Date of publication or update 07/12/2017

It took place in apartment 31, building 31/1 on the street. Mercy (now Tekstil Street).

Present at the meeting of the Central Committee were: V. I. Lenin, Ya. M. Sverdlov, I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. S. Bubnov, A. M. Kollontai, G. I. Lomov (Oppokov) etc.

The meeting began with a report from Ya. M. Sverdlov on the situation on the Northern and Western fronts closest to the capital.

Y. M. Sverdlov pointed out the growth of Bolshevik influence among the soldiers.

V. I. Lenin made a report on the current situation.

“Politically, the matter is completely ripe for the transfer of power...,” V.I. Lenin pointed out. - We need to talk about the technical side. That’s the whole point” (Works, 4th ed., vol. 26, p. 160).

V.I. Lenin emphasized that now we are talking about the very moment of the uprising, and demanded comprehensive preparation for an armed uprising.

The slogan “All power to the Soviets” in October 1917 turned from a slogan of agitation into a slogan of action.

The resolution proposed by V.I. Lenin stated: “The Central Committee recognizes that both the international situation of the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the navy in Germany, as an extreme manifestation of the growth of the world socialist revolution throughout Europe, then the threat of peace by the imperialists with the aim of strangling the revolution in Russia ), - and the military situation (the undoubted decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and company to surrender St. Petersburg to the Germans), - and the acquisition of a majority by the proletarian party in the Soviets - all this in connection with peasant uprising and with the turn of people's trust in our party (elections in Moscow), finally, the obvious preparation of the second Kornilov revolt (withdrawal of troops from St. Petersburg, bringing Cossacks to St. Petersburg, encircling Minsk with Cossacks, etc.). - all this puts an armed uprising on the agenda.

Thus recognizing that an armed uprising is inevitable and fully mature, the Central Committee invites all party organizations to be guided by this and from this point of view to discuss and resolve all practical issues (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from St. Petersburg, speeches by Muscovites and Minsk residents, etc. )" (Lenin V.I., Soch., 4th ed., vol. 26, p. 162).

Denying the possibility of the victory of socialism in Russia, the strikebreakers of the revolution, Kamenev and Zinoviev, opposed the preparation and conduct of an armed uprising.

Trotsky at this meeting proposed not to start an uprising until the opening of the 2nd Congress of Soviets, which meant prolonging the uprising, warning the bourgeois Provisional Government about it and failing the uprising.

The Central Committee of the RSDRN(b) gave a decisive rebuff to the capitulators. Lenin's resolution was adopted by 10 votes to 2 and became a directive for the Bolshevik Party.

At the suggestion of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, the Central Committee decided to create a Political Bureau for the political leadership in the near future, which was elected from 7 members of the Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin.

A few days later, on October 16 (29), an extended meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) was held, confirming the resolution of the Party Central Committee adopted at the meeting on October 10 (23).

At the meeting, a military revolutionary center was elected to lead the uprising, which included Ya. M. Sverdlov, J. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. S. Bubnov, M. S. Uritsky.

Lenin V.I. Complete Works Volume 34

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RSDLP(b)
OCTOBER 16 (29), 1917 124

REPORT

PROTOCOL RECORDING

Comrade Lenin reads out the resolution adopted by the Central Committee at the previous meeting. Reports that the resolution was adopted with two votes against. If the comrades who objected wish to speak out, then the debate can begin, but in the meantime this resolution will motivate.

If the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties broke with conciliation, it would be possible to offer them a compromise. This proposal was made, but it was clear that these parties rejected this compromise*. On the other hand, by this period it was already clearly determined that the masses were following us. This was even before the Kornilov revolt. As evidence, he cites election statistics in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Kornilovism pushed the masses towards us even more decisively. The balance of forces at the Democratic Conference. The situation is clear: either the Kornilov dictatorship, or the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. It is impossible to be guided by the mood of the masses, because it is changeable and cannot be taken into account; we must be guided by an objective analysis and assessment of the revolution. The masses gave confidence to the Bolsheviks and demand from them not words, but deeds, a decisive policy both in the fight against war and in the fight against devastation. If we take the political analysis of the revolution as a basis, it becomes absolutely clear that even the anarchist uprisings now confirm this.

*Cm. this volume, pp. 133-139. Ed.

Next he analyzes the situation in Europe and proves that the revolution there is even more difficult than ours; if in a country like Germany it came to a revolt in the navy, then this proves that there too things have already gone very far. The international situation gives us a number of objective data that, when we act now, we will have the whole of proletarian Europe on our side; proves that the bourgeoisie wants to surrender St. Petersburg. We can only save ourselves from this by taking Petrograd into our own hands. From all this, the conclusion is clear that the armed uprising mentioned in the Central Committee resolution is next.

As for practical conclusions from the resolution, it is more convenient to draw them after hearing the reports of representatives of the centers.

From the political analysis of the class struggle both in Russia and in Europe, the need for the most decisive, most active policy, which can only be an armed uprising, follows.

396 V. I. LENIN

SPEECHES

PROTOCOL RECORDING

Comrade Lenin polemicizes with Milyutin and Shotman and proves that the issue is not the armed forces, it is not a matter of fighting the army, but of the struggle of one part of the army with another. He doesn’t see pessimism in what was said here. Proves that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie are small. Facts prove that we have an advantage over the enemy. Why can't the Central Committee start? This does not appear from all the data. In order to reject the Central Committee resolution, it is necessary to prove that there is no devastation, that the international situation does not lead to complications. If professional figures demand all the power, then they understand perfectly well what they want. Objective conditions prove that the peasantry must be led; it will follow the proletariat.

They are afraid that we will not retain power, but now we have special chances to retain power.

Expresses the wish that the debate be conducted on the basis of discussing the resolution on its merits.

If all resolutions failed like this, then nothing better could be desired. Now Zinoviev says that the slogan “power to the Soviets” is down, and put pressure on the government. If we say that the uprising is ripe, then there is no need to talk about conspiracies. If

politically, an uprising is inevitable, then we need to treat the uprising as an art, but politically it is already ripe.

Precisely because there is only enough bread for the day, we cannot wait for the Constituent Assembly. He proposes to confirm the resolution, to resolutely prepare for preparations, and to let the Central Committee and the Council decide when.

Comrade Lenin objects to Zinoviev that this revolution cannot be contrasted with the February revolution. Essentially proposes a resolution.

RESOLUTION

The meeting fully welcomes and fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee, calls on all organizations and all workers and soldiers to comprehensively and intensively prepare for an armed uprising, to support the center created for this by the Central Committee, and expresses full confidence that the Central Committee and the Council will promptly indicate a favorable moment and expedient methods of attack.

First published in 1927 in the magazine Proletarian Revolution No. 10

Printed from a handwritten copy of the protocol record;
resolution - according to manuscript

Minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP.

Russian state archive socio-political history

F. 17. Op. 1a. D. 59. L. 86–94.

White copy

Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Kollontai, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, Sokolnikov and Lomov.

Chairman - Sverdlov.

Order of the day:

1. Romanian Front

2. Lithuanians

3. Minsk and the northern front

4. Current moment

5. Regional congress

6. Troop withdrawal

IV. Comrade Lenin receives the word about the current moment. He states that since the beginning of September there has been some kind of indifference to the issue of the uprising. Meanwhile, this is unacceptable if we seriously raise the slogan of the seizure of power by the Soviets. Therefore, it is high time to pay attention to the technical side of the issue. Now, apparently, time has been lost significantly.

However, the issue is very pressing, and the decisive moment is near. The international situation is such that the initiative should be ours.

What is going on with the surrender to Narva and the surrender of St. Petersburg forces us even more to take decisive action.

The political situation also influences impressively in this direction.

On July 3-5, decisive actions on our part would have been frustrated by the fact that the majority was not with us. Since then, our rise has been in giant strides.

Absenteeism and indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.

The majority are now behind us. Politically, the matter is completely ripe for a transfer of power.

The agrarian movement is also moving in this direction, for it is clear that heroic forces are needed to suppress this movement. The slogan of the transfer of the entire land became the common slogan of the peasants.

The political situation is thus ready. We need to talk about the technical side. That's the whole point. Meanwhile, following the defencists, we are inclined to consider the systematic preparation of an uprising as something like a political sin. Waiting until the Constituent Assembly, which obviously will not be with us, is clearly pointless, because it means complicating our task.

The regional congress and the proposal from Minsk must be used to begin decisive action.

2) Comrade Lomov takes the floor for information about the position of the Moscow regional bureau and the Moscow committee, as well as about the situation in Moscow in general.

3) Comrade Uritsky states that we are weak not only technically, but also in all other aspects of our work. We passed a lot of resolutions. There are no decisive actions. The Petrograd Soviet is disorganized, there are few meetings, etc.

What forces do we rely on?

The workers in Petrograd have 40,000 rifles, but this does not solve the matter, this is nothing. Garrison after July days cannot inspire much hope.

But, in any case, if we are heading towards an uprising, then we really need to do something in this direction. We must decide to take certain actions.

4) Comrade Sverdlov informs that he knows about the state of affairs throughout Russia.

A resolution is adopted in the following form: (10 people are in favor, 2 are against). The Central Committee recognizes that the international situation of the Russian revolution (the uprising in the navy in Germany, as an extreme manifestation of the growth of the world socialist revolution throughout Europe, then the threat of peace by the imperialists with the aim of strangling the revolution in Russia) - and the military situation (the undoubted decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky with To surrender St. Petersburg to the Germans) - and the acquisition of a majority by the proletarian party in the soviets - all this in connection with the peasant uprising and the turn of the people's confidence in our party (elections in Moscow), and finally, the obvious preparation of the second Kornilov revolt (withdrawal of troops from St. Petersburg, the transport of Cossacks to St. Petersburg, the encirclement of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.) all this puts an armed uprising on the agenda.

Thus recognizing that an armed uprising is inevitable and fully mature, the Central Committee invites all party organizations to be guided by this and from this point of view to discuss and resolve all practical issues (the Congress of Councils of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from St. Petersburg, the speech of Muscovites and Minsk residents, etc. )

Then the question of creating a political bureau of the Central Committee is raised.

It was decided to form a bureau of 7 people: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov.

(b) 24 Sep. (Oct. 7) 1917 - took place in Petrograd. Present were members of the Central Committee, Petrograd. By the way, local desks. workers are delegates to the Democratic Conference. The issue of holding this meeting was considered by the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) on September 13, 20, 23 and 24. 1917. According to gas. "Working Path" No. 22 from September 27. The meeting heard a report by N.I. Bukharin on the current situation and adopted a resolution on this report. The meeting was reported on the same day at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) by Ya. M. Sverdlov, who conveyed to the Central Committee the resolution on the current situation and the appeal “To help the railway workers” adopted as the basis for the meeting. Both the report and the resolution of the meeting emphasized the increased influence of the Bolshevik Party among the masses, the aggravation of the class struggle in the country, and pointed out the danger of the bourgeois counter-revolution, which was heading towards civil war. With the slogan of the day, the meeting recognized the transfer of power to the Soviets and called on party organizations to develop the activities of the Soviets and increase their political significance to the role of bodies opposing bourgeois power - Temp. pr-vu, the Pre-Parliament, etc. However, both the report and the resolution of the meeting did not reflect the task substantiated by V. I. Lenin “... to put an armed uprising in St. Petersburg and Moscow (with the region) on the order of the day,” conquest of power, overthrow of the government" (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 34, p. 240 (vol. 26, p. 2)). The resolution of the meeting confirmed the erroneous decision of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) to participate in the Pre-Parliament, which, at the insistence of Lenin, was canceled by the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) on October 5 (18). 1917.

Lit.: Lenin V.I., Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 34, p. 239-41, 242-47, 248-56, 257-63, 272-83 (vol. 26, pp. 1-2, 3-8, 24-31, 32-37, 52-62); Communist Party Soviet Union in the struggle for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Sat. Doc-tov, M., 1957, p. 55-57; Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). August 1917 - February 1918, M., 1958.

• - took place in Poronin, near Krakow, September 23. - 1 Oct. For purposes of secrecy it was called "August"...
• - took place in Krakow on December 26. 1912 - Jan 1 1913. For the sake of conspiracy, it was called February...

  Soviet historical encyclopedia

• - see "August" 1913 meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers...

  Soviet historical encyclopedia

• - See: telephone meeting; video meeting...

  Dictionary of business terms

• - see Poronin 1913 meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers...
• - took place December 26, 1912 - January 1, 1913; for the sake of conspiracy it was called “February”. Participants in its work were: members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin, G. E. Zinoviev, R. V. Malinovsky...

  Big Soviet encyclopedia

• - see Poronin 1913 meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers...

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

• - took place in Poronin, near Zakopane, September 23 - October 1. For secrecy it was called “August”, “Summer”. 22 people were present. With the casting vote: from the Central Committee - V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev...

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

• - see Krakow meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers...

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

• - about what and why. Meeting on the tasks of raising livestock production. In an hour, the development of a rescue plan was supposed to begin...

  Management in Russian

• - Ave. about the meeting...

  Spelling dictionary Russian language

• - MEETING, -I, cf. A meeting, a meeting dedicated to discussing something. special question. All-Russian village teachers...

  Dictionary Ozhegova

• - MEETING, meetings, cf. Action under Ch. confer; a meeting dedicated to discussing some issues, actions, measures. Arrange a meeting. The court retired to deliberate. A meeting took place...

  Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

• - meeting Wed. 1. process of action according to ch. confer 2. A meeting for the purpose of discussing something together. Ott. The participants of such a meeting...

  Explanatory Dictionary by Efremova

• - meeting noun, p., used. compare often Morphology: what? meetings, why? meeting, what? meeting, what? meeting, about what? about the meeting...

  Dmitriev's Explanatory Dictionary

• - council "...

  Russian spelling dictionary

"MEETING OF THE RSDLP Central Committee" in books

Meeting May 23