The first and most difficult day of the Great Patriotic War. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War Time of the start of the war 1941

Today's topic of the lecture is the battle in the sky on June 22, 1941, the confrontation between the Red Army and the Luftwaffe. Today we will talk both directly about the battle and about the background.

I would like to note that in Soviet times this issue has received little attention in the literature. There were no special publications on this topic at all, and in some studies that covered the development of Soviet armed forces and in particular the Air Force, several paragraphs or, at best, a chapter were devoted to this problem.

Everything led to the fact that by the beginning of the 90s, stereotypes had formed, a very definite picture of that day and previous events, which can be briefly characterized by the following points: the defeat of the Red Army Air Force was due to the surprise of the German attack, as a rule, it was always added that there were More than 60 Soviet airfields were attacked and over 1,200 aircraft were destroyed. Almost all publications added that the Luftwaffe had a numerical superiority over the Soviet Air Force and that most of the Soviet aircraft were outdated or technically faulty. There were around 2 thousand aircraft of new types, Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2. The Luftwaffe, together with its allies, had about 5 thousand aircraft in all publications, thus they were superior to the Red Army Air Force technically and numerically.

This information wandered from book to book, and there were few variations. Basically, people who were interested in this topic could glean information from the memories of eyewitnesses or participants. By the beginning of the 90s, certain myths had developed. This had negative consequences: in connection with the so-called. “freedom of speech” gave birth to pseudo-theories that tried to answer who was to blame. It turned out that in fact, either the generals betrayed and this catastrophe occurred, or the Soviet soldiers did not intend to fight. In particular, such a theory was put forward by the well-known Mark Solonin, who devoted several books to this topic. In them, he tries to prove that supposedly no battle took place in the air, and that the Russian pilots simply fled, abandoned their equipment and retreated far to the east. This started already in the early 2000s. The first publication was called: “Where did Stalin’s falcons fly away?” Briefly, I would like to dispel doubts: they fought the enemy as best they could, using all the forces and means that were available at that moment, simply the lack of documentary material made it possible for such people to operate with unverified facts.

The first thing that Solonin is wrong about is that he starts from the wrong tasks. He could not even determine the composition of the Soviet Air Force grouping on June 22 in the Western border districts, since at that time he did not have information about the real composition and deployment of the Air Force in the western districts. And then, using operational reports, operational documentation, combat reports, he draws incorrect conclusions. He believes that if, say, a regiment had 50 aircraft, and the next day the report says that there are 20 aircraft left, and in terms of losses in the same operational report it says 10 aircraft, against this background he says: “And where what about the remaining cars?" And he expresses some theses that are completely untrue, because operational reports were very different from reports of losses, and often what was written in the morning operational report, for example, on June 22, 1941, was completely inconsistent with what later , a few days later was given to higher command as losses. That is, the person initially set the wrong direction, then “put” under his version certain documents that do not correspond to the research format. Roughly speaking, he starts talking about quantity, and in the end he operates with operational documents that had nothing to do with this quantity. Thus, a person makes incomprehensible conclusions and puts forward crazy theories. The strangest thing is that this is picked up by many on the Internet, and some kind of conspiracy theory practically begins.

How did things really go?

The condition of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of World War II, by September 1, 1939, and by June 22, 1941, was far from optimal. Why? There were quite objective reasons. Firstly, the very geography of our country played against the Red Army, which implied the presence of a very powerful group in the Far East, including the air force, and in Transcaucasia. The forces that the Soviet Union should have had at that time could not be transferred quickly. Let's say, aviation from Central Russia to the Far East. There wasn’t even a flight route, so the plane had to first be disassembled and transported in trains. This took a lot of time, so the Soviet leadership was forced to maintain very powerful groups in the Far East and Transcaucasia. That is, initially Soviet Union It was necessary to have much more strength even in peacetime, accordingly, to produce more aircraft, graduate more pilots, spend more resources, fuel, engine hours, and so on.

Second aspect: The Soviet Union only began industrialization in the early 20s. To develop such an industry as aircraft manufacturing in 10–15 years is a very difficult task, considering that neither production nor development took place in Tsarist Russia. Purchased engines and aircraft structures were used. Although there were outstanding designers, Sikorsky is the same, but basically what was used at the front was Allied equipment, which, at best, was produced under license. In general, it was not possible to overcome the problem of creating our own high-quality aircraft industry and equipment at the beginning of World War II.

Map of the construction of operational airfields

A striking example: by September 1, the Luftwaffe received several engines with power above 1000 hp. Unfortunately, the Red Army Air Force did not have such equipment and lagged behind for almost an entire period.

Thus, in technical terms, Soviet aircraft were inferior to German ones. Another reason for this was the production of aluminum, which in the USSR was 3–4 times behind that of Germany. Accordingly, the Germans could afford to build all-metal aircraft from duralumin, which are naturally lighter, but the USSR was forced to build aircraft of mixed designs, heavier, which created a difficult situation in the presence of weak engines.

The second issue, which, as a rule, has not been and is not covered, is the organizational and mobilization activities carried out from 1938 until the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union, as is known, although it did not fully enter the war on September 1, began preparations long ago. There was a “bias” towards quantitative parameters. There were reasons for this, including the territory. We took the path of more aircraft, pilots, formations, parts, at the expense of quality. The training of flight personnel, which was already not up to par in the 30s, completely fell to an unacceptable minimum in the 38–40s, and graduating pilots, as a rule, the most they could master on a combat aircraft was takeoff and landing . There were often cases when graduating cadets had literally 20–30 flights on combat aircraft. They practically couldn’t even take off and land. At the beginning of 1939, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 aviation regiments, in 1940 they added another 100, and in 1941 they began to form another 100 regiments. Thus, in terms of quantitative characteristics, the Red Army Air Force had a perfect armada - 350 aviation regiments, more than 20 thousand combat aircraft, 23 thousand pilots in combat units, plus 7 thousand instructor pilots in military schools and 34 thousand simultaneously trained cadets. With such indicators there was no talk of any quality of preparation. This is another reason that the events were quite tragic.

In many countries, including Japan, the opposite trend was observed. They paid too much attention to the quality of pilot training and, as a result, lost a lot in numbers. When in 1942-44 the Americans knocked out the bulk of their experienced pilots - probably everyone knows this story - it turned out that the Japanese simply did not have the personnel. The bias in both directions is not very good, and only the Americans managed to find a middle ground, and only due to the fact that they had the most rich country. They had the opportunity to train good pilots in huge quantities and at the same time produce excellent aircraft and engines.

Due to the so-called organizational and mobilization measures, the composition of the personnel units was greatly “liquified.” Even those units that were formed in the 30s and reorganized into regiments in 1938, from them throughout the 40-41 years, experienced pilots and commanders were regularly taken and sent as command staff to the newly formed units. This led to negative consequences, because the personnel of the personnel units was greatly weakened.

Let's move on to preparing for war. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing to conduct combat operations in the air quite decisively. Both sides intended to carry out the first operations specifically to gain air supremacy and were preparing to act on airfields first. However, the approaches differed. The German Air Force took a more detailed approach to this issue. An important factor here was that the Germans held fewer organizational events, formed fewer units, retaining the pre-war personnel in a very good composition. Of course, they had losses in the campaign in the West, the campaign of 1940, but overall the core remained. If the Germans had 23 fighter groups at the beginning of World War II, then on June 22 they had about 40 fighter groups, i.e. The composition has increased, but not much. And the Soviet Air Force, which had 55 fighter regiments on September 1, 1939, already had about 150 by 1941, and the number of personnel and equipment in them was meant to be greater than that of the Luftwaffe. The quality of training suffered because of this, but there were other reasons related to intelligence activities. The Germans at one time created a powerful reconnaissance aviation even before the war, which included units at all levels of subordination, starting from the Wehrmacht high command, which had its eyes in the form of a specialized unit, or rather, a formation, the Rovel chief group, which included both reconnaissance aviation units , as well as infrastructure, laboratories, airfields, which allowed them to conduct reconnaissance on the highest level. The Germans began preparing for military operations against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbarossa plan, which was adopted in December 1940; accordingly, the Germans began preparations from the beginning of January. The planes were specially built, or rather, converted from existing models: high-altitude engines were installed on them, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, and all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several Yu-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins, which allowed them to operate from altitudes of 12–13 km. At that time, this was the maximum altitude for interceptors, and it was difficult to use interceptor fighters effectively. Plus, the fact that there was no radar field over the Soviet-German border played a role. The Soviet Union had several radar stations, but they were all located in the area of ​​Leningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were completely unpunished. You can look at a map, a real map from TsAMO, which gives an idea of ​​the activities of German reconnaissance aircraft.

This is the region of East Prussia and the Baltic states. One of the squadrons, based in the Königsberg area, the 2nd squadron of Rovel's Obergruppe, carried out reconnaissance flights along the route: they took off from the Seerappen airfield along Königsberg, further over the Baltic Sea, arrived approximately in the Libau region, further in the Riga region, made reconnaissance flights over the entire territory of the Baltic states, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest region, landed at an airfield in the Warsaw region, refueled and carried out a return reconnaissance flight along the same route in the opposite direction. Soviet VNSO posts, that is, observation and detection, very rarely recorded these flights, because they were carried out on high altitude. Unfortunately, we do not know how many such flights were carried out. Soviet data speaks of 200 flights, but in reality there were many more. There is no German data, but there is factual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at one time were able to photograph almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, and troop concentrations. For example, an aerial photograph taken from a German reconnaissance aircraft on April 10, 1941.

Aerial photography. Kaunas, April 10, 1941

It shows Kaunas, the famous Kaunas Fortress, the airfield, or more precisely, the southern part of the airfield, where the 15th Fighter Regiment of the 8th Mixed Division was based. Hangars and aircraft parking areas are visible. The detail in these images was amazing, you can see everything, including every plane. The Luftwaffe crews for whom such tablets were being prepared had the opportunity to familiarize themselves in detail with future targets. This activity was carried out on a daily basis, without stopping almost until June 22, before the invasion, and we have some opportunities in retrospect to see how the situation changed.

For example, here is a later photo taken on June 9, the entire Kaunas airfield is already visible, including what we saw in the previous photo - the hangars of the 15th IAP, the planes are standing in three rows in front of the hangars, you can even count each plane now. In the northern part of the airfield of the 31st IAP, you can count all the planes and plan approaches for bombing on both sides.

Aerial photography. June 9, 1941

What could the Red Army oppose in terms of intelligence? Many have noticed that recently there have been a number of publications devoted to the intelligence activities of various structures. She, of course, was very important, but, unfortunately, she did not provide materials similar to the German ones. Here, by the way, is a Yu-86 aircraft with a pressurized cabin, civilian registration plates are visible. This is the only vehicle lost during these reconnaissance flights. A unique photo. The crew landed in the Rivne area - their engines failed. The Germans managed to blow up the plane before they were captured, but, nevertheless, Soviet specialists were able to extract several remnants of photographic equipment, including film where it was clear that the Germans were photographing railway crossings in the Korosten area.

Downed Yu-86

The Soviet Air Force could rely on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 1930s, because permission for intelligence activities was not received until at least the beginning of June. There are several notes written by the heads of the Red Army Air Force department - first Rychagov, then Zhigarev, who asked Timoshenko and Stalin to begin reconnaissance over German territory, but until mid-June there was no such decision. Soviet pilots were forced to rely on less current data that was collected back in the 30s. For some objects they were of quite good quality - for example, the plan of Königsberg, which is quite good, there are map materials, even some photographic materials on which the Devau airfield is marked. But the bulk of the data was represented by approximately these diagrams, which at best contained target coordinates, a small description and a simple diagram, which, of course, can be used as a visual aid, but it was almost impossible to find the airfield using it.

Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations often at random. The difference in intelligence between the Germans and the Red Army Air Force is roughly understandable. According to the plans (we do not take into account political questions about who was going to attack first and who was not), the Soviet cover plans for the Red Army were to act aggressively, delivering a series of attacks on German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of up-to-date intelligence information, some of the attacks, even according to these plans, would have been carried out on empty airfields where there were no combat units, and vice versa, those airfields where combat units were located, according to the plan, should not have been attacked .

The Germans, accordingly, could adjust their plans until June 22 and have up-to-date information, seeing the movements of the Red Army Air Force as if online. And when some comrades doubt that the Germans had such successes on June 22, this is quite strange. Because, having information about where it was necessary to strike, the Germans did not even need to expend effort for this, only selecting small groups of aircraft that carried out precise strikes.

The aspect of technical preparation for combat operations is interesting. The Luftwaffe carried out research after the Polish and French events and especially during the “Battle of Britain.” Tactics of action against enemy airfields were developed, which included both tactical techniques and the use of specialized ammunition. A range of weapons was developed for the purpose, including fragmentation bombs, which were supposed to become know-how, an effective method of destroying aircraft at airfields. This is a small SD-2 bomb, weighing 2.5 kg, the smallest bomb at that time intended for combat. Next came the SD-10 in the nomenclature, then the SD-50 fragmentation bomb, and the last, SD-250, this is already a very heavy bomb, but it was rarely used. The main bombs that were used were SD-2 and SD-50.

Aircraft bombs SD-2 and SD-50

What was their advantage? German planes received holders for these bombs, which made it possible to hang a very large number of them. Let's say that an ordinary Messerschmitt fighter had the ability to hang 96 such bombs. Despite the fact that the bomb was small at first glance, it had an effectiveness equal to an 82-mm mine, that is, very serious: hitting an aircraft almost always disabled it. In addition, some of this ammunition was clocked, making it an even greater problem for airfields. They could explode an hour or two after they were dropped.

This is what a plane from the second group of the 27th Fighter Squadron, equipped with bombs, looked like in the field.

A real photo of June 1941 in the Suwalki area. SD-2 suspensions for the BF-110 heavy fighter, it has 48 bombs under each wing, the total load is 96 bombs. They also practiced hanging 4 SD-50 bombs, which, in principle, is also effective. Please note that, for example, a typical SB, the main bomber in the Red Army Air Force by 1941, as a rule, carried a load of only 6 FAB-100 bombs, that is, the Mi-109 fighter was actually equivalent to the SB.

An interesting video of the attack with SD-2 bombs is that it shows the area of ​​airfields that could have been covered with them. This is the first footage, this is an SD-50 bombing, by the way. But SD-2 is being bombed. That is, even a small group of German fighters equipped with such bombs could high degree confidence to guarantee the destruction of equipment that was not covered.

German bombers were also prepared specifically for operations against airfields. They, as a rule, carried (Junkers-88 and Dornier-17) 360 of these bombs, which is what we just saw. A group of three aircraft could drop 1000 of these bombs. In addition, even larger ammunition was used, mainly SD-50 bombs. In the range of the German Ju-88 and Dornier-17 bombers, 20 such bombs could be suspended without overload, and the Heinkel-111 bomber could suspend 32 such bombs without overload. That is, the attack of the Junkers-88 flight was equivalent to an attack by an SB group of 9 aircraft.

Accordingly, the Heinkel-111 link could drop almost 100 such bombs, and this is equivalent to the actions of a squadron of DB-3 aircraft, into which 10 “hundred parts” were suspended. In addition, all German fighters at that time were already armed with cannons, two guns or one each, if we talk about the Me-109 F. Soviet aircraft were armed mainly with machine guns, there were a very small number of I-16 aircraft with cannon armament, and The Yak-1 aircraft have just entered production.

An important factor was the enemy’s organization itself. The Luftwaffe is clearly a branch of the military in Germany, which reported directly to the Reichsmarschall and then to the Fuhrer and had its own fully structured structure. In addition to the actual aviation units, there was also rear support and anti-aircraft artillery, which was very powerful. The Red Army Air Force was not fully a branch of the military; it was rather a branch that was subordinate to the ground forces. Interesting fact: Until June 30, 1941, there was no post of commander of the Red Army Air Force, there was a head of department. The front air force commanders reported directly to the front commanders, and this subsequently played a negative role. In addition to mobilization and organizational measures, the Soviet Air Force in 1939–40. moved to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic states, so they were forced to build a new network of airfields along the entire border. For example, this is part of the map of airfield construction in the Baltic states. Accordingly, that system of subordination to the ground forces created a very serious problem: the Soviet Air Force was stretched along the entire front from Murmansk to the Black Sea in a thin layer. Because the construction of airfields was just underway, the Red Army Air Force was forced to keep part of its forces much to the east, approximately along the Smolensk-Kyiv-Zaporozhye meridian. It turned out that the air force was divided into at least two echelons, separated from each other by approximately 400–500 kilometers. The units located in the area of ​​Tallinn, Smolensk, Orsha, Mogilev, Kyiv, Proskurovo, Krivoy Rog could not help the first echelon units in the first battles. But the construction of airfields was not carried out properly either in 1939 or 1940. '41 was the year when they tried to close these gaps. The construction of 800 operational airfields began at once, in addition, at 240 airfields they began to build such standard concrete runways, which also did not add optimism, because even a person who is not familiar with construction understands that such a gigantic number of construction projects in six months is simply impossible build.

Layout of stripes at the airport

Accordingly, here is one of the photographs of how the Red Army soldiers install a grid for pouring a concrete strip.

Laying mesh for pouring concrete strip

Distribution of forces. In the Baltics, the first aviation corps is located approximately from Königsberg to the border, and accordingly the Red Army Air Forces opposing it are located here, the 6th division, here the 7th division, here the 8th, here the 57th, and the fourth, for example, is located as far in the Tallinn, Tartu area, and in such a formation it cannot begin hostilities. It cannot conduct effective combat operations, even with bombers. That is, the Germans could use all their forces in the first strike, but the Soviet Air Force could not. Moreover, even according to the cover plan, part of the forces still had to be located along the line of the Western Dvina, that is, at a distance of about 250 km from the border, and also accordingly, I can’t imagine how they could participate in the border battle from such a perspective. This happened everywhere, not only in the Baltic states, throughout the Western Front, the Southwestern Front, and the Air Force of the 9th Army in Moldova. The Soviet Air Force entered with far from optimal composition, being divided into several echelons. Even the first echelon was then divided into two echelons along the border, and at a distance of about 250 km, and the third echelon was at a distance of 400–500 km from the border. Everyone knows from textbook data that the Luftwaffe had somewhere around 2.5 thousand combat aircraft, the Red Army Air Force had about 7.5 thousand combat aircraft in the Western districts, but it is impossible to actually use most of the forces for the above reasons. In addition, the Red Army Air Force was in the deployment stage, and if the Germans could field all of their 20 fighter groups in optimal composition on June 22, then of the 69 fighter regiments represented in the western districts, 24 were of real combat value, 7 of which were in the second or third echelons. It was simply impossible to use the notorious numerical superiority. The Soviet Air Force had to enter the battle in parts, which gave the Germans an excellent opportunity to defeat them, which subsequently happened.

The preliminary part, unfortunately, is not so rosy, but, nevertheless, it really happened. Being in such a formation, in such a condition, with such forces and preparation, the Soviet Air Force, I must say honestly, did not have the slightest chance of winning the preliminary battle. They could only delay the inevitable defeat of the first echelon and wait for the arrival of the second and third echelons in order to continue the battle with a more powerful force.

Let's move on to the war itself. Here, for example, are the results of the first strike. The western and northwestern directions were planned for 4 am, that is, the German planes were supposed to cross the Soviet-German border with the first salvos of the artillery offensive, and after 15–20 minutes they had already struck the forward airfields. In the southwestern and southern direction it was an hour later, apparently due to light conditions.

Here is the Kaunas airfield, its southern part. The same parking lots that we saw in the first episode, bomb craters are visible. Not everything is visible, because I had to crop the picture a little.

Kaunas. result of the bombing

People who say that it was impossible to destroy such a large number of aircraft on June 22 are sinning against the truth, because this is confirmed by objective data from German control. Shooting on June 23, this is photo control. And this is what it looked like on earth. This is the same parking lot, hangars, there are planes standing in three rows. It can be seen that the second row is completely destroyed, the back row is completely destroyed, but in the first row there is something more or less alive left. The shooting was carried out on these two planes; in fact, they were also half burned.

Kaunas. The result of the bombing

This gives an idea of ​​the effectiveness of the German strikes. In reality, on June 22, the Red Army Air Force faced an incredibly strong enemy, persistent in achieving its goal, and there was no chance of winning this confrontation, at least not in the first operation.

These are photographs from Signal magazine - the same group of aircraft, but from a different angle. Here is the spread of this “Signal”. Here are all the photos from the Baltic states - these are Kaunas, Kedaniai, Alytus, a visual German report on the hostilities.

Signal Magazine

As for the very first point: another negative factor was that on the morning of June 22, there was no agreement among the military-political leadership, and for a very long time a clear order to start hostilities was not given. In fact, there was no surprise as such, because the troops of the Soviet border districts began to rise on alarm long ago on June 22, and in the Baltic states on the 19th–20th the planes were dispersed where possible, due to airfield construction, to field airfields , and one squadron was always in readiness number two, that is, ready to take off within 5–10 minutes. But for some reason this completely normal state was violated on the night of June 21-22 by the notorious “directive No. 1,” which was handed over to the troops at about one in the morning on June 22. The following postulates were stated there: during an attack, do not get involved in battle, and do not return fire until enemy aircraft open fire. This greatly upset the mood of Soviet commanders and pilots. In films of the Soviet era, we saw where, roughly speaking, Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, or some other characters call Tymoshenko, the People's Commissar of Defense, and say: “Well, look, the Germans are attacking.” And in response they are told not to give in to provocations, to remain calm, and so on. Instead of clearly and clearly telling the commanders how to act, they were given a choice: either to attack, or to fight, or not to fight, to wait, maybe this is a provocation. And in the context of the Air Force, this played a negative role, because while the ground forces did not enter the battle everywhere on June 22, the Air Force on June 22 entered the battle in almost full strength. This moment, when the first blow was not reflected, had a completely negative impact in the future. Even Kaunas, the destroyed airfields that we saw, was done during the first raid, although the Germans did not set such a goal of destruction in this first raid. For them, it was more of a sighting exercise; basically, they set the task of conducting additional reconnaissance and once again clarifying the targets. However, where they had excellent intelligence documents, they acted in powerful groups. Several airfields were destroyed in the Baltic states, and our Air Force suffered serious losses. The situation was the same in Ukraine and Belarus. Even the very first strikes were very effective. But I emphasize once again that this was not their main task, the main one was additional exploration. What happens next is this: some Soviet military leaders who were presented with such a puzzle solved it in the normal way: for example, in the Baltics, the commander of the Air Force was Alekei Ivanovich Ionov, an aviation major general.

Ionov A.I., Major General of Aviation

Here he is, still a brigade commander, in his pre-war rank. He most likely received an order from the chief of staff of the North-Western Front, Klenov, to conduct military operations, and in response to the first strike, they raised (I honestly don’t know if a cover plan was introduced, but at least orders, which were assigned to the formations, clearly corresponded to the cover plan), bomber regiments were raised into the air and went to bomb German airfields and other targets. For example, a man, at that time a captain, Mikhail Antonovich Krivtsov, he was the commander of the first Soviet squadron, which dropped bombs on Tilsit on the morning of June 22.

Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich

There is an interesting fact associated with this man, which, again, speaks of the role of the individual: a directive put a choice in front of people, and the most decisive commanders acted decisively, such as Ionov, Krivtsov, a number of other commanders, while others simply sat on the ground and did not succumb to provocations, some regiments did not even take off into the air. And those who took off obeyed the order not to open fire first, and the German Air Force suffered very small losses in the first raid because of this. Not only did the directive not regulate these actions, but when the planes of the Northwestern Front were already approaching German airfields, bases, etc., from the People's Commissariat of Defense or from the General Staff, it is now difficult to say whether an order was received by radio to turn around and bomb do not produce on German territory. One squadron of the 46th Sbap returned from a combat course. But people like Krivtsov showed determination, own opinion and yet they dropped the bombs, thanks to which the Germans received at least some kind of retaliatory strike at that moment. Further more.

All planes were returned and they were allowed to operate only up to the border. At about 7:15 a.m. there was the so-called “directive No. 2,” which again did not allow the plan to be put into effect; it spoke in “interesting” language and set local tasks. There was a completely incomprehensible phrase to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel - it is not clear why it was said. Otherwise, it was allowed to shoot down enemy planes, act in the tail, that is, after the strike, pursue the enemy plane and bomb its units, but, unfortunately, it arrived in the districts by 9 am. What is 9 am? The Germans carried out the first series of attacks at 4–5 am, the next series was at 7–8 am. The goal of the latter was not only a reconnaissance mission, but also the destruction of aviation at airfields. The second raid of German planes was focused on materiel, additional reconnaissance, that is, the German pilots had already visited German airfields once, they had no questions, they acted clearly. Several regiments in Belarus were simply completely destroyed as a result of these raids. Indeed, completely, they then did not act at all. For example, the 113th and 16th bomber regiments were completely destroyed, not a single one of their aircraft took part in any operations after that. This is not an isolated case. When the directive arrived, because of these morning stop orders, apparently, the comrades were a little on edge and were already afraid to produce some independent things, and this directive also raised questions for them. Interesting fact: in the documents of the 125th Fast Bomber Regiment of the Air Force Western District The division commander persistently, several hours after receiving the directive, tries to force the regiment commander to fly out on a combat mission, he finally, at about 11.45, agrees to do this, and asks to give him a radio message on board every 5 minutes to see if the order has been canceled. This is what people have been brought to by such nonsense. As a result, his last doubts disappeared when they listened to Molotov’s speech about the declaration of war in the air at 12-odd o’clock. By such actions, before lunch, aviation was put in the role of a manager: either we are at war, or we are not at war. Many said and wrote that the connection was interrupted. Many units, whose connection with their superiors was interrupted, actually worked better, because, having no connection, they began to conduct combat operations, without looking at anyone, making a decision on their own. Before lunch, the Germans managed to carry out three, if we take the Baltic states and the Western Front, and two sorties, if we take the South-Western Front, against our airfields. The effect was devastating.

Now, if we take Tilsit, these were the results of the first flight of nine of Mikhail Krivtsov’s 9 sbap, which was the first to drop bombs on the Tilsit railway station.

Tilsit. The result of the bombing

These are the results of SD-2 strikes on Vilnius airfield. The burned-out Chaika and, possibly, its “killer” are visible; here you can see that the pylon for SD-2 is suspended.

Result of SD-2 strikes on Vilnius airfield

Accordingly, the Western Front - the forward airfields of three divisions were attacked, on which by 10.00, after the second raid, they were completely defeated, for example, in the 10th division - 74th regiment, 33rd regiment, 123rd regiment. In the 10th mixed division, the 124th and 126th regiments were defeated. In reality, there remained in the regiments: in the 33rd - not a single aircraft, in the 74th - not a single combat-ready aircraft, the 123rd IAP was able to withdraw 13 fighters, the 126th IAP was able to withdraw 6 fighters, the 124th - 1.

I have one interesting comrade from Poland who said and wrote several times: “Mikhail, this is impossible, only a nuclear strike...” Well, everything was possible, this is confirmed by our documents, not German ones, it is precisely the documents of the Red Army Air Force that confirm this level losses. At an airfield with 50–60 aircraft, in 2–3 sorties the Germans could destroy almost all the equipment. Well, of course, these were both destroyed and damaged cars. But a damaged plane, if your engine crankcase is punctured or even the tires are shot, you cannot repair in the near future.

The 13th Sbap was completely destroyed, the 16th Sbap of the neighboring 11th Division, and the 122nd IAP received heavy defeats. Thus, by 10 am the situation was completely unbearable. There is a telegram, intercepted by the Germans, from a commander from Bialystok, Chernykh, who almost openly asked for help. Ultimately, the only thing he was allowed to do was withdraw to the Pinsk-Baranovichi-Volkovysk-Lida line, that is, 100 kilometers. And by 12 o’clock these formations, almost in full strength, with only one fighter regiment remaining, were redeployed to the second line. But then it came into force that the Red Army was just unfolding, that is, there was no mobilization, so the rear services were in a peacetime state, so retreat and quickly transfer the materials that were available: bombs, a supply of fuel and lubricants, to the airfields of the second runway, to which relocated, it was difficult. The airfields were in the process of being built, there weren’t even garrisons there, and there were mostly builders, units that were constructing the runways. But even this withdrawal did not guarantee anything: the Germans already bombed the Lida and Pinsk airfield in the afternoon. It is interesting that units from the Bialystok salient first retreated to the Bialystok area, they were bombed from there within 2-3 sorties, and they, too, were forced to travel further after lunch. Having moved to the second line, the regiments did not conduct combat operations due to lack of material resources and became passive witnesses. Approximately the same situation arose in the Baltic states, but with the addition that the energetic commander of the Air Force was constantly trying to act according to his plans. He was one of the few leaders of the Red Army Air Force who understood that it was necessary to fight for dominance until the very end, but, unfortunately, on June 22, certain circumstances did not allow him to do this. Why? I have already said that the Air Force is subordinate to the ground forces, to the ground commanders. At 8–9 o'clock in the morning there were breakthroughs of German groups on Taurage and Alytus, so the front commander or chief of staff - it is difficult to establish who really led this - gave the order to strike these retractable tank wedges, respectively, the entire Northwestern Air Force front were focused on fighting these units. That is, German planes continued to attack new Soviet airfields or repeat attacks on old ones; they operated throughout the day, without stopping, even in small groups. The Soviet Air Force did not respond to them in principle, acting against the motorized units of the Wehrmacht.

The belated reaction of the Western Front, what I already described, the commander of one of the regiments asked for a radiogram to be sent to him every 5 minutes on board, whether the flight had been cancelled. A little later, General Pavlov gave the order for active military operations against the enemy, around 5.30. An order was issued for actions against German airfields, but at 6–7, “amateur activity” was prohibited, and the Air Force stood for several more hours under a hail of blows. The Western Front Air Force strikes were late, but they happened. By the way, what’s interesting is that one of the regiments, the 125th Sbap, as I already said, attacked the Berzhniki airfield in the Suwalki salient. The Nine attacked, bombed, even damaged one German plane and returned completely without losses. There was also an airfield in Biała Podlaska, this was even later: one of the 130th Sbap also attacked, and the Germans had losses. The most interesting thing is that the SB was bombed from a height of 5 kilometers and still hit. To be objective, only two attacks were carried out on German airfields: one airfield in the Suwalki salient, Berzhniki, and one in Biała Podlaska, in the Brest region, to the west.

Plan for the location of the air force in the Baltics

Despite these timid attacks, on June 22, in the morning in the Baltic states and in the afternoon in the area of ​​Suwalki and Brest, they were practically ineffective (the loss of three aircraft was worth nothing). However, after this, the Germans did not use fighter aircraft in repeated attacks, but used them for loitering and even carried out an airfield maneuver, that is, they transferred fighter regiments to their airfields so as not to be under attack. This again suggests that if the Red Army Air Force had acted according to the cover plan for German airfields, no matter how effective it was, we now understand that most of the airfields would have been attacked in vain, since there would have been no German aircraft there. However, the actions themselves, like a magnet, would attract German planes and, accordingly, would not give them the opportunity to attack Soviet airfields. And so it happened: the regiments of the advanced Western Front were thrown back from the border before lunch on June 22, in the Baltic states the same process occurred after 2 hours. As soon as the sorties against the German columns ended, most of the units were immediately moved to the Riga area, in the area of ​​Daugavpils, Mitava, that is, most of the airfields, and most of the airfields of the district were generally located within a 200 km zone, they were abandoned and the units moved to a distance of 200– 250 km from the border. Accordingly, the advanced units of the Soviet troops, which were still fighting on the borders, were thereby completely deprived of support from fighters. That is, while the bombers could still fly quite normally with a bomb load, the fighters were practically unable to operate from such a distance. The departure from the Baltic states had been suggested even earlier, and commanders at all levels asked for it, but the task was to bomb tank columns, and they still carried out these sorties and only after that redeployed.

The situation was approximately the same in the Kiev Military District. The Germans also attacked virtually advanced airfields along the entire border period, starting from Kovel to Lvov, along the border to Chernivtsi. The Germans had the audacity in the confrontation with the Kyiv Military District, having a limited number of forces, to even bomb Kyiv. Neither Minsk was bombed on June 22, nor Riga was bombed, but for some reason Kyiv was, although the Germans had very limited forces in the Kyiv district zone. KOVO itself had the most powerful air force, more than 2000 aircraft, and most importantly, most of the fighter air regiments of the Kyiv district were personnel, that is, they could repel German aircraft, which was done. The Luftwaffe suffered the greatest losses precisely in the zone of the Kyiv Military District. For example, the 3rd group of the 51st bomber squadron operating in the area of ​​Stanislav and Lvov lost about half of its strength, that is, 15 aircraft. The 7th squadron of the 3rd group of the 55th squadron, which in the first flight bombed the airfield in the area of ​​Brody and Dubno with 6 planes, of the 6 planes that took off, lost 2 over the target, 2 burned out (one fell on Soviet territory, one landed at the airfield there , but burned out), and two were damaged with wounded shooters and landed at the airfield in Klimentsovo. That is, the Soviet Air Force also gave a very definite answer if the commanders had the determination to act without orders from above. But, nevertheless, all airfields were practically attacked, some airfields were simply destroyed, for example, the airfield of the 62nd Shap Lisyachich was attacked several times, and literally in the first flight 50 aircraft were destroyed. The Chernivtsi airfield was attacked twice, but even after the first sortie, most of the 149th was destroyed. The neighboring airfield was also attacked, most of the 247th IAP was destroyed, and the total losses somewhere reached 100 aircraft.

There is an opinion that in Moldova, through some incredible tricks, the district command managed to avoid defeat due to the fact that they were dispersed among operational airfields. I want to say that this is a myth. The fact is that the Germans were separated from the Romanians somewhere along the meridian of Chisinau, and, accordingly, the German 4th Air Corps, which was based in Romania, operated precisely at airfields in the Chernivtsi region. A little west of Chisinau there was an airfield of the 55th IAP, Balti, which was attacked several times on June 22, and also suffered heavy losses, which were not reflected in the reports, which gave the opportunity to some of the officers of this district to write in their memoirs, to promote themselves that they succeeded . Although, in fact, if their opponents were not the Romanians, but the Germans, most likely, the fate of the district air force would also be sad.

In the Kiev Military District, Soviet units practically did not retreat to airfields; only some units withdrew on June 22, including from Chernivtsi. Why did this happen? In fact, the strip from Kovel to Stanislav (on the Ukrainian side) is a rather undeveloped strip, and there was a problem with airfields in general. Therefore, the Germans had airfields quite far from the border, and our closest airfields in the Lvov region were somewhere 100 kilometers from the border. Accordingly, German planes were forced to operate at full range in some places and were unable to achieve decisive success at all airfields with bombing. They suffered heavy losses.

The command of the Air Force front, apparently, did not even try to draw any conclusions. In addition, according to some reports, the front air force commander Ptukhin was already removed from leadership, and, apparently, on June 22 did not even participate in combat planning. At least there is no serious combat order.

Diagram of the deployment of air force units on the Western Front

If we take the Baltics and the Western Front, who at least tried to act on German airfields in response, then there was no 9th Army on the Southern Front and in the Air Force, although reconnaissance activities were carried out. If anyone has read Pokryshkin’s memoirs, he describes a reconnaissance raid on Romanian airfields around lunchtime on June 22, when he arrived, reported to the command, and was told: “Sorry, we will have other goals.” And the Air Force of the 9th Army in the afternoon received an order to bomb the crossings on the Prut, and from the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd regiment was given the task of bombing German tank units that crossed the Bug and advanced on Vladimir-Volynsky. That's all.

That is, on June 22, by 18:00, the Soviet Air Forces in the Baltic States and Belarus were driven to the rear line of the airfields, practically no military operations were conducted after 18:00, and the only thing they could do was patrol, patrol over their own airfields, and cover it. The Luftwaffe finished its sorties at the airfields somewhere later, around 20 o’clock, but it was already “catching up” when German reconnaissance officers discovered that detour to the rear line and tried to reconnoiter in order to continue the operation the next day. The same thing happens in the zone of the South-Western Front, the Southern Front. The enemy completely controlled the sky over the forward lines, the Red Army Air Force practically did not participate in patrolling over the borders, forward units, and the only thing that happened was a blow to the German troops who were crossing the Bug in the Vladimir-Volynsky area.

The Germans, by their actions on June 22, especially in the first half of the day, ensured dominance in the zone of the North-Western and Western fronts somewhere at a distance of 200-250 km from the border, completely knocking out Soviet units from there. They were not yet completely defeated, but they were defeated, and the territory remained with the enemy. In the Southwestern Front, many units were also driven out of their airfields, not all, but very many. When leadership of the Southwestern Front was resumed on June 23, almost all units were redeployed further, deeper into the territory, 50–100 km, that is, to the Ternopil and Rivne region. A situation arose when there were no Soviet air units about 200 km from the borders. For a fighter, 200 km at that time is just to fly and come back, time for air battle No. The units that were along the border had already lost complete cover. Conclusion: thanks to its unique training, its technical capabilities, perseverance in achieving goals, a well-formed plan, and tactically competent actions, the Luftwaffe, unfortunately, managed to defeat the Red Army Air Force on June 22.

Loading ammunition

What could be the positive aspects? First: there was no defeatist mood, despite the fact that many are now trying to create some kind of image of scurrying pilots and fleeing generals. All this is obvious nonsense. Part of the Air Force of the North-Western Front and part of the Air Force of the Western Front retreated, having strictly received orders, but if they had retreated earlier without an order, they could have saved part of the forces, part of the funds. The Soviet pilots did, in my opinion, everything possible. There are confirmed episodes of 4 or even 5 ramming attacks. Quite fierce battles took place along the entire front line. However, the Germans were not “whipping boys”; they gained very serious experience in Western Europe, and besides, on occasion they tried to avoid serious military clashes. As an example, these are the actions of the 1st German bomber squadron against the Liepaja airfield. The 148th Fighter Squadron was based there. aviation regiment. The Germans, using such a simple technique as approaching from the sea, destroyed and damaged 41 aircraft of this regiment in one day. There were no German fighters there at all. There were no serious air battles for the reason that the Germans came in, bombed and dived towards the sea. On I-153 it was very difficult to catch up with Yu-88. This served, at one time, as one of Solonin’s theories when he found an operational report of the North-Western Front, where it was written that there were 14 aircraft losses per day, and on the morning of the 23rd in Riga there were 27 aircraft of the regiment. And he says: “Where did the 30 cars go?” In fact, due to inconsistencies in operational documents, only the very first operational report of the regiment or combat report reached the front headquarters. After this, the battles for Liepaja began, and accordingly, the regiment’s headquarters began to move towards Riga and try to retreat. Apparently, the data was not transmitted, so only the first encryption message reached front headquarters, which mentioned 14 destroyed aircraft. Then there were more losses, and the last loss was around 8 pm, when by chance the Germans, apparently, got in at the moment when the planes were refueling and destroyed almost the entire squadron. But this again suggests that the Germans did not stop acting. They had success in the morning, they did not stop developing it and, characteristically, even attacked targets that had already been abandoned by Soviet units. Some airfields, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, there were no combat-ready units of the Red Army there at all, there were rear services, there were planes that had no pilots, or they were faulty, old and subject to transfer to other units. However, the Germans continued to hammer until the evening, thus depriving pilots who could have moved there from other airfields and picked up materiel from such an opportunity. The Luftwaffe did not intend to end the fight for air supremacy on June 22, and what they had succeeded in, they happily continued on June 23, and began even earlier, at about 3 o’clock in the morning.

Some Soviet commanders understood this very well. Alexey Ivanovich Ionov, for example, as soon as the opportunity allowed him, as soon as they completed the battle with German mechanized units, he took the regiment to the Dvina line. Even before the appearance of Directive No. 3, which implied a Soviet attack on Lublin, he had already given the order on the morning of June 23 to act according to the cover plan. Just as pilots, regiment and squadron commanders spent the whole day trying to counteract the enemy as best they could, so at the level of Air Force commanders there were people who were well versed in the situation, understood and tried to respond adequately. Unfortunately, the tools that were available at that time did not yet allow this to be done fully. That is, it was almost impossible to fight the Luftwaffe that was there at that moment. One more point: anti-aircraft artillery could have protected us from the first strikes, to a certain extent. Why did this happen? The Red Army was in the stage of reorganization, most of the anti-aircraft units in the territory of western Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states were in the process of formation. Many people remember from Soviet films, especially when they make accusations and say: why were your anti-aircraft divisions somewhere at the training ground? The answer is obvious: the anti-aircraft gunners carried out combat coordination, because for most of the Red Army soldiers of these units it was their first year of service, and they still had to train. Again, the Red Army was not mobilized, so the regular units of anti-aircraft machine guns that were available at each airfield were not only understaffed and instead of 9 machine guns they had only 3, well, quad Maximum installations, but they also felt a shortage of personnel , and there was simply no one to put many machine guns into operation. Unlike, again, the Germans. The Luftwaffe had a completely different organization, and the anti-aircraft units were subordinate to the Wehrmacht, and less, most of the anti-aircraft units and anti-aircraft guns were subordinate to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe command could build an umbrella over whatever arrangement they saw fit. Accordingly, the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht were in combat-ready condition at the beginning of the war and had a huge amount of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If in the Soviet Union before the war they produced about 1.5 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns of 25 mm and 37 mm, which practically did not have time to be used by the troops, because they were mostly released at the end of the 40th and the beginning of the 41st and were just beginning to join the troops. In addition, there was a very big problem because there was very little ammunition for these anti-aircraft guns. All the documents that we looked at were 1 ammo in the unit, and in the warehouses of the districts there were no 37-mm shells at all, as well as 85 mm for heavy anti-aircraft guns.

What conclusion could be drawn from this and why was it not drawn? Probably, that defeat was morally difficult, so there was no serious analysis. Some commanders of formations wrote reports in hot pursuit, but they were still unable to rise above the situation, accordingly, everyone had their own opinion, no one analyzed it, did not collect it, and reports on the combat operations of the Southwestern Front, Northwestern and Western , they were made: Southwestern - in August 1941, Western Front - generally at the beginning of 42. By this time, at the headquarters of the Western Front Air Force there were no longer people who participated in all these events, that is, the reports are half-hearted, to be honest, about nothing. The situation was not analyzed, no conclusions were even drawn as to why this unfortunate cruel defeat occurred. Subsequently, in 42-43, the Soviet Air Force stepped on the same rake. There are no examples when an attack on German airfields could end with such an effect as that of the Luftwaffe. For example, push back Luftawaffe units from these airfields and gain air supremacy over some area, even a local one. That is, no instrument was created, it even seems to me that it was not created throughout the war, any adequate instrument, nor were any specialized bombs prepared technically. This lecture was intended largely to say that history teaches no one anything. The fact that it was possible to draw conclusions and then effectively conduct military operations - unfortunately, was not analyzed, did not materialize into conclusions or instructions. The Red Army then, unfortunately, followed the same rake for almost the entire war. And it is impossible to even remember such serious operations as those carried out by the Luftwaffe. Often cited events Battle of Kursk, supposedly there was something there, but recent research shows that the preparatory things, when attempts at destruction raids were carried out in May-June, failed miserably and were akin, for example, to the attempts on June 25, 1941 to bomb Finnish aviation from combat operations. The same thing: the lack of serious targeted reconnaissance, specialized ammunition, and strike tactics. The Germans must be given their due: they continued and expanded this operation, that is, on June 23–24–25, they bombed Soviet aircraft in this zone, somewhere around 200–250 km. This was the last line, because, as we saw, the configuration of the new border, mainly airfields were built on these annexed territories. And after that, strictly speaking, the Soviet Air Force had a paradoxical situation; they were forced to retreat to the area of ​​Pskov, Smolensk, Mogilev, Proskurovo, Kyiv, and so on. The retreat was irreversible, vast spaces were no longer covered by anything, and the Germans could do whatever they wanted there. Soviet aviation was no longer there. Literally on the 26th, relocation began to an even more rear line 400–500 km from the border, and the fighting, in general, was still ongoing. Lvov was taken on June 30, the battles for Riga took place on June 27–28–29, Minsk, respectively, everyone also knows when the encirclement was closed at the end of June. They lost air support, all because of the actions of the Luftwaffe. This is not connected with defeatist sentiments, with a reluctance to fight, with a lack of fighting spirit and patriotism. In no case. People on the ground did everything they could. They fought to the last opportunity, having that technique, that preparation. Many died heroic deaths. We don’t even know most of the heroes - the same Krivtsov who was the first to drop bombs on German territory. He died in the 44th regiment commander; he was not even a Hero of the Soviet Union. The same Ionov - he, unfortunately, was arrested on June 24 in a large group of aviation commanders. A person has a completely unique destiny. He was a pilot back in the First world war, then went through all the stages of his military career, commanded a squadron and a brigade for a very long time, graduated from the academy, participated in the Finnish campaign as the chief of staff of the 14th Air Force Army, and acted in the most adequate manner in the border battle. This man had a clear focus, a clear understanding of the essence of the first operation and many processes in general. His talent lay not even in the field of knowledge, but in the field of military art. However, he was arrested and shot on February 42 with a large group of commanders, although I believe that this man was worthy of becoming an air marshal and commander of the Red Army Air Force.

In conclusion, maybe I’ll add a spoonful of honey to our sad story. The only place where the Soviet Air Force managed to defend its airfields, and to defend them for a whole month, was Moldova. In Moldova there were Romanians who were not at all as professional as their colleagues in the Luftwaffe, plus they did not have the same tools as the Luftwaffe, that is, technical training, ammunition, reconnaissance, and so on. The first flights of the Romanians were akin to the Soviet ones. The Romanian Air Force, allocated for combat operations, all ended up at the Bolgarika airfield, this is in the Izmail region, only one Soviet fighter regiment, the 67th, was based there, and all day the Romanians tried to bomb this regiment, attack, and as a result they lost more than a dozen aircraft, actually confirmed shot down. At the same time, the regiment itself lost a meager amount: one pilot with the plane in the air, 5 planes damaged and two more pilots wounded. That is, the whole day the regiment fought off all the Romanian Air Force, in fact, and did not give the slightest opportunity to the descendants of the Roman patricians to do anything. That is, all groups were scattered, defeated, and suffered losses with minimal losses to the Red Army. In many ways - the role of the individual. The chief of staff of the regiment developed tactics, this is confirmed in documents and memoirs - patrolling in large groups over the airfield. He constantly kept one or two fully equipped squadrons over the airfield, they replaced each other, and only single groups of aircraft could break through to the airfield, completely by accident, which could slip between patrols. Here's the story. If the 4th Luftwaffe Air Corps had not operated in parts of the Southwestern Front in the Chernivtsi region, but had attacked Chisinau and Odessa, I think the outcome would have been different. And so this allowed the Soviet units in the area of ​​Izmail, Chisinau, Odessa to make their feasible contribution to the beginning of victorious actions.

The war came to Sevastopol earlier than to other cities of the Soviet Union - the first bombs were dropped on the city at 3:15 am. Earlier than the officially approved time of the start of the Great Patriotic War. It was at 3 hours 15 minutes that the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky, called the capital and reported to Admiral Kuznetsov that an air raid had been carried out on Sevastopol and anti-aircraft artillery was returning fire.

The Germans sought to block the fleet. They dropped bottom proximity mines of enormous power. The bombs were lowered by parachute; when the shell reached the surface of the water, the fastenings came off and the bomb sank to the bottom. These mines had specific targets - Soviet ships. But one of them fell on a residential area - about 20 people were killed, more than 100 were injured.

Warships and air defenses were ready to launch retaliatory strikes. At 3:06 a.m., the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Ivan Eliseev, gave the order to open fire on the fascist planes that had invaded far into air space THE USSR. This is how he left his mark in the series historical events- gave the first combat order to repel enemy attacks.

It is interesting that for a long time Eliseev’s feat was either hushed up or fitted into the framework of the official chronology of military operations. That is why in some sources you can find information that the order was given at 4 am. In those days, this order was given in defiance of the orders of the higher military command and, according to the laws, it should have been executed.

On June 22 at 3 hours 48 minutes in Sevastopol there were already the first casualties of the Great Patriotic War. 12 minutes before the official announcement of the start of hostilities, German bombs ended the lives of civilians. In Sevastopol, a monument to the first victims of the war was built in memory of them.

On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of Nazi Germany, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and carried out bombing airstrikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

The Great Patriotic War began. They were waiting for her, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin’s distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates for the start of the war were given, for example May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to a later date. There is another factor that is extremely rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. Thus, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the main attack directed in an area where this was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like misinformation, so it was on this day that the attack was least expected.
And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic states this date is considered positive, giving “hope for liberation.”

Russia

§4. Invasion of the USSR. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War
At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, relied mainly on the surprise attack factor, blitzkrieg tactics (“ lightning war"). The defeat of the USSR was planned within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
In the first days of the war, the German army caused serious damage to the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic states. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July 5 million people had been drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps that had formed at the front.

V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. 9th grade. Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, Ventana-Graf Publishing House, 2013.

Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
While fulfilling the grandiose tasks of Stalin's third five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government did not for a minute forget about the possibility of a new "attack by the imperialists on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 in his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try to carry out a military attack on the USSR on occasion.”
Comrade Stalin demanded strengthening the defense capability of our country. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, and Osoaviakhim in every possible way. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies can take us by surprise...”
Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, forced them to more vigilantly monitor the machinations of their enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were seeking to unleash a new bloody war, with the help of which they hoped to win world domination. Hitler declared the Germans to be the “superior race”, and all other peoples to be inferior, inferior races. The Nazis treated the Slavic peoples with particular hatred and, first of all, the great Russian people, who more than once in their history fought against the German aggressors.
The Nazis based their plan on the plan for a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and a rapid advance deep into Russia, right up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
The monstrous war machine of the Hitlerite imperialists began its movement in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.

Textbook “History of the USSR”, 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Fokht, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

Austria, Germany

Chapter “From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat”
After careful preparation that lasted many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany began a “war of total annihilation” against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the German Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called Barbarossa. It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of the trained German military machine, Soviet troops would not be able to provide worthy resistance. In a few months Hitler's command seriously expected to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would completely demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, within a few weeks the Nazis were driven back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

Textbook “History” for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

Holt McDougal. The World History.
For high school high school, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

Hitler began planning an attack on his ally the USSR in the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeastern Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a bridgehead in Southeastern Europe for an attack on the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
In preparation for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threat of force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis powers. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, resisted. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell 11 days later. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, a roar German tanks and the drone of planes marked the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not prepared for this attack. Although he had the largest army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans were 500 miles (804.67 kilometers) inside the Soviet Union. Retreating, Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the enemy's path. The Russians used this scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

Section 7. World War II
The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. German army, which numbered about three million soldiers, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - towards Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - towards Moscow and in the south - towards Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans besieged Leningrad and Sevastopol and came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main goal of the Nazis - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - was never realized. Vast spaces and the early Russian winter, with fierce resistance from Soviet troops and ordinary residents of the country, thwarted the German plan for a lightning war. At the beginning of December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and pushed back enemy troops 200 kilometers from Moscow.

History textbook for the 8th grade of primary school (Klett publishing house, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

Never before had our people reacted to a German invasion except with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov, in a trembling voice, reported the German attack, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
Russian soldiers aroused hostility among the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and passionate about music; laughter and playing musical instruments could be heard from the places where they gathered.

Lauri Vakhtre. Textbook “Turning moments in Estonian history.”

Bulgaria

Chapter 2. Globalization of the conflict (1941–1942)
Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Having begun the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of “living space”, proclaimed in the book “My Struggle” (“Mein Kampf”). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet Pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating “Jewish Marxists.”
However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shocked by the sudden attack, drained of blood Stalin's repressions and poorly prepared Soviet army was quickly rejected. In a few weeks, German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht was unable to defeat the enemy in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.

Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership developed plans to attack the USSR and develop the territory and use its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was supposed to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

Plan for a “lightning war” against the USSR
The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against “Asian Russia” by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary joining the Red Army became widespread. The people's militia became widespread. In the front-line zone, fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and material assets began from territories threatened by occupation.
The military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The headquarters was headed by J. Stalin. Italy
June 22, 1941
Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for graduating 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for 11th grade of high school "Our new story", publishing house "Dar Aun", 2008.
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. A broad front opened in eastern Europe. Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the end of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 took an ambiguous position of condemning “opposing imperialisms,” revised it in favor of an alliance with democracy and the fight against fascism.
What the USSR is main goal Hitler's expansionist intentions were no mystery to anyone, including Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Great Britain. So when the German offensive (codenamed Barbarossa) began on June 22, 1941, along a 1,600-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, a lack of preparedness reinforced by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red Army of the army of its best military leaders, initially made the task of the aggressor easier.
An offensive in which the Italian expeditionary force also took part, which was sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltic states, in the south through Ukraine with the aim of reaching the oil regions in the Caucasus.

“On June 21 at 21.00, a soldier who fled from the German army, Alfred Liskov, was detained at the Sokal commandant’s office. Since there was no translator at the commandant’s office, I ordered the commandant of the site, Captain Bershadsky, to deliver the soldier to the detachment headquarters in Vladimir by truck.

At 0.30 on June 22, 1941, the soldier arrived in Vladimir-Volynsk. Through an interpreter, at approximately 1 o'clock in the morning, soldier Liskov indicated that on June 22 at dawn the Germans were to cross the border. I immediately reported this to the person on duty at the military headquarters, Brigade Commissar Maslovsky. At the same time, I personally informed the commander of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov, by telephone, who was suspicious of my message and did not take it into account.

I personally was also not firmly convinced of the veracity of soldier Liskov’s message, but nevertheless I called the commandants of the sections and ordered to strengthen the security of the state border, to post special listeners to the river. Bug and in the event of the Germans crossing the river, destroy them with fire. At the same time, he ordered that if anything suspicious is noticed (any movement on the adjacent side), immediately report to me personally. I was at headquarters all the time.

At 1.00 on June 22, the commandants of the sites reported to me that nothing suspicious had been noticed on the adjacent side, everything was calm..."(“Mechanisms of War” with reference to RGVA, f. 32880, on. 5, d. 279, l. 2. Copy).

Despite doubts about the reliability of the information transmitted by the German soldier, and the skepticism towards it on the part of the commander of the 5th Army, it was promptly transferred “to the top”.

From a telephone message from the UNKGB in the Lvov region to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

" On June 22, 1941, at 3:10 a.m., the NKGB for the Lviv region sent the following message by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR: “The German corporal who crossed the border in the Sokal region revealed the following: his name is Liskov Alfred Germanovich, 30 years old, worker, carpenter of a furniture factory in Kolberg (Bavaria), where he left his wife, child, mother and father.

The corporal served in the 221st Engineer Regiment of the 15th Division. The regiment is located in the village of Tselenzha, 5 km north of Sokal. He was drafted into the army from the reserves in 1939.

He considers himself a communist, is a member of the Union of Red Front Soldiers, and says that life in Germany is very difficult for soldiers and workers.

Before the evening, his company commander, Lieutenant Schultz, gave the order and stated that tonight, after artillery preparation, their unit would begin crossing the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons. As a supporter of Soviet power, having learned about this, he decided to run to us and inform us.”(“History in documents” with reference to “1941. Documents”. Soviet archives. "Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU", 1990, No. 4.").

G.K. Zhukov recalls: “At about 24 hours on June 21, the commander of the Kyiv district M.P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on the HF [...] another German soldier appeared in our units - 222- th infantry regiment of the 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, appeared to the border guards and reported that at 4 o'clock the German troops would go on the offensive. M. P. Kirponos was ordered to quickly transmit the directive to the troops to put them on combat readiness... ".

However, there was no time left. The above-mentioned chief of the 90th border detachment, M.S. Bychkovsky, continues his testimony as follows:

“...Due to the fact that the translators in the detachment are weak, I called a German language teacher from the city, who speaks excellent German, and Liskov again repeated the same thing, that is, that the Germans were preparing to attack the USSR at dawn on June 22, 1941. Named himself a communist and stated that he had come specifically to warn on his own initiative.

Without finishing the interrogation of the soldier, I heard heavy artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant’s office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken..."(cit. source) The Great Patriotic War began.

03:00 - 13:00, General Staff - Kremlin. The first hours of the war

Was Germany's attack on the USSR completely unexpected? What did the generals, the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense do in the first hours of the war? There is a version that they simply slept through the beginning of the war - both in the border units and in Moscow. With the message about the bombing of Soviet cities and the transition fascist troops During the offensive, confusion and panic arose in the capital.

This is how G.K. Zhukov recalls the events of that night: “On the night of June 22, 1941, all employees of the General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense were ordered to remain in their places. It was necessary to transmit to the districts as quickly as possible a directive to bring border troops to combat readiness. At this time, the People's Commissar of Defense and I were in continuous negotiations with district commanders and chiefs of staff, who reported to us about the increasing noise on the other side of the border. They received this information from border guards and forward covering units. Everything indicated that German troops were moving closer to the border."

The first message about the start of the war arrived at the General Staff at 3:07 a.m. on June 22, 1941.

Zhukov writes: “At 3:07 a.m. the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, F.S. Oktyabrsky, called me on HF and said: “The fleet’s VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communications] system reports that a large number of unknown aircraft are approaching from the sea; the fleet is in full combat readiness. I ask for instructions" [...]

“At 4 o’clock I spoke with F.S. again. Oktyabrsky. He reported in a calm tone: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike the ships was foiled. But there is destruction in the city."

As can be seen from these lines, the start of the war did not take the Black Sea Fleet by surprise. The air raid was repulsed.

03.30: Chief of Staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reported on an enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus.

03:33 The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reported on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine.

03:40: The commander of the Baltic district, General Kuznetsov, reported on the raid on Kaunas and other cities.

03:40: People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko ordered Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov to call Stalin at the “Near Dacha” and report on the start of hostilities. After listening to Zhukov, Stalin ordered:

Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to call all members of the Politburo.

04.10: Western and Baltic special districts reported the beginning of hostilities of German troops on land sectors.

At 4:30 a.m., members of the Politburo, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov gathered in the Kremlin. Stalin asked to urgently contact the German embassy.

The embassy reported that Ambassador Count von Schulenburg requests to be received for an urgent message. Molotov went to meet with Schulenberg. Returning to the office he said:

The German government declared war on us.

At 7:15 a.m., J.V. Stalin signed a directive to the Armed Forces of the USSR on repelling Hitler’s aggression.

At 9:30 a.m., J.V. Stalin, in the presence of S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov, edited and signed a decree on mobilization and the introduction of martial law in the European part of the country, as well as on the formation of the High Command Headquarters and a number of other documents .

On the morning of June 22, it was decided that at 12 o’clock V. M. Molotov would address the people of the Soviet Union by radio with a Statement of the Soviet Government.

“J.V. Stalin,” recalls Zhukov, “being seriously ill, of course, could not make an appeal to the Soviet people. He and Molotov drew up a statement.”

“At about 13 o’clock I.V. Stalin called me,” Zhukov writes in his memoirs, “and said:

Our front commanders do not have sufficient experience in directing the combat operations of troops and, apparently, are somewhat at a loss. The Politburo decided to send you to the Southwestern Front as a representative of the High Command Headquarters. We will send Shaposhnikov and Kulik to the Western Front. I called them to my place and gave appropriate instructions. You need to fly immediately to Kyiv and from there, together with Khrushchev, go to the front headquarters in Ternopil.

I asked:

And who will lead the General Staff in such a difficult situation?
J.V. Stalin replied:

Leave Vatutin in charge.

Don't waste time, we'll get by somehow.

I called home so that they wouldn’t wait for me, and 40 minutes later I was already in the air. Then I just remembered that I hadn’t eaten anything since yesterday. The pilots helped me out by treating me to strong tea and sandwiches." (chronology compiled from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov).

05:30. Hitler announces the start of war with the USSR

On June 22, 1941, at 5:30 a.m., Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, in a special broadcast of Greater German Radio, read out Adolf Hitler’s appeal to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union.

“...Today there are 160 Russian divisions on our border,” the address said, in particular. “In recent weeks, there have been continuous violations of this border, not only ours, but also in the far north and in Romania. Russian pilots are amused by this that they carelessly fly over this border, as if they want to show us that they already feel like the masters of this territory. On the night of June 17-18, Russian patrols again invaded the territory of the Reich and were driven out only after a long firefight. But now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow.

German people! At the moment, the greatest troop movement in terms of length and volume that the world has ever seen is taking place. In alliance with their Finnish comrades are the victorious fighters at Narvik near the Arctic Ocean. German divisions under the command of the conqueror of Norway, they defend Finnish soil together with the Finnish heroes of the struggle for freedom under the command of their marshal. From East Prussia German units deployed to the Carpathians eastern front. On the banks of the Prut and in the lower reaches of the Danube to the Black Sea coast, Romanian and German soldiers unite under the command of the head of state Antonescu.

The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby save everyone.

Therefore, today I have decided to once again place the fate and future of the German Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord help us in this struggle!"

Battles along the entire front

Fascist troops went on the offensive along the entire front. Not everywhere the attack developed according to the scenario conceived by the German General Staff. The Black Sea Fleet repelled the air raid. In the south and north, the Wehrmacht failed to gain an overwhelming advantage. Here heavy positional battles ensued.

Army Group North came across fierce resistance from Soviet tankers near the city of Alytus. Capturing the crossing of the Neman was critical for the advancing German forces. Here, units of the 3rd Tank Group of the Nazis stumbled upon organized resistance from the 5th Tank Division.

Only dive bombers managed to break the resistance of Soviet tankers. The 5th Panzer Division did not have air cover and, under the threat of destruction of manpower and materiel, began to retreat.

Bombers dived at Soviet tanks before noon on June 23. The division lost almost all its armored vehicles and, in fact, ceased to exist. However, on the first day of the war, the tankers did not leave the line and stopped the advance of fascist troops deeper into the country.

The main blow of the German troops fell on Belarus. Here the Brest Fortress stood in the way of the Nazis. In the first seconds of the war, a hail of bombs fell on the city, followed by heavy artillery fire. After which units of the 45th Infantry Division went on the attack.

The hurricane fire of the Nazis took the defenders of the fortress by surprise. However, the garrison, numbering 7-8 thousand people, offered fierce resistance to the advancing German units.

By mid-day on June 22, the Brest Fortress was completely surrounded. Part of the garrison managed to escape from the “cauldron”; part was blocked and continued to resist.

By the evening of the first day of the war, the Nazis managed to capture the southwestern part of the fortress city, the northeast was under the control of Soviet troops. Foci of resistance remained in fascist-controlled territories.

Despite complete encirclement and overwhelming superiority in men and equipment, the Nazis were unable to break the resistance of the defenders Brest Fortress. Skirmishes continued here until November 1941.

The battle for air supremacy

From the first minutes of the war, the USSR Air Force entered into a fierce battle with enemy aircraft. The attack was sudden; some of the planes did not have time to take off from the airfields and were destroyed on the ground. The Belarusian Military District took the greatest blow. The 74th attack air regiment, which was based in Pruzhany, was attacked at about 4 a.m. by Messerschmitts. The regiment did not have air defense systems, the planes were not dispersed, as a result of which enemy aircraft destroyed the equipment as if at a training ground.

A completely different situation arose in the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment. Here the pilots entered the battle at 3.30 in the morning, when Lieutenant Mochalov’s flight shot down a German plane over Brest. This is how the Aviation Encyclopedia “Corner of the Sky” website describes the battle of the 33rd IAP (article by A. Gulyas):

“Soon about 20 He-111s flew into the regiment’s airfield under the cover of a small group of Bf-109s. At that time there was only one squadron there, which took off and entered into battle. Soon it was joined by the other three squadrons, returning from patrolling the Brest-Kobrin area . In the battle, the enemy lost 5 aircraft. Two He-111s were destroyed by Lieutenant Gudimov. He won the last victory at 5.20 am, ramming a German bomber. Twice more, the regiment successfully intercepted large groups of Heinkels on the far approaches to the airfield. After the next interception, those returning Already on the last liters of fuel, the regiment's I-16s were attacked by Messerschmitts. No one could take off to help. The airfield was subjected to continuous attack for almost an hour. By 10 o'clock in the morning there was not a single aircraft left in the regiment capable of taking off..."

The 123rd Fighter Aviation Regiment, whose airfield was located near the town of Imenin, just like the 74th Attack Aviation Regiment, did not have anti-aircraft cover. However, its pilots were in the air from the first minutes of the war:

“By 5.00 in the morning, B.N. Surin already had a personal victory - he shot down a Bf-109. On the fourth combat flight, being seriously wounded, he brought his Seagull to the airfield, but was unable to land. Apparently, he died in the cockpit during leveling ... Boris Nikolaevich Surin fought 4 battles, personally shot down 3 German planes. But this did not become a record. The best sniper of the day was the young pilot Ivan Kalabushkin: at dawn he destroyed two Ju-88s, closer to noon - a He-111, and At sunset, two Bf-109s fell victims to his nimble Seagulls!..” - reports the Aviation Encyclopedia.

“About eight in the morning, four fighters, piloted by Mr. M.P. Mozhaev, Lt. G.N. Zhidov, P.S. Ryabtsev and Nazarov, took off against eight Messerschmitt-109s. Taking Zhidov’s car in pincers , the Germans knocked it out. Helping out a comrade, Mozhaev shot down one fascist. Zhidov set fire to the second. Having used up the ammunition, Ryabtsev rammed the third enemy. Thus, in this battle the enemy lost 3 vehicles, and we lost one. For 10 hours, the pilots of the 123rd IAP fought "Heavy battles, performing 10 -14 and even 17 sorties. The technicians, working under enemy fire, ensured the readiness of the aircraft. During the day, the regiment shot down about 30 (according to other sources, more than 20) enemy aircraft, losing 9 of its own in the air."

Unfortunately, in the conditions of lack of communication and reigning confusion, the timely delivery of ammunition and fuel was not organized. The fighting vehicles fought until the last drop of gasoline and the last cartridge. After which they froze dead on the airfield and became easy prey for the Nazis.

The total losses of Soviet aircraft on the first day of the war amounted to 1,160 aircraft.

12:00. Radio speech by V.M. Molotov

At noon on June 22, 1941, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union:

"CITIZENS AND CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the Soviet Union regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers.

After the attack, the German Ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg at 5:30 a.m. made me, as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a statement on behalf of his government that the German government had decided to go to war against the Soviet Union in connection with the concentration of Red Army units near eastern German border.

In response to this, on behalf of the Soviet government, I stated that until the last minute the German government did not make any claims against the Soviet government, that Germany carried out an attack on the Soviet Union, despite the peace-loving position of the Soviet Union, and that thereby fascist Germany is the attacking party .

On behalf of the government of the Soviet Union, I must also state that at no point did our troops and our aviation allow the border to be violated, and therefore the statement made by Romanian radio this morning that Soviet aviation allegedly fired at Romanian airfields is a complete lie and provocation. The entire today’s declaration by Hitler, who is trying to retroactively concoct incriminating material about the Soviet Union’s non-compliance with the Soviet-German Pact, is the same lie and provocation.

Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the bandit attack and expel German troops from the territory of our homeland.

This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by the German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples .

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable confidence that our valiant army and navy and the brave falcons of Soviet aviation will honorably fulfill their duty to their homeland, to Soviet people, and will deal a crushing blow to the aggressor.
This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking, arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon’s campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who announced a new campaign against our country. The Red Army and all our people will again wage a victorious patriotic war for their homeland, for honor, for freedom.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its firm confidence that the entire population of our country, all workers, peasants and intellectuals, men and women, will treat their duties and their work with due consciousness. Our entire people must now be united and united as never before. Each of us must demand from ourselves and from others discipline, organization, and dedication worthy of a true Soviet patriot in order to provide all the needs of the Red Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure victory over the enemy.

The government calls on you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

The first atrocities of the Nazis

The first case of atrocities by the German army on the territory of the Soviet Union occurred on the first day of the war. On June 22, 1941, the Nazis, advancing, broke into the village of Albinga, Klaipeda region of Lithuania.

The soldiers robbed and burned all the houses. The residents - 42 people - were herded into a barn and locked. During the day of June 22, the Nazis killed several people - beaten to death or shot.

The very next morning, the systematic extermination of people began. Groups of peasants were taken out of the barn and shot in cold blood. First, all the men, then the turn came to women and children. Those who tried to escape into the forest were shot in the back.

In 1972, a memorial ensemble to the victims of fascism was created near Ablinga.

The first summary of the Great Patriotic War

SUMMARY OF THE RED ARMY CHIEF COMMAND
for 22.VI. - 1941

At dawn on June 22, 1941, regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the BALTIC to the BLACK Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the GRODNO and KRISTYNOPOLE directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of KALVARIYA, STOYANOW and TSEKHANOWEC (the first two are 15 km and the last 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and populated areas, but everywhere they met decisive resistance from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy aircraft. from RIA Novosti funds

23:00 (GMT). Winston Churchill's speech on BBC radio

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made a statement on June 22 at 23:00 GMT in connection with the aggression of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.

“...The Nazi regime has the worst features of communism,” in particular, he said on BBC radio. “It has no foundations or principles other than greed and the desire for racial domination. In its cruelty and furious aggressiveness, it surpasses all forms of humankind.” depravity. Over the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I. I will not take back a single word that I said about it. But all this pales before the spectacle that is now unfolding. The past with its crimes, follies and tragedies is disappearing.

I see Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields that their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial.

I see them guarding their homes, where their mothers and wives pray - yes, for there are times when everyone prays - for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, their protector and support.

I see tens of thousands of Russian villages, where livelihoods are torn from the ground with such difficulty, but where primordial human joys exist, where girls laugh and children play.

I see the vile Nazi war machine approaching all this with its dapper, spur-clanging Prussian officers, with its skilled agents who have just pacified and tied a dozen countries hand and foot.

I also see a gray, trained, obedient mass of fierce Hun soldiers, advancing like clouds of crawling locusts.

I see in the sky German bombers and fighters with still unhealed scars from the wounds inflicted on them by the British, rejoicing that they have found, as it seems to them, easier and more certain prey.

Behind all this noise and thunder, I see a bunch of villains who are planning, organizing and bringing this avalanche of disasters upon humanity... I must declare the decision of His Majesty's Government, and I am sure that the great dominions will agree with this decision in due time, for we must speak out immediately, without a single day of delay. I must make a statement, but can you doubt what our policy will be?

We have only one unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from this, nothing. We will never come to an agreement, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or with anyone from his gang. We will fight him on land, we will fight him by sea, we will fight him in the air, until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his very shadow and freed the nations from his yoke. Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler is our enemy...

This is our policy, this is our statement. It follows that we will provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can..."

An air defense fighter conducts surveillance from the roof of a house on Gorky Street. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

75 years ago, on June 22, 1941, the troops of Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began. In Russia and some countries of the former Soviet Union, June 22 is the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow.

June 22, 1941 for the USSR and its capital Moscow was determined in Berlin a week before this date - on Saturday, June 14, at a meeting of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany. On it, Adolf Hitler gave the last orders to attack the USSR from 04 am on June 22, 1941.

On the same day, a TASS report on Soviet-German relations was circulated, which stated:

“According to the USSR, Germany is as steadily observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis.”

However, June 22, 1941 for the world’s first state of workers and peasants could have come a month or a week earlier. The leaders of the Third Reich initially planned to invade Russia at dawn on Thursday, May 15th. But on April 6, together with the troops of the allies - Italy and Hungary - the Germans entered Yugoslavia. The Balkan campaign forced Hitler to postpone the conquest of Moscow.

Until noon on June 22, 1941 (and there is hundreds of archival evidence of this), Moscow did not know about the German invasion.

04:30. According to documents, 48 ​​water sprinklers rolled out onto the streets.
05:30. Almost 900 janitors started working. The morning was fine, sunny, painting the “gentle light of the walls of the ancient Kremlin.”
From approximately 07:00. In parks, squares and other places where people usually gather, “outdoor” hawker trade began to unfold, summer buffets, beer halls and billiards opened - the coming Sunday promised to be very warm, if not hot. And in places of mass recreation, an influx of citizens was expected.
07:00 and 07:30. (according to the Sunday schedule - on ordinary days half an hour earlier). Dairy shops and bakeries opened.
08:30 and 09:00. Grocery stores and grocery stores have started operating. Department store stores, except for GUM and TSUM, were closed on Sundays. The range of goods is essentially normal for a peaceful capital. The "Molochnaya" on Rochdelskaya offered cottage cheese, curd mass, sour cream, kefir, yogurt, milk, cheese, feta cheese, butter and ice cream. All products are of two or three varieties and names.

It’s an ordinary Sunday in Moscow

Gorkogo Street. Photo: TASS/F. Kislov

Gastronome No. 1 "Eliseevsky", the main one in the country, put on the shelves boiled, half and uncooked smoked sausages, frankfurters, sausages from three to four types, ham, three types of boiled pork. The fish department offered fresh sterlet, lightly salted Caspian herring (zalom), hot smoked sturgeon, pressed and red caviar. There was an abundance of Georgian wines, Crimean Madeira and sherry, port wines, one type of vodka and rum, and four types of cognac. At that time there were no time restrictions on the sale of alcohol.

GUM and TSUM exhibited the entire range of the domestic clothing and footwear industry, calico, drapes, Boston and other fabrics, costume jewelry, and fiber suitcases of various sizes. And jewelry, the cost of individual samples of which exceeded 50 thousand rubles - a fifth of the price of the legendary T-34 tank, the IL-2 victory attack aircraft and three anti-tank guns - ZIS-3 76 mm caliber guns according to the "price list" of May 1941. No one could have imagined that day that the Central Department Store of Moscow would turn into army barracks in two weeks.

From 07:00 they began to prepare the Dynamo stadium for the big “mass event”. At 12 o'clock there was to be a parade and athletic competition.
Around 08:00, 20 thousand schoolchildren were brought to Moscow from cities and districts of the region for a children's holiday, which began at 11 o'clock in Sokolniki Park.

There were no “fermentations” of school graduates around Red Square and the streets of Moscow on the morning of June 22, 1941. This is the “mythology” of Soviet cinema and literature. The last graduation ceremonies in the capital took place on Friday, June 20.

In a word, all 4 million 600 thousand “ordinary” residents and about one million guests of the capital of the USSR did not know until lunch on June 22, 1941 that the biggest and bloodiest war with the invaders in the history of the country had begun that night.

01:21. The last train, loaded with wheat, which the USSR supplied under an agreement with Germany on September 28, 1939, crossed the border with Poland, absorbed by the Third Reich.
03:05. 14 German bombers, taking off from Koenigsberg at 01:10, dropped 28 magnetic bombs at a roadstead near Kronstadt, 20 km from Leningrad.
04:00. Hitler's troops crossed the border in the Brest area. Half an hour later they launched a large-scale offensive on all fronts - from the southern to the northern borders of the USSR.

And when at 11 o’clock in the Sokolniki park the capital’s pioneers greeted their guests, the pioneers of the Moscow region, with a ceremonial line, the German advanced 15, and in some places even 20 km into the interior of the country.

Solutions at the highest level

Moscow. V.M. Molotov, I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov (from left to right in the foreground), G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, A.S. Shcherbakov (from left to right in the second row) and other members of the government head to Red Square. TASS photo chronicle

In the rear in the morning of June 22, 1941, only the top leadership of the country, the command of military districts, the first leaders of Moscow, Leningrad and some others knew that the war was going on. major cities– Kuibyshev (now Samara), Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Khabarovsk.

06:30. Candidate member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov convened an emergency meeting of key leaders of the capital with the participation of senior officers of NGOs, the NKVD and directors largest enterprises. He and the chairman of the city executive committee Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin by that time had the rank of general. At the meeting, priority measures were developed to ensure the life of Moscow in wartime.

Directly from the city committee by telephone, orders were given to strengthen the protection of water supply systems, heat and electrical energy, transport and, above all, the metro, food warehouses, refrigerators, the Moscow Canal, railway stations, defense enterprises and other important objects. At the same meeting, the concept of camouflaging Moscow was “roughly” formulated, including the construction of models and dummies, the protection of government and historical buildings.

At the suggestion of Shcherbakov, from June 23, a ban was introduced on entry into the capital for anyone who did not have Moscow registration. Residents of the Moscow region, including those who worked in Moscow, also fell under it. Special passes were introduced. Even Muscovites had to correct them when going to the forest to pick mushrooms or to a suburban dacha - without a pass they were not allowed back into the capital.

15:00. At the afternoon meeting, which took place after People's Commissar Molotov spoke on the radio and after Shcherbakov and Pronin visited the Kremlin, the capital authorities, in agreement with the generals of the Moscow Military District, decided to install anti-aircraft batteries at all high-altitude points of the capital. Later, at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, created the next day, June 23, this decision was called “exemplary.” And they sent a directive to the Military Districts to ensure anti-aircraft protection of cities following the example of the capital.

Prohibition on photography

One of the remarkable decisions of the second meeting of the Moscow leadership on June 22, 1941: an appeal was formulated calling on the population to hand over their personal cameras, other photographic equipment, photographic film and reagents within three days. From now on, only accredited journalists and employees of special services could use photographic equipment.

This is partly why there are few photographs of Moscow in the first days of the war. Some of them are completely staged, such as, for example, the famous photograph by Yevgeny Khaldei “Muscovites listen to Comrade Molotov’s address on the radio about the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941.” On the first war day in the capital of the Union at 12 o'clock in the afternoon (the time of the live broadcast of People's Commissar Molotov's speech) it was +24 degrees C. And in the photo - people in coats, hats, in a word, dressed for autumn, as in the twentieth of September, when , presumably this photo was taken.

By the way, the clothes of the people in that staged photo are very different from the T-shirts, white canvas boots and trousers in which in another photo on June 22, 1941, Muscovites are buying soda on Gorky Street (now Tverskaya).

At the same morning meeting on June 22, 1941, which was chaired by Alexander Shcherbakov, a special resolution was adopted to “prevent and suppress panic” in connection with the invasion of Hitler’s troops in the USSR. The party secretary and de facto owner of the capital advised all leaders and, especially, artists, writers, and newspapermen to “stick” to the position that the war would end in a month, a maximum of a month and a half. And the enemy will be defeated on its territory." And he drew special attention to the fact that in Molotov’s speech the war was called “sacred.” Two days later, on June 24, 1941, having overcome a protracted depression, Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin), at the suggestion of Lavrentiy Beria, appointed Shcherbakov (in addition to existing positions and regalia) as the head of the Sovinformburo - the main and, in fact, the only source of information for the masses during the Great Patriotic War.

Sweeps

Muscovites enroll in the ranks of the people's militia. Photo: TASS

One of the results of the last meeting of the Moscow leadership, which took place after 21:00, was the decision to create fighter battalions. They, apparently, were initiated in the Kremlin, because a day later the general leadership of the units was entrusted to the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria. But the country’s first fighter battalion came under arms precisely in Moscow, on the third day of the war, June 24, 1941. In the documents, the destroyer battalions were designated as “volunteer formations of citizens capable of owning weapons.” The prerogative of admission to them remained with party, Komsomol, trade union activists and other “verified” (as in the document) persons who were not subject to conscription military service. The task of the extermination battalions was to fight saboteurs, spies, Hitler's accomplices, as well as bandits, deserters, looters and speculators. In a word, everyone who threatened order in cities and other populated areas during wartime conditions.

On the fourth day of the war, the Moscow fighter plane made its first raids, choosing to begin with the workers' closets and gateways of Zamoskvorechye and the barracks of Maryina Roshcha. The “cleansing” was quite effective. 25 bandits with weapons were captured. Five especially dangerous representatives criminals were eliminated in a shootout. Food products (stewed meat, condensed milk, smoked meats, flour, cereals) and industrial goods, stolen before the start of the war from one of the warehouses in the Fili region, were seized.

The leader's reaction

General Secretary of the CPSU (b) Joseph Stalin. Photo: TASS

In Moscow - not only the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the city executive committee, but the entire highest government of the USSR. According to the “reflected” documents, Stalin was informed about the invasion of Nazi troops almost immediately - around 04:35-04:45. He, as usual, had not yet gone to bed, and, according to one version, was at the “nearby dacha.”

The subsequent (second) report on the advance of the Germans along the entire front made a strong impression on the leader. He locked himself in one of the rooms and did not leave it for about two hours, after which he allegedly went to the Kremlin. I did not read the text of Vyacheslav Molotov’s speech. And he demanded that he report to him about the situation at the fronts every half hour.

According to the testimony of a number of military leaders, this was precisely what was most difficult to do - communication with the active units conducting fierce battles with German troops was weak, if not completely absent. In addition, by 18-19 hours on June 22, 1941, according to various sources, a total of 500 thousand to 700 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were surrounded by the Nazis, who, through incredible efforts, with a terrible shortage of ammunition, equipment and weapons, tried to break through the "rings" of the Nazis.

However, according to other, also “reflected” documents, on June 22, 1941, the leader was on the Black Sea, at a dacha in Gagra. And, according to the USSR Ambassador to the USA Ivan Maisky, “after the first report of the German attack, he fell into prostration, completely cut himself off from Moscow, remained out of touch for four days, drinking himself into a stupor.”

Is that so? Or not? It's hard to believe. It is no longer possible to verify - documents of the CPSU Central Committee have since been massively burned and destroyed at least 4 times. For the first time in October 1941, when panic began in Moscow after the Nazis entered the outskirts of Khimki and a column of Nazi motorcyclists passed along Leningradsky Prospekt in the Sokol area. Then at the end of February 1956 and the end of October 1961, after the revelations of Stalin’s personality cult at the XX and XXII Congresses of the CPSU. And finally, in August 1991, after the defeat of the State Emergency Committee.

And is it necessary to check everything? The fact remains that in the first 10 days of the war, the most difficult time for the country, Stalin was neither heard nor seen. And all orders, orders and directives of the first week of the war were signed by marshals and generals, people's commissars and deputies of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Lavrenty Beria, Georgy Zhukov, Semyon Timoshenko, Georgy Malenkov, Dmitry Pavlov, Vyacheslav Molotov and even the "party mayor" of the capital Alexander Shcherbakov.

Appeal from Nakrom Molotov

12:15. From the studio of the Central Telegraph, one of the leaders of the Soviet state, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, made an appeal on the radio.

It began with the words: “Citizens and women of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement. Today, at 4 o’clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country ..." The speech ended with the famous words that became the idiom of the entire Great Patriotic War: "Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours!"

12.25. Judging by the “log of visits”, Molotov returned from the Central Telegraph to Stalin’s office.

Muscovites listened to the People's Commissar's speech mainly through loudspeakers installed on all city streets, as well as in parks, stadiums and other crowded places. Performed by announcer Yuri Levitan, the text of Molotov’s speech was repeated 4 times at different times.

Muscovites are listening to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland. Photo: TASS/Evgeny Khaldey

Moreover, from approximately 09:30. until 11:00 there was allegedly a serious discussion in the Kremlin about who should make such an appeal? According to one version, all members of the Politburo believed that Stalin himself should do this. But he actively pushed back, repeating the same thing: the political situation and the situation on the fronts “are not yet clear,” and therefore he will speak later.

As time went. And delaying information about the start of the war became dangerous. At the proposal of the leader, those who notify the people about the beginning holy war, became Molotov. According to another version, there was no discussion because Stalin himself was not in the Kremlin. They wanted to entrust the “All-Union Elder” Mikhail Kalinin to tell the people about the war, but he even read from a piece of paper, stuttering, syllable by syllable.

Life after the start of the war

The news of the invasion of Hitler's troops on June 22, 1941, judging by archival documents (reports of NKVD employees and freelance agents, police reports), as well as the recollections of eyewitnesses, did not plunge residents and guests of the capital into despondency and did not change their plans too much.

After the announcement of the start of the war, Moscow-Adler passenger trains departed from the Kursk station exactly on schedule. And on the night of June 23 - to Sevastopol, which Nazi aircraft brutally bombed at 05:00 on June 22. True, passengers who had tickets specifically to Crimea were dropped off in Tula. But the train itself was only allowed to go to Kharkov.

During the day, brass bands played in parks, and performances took place in theaters to full houses. Hairdressers were open until the evening. The beer halls and billiard rooms were practically packed with visitors. In the evening the dance floors were not empty either. The famous melody of the foxtrot "Rio-rita" was heard in many parts of the capital.

A distinctive feature of the first military day in Moscow: mass optimism. In conversations, in addition to strong words of hatred towards Germany and Hitler, they heard: “Nothing. A month. Well, a month and a half. We’ll smash, crush the reptile!” Another metropolitan sign of June 22, 1941: after the news of the Nazi attack, people in military uniform were allowed to skip the line everywhere, even in pubs.

Anti-aircraft artillery guarding the city. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

An impressive example of the efficiency of the Moscow authorities. By their order, at screenings in cinemas after 2 p.m. on June 22, 1941, before feature films(and these were “Shchors”, “If Tomorrow is War”, “Professor Malok”, “The Oppenheim Family”, “Boxers”) they began to show educational short films like “Blackout of a residential building”, “Take care of the gas mask”, “The simplest shelters from air bombs” .

In the evening Vadim Kozin sang in the Hermitage garden. In the "Metropol" and "Aragvi" restaurants, judging by the "expense sheets" of the kitchen and buffet, sandwiches with pressed (black) caviar, hall herring with onions, fried pork loin in wine sauce, kharcho soup, and chanahi (lamb stew) were especially popular ), lamb cutlet on the bone with a complex side dish, vodka, KV cognac and sherry wine.

Moscow has not yet fully realized that a big war is already underway. And on the fields of its battles, thousands of Red Army soldiers have already fallen, hundreds of civilians of Soviet cities and villages have died. Within a day, the city registry offices will notice an influx of fathers and mothers asking to replace the name Adolf on the birth certificates of their sons with Anatoly, Alexander, and Andrey. Being Adolfs (in common parlance - Adiks), who were born en masse in the second half of 1933 and at the end of 1939, in June 1941 it became not only disgusting, but also unsafe.

A week later . In the capital of the USSR, cards will gradually be introduced for food, household essentials, shoes and fabric.
In two weeks. Muscovites will see newsreel footage of Soviet villages, towns and cities burning, and women and young children lying near their huts, shot by the Nazis.
Exactly in a month. Moscow will survive the first raid of Hitler's aircraft, and will see firsthand, not in the movies, the mutilated bodies of fellow citizens who died under the rubble, destroyed and burning houses.

In the meantime, on the first day of the war, in Moscow everything is approximately the same as in the textbook poem by Gennady Shpalikov “On the dance floor in the Forty-First Year”: “It’s okay that Poland doesn’t exist. But the country is strong. In a month – and no more – the war will end... "

Evgeny Kuznetsov