on all fronts at the end of 44 - beginning of 45, its entry into German territory, while the allies were defeated in the Ardennes, and then remained at the Siegfried Line, determined the undeniable leading role of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition at the final stage war.
At the same time, the USSR's movements to ensure its influence in Central and South-East Europe caused tension in relations with its allies, which was acutely expressed in negotiations to resolve Yugoslav and Polish issues. It was important for the Kremlin to recognize in the international arena the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, formed in Lublin on December 31, 44. On January 4, it was recognized by the USSR and both sides exchanged representatives at the ambassadorial level.
Thus, in Eastern Europe by 49, the Stalinist model of building socialism was strengthened.
XX - early XXI century."
Option 1
A1. For the advanced countries of the world at the beginning of the 20th century. was characterized by a reduction:
1) social expenses2) the number of people employed in the service sector
3) powers of representative authorities
4) the share of agricultural production in the total volume of output
A2. Bank financing of enterprises and participation in their management at the beginning of the 20th century.
testified to:
1) democratization of society 2) transition to mass production
3) formation of financial capital 4) pursuing a policy of social reformism A3. Features of the development of Italy at the beginning of the 20th century:
1) large colonial possessions 2) strong influence of the Catholic Church
3) the predominance of the export of capital over the import
4) the presence of a bipartisan political system
A4. Conservatives and liberals at the beginning of the 20th century. were supporters:
1) revolution 2) social equality
3) omnipotence of the state 4) expansion of suffrage
A5. The Triple Alliance on the eve of the First World War included:
1) Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy 2) England, Austria-Hungary, USA
3) Germany, Russia, France 4) England, France, Russia
A6. By participating in the First World War, Germany sought to:
1) capturing new colonies 2) maintaining dominance at sea
3) the capture of the Bosporus and Dardanelles 4) the liberation of one’s country from invaders
A7. First World War ended:
1)7 November 1917 2) July 18, 19183)3 March 19184) November 11, 1918
A8. The concept of "fascism"most fullycorresponds to the definition:
1) open state terrorist dictatorship
2) one-party political system
3) establishment of press censorship 4) the power of one person
A9. In Great Britain,like
1) a low-cost construction program was implemented
2) the social insurance system has expanded
3) a totalitarian regime has emerged4) exports decreased
A10. The phenomenon called “caudilism” is associated with the peculiarities of political development:
1) India 2) China 3) Turkey 4) Latin America
All. What phenomenon is being discussed in the excerpt from the document?
I was surprised by the calm that reigned there. The artillerymen, who were stationed on the Rhine, calmly looked at the German trains with ammunition that were running on the opposite bank, our pilots flew over the smoking chimneys of the Saar plant without dropping bombs. Obviously, the main concern of the high command was not to harass the enemy.
1) about the Anschluss 2) about the blitzkrieg 3) about the “strange war” 4) about the Resistance movement
laterothers?
1) liberation of Prague 2) the beginning of a radical change
3) Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 4) landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy
A13. The decision to demilitarize and demonopolize Germany after the end of World War II was made at a conference:
A14. Cause of nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
1) the US desire to destroy the population of Japan
2) refusal of the USSR to participate in military operations against Japan
3) the US lacks other technical means to defeat Japan
4) US demonstration of nuclear weapons as a means of putting pressure on other states
A15. US economic assistance to countries fighting against Germany in the years
The Second World War was called:
1) Lend-Lease 2) reparations 3) McCarthyism 4) Marshall Plan
A16. President of the United States in 1961-1963. was:
1) K. Adenauer 2) D. Eisenhower 3) J. Kennedy 4) K. Attlee
A17. The position of the economic theory of Keynesianism:
complete subordination of the economy to the state 2) complete freedom of private enterprise
3) reduction of state social expenditures 4) expansion of social insurance of citizens
A18. What concept does the words from the document illustrate?
The best and most reliable way to make war impossible is... to solve the problem of disarmament... We believe that differences in worldviews should not spoil relations between countries. Close economic and cultural ties must be established between all countries. This will help peoples and statesmen to know each other better and better understand each other.
1) discharge2) " cold war» 3) doctrine of containment 4) policy of appeasement
A19. The reason for the rapid economic growth in Western countries in 1950-1973:
1) the beginning of the Cold War 2) the development of the world trade system
3) competition between East and West
4) the process of disintegration of the economies of European countries
Greece 2) Spain 3) Norway 4) Poland
A21. “Velvet revolutions” in a number of European countries in the late 1980s. led to:
1) elimination of the foundations of totalitarianism 2) nationalization of large enterprises
3) establishing the power of communist parties
4) establishment of a command-administrative system
A22. The countries participating in the meeting in Helsinki in 1975 laid the foundation for the creation of the organization:
1) CMEA 2) NATO 3) UN 4) OSCE
A23. Development of the countries of the Arab-Muslim region at the beginning of the 21st century. characterized by:
1) at a fast pace 2) maintaining traditionalism
3) the establishment of parliamentary democracies 4) the absence of military coups and revolutions
1) liberalization of world trade 2) strengthening of protectionism in the economy
3) introduction of national currency in individual countries
4) formation of the economy,independentfrom other countries
A25. Outstanding architects of the second half of the 20th century:
1) Picasso, Gattuso 2) Camus, Sartre 3) Visconti, de Santis 4) Le Corbusier, Niemeyer
IN 1.Arrange international treaties in chronological order.
A) Munich Treaty B) Maastricht Agreements
B) Treaty of Versailles
D) Treaty on the Limitation of Nuclear Weapons (SALT-1)
AT 2.Arrange the periods of development of society in chronological order.
A) “age of coal and steel” B) industrial revolution
B) post-industrial society D) scientific and technological revolution
B3.What new artistic movements emerged in the second half of the 20th century?
Please indicate two correct answers out of five given.
1) pop art 2) romanticism 3) symbolism 4) impressionism 5) postmodernism
B 4.What features are inherent in Nazi ideology? Please indicate two correct answers out of five given.
1) populism 2) liberalism 3) democracy 4) division of races into “higher” and “lower”
5) recognition of individual interests above the interests of the state
AT 5.Match the date with the event.
date
Event
A) 1919
1) creation of the League of Nations
2) Cuban Missile Crisis
B) 1933
3) the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany
B) 1962
4) unification of Germany
AT 6.
One element of the left column corresponds to one element of the right.
Problem
A country
A) the struggle between Catholics and Protestants
B) deep penetration of the mafia into the state apparatus
B) uneven development of the western and eastern parts of the country
1) Italy
2) Germany
3) Great Britain
4) France
AT 7.Read an excerpt from the document and indicate the author of the memoirs.
All over the country, men and women, forgotten in the political philosophy of government, look to us for guidance on what to do and a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth... I promise a new course for the American people. This is not just a political campaign. This is a call to arms.
Test 38. Final test for the course “Recent history of foreign countries. NI - 9
XX - early XXI century."
Option 2
A1. For the advanced countries of the world at the beginning of the 20th century. was typical:
1) urbanization process 2) republican system 3) industrial revolution
4) increase in the number of people employed in agricultural production
A2. The emergence of banking monopolies at the beginning of the 20th century. testified to:
1) concentration of capital 2) democratization of society 3) implementation of a policy of social reformism
4) creation of a single economic space in Europe
A3. A feature of the development of England at the beginning of the 20th century. was:
1) preservation of landownership 2) strengthening the influence of the Catholic Church
3) acceleration of the pace of economic development4) presence of a two-party political system
A4. Conservatives and liberals at the beginning of the 20th century. advocated:
1) reforms 2) revolution 3) social equality4) omnipotence of the state
A5. The Entente on the eve of the First World War included:
1) Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy2) England, Austria-Hungary, USA
3) Germany, Russia, France4) England, France, Russia
A6. By participating in the First World War, Great Britain sought to:
1) maintaining supremacy at sea2) maintaining its neutrality
3) capture of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits4) liberating your country from invaders
A7. The First World War began:
1) 1 August1914 g. 2)1 September1914 g. 3)1 Martha1915 G. 4) 1 November1915 G.
A8. Totalitarianism is called:
1) waging aggressive wars 2) strengthening the class struggle
3) holding parliamentary elections4) total state control
A9. In France,likein the USA, during the years of economic crisis:
1) unemployment decreased 2) trade unions were dissolved
3) a policy of protectionism was pursued 4) antitrust laws were in effect
A10. The emergence of the concept of “Gandhism” is associated with history:
1) India 2) China 3) Turkey4) Latin America
All. What is the passage from the document talking about?
All night General Eisenhower paced his command trailer, waiting for the first messages...
Finally the first messages began to arrive. They were fragmentary, but they spoke of success.
The commanders of the naval and air forces were satisfied with the course of events, troops landed on all
five bridgeheads. Operation Overlord was a success.
1) about the Anschluss of England 2) about the attack on Poland3) about the opening of a second front4) about the attack on Pearl Harbor
A12. What event happened during World War II?laterothers?
1) creation of an anti-Hitler coalition 2) operation of German troops in the Ardennes
3) atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki4) invasion of German troops into France
A13. The decision to create the UN was made at the conference:
1) Yalta 2) Genoa 3) Tehran 4) Potsdam
A14. The reason for the beginning of a radical change during the Second World War:
1) entry into the war by the United States 2) opening of a second front in Europe 3) refusal of Japan and Italy from an alliance with Germany
4) achieving economic superiority of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition
A15. The concept of “demilitarization” means:
1) disarmament 2) increasing the size of the army 3) punishing war criminals
4) restoration of the activities of various parties
A16. First President of the Fifth Republic in France:
1) K. Adenauer 2) Charles de Gaulle 3) J. Kennedy 4) K. Attlee
A17. The position of the economic theory of neoconservatism:
1) intensification of market competition 2) state regulation of the economy
3) nationalization industrial enterprises 4) completenon-interventionstates into the economy
A18. Which concept is illustrated by the following words?
It was an unusual, unconventional war, carried out mainly in ideological,
political, economic and technological spheres using unprecedentedly tough
non-military and unconventional means.
1) détente 2) expansion 3) integration 4) “cold war”
A19. Cause of the global economic crisis of 1974-1975:
1) depletion of oil reserves in the world 2) exhaustion of opportunities for extensive development
3) providing economic assistance to third world countries
4) the confrontation between two economic systems - socialism and capitalism
A20. After 1945, the socialist system was established in:
1) Romania 2) Finland 3) Mexico 4) India
A21. By the end of the 1980s. the construction of socialism in a number of European countries led to:
1) modernization of the economy 2) development of a market economy 3) economic lag behind developed countries
4) creation of a self-sustaining economic model of the system
A22. In 1957, a number of European countries created an organization:
1)CMEA2) League of NationsZ)NAPHTHA4) "Common Market"
A23. Development of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region at the beginning of the 21st century. characterized by:
1) rapid pace of development 2) the dominance of traditionalism 3) the establishment of totalitarian regimes
4) commitment to the socialist development model
A24. International integration is characterized by a process:
1) isolation from other countries 2) refusal to participate in world trade
3) introduction of a single currency in several countries 4) prohibition of the creation of transnational enterprises
A25. Outstanding film directors of the second half of the 20th century:
1) Gauguin, Cezanne 2) Warhol, Rauschenberg 3) Visconti, de Santis 4) Marquez, Borges
IN 1. Arrange military alliances in the chronological order of their creation.
Provide your answer as a sequence of letter designations for the selected elements.
A) NATO B) Entente C) Warsaw Pact Organization D) Tripartite Pact (“Berlin - Rome - Tokyo”)
AT 2. Arrange the periods of development of society in chronological order.
Provide your answer as a sequence of letter designations for the selected elements.
information society B) industrial society C) industrial revolution
D) industrial-technological revolution
AT 3.What new types of art arose in late XIX-XX V.? Please indicate two correct answers out of five given.
theater 2) engraving 3) airbrushing 4) caricature 5) cinema
AT 4.What features are inherent in fascism? Please indicate two correct answers out of five given. leaderism
democracy 2) multi-party system 3) developed civil society
merging of the state and party apparatus
AT 5.Match date and event
One element of the left column corresponds to one element of the right.
Problem
A country
A) Ulster
B) racial segregation
B) uneven economic development
North and South
1) Italy
2) USA
3) Great Britain
4) France
AT 6.Match the problem to the country.
One element of the left column corresponds to one element of the right.
date
Event
A)1919GB) 1929
B) 1936
1) collapse of Yugoslavia
2) the beginning of the fascist rebellion in Spain
3) signing of the Treaty of Versailles
4) the beginning of the global economic crisis
AT 7. In what year did the event discussed in the excerpt from the document occur?
Spotlights, hustle and bustle, cheering. A group of people had already burst into the border crossing corridor, before the first lattice barrier. Behind them are five embarrassed border guards... Do the GDR border guards realize that this super-protected border is now being violated?.. We move on... The legs move, the mind warns. Detente comes only at the crossroads... Faces laugh, language refuses to obey: madness, madness. The light display shows the time: 0 hours 55 minutes, 6 degrees Celsius.
Answer:
Test 38. Final test for the course “Recent history of foreign countries. NI - 9
XX - early XXI century."
Keys
Option 1 Option 2
A 1.4 A 1.1
A 2.3 A 2.1
A 3.2 A 3.4
A 4.4 A 4.1
A 5.1 A 5.4
A 6.1 A 6.1
A 7.4 A 7.1
A 8.1 A 8.4
A 9.2 A 9.3
A 10.4 A 10.1
A 11.3 A 11.3
A 12.1 A 12.3
A 13.4 A 13.1
A 14.4 A 14.4
A 15.1 A 15.1
A 16.3 A 16.2
A 17.4 A 17.1
A 18.1 A 18.4
A 19.2 A 19.2
A 20.4 A 20.1
A 21.1 A 21.3
A 22.4 A 22.4
A 23.2 A 23.1
A 24.1 A 24.3
A 25.4 A 25.3
B 1. VAGB B 1. BGAV
B 2. BAGV B 2. VBGA
V 3. 1 5 V 3. 3 5
B 4. 1 4 B 4. 1 5
B 5. A1 B3 B2 C 5. A3 B4 B2
AT 6. A3 B1 B2 B6. A3 B2 B1
AT 7. Roosevelt V 7. 1990
After the Second World War, a socialist camp was formed: a number of states, following the example of the USSR, began to build socialism. Since the economic development of these countries, which form a significant part of the world economy, has been determined for more than forty years by actions to build socialism, it is necessary to consider the historical experience of socialist transformations in these countries. We will consider this experience using the example of Eastern European countries, since the transformations in Asian countries and in the Cuban Republic were too specific.
Initially, it was assumed that the new socialist states would exactly follow the path of the Soviet Union, copying the Soviet experience, but much of our experience turned out to be unacceptable for other countries. The main directions of transformation were the same as in the USSR, but their specific manifestation was significantly different, and these differences were determined both by the new historical situation and by the characteristics of the previous economic development of a given country.
Such a departure from the Soviet experience was initially not encouraged; they even tried to suppress it by force. Subsequently, the possibility of a variety of ways to build socialism was recognized.
Two stages of transformation should be distinguished.
At the first stage, “revolutionary transformations in the economy” were carried out, i.e. agrarian reform and nationalization - the basis of the capitalist system - private ownership of the means of production - was eliminated. This was the stage of destruction of the old, on the ruins of which it was planned to build a new one.
The second stage was the construction of a socialist economy, socialist reconstruction, the main components which was supposed to be the industrialization and cooperation of the peasantry.
Let us consider the features of the identified stages of socialist transformations in the countries of Eastern Europe.
1. The nationalization of banks, transport and industry in the Soviet state was carried out in the form of confiscation without recourse
sweeping and was a revolutionary act of liquidation of the bourgeois system. But the new states did not immediately become socialist after the end of the war. At first, a democratic system was established there with the participation of bourgeois parks, a system of “people's democracy”. Only then, as a result of the struggle between bourgeois and socialist forces, did a socialist revolution take place - a transition to the path of building socialism. For example, in Czechoslovakia, such a coup was the events of 1948, when representatives of the bourgeois parties were forced to leave the government, and President Benes resigned. In the first post-war elections in Hungary, the agrarian party, which expressed the interests of large landowners and farmers, won, and the communists received only 17% of the votes in these elections. Only in 1947 did the left bloc led by the communists win.
Naturally, before the socialist revolution there could be no talk of complete nationalization. So far, only enterprises that became German during the war years, enterprises of collaborators and monopolies, have been nationalized. These actions did not yet have a clear anti-capitalist content. Only after the socialist revolution did governments move to nationalize all industry. But at the same time, small enterprises, especially in the field of trade, consumer services and public catering, as a rule, were not nationalized.
For example, in the GDR, enterprises that belonged to the Nazis, as well as those that were part of monopolistic corporations, were initially nationalized. This was seen as a process of denazification that took place in accordance with the Potsdam agreements. The remaining enterprises remained the property of the previous owners. These enterprises, mainly already in the 50s, began to turn into mixed, state-capitalist ones, in accordance with the Leninist theory of state capitalism. The state provided assistance in the post-war restoration and reconstruction of enterprises, allocating monetary and material resources for this purpose.
As is known, in West Germany the post-war renewal of fixed capital was also carried out with the help of the state, but only in the GDR, as a result of such assistance, the state became a co-owner of the enterprise. Such a state-capitalist enterprise was included in the system of state planning and logistics. The capitalist sometimes remained the head of the enterprise, but now he increasingly turned into a state director, and the enterprise gradually turned from a mixed enterprise into a state enterprise.
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A special situation has developed in Poland. By the time of liberation, most of the industry was no longer owned by Polish capitalists. It was not the new government that took away their enterprises, but the Nazi occupation authorities. Therefore, if in other countries the bourgeoisie fought to preserve their property from nationalization, then in Poland they had to seek the return of property taken by the Nazis from the hands of
new state. And in Poland, indeed, a cha-
¦
ethical reprivatization. However, in most cases, the business was not returned to the original owner because it was no longer the same business that he once owned. For example, the zinc plant was converted by the Nazis into an automobile repair shop, and the zinc plant that belonged to the previous owner no longer existed. In other cases, by the time of liberation the enterprise was in ruins and was restored with public funds. Naturally, it remained state-owned.
2 > In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, nationalization was carried out in three stages, and in Hungary - even in five. At first, it had not so much a social as a national character: enterprises of foreign (German) capital and collaborators, i.e., became the property of the state. persons who collaborated with the Nazis.
i- "2. Agrarian reform in countries that have embarked on the path of socialism is usually called the confiscation of land from large landowners with its transfer to peasants. In our country it was carried out in the form of nationalization of land. This feature of the agrarian reform (according to the decree on land) was a consequence of communal land ownership Russian peasants: the Russian peasant was not used to having land in private ownership. In the new countries that had embarked on the path of socialism, nationalization of land was not carried out. Land was taken away from large landowners and sold on preferential terms to the peasants. At the same time, sometimes not all the land was taken away, but only the surplus land in excess of the established norm, and its former owners in some cases received partial compensation.Since large commercial farms were liquidated and small, small-scale and subsistence farms became predominant, the negative consequences of such a reform for agriculture were obvious.
For example, in Hungary, the agrarian reform was directed against the landowners, but not against the kulaks, i.e. large farmers from peasants. It should be noted that the landowners there were no longer landowners for a long time and did not receive feudal rent from the peasants. They rebuilt their farms on capitalist lines and from
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tal farmers differed only in their “social origin”. However, for landowners the maximum land ownership was set at 50 hectares, and for “kulaks” - at 100-150 hectares. This differentiated approach split the agrarian party, which won the post-war elections, and ensured support for the new order from the wealthy elite of the village.
A very high maximum land ownership, 100 hectares, was set in the GDR. Capitalism in agriculture here developed along the “Prussian path”, landownership prevailed, and 70% of rural owners, i.e. the vast majority of peasants owned 17% of the land. The reform was a clear compromise: it did not completely destroy large commercial farms, but at the same time satisfied the land needs of the poorest part of the village.
In Bulgaria, the maximum land ownership was set at just 20 hectares. There were no landowners here. For a long time, Bulgaria was under Turkish rule, so the feudal lords here were replaced by the Turkish administration. When, at the end of the last century, Bulgaria freed itself from Turkish rule with the help of Russian weapons, the land became the property of the peasants. Of course, differentiation of the peasants took place here, but during the agrarian reform, the richest elite of the village lost only 16% of the land, i.e. only 16% of the land exceeded the land holding norm of 20 hectares.
Since private ownership of land was maintained in the new countries, peasants received land confiscated from large landowners not entirely free of charge. True, this fee was most often nominal. For example, in Poland, for land received from the agrarian reform fund, a peasant had to pay in installments over 10-20 years the cost of one harvest from this land.
Thus, in the new countries, “revolutionary transformations in the economy” were of a compromise nature and were carried out much more carefully than in Soviet Russia. The experience of our country was taken into account, which showed that extreme measures lead to the destruction of the economy. There was no stage of “war communism” in the new countries.
In the new countries, “revolutionary transformations in the economy” were of a compromise nature and were carried out much more carefully than in Soviet Russia. The experience of our country was taken into account, which showed that extreme measures lead to the destruction of the economy. There was no stage of “war communism” in the new countries.
The socialist reconstruction of the economy in the new countries differed even more from the similar process in the USSR.
3. The cooperation of the peasantry here had slightly different goals than Soviet collectivization. The real goal of collectivization in the USSR was to obtain savings for industrialization at the expense of the countryside. In new states, it comes to the fore
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Economy of Eastern European countries in 1945-1990.
The program task of building socialism, the socialization of production, was advocated. The transition from individual peasant farms to cooperatives was supposed to ensure the rise of agriculture and facilitate state control over this area of the economy. But if in the USSR communal relations facilitated collectivization, then here it was necessary to move from private to collective ownership of land, and the peasants were reluctant to give their land into public ownership.
Therefore, if our collectivization was carried out in the uniform form of an agricultural artel, then in the new states several types of production cooperatives were developed. In cooperatives of the lowest type, only labor was united, i.e. Basic agricultural work was carried out collectively, and land and other means of production remained privately owned. In the cooperatives of the middle/sh/lyazmlya, other means of production were combined, but part of the income was divided in accordance with the shares of land contributed to the cooperative. This was considered as a purchase of land into cooperative ownership. And only in cooperatives of the highest type were incomes divided according to labor.
Thus, in Hungary, two types of cooperatives were developed: a “production-cooperative group”, where only labor was united, and a “production cooperative”, where the main means of production were combined, but 25% of income was divided in proportion to the contributed shares of land. Here, as a result of attempts to force cooperation on the model of Soviet collectivization, cooperatives fell apart, and cooperation had to be started all over again, abolishing mandatory state supplies and increasing the economic independence of cooperatives.
In the GDR, three types of cooperatives were developed, and even in the highest type of cooperatives, 20% of the income was distributed among land shares.
In Bulgaria, the vast majority of peasants were united in cooperatives even before the Second World War. Here the peasants did not have to prove the advantages of cooperative farming. Therefore, the new government did not build an artificial “ladder” of types of cooperatives, but used traditions and began to reduce existing cooperatives to a single type - “labor farming.”
The cooperation of the peasantry in Poland did not work out at all. It was a country of acute peasant land shortage. The lack of land was the reason for the mass emigration of Polish peasants to America. The peasants received the land confiscated from the landowners from the new government and were very jealous of this land. Therefore, in Poland, production cooperatives united only
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a small part of the peasants. True, these Lminio peasants participated in supply and marketing cooperation, the cooperation that prevailed in our country during the NEP years.
4. Industrialization only in the initial period of the existence of the socialist camp was considered an obligatory part of socialist construction. Later it was assumed that in industrial countries, which included the GDR and Czechoslovakia, there was no need to industrialize. For these countries it was replaced by a more vague concept of socialist industrial reconstruction.
But even where industrialization was carried out, its tasks differed significantly from the tasks of industrialization in the USSR. Our industrialization was carried out to ensure the country's economic independence from the capitalist world and to create a powerful military-industrial potential. Under the new conditions, it was not necessary to ensure the independence of each state from other socialist countries and to create all branches of industry, and this was impossible in relatively small countries with limited resources. It was possible to develop only some industries, receiving the products of the rest from other socialist countries in exchange for their products. And the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union was sufficient to ensure the defense capability of all Warsaw Pact countries. It is known that all these states used Soviet brands of weapons.
True, these adjustments were made only over time, and initially the experience of Soviet industrialization was copied.
Thus, in the GDR they began to create a coal, metallurgical industry and heavy metal-intensive engineering, i.e. industries that did not exist here before, because the coal and ore deposits were located in western Germany. Since there were no coal deposits here, brown coal began to be intensively developed in the GDR. Even metallurgical coke began to be prepared from it. Metallurgical plants were built that used local low-quality, low-metal iron ore, and partly ore from the Soviet Union and coke from Poland.
Only later was it recognized that one should not count on complete economic independence from other socialist countries, that importing metal and coal is more profitable than processing low-grade ore and brown coal using complex and expensive methods or developing metallurgy using imported raw materials and fuel. Therefore, it was decided to limit the development of the coal and metallurgical industries, and to specialize mechanical engineering in non-metal-intensive industries.
336
Economy of Eastern European countries in 1945-1990.
Czechoslovakia consisted of two parts - industrial Czech Republic and Agrarian Slovakia. In accordance with the program for building socialism, it was decided to industrialize Slovakia. Not only were new factories built there, but three and a half hundred existing enterprises were transferred from the Czech Republic to Slovakia. This was explained by the fact that there are many mountain rivers in Slovakia, on which it is profitable to build hydroelectric power stations, and therefore energy-intensive industries were transferred to Slovakia. In Czechoslovakia, like the GDR, they began to hastily create the missing industries, the products of which had previously been imported. t: The most underdeveloped of the countries of Eastern Europe were “Bulgaria and Romania, so industrialization was carried out here in the literal sense of the word - a factory industry was created.
~ In Bulgaria, only 7% of the population was employed in industry. There was almost no heavy industry. The predominant form of industry was handicraft workshops. From the very beginning it was obvious that in this small country it was impossible to create all branches of modern industry, so only those industries for which Bulgaria had favorable conditions were built here. This meant specialization in the food industry (especially in the production of canned vegetables and fruits), electric power (using the energy of mountain rivers), non-ferrous metallurgy (based on deposits of non-ferrous metal ores in the Rhodope Mountains) and only some branches of mechanical engineering (in particular, in the production of some agricultural machines With the development of the international division of labor, these industries, determined by natural conditions, began to be supplemented by others that were no longer associated with this factor: for example, the production of electric cars and motorcycles was mastered, as well as the production of magnetic disks for computers. It was in such countries. In Bulgaria, industrialization brought the most tangible results: by 1985, industry here provided over 60% of national income.
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12 M. Konotopov
Poland and Hungary were not agricultural countries. Poland is already included Russian Empire was a region of textile, coal and metallurgical industries. The textile, metallurgical industries, and some branches of mechanical engineering were also developed in Hungary. As a socialist industrial; In the process of industrialization, the creation of a number of “missing” industries was planned for these countries, as in Soviet industrialization, the emphasis was placed on the creation of new branches of heavy industry. Naturally, this required huge costs. Light industry began to lag behind, and the material standard of living dropped. In Ven-
Section VIII
fii in the early 50s. Over 90% of capital investments were allocated to heavy industry. After recognizing the excesses that had been committed, it was decided to correct the “improportions”, and Hungary even decided to almost abandon the development of heavy industry altogether, limiting itself to light and food industry. 11 industry was paralyzed by conflicting instructions, and in 1953-1954. production did not increase.
Thus, despite significant adjustments to the initial program of socialist reconstruction, administrative methods of management led to large economic losses.
What policy did the post-war USSR pursue towards Eastern Europe and China?
In October 1949, two new states appeared on the political map of the world. After many years civil war On October 1, the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed. And on October 7, the Soviet zone of occupation was transformed into the sovereign German Democratic Republic (GDR). Often these events are presented as a manifestation of communist expansion directed from the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the Kremlin itself then perceived the process of formation of new, socialist states without much enthusiasm. In general, the “communization” of East Germany, Eastern Europe and China was seen as a forced measure caused by the Cold War.
1. Special way
The Soviet leaders of the 1940s were no longer some kind of closed-minded fanatics who wanted to impose the Soviet model on the whole world. They understood very well that European countries were not ready to build socialism under the leadership of local communist parties. In 1945-1946, Stalin and his entourage considered it necessary to place their main emphasis on social-patriotic, but at the same time, non-communist parties. Thus, the centrist patriot E. Beneš, who advocated for a non-Marxist version of socialism (“national socialism”), was considered as the leader of the new Czechoslovakia. Stalin had a similar attitude towards such non-Marxist and “non-left” politicians as O. Lange (Poland), G. Tatarescu (Romania), Z. Tilza (Hungary), J. Paasikivi (Finland).
As for the communist parties, Stalin advocated their reformatting. G. Dimitrov recalls the following Stalinist recommendations: “You need to create a Labor Party (Labor Party) in Bulgaria. Unite your party and other parties of workers (for example, the party of farmers, etc.) into such a party. It is unprofitable to have a Workers' Party and at the same time be called communist. Previously, Marxists had to isolate the working class into a separate labor party. They were in opposition then. Today you are participating in governing the country. You need to unite the working class with other sections of the working people on the basis of a minimum program, and the time for a maximum program will come. The peasants look at the workers' party as someone else's party, and they will look at the workers' party as their own party. I highly recommend doing this. The Labor Party or Workers' and Peasants' Party is suitable for a country like Bulgaria. It will be a people's party."
In essence, Stalin demanded the transformation of the Communist Party into a people's party, that is, a national one, and even presented this as the application of Marxism in modern conditions.
Apparently, in 1945-1946. he tried to develop a model of national socialism in Eastern Europe (not to be confused with Nazism!), which can be roughly reduced to the following - the leading role of the state in the economy and democracy without large capital. Stalin tried in every possible way to avoid “communization.” In May 1946, at a meeting with Polish leaders, he said: “The system established in Poland is democracy, it is a new type of democracy. It has no precedent. Neither Belgian, nor English, nor French democracy can be taken by you as an example and model... Your democracy is special... You do not need the dictatorship of the proletariat because in the current conditions, when large industry has been nationalized and the classes of large capitalists and landowners have disappeared from the political arena, It is enough to create an appropriate regime in industry, raise it, lower prices and give the population more consumer goods, and the situation in society will stabilize. The number of people dissatisfied with the new democratic system will decrease, and you will get closer to socialism without a bloody struggle. The new democracy established in Poland... is its salvation... The regime now established in Poland provides it with maximum prosperity without exploitation of the working people. .". (T.V. Volokitina, G.P. Murashko, A.F. Noskova, T.A. Pokivailova “Moscow and Eastern Europe. The formation of political regimes of the Soviet type. 1949-1953. Essays on history”).
At times, Soviet administrators came into sharp conflict with local “r-r-revolutionaries.” For example, political adviser to the Allied Control Commission in Hungary G.M. Pushkin complained to the leadership that he constantly had to “correct” the leftist deviation of the local communists. He convinced the “Hungarian comrades” that their leftism was leading to the isolation of the Communist Party, while success could only be achieved in the conditions of a broad democratic bloc organized “on a peaceful basis.” (E.I. Guskova “Post-war Eastern Europe: Stalin and Tito”).
In Germany, Stalin was also in no hurry to carry out socialist reforms. In January 1947, at a meeting with the leaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED, formed after the unification of communists and social democrats), the leader invited them to think about restoring the activities of the Social Democratic party in the Soviet occupation zone. “...In fact, this threatened the collapse of the SED,” notes A. Filitov, - which the shocked guests did not fail to point out; the answer was a recommendation... to conduct better propaganda.”(“USSR and the German question: turning points (1941-1961)”
At times, Stalin was forced to restrain the leftist tendencies inherent in some of the leaders of the SED. Many in the leadership of this party did not want to reunite with West Germany. In the spring of 1947, SED leader W. Ulbrecht spoke out against participating in an all-German meeting of ministers-presidents of all German states. I had to put down an overly “principled” comrade.
In general, Stalin was ready to abandon the idea of building socialism in East Germany and suggested that the West create a united and neutral Germany - similar to post-war Finland. In March-April 1947, at a meeting of four foreign ministers (USSR, USA, England, France), V. M. Molotov showed himself to be a strong advocate of preserving the national unity of Germany. He proposed making the provisions of the constitution of the Weimar Republic the basis for its state building.
By the way, it should be noted that the Soviet occupation policy towards Germany was undoubtedly distinguished by greater humanism than the corresponding policy pursued by the super-democratic United States. The Americans were extremely hostile towards the civilian population, viewing all Germans as potential opponents. “The first anti-fascist demonstration after the end of the war, organized on May 20, 1945 in Cologne by former concentration camp prisoners, was dispersed by the military police,” reports F. Ruth. - The Americans were afraid of any manifestations public life. In every political organization they saw disguised fascists... In one of the American documents, dated May 18, 1945, there were the following lines: “German anti-fascists are wolves in sheep’s clothing...”("Werewolf. Shards of the Brown Empire")
The American military and police treated civilians with unjustifiable cruelty. So, in North Baden, the Americans, in response to an attack by the SS “werewolves,” razed the city of Bruchsal to the ground. There were other, numerous cases of mass terror against civilians.
In the same time “When suppressing the Nazi underground, the Soviet side relied not only on forceful methods, but also on the support of the local population.” Soviet administration “never spoke about the collective responsibility of the Germans, and therefore by 1945 she ceased to consider them as a single enemy.” That's why she “before the Western occupation administrations began to establish cooperation with local anti-fascists, gradually transferring power into their hands.”("Werewolf")
Stalin, obviously, did not at all intend to “communize” the countries that found themselves under Soviet control. The Cold War started by the West changed everything. The Soviet leadership was forced to “communize” Eastern Europe so as not to lose it. It was for this purpose that politically monolithic regimes were created.
The question arises - maybe it was still worth giving Eastern Europe to the West, which later caused us so many problems? However, this would mean admitting weakness and demoralizing millions Soviet soldiers who shed their blood outside the borders of the USSR. Pro-Western Eastern Europe would become a powerful springboard for the United States and its allies in its geopolitical struggle against Russia.
Of course, the best solution would be to create a neutral Eastern Europe. And in this regard, the example of excellent relations with neutral post-war Finland is indicative.
(Moscow had a sharply negative attitude towards projects for creating a communist Finland. And this was quite possible. Communist Party was very strong there and even controlled the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, Minister Urjo Leino himself took a very tough position and even began to slowly arrest “enemies of the people.” Nevertheless, the command came from Moscow to “press the brakes.”) But, alas, Soviet-Finnish relations were a happy exception to general rule. As it was, there was no opportunity for the emergence of a neutral Eastern Europe. The West continued its eternal geopolitical offensive against Russia-USSR.
2. “Balkan Lenin”
At the same time, Stalin excluded communist Yugoslavia from the Eastern European monolith. He was justifiably afraid that its leader, I.B. Tito will try to create a second pole within the socialist camp. The Yugoslav leader tried to present himself as a true successor of Lenin's work, a supporter of Bolshevisation and Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Already in 1945, Tito declared that his country “Strides firmly along the path of socialist development.” The Communists viewed the Yugoslav Popular Front as a kind of “popular movement,” but in no case as a bloc of different parties. By the beginning of 1946, all non-communist parties came under full communist control or were banned. The representative of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPYU) to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, B. Zicherl, wrote: “The word “party” in Yugoslavia has the same meaning as in the USSR: the people in it mean exclusively the Communist Party. The Communist Party firmly holds in its hands all command positions in the army, in the state security apparatus, in the national economic apparatus, in trade unions and other mass organizations... Sooner or later we will have to step over the stage of the Popular Front and start creating a united party of working people...”
Over time, Tito began to perceive himself as the “Balkan Lenin”, and Yugoslavia as some kind of regional similarity USSR. The Belgrade leader was thinking about creating a federation with Bulgaria. Moreover, his plans included joining Albania to this federation. He wanted to conclude a secret military agreement with the Albanians and develop a unified defense plan. Tito thought that he would be able to include Albania in the Yugoslav Five Year Plan. And the military budget of this country was supposed to be included in the budget of the Yugoslav army.
Stalin, of course, could not like this. Actually, what he had always feared happened - a more or less strong country, in which the Communist Party is in power, began to perceive itself as an alternative center of the socialist camp.
However, relations between the two countries could still be improved. “Tito was ready to admit and correct mistakes, because the Yugoslavs were the best students in Stalin’s school...- writes E.I. Guskova. – In Yugoslavia, the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia was widely celebrated; portraits of Stalin and laudatory speeches addressed to him did not leave the pages of Yugoslav newspapers. Therefore, it seemed that any contradictions could be overcome, misunderstandings could be discussed and resolved. But the dialogue did not work out. In March 1948, Tito learned that the Soviet Union refused to conclude a trade agreement with Yugoslavia. On March 18, 1948, the USSR made a statement about the recall of Soviet specialists and military advisers from Yugoslavia due to the manifestation of unfriendliness towards the USSR. Tito does not understand this position... He is trying to clarify the situation, but Moscow is not willing to explain.”(“Post-war Eastern Europe. Stalin and Tito”)
Many researchers, with some amazement, note that Stalin seemed to deliberately sharpen disagreements with the Yugoslav leadership, making a break with them inevitable. In fact, Joseph Vissarionovich deliberately pushed Belgrade away from both Moscow and Eastern Europe. He absolutely did not need this center of “independence” within the “camp of people’s democracy.” And it was easier to unite the latter using such a bogeyman as “Yugoslav revisionism.” It was necessary to wage a merciless struggle against this very revisionism, and not to look closely at its experience. E.I. Guskova notes: “It seemed that Stalin deliberately did not go for reconciliation, but used the example of Yugoslavia to consolidate all other countries in a single bloc under the leadership of the USSR and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The need to express their attitude towards the mistakes of Yugoslavia and Tito forced the national communist parties to fight against anti-Soviet tendencies, to strengthen their ranks according to the scheme proposed by Moscow... Stalin sacrificed Yugoslavia, but received in return a welded camp of like-minded people loyal to the USSR.”
Subsequently, a very significant metamorphosis occurred with the orthodox communist Tito - he became a “democratic communist”, determined to rapprochement with the West.
This metamorphosis may surprise some, but everything is completely logical. In order to isolate himself from Moscow, Tito needed to get closer to the West and enlist its support. Well, such a rapprochement presupposed reforms in the “right” social-democratic direction. Tito carried them through.
3. Red China – not needed
Stalin's policy in the eastern direction is no less indicative. He was categorically against the communist revolution in China.
Here is one example. In December 1936, one of his military commanders, Zhang Xueliang, spoke out against the leader of the Chinese Nationalists Chiang Kai-shek. In essence, it was a successful rebellion. Chan was captured and he was required to change his policy (then the high-ranking prisoner was released). Rejoicing began in the camp of the Chinese communists, with the Reds demanding the execution of Chiang Kai-shek. However, the Kremlin thought differently. The Stalinist leadership regarded the rebellion as “another conspiracy of Japanese militarists whose goal is to prevent the unification of China and undermine the organization of resistance to the aggressor.” Everyone was perplexed, because it turned out that the USSR was taking the side of the nationalists - the worst enemies of the Chinese Communist Party. “Much later, the true reasons for such a step by Moscow were revealed,” reports Mao Zedong biographer F. Short. - In November - and Mao could not have known about it then - Stalin decided to make a new attempt to turn the Kuomintang government into his ally... Secret consultations were already underway in Moscow on the preparation of a Soviet-Chinese security treaty. The arrest of Chiang Kai-shek mixed up all the cards for Stalin. For Stalin, the CCP’s doubts meant absolutely nothing: the interests of the world's first state of victorious socialism were above all (emphasis - A. E.)». ("Mao Zedong")
After the war, Stalin advised Mao to come to a peace agreement with Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists.
He even insisted that the Chinese communist leader go to the city of Chongqing to meet with Generalissimo Chiang (with whom the USSR ostentatiously signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation on August 15, 1945). But Stalin stubbornly did not want to meet with Mao himself. And he accepted him only after he came to power and became a statesman.
But Stalin did not want a military-political victory for the Chinese communists under any circumstances. In November 1945, when clashes between the CCP and the Kuomintang resumed, the Soviet command demanded that the communist army abandon all major cities it controlled. And even in the spring of 1949, when Mao successfully crushed the Kuomintang, Stalin strongly recommended that he limit himself to control over the northern provinces of China.
The Americans, on the contrary, did a lot for the victory of the Chinese Communist Party. Back in 1944, Mao conducted active negotiations with US representatives (mission of General P.J. Hurley), expressing his readiness to cooperate. The leader of the Chinese communists for some time even thought about changing the name of his party - from “communist” to “democratic” (in the States it was the Democratic Party that ruled at that time). And in January 1945, secret negotiations between the CCP and representatives of the US State Department began, during which Mao explored the possibility of a personal meeting with F.D. Roosevelt.
Subsequently, the “staff members” helped the Maoists very thoroughly. In December 1945, J. Marshall, who replaced Hurley as head of the American mission in China, forced Chiang Kai-shek to agree to a truce with the Communists. But the nationalist army successfully defeated Mao’s communist troops. Thus, the Americans saved the CPC from complete military defeat.
Further more. “The parastatal organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, virtually determined American policy in China for fifteen years,” writes I.R. Shafarevich. - This influence contributed significantly to the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. For example, information was conveyed to government circles portraying Chinese communists as democrats and “supporters of land reform.” As a result, Chiang Kai-shek was proposed to introduce communists into the government. When he refused, supplies from the US were stopped completely. The financial policy developed by the institute caused colossal inflation in China and mass discontent of the population with the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. This policy was encouraged by the Treasury Department under the leadership of White and the department's representative in China, Solomon Adler...”(“Was perestroika a CIA action?”)
Why did the Americans need to help the communists? It's simple - they needed to create some kind of second pole forces that would constantly weaken the USSR. As a matter of fact, in the 60s, “Red China” just became such a pole. Things almost came to a war between the two socialist powers. And already in the 70s, Mao began an open rapprochement with the United States. Stalin is all this foresaw, that’s why he sabotaged the victory of the Chinese revolution as much as possible (although at the same time he was forced to provide some assistance to the Maoists - otherwise the leaders of foreign communist parties would not have understood him).
Facts indicate that in the post-war period Stalin pursued a purely pragmatic policy and was guided exclusively by state interests of the USSR. And this policy changed depending on the changing international climate.
Special for the Centenary
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