Ranks in the army of the German Democratic Republic. National People's Army: which former German officers of Hitler began to command the troops of the GDR. Operations in Ethiopia

- "Militärgeschichte", Ausg. 3/2012

In March 1980, the cover of Der Spiegel featured a photograph of four East German soldiers under a Wehrmacht-style sleeve tape with the inscription: "Honecker's Afrika Korps." The Hamburg magazine reported 2,720 East German military advisers involved, including 1,000 in Angola alone, 600 in Mozambique, 400 in Libya and 300 in Ethiopia. Before this, the bright wording had already been found in other newspapers. In the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit, as early as May 1978, the headline appeared: “Hoffmann's Afrika Korps”; followed in June 1978 by the Bayernkurier and its Red Afrika Korps by Honecker. And in November 1979, Americans read about the “East German Africa Corps” in the New York Times.

Almost all newspapers were ready to publish a sensation about the GDR soldiers in Africa: Le Figaro, published in Paris, reported back in August 1978 that more than 2,000 soldiers from the GDR were sent to Ethiopia, coming under the command of Soviet generals. The West Berlin Tagesspiegel in December 1978 published, with reference to Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, that in Angola alone there were 5,000 “soldiers of the GDR army,” primarily “elite units such as airborne troops.” 2,000 of them were "currently engaged in the offensive." In February, the Tagesspiegel reported the redeployment of an East German airborne regiment from Ethiopia to Angola.

"Die Welt" in February 1980 spoke about total number“military experts from the GDR” in Africa: “about 30,000.” In December 1979, the leader of the opposition CDU/CSU faction in the German Bundestag, Rainer Barzel, declared in the pages of Welt am Sonntag: “Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt no longer has the right to remain silent about the bloody trail of the GDR.” The popular 1977 film The Wild Geese - starring Roger Moore, Richard Burton and Hardy Krueger - also features a scene set on African soil where a mercenary attack on a control tower kills a National People's Army (NPA) officer, easily identified by his uniform cap. In the attacked camp, along with local African and Cuban soldiers, two GDR officers also appear. So were the armed forces of the GDR really involved in Africa?

African requests

Many times, African governments asked East Berlin to send NPA troops. First of all, they asked for military advisers, instructors and military pilots. For example, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and his Minister of Defense Gray Zulu asked to send the NPA to their country in 1979–1980. Specifically, NPA pilots in their cars had to defend the Zambian air space. GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann refused immediately, with the wording: “not feasible.” In 1980, during the second attempt, the Zambian president asked to send military advisers. Negotiations with Hoffmann “have not yet led to any solution,” Kaunda wrote Secretary General SED to Erich Honecker after receiving nothing from the GDR Defense Minister. Similarly, in 1979, the leader of the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) ZAPU liberation movement, Joshua Nkomo, while visiting the GDR, expressed a desire to see NPA officers in ZAPU camps in Zambia. Army General Hoffmann again refused to send military personnel, this time as "politically inexpedient." Isolated cases of refusal by Zambia and Zimbabwe to send advisers, instructors and pilots reflected the general course of the GDR armed forces towards passivity. The leadership of the GDR acted cautiously: basically, it was restrained and skeptical about requests and requests regarding the sending of military personnel to third world countries. In East Berlin and Strausberg (the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense), it was not without reason that they saw the danger in dragging their soldiers into conflicts and wars on the African continent. Direct participation in hostilities could likely have far-reaching political and military consequences. East Berlin attached importance to the international reputation of the GDR and did not want to give rise to negative publications in the Western press. Thus, the use of the army abroad posed incalculable risks for the GDR. The GDR and its armed forces did not engage in such adventures - except for a few exceptions described below.

In isolated, strictly limited cases, the NPA was still present in Africa: already in 1964, two officers from this army were sent to Zanzibar to advise the then people's republic on the development of its armed forces. Also, until 1970, 15 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Volksmarine (GDR Navy) were sent to Zanzibar as advisers. Individual, mostly limited to a few weeks, business trips of advisers and “specialists” were carried out, for example, to Angola. Large volumes of transport aviation officers and pilots were sent to Mozambique and Ethiopia.

Military advisors and transport pilots in Mozambique

One of the main recipients of GDR military aid was Mozambique. In the country in southern Africa, wars raged for more than thirty years, both with an external enemy and civil. The new state, after gaining independence in 1975, was forced to repel attacks by the armed opposition in a long and bloody war. At the same time, the conflict between East and West also spread to southern Africa. The ruling (to this day) party FRELIMO positioned the country as socialist, armed rebels from RENAMO were supported by South Africa and the USA. Already during the long struggle for independence against the Portuguese colonial authorities, the GDR supported the still weak FRELIMO with weapons and equipment. In December 1984, opposition partisans, among other foreigners, killed eight civilian specialists from the GDR. The East Germans were agricultural specialists who were captured on their way to a state farm where they were supposed to work.

In response, in 1985, the NPA sent several groups of senior officers, and even two generals, to the country to serve as advisers to the general staff, commands, headquarters and formations. The task of the officers, who were in the country for about six months, was primarily to improve the safety of more than 700 specialists from the GDR. Along with this, they were supposed to improve the fighting qualities of the Mozambican armed forces. Since late 1985, three NPA officers have been permanently stationed in the country as advisers. In this regard, there was also the use of transport aircraft by the GDR Air Force from 1986 to 1990. The vehicles, based in the capital, Maputo, provided for the needs of specialists from the GDR working in the country and were supposed to begin evacuating them if the situation worsened. In addition to the officers deployed in the territory, the Mozambican government in 1985 - 1986. repeatedly addressed the GDR, expressing the need for instructors and “mentors” of the NNA. In June 1986, General of the Army Kessler, Hoffmann's successor as Minister of Defense, informed Honecker and Egon Krenz (Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the SED Politburo - approx. Transl.) that he also refused such participation: he assessed the work of the "mentors" on the spot as “inappropriate” for “political reasons.” Before this, in January 1986, Krenz rejected as “inappropriate” the deployment of NPA instructors in Mozambique. Apart from the deployment of transport aviation pilots and the work of advisers, references to other uses of the NPA in Mozambique could not be found in the extensive source database.

Operations in Ethiopia

After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, a series of wars began in Ethiopia. In February 1977, together with Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, young military men came to power, striving to radically change the previous internal political situation with its feudal relations, and in foreign policy focusing on Moscow, Havana and East Berlin. Mengistu's reign can hardly be called stable; he fought wars against neighboring Somalia as well as separatists in the north. Mengistu sent dramatic requests for military assistance to the ambassadors of the USSR, South Yemen, Cuba and the GDR: “The people of Ethiopia feel isolated and abandoned, comrade,” he wrote verbatim in a telegram to Honecker in August 1977. Calls from Addis Ababa and Havana did not go unnoticed: already in October 1977, about 150 Soviet officers, including four generals, were here as instructors and advisers. In September 1977, the first 200 Cubans were deployed on the side of the Ethiopians; from December 1977, Havana increased its group. Now it numbered from 16 to 18 thousand people. The GDR sent weapons and equipment - but not soldiers. If NPA units were in Ethiopia, then General Hoffmann, during his visit to the country in May 1979, probably should have met with them and mentioned this visit in one of the reports. The fundamentally skeptical position of the NPA command and refusal of military operations extended in the same way to war-torn Ethiopia. The danger of being drawn into local conflicts, and ultimately into war, due to the presence of the military, was high. However, NPA transport planes arrived in Ethiopia and were deployed.

Between 1984 and 1988 first four and then one more vehicle were stationed in the Horn of Africa. To overcome the consequences of a catastrophically severe drought, in October 1984, Addis Ababa sent urgent requests for assistance to various countries. Since November of this year, the GDR has sent the first two aircraft of the NPA military transport aviation, as well as the civil airline Interflug, to ensure international air traffic. At this stage, 41 people were involved, including 22 NPA officers and non-commissioned officers and 19 Interflug employees. Secrecy had priority. The NPA's involvement in the aircraft and crews had to be hidden. The order clearly ordered that the vehicles be prepared in a “civil aviation version”, that the recognition equipment be dismantled, and that Air Force personnel be provided with civilian service passports. Two An-26s were repainted overnight and fitted with civilian markings. Even on the dishes and technical equipment of the crew, the NPA identification marks were painted over. The staff did not have any uniform. Witnesses claim that NPA insignia was even evaporated from underwear: nothing should have indicated membership in the armed forces of the GDR. The reason for the strict secrecy was rooted not so much in the possible danger of a business trip to Ethiopia, but in the usual practice of the GDR in resolving military issues.

Almost simultaneously with the GDR planes, three C-160 Transalls of the Bundeswehr Air Force also flew to Ethiopia - completely officially and without camouflage. They were also based at Assab airfield, later at Dire Dawa, and were used in the same way as NPA vehicles. Thus, an unusual German-German joint operation took place.

From its base in Assab, the An-26 spent the first weeks mainly flying to Asmara, Axum and Mekele. In the following months - mainly in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Godi and Kabri Dehar. Flights over various territories of Ethiopia were complicated by the ongoing wars, including civil wars. The aggravation of the global conflict between the West and the East also played a role. The Assab base and some portions of the flight were located in particularly hard-fought Eritrea. The planes carried food, as well as medicine and clothing. The operation continued until October 1985, with GDR aircraft also participating in controversial Ethiopian forced relocation operations.

At the request of the Ethiopian government, NPA transport aircraft returned in April 1986, now as an “operational unit of the NPA GDR.” The personnel this time were also presented openly, as employees of the GDR Air Force. Two An-26s were stationed in the capital Addis Ababa. The third transport aviation operation began in June 1987. One Antonov was again stationed at Addis Ababa airport. As with the ongoing operation in Mozambique at the same time, he was tasked with providing services and supplies to specialists and medical teams from the GDR. In addition, in 1987-88. A limited number of NPA officers were deployed as a security group at the GDR-established hospital in Metema.

Despite the support of the GDR, Cuba and other socialist countries, Ethiopian government troops operated in Eritrea from early 1988 until the collapse of the country. Mengistu's regime was under immediate threat. Several times he received emergency assistance from the GDR. Honecker personally decided in 1988 and again in 1989 to make large deliveries of weapons, including tanks. These actions of the GDR could neither delay nor prevent the decline of Mengistu. He was overthrown in 1991. Eritrea gained independence in 1993. And certain internal documents of the GDR already in 1977 characterized Mengistu’s Ethiopia as a “bottomless barrel.”

Purposeful disinformation?

Reports of East German military operations in Africa resonated even in internal documents federal government Germany. For example, in September 1978, Section 210 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to a report from the planning headquarters that put the military presence of Cuba and the GDR in Africa on the same level, objected: “In the policy of intervention, the actions of the GDR lag significantly behind the massive military activity of Cuba.” The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in South Africa, in its communications to Bonn, referred to reports of a GDR military presence in Angola in November 1978 as what they clearly were: “rumours”.

The origin of these misleading messages remains an open question. The links provided by the articles at the time were directed to “security experts” or “Western analysts.” There is much to suggest that this was in the interests of the Republic of South Africa. Reports of thousands of GDR soldiers on its borders brought tangible benefits to the Pretoria government: no doubt, it was very interested in presenting the struggle in southern Africa as part of a conflict between West and East, and positioning itself as a close ally of the West. South Africa – due to racial segregation and the violent suppression of the non-white majority (“apartheid”) – experienced increasing pressure from Western Europe and Germany. Thus, reactivating the old enemy image of the GDR in Germany seems quite reasonable from a South African point of view. Der Spiegel's 1980 observation that South African intelligence agencies may well have launched disinformation appears to be correct when viewed from the future. As a rule, the press readily picks up and publishes such reports, even if the sources are shrouded in darkness. After intensive research in the archives, today only one conclusion remains: “Honecker’s Afrika Korps” existed only in the minds of journalists, some politicians and intelligence agencies.

Exactly sixty years ago, on January 18, 1956, the decision was made to create the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic (NPA GDR). Although the Day of the National People's Army was officially celebrated on March 1, since it was on this day in 1956 that the first military units of the GDR took the oath, in reality the NPA can be counted precisely from January 18, when the People's Chamber of the GDR adopted the Law on the National People's Army of the GDR. Having existed for 34 years, until the unification of Germany in 1990, the National People's Army of the GDR went down in history as one of the most combat-ready armies of post-war Europe. Among the socialist countries it was second after Soviet army in terms of training level and was considered the most reliable among the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Actually, the history of the National People's Army of the GDR began after West Germany began to form its own armed forces. Soviet Union in the post-war years he pursued a much more peaceful policy than his Western opponents. Therefore, for a long time, the USSR sought to comply with the agreements and was in no hurry to arm East Germany. As is known, according to the decision of the Conference of the Heads of Government of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA, held on July 17 - August 2, 1945 in Potsdam, Germany was prohibited from having its own armed forces. But after the end of World War II, relations between yesterday's allies - the USSR on the one hand, the USA and Great Britain on the other, began to rapidly deteriorate and soon became extremely tense. Capitalist countries and socialist camp found themselves on the verge of armed confrontation, which actually gave grounds for violating the agreements that were reached in the process of victory over Nazi Germany. By 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was created on the territory of the American, British and French occupation zones, and the German Democratic Republic on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone. The first to militarize “their” part of Germany - the Federal Republic of Germany - were Great Britain, the USA and France.

In 1954, the Paris Agreements were concluded, the secret part of which provided for the creation of West Germany's own armed forces. Despite the protests of the West German population, which saw the re-creation of the country's armed forces as an increase in revanchist and militaristic sentiments and feared a new war, on November 12, 1955, the German government announced the creation of the Bundeswehr. Thus began the history of the West German army and the history of the almost undisguised confrontation between the “two Germanys” in the field of defense and weapons. After the decision to create the Bundeswehr, the Soviet Union had no choice but to “give the go-ahead” to the formation of its own army and the German Democratic Republic. The history of the National People's Army of the GDR has become a unique example of a strong military partnership between the Russian and German armies, which in the past fought more with each other than cooperated. We should not forget that the high combat capability of the NPA was explained by the inclusion of Prussia and Saxony in the GDR - lands from which the bulk of the German officers had long originated. It turns out that it was the NNA, and not the Bundeswehr, that largely inherited the historical traditions of the German armies, but this experience was put at the service of military cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet Union.

Barracks People's Police - predecessor of the NPA

It should be noted that in fact the creation of armed units, the service of which was based on military discipline, began in the GDR even earlier. In 1950, the People's Police was created as part of the Ministry of the Interior of the GDR, as well as two main departments - the Main Directorate of the Air Police and the Main Directorate of the Maritime Police. In 1952, on the basis of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the People's Police of the GDR, the Barracks People's Police was created, which was an analogue of the internal troops of the Soviet Union. Naturally, the KNP could not conduct fighting against modern armies and was called upon to perform purely police functions - to fight sabotage and bandit groups, disperse riots, and protect public order. This was confirmed by the decision of the 2nd party conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The Barracks People's Police was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior of the GDR, Willi Stof, and the direct leadership of the Barracks People's Police was carried out by the chief of the KNP. Lieutenant General Heinz Hoffmann was appointed to this post. The personnel of the Barracks People's Police were recruited from among volunteers who entered into a contract for a period of at least three years. In May 1952, the Union of Free German Youth took patronage over the Barracks People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR, which contributed to a more active influx of volunteers into the ranks of the barracks police and improvement of the rear infrastructure of this service. In August 1952, the previously independent Maritime People's Police and Air People's Police became part of the Barracks People's Police of the GDR. In September 1953, the People's Air Police was transformed into the KNP Aero Clubs Directorate. It had two airfields, Kamenz and Bautzen, and Yak-18 and Yak-11 training aircraft. The Maritime People's Police had patrol boats and small minesweepers.

In the summer of 1953, it was the Barracks People's Police, along with Soviet troops, that played one of the main roles in suppressing the mass unrest organized by American-British agents. After this, the internal structure of the Barracks People's Police of the GDR was strengthened and its military component was strengthened. Further reorganization of the KNP along military lines continued, in particular, the Main Headquarters of the Barracks People's Police of the GDR was created, headed by Lieutenant General Vinzenz Müller, a former Wehrmacht general. The Territorial Administration North, headed by Major General Hermann Rentsch, and the Territorial Administration South, headed by Major General Fritz Jone, were also created. Each territorial department was subordinate to three operational detachments, and subordinate to the General Staff was a mechanized operational detachment, which was armed with even 40 units of armored vehicles, including T-34 tanks. The operational detachments of the Barracks People's Police were reinforced motorized infantry battalions with up to 1,800 personnel. The structure of the operational detachment included: 1) the headquarters of the operational detachment; 2) a mechanized company with BA-64 and SM-1 armored vehicles and motorcycles (the same company was armed with SM-2 armored water cannon tankers); 3) three motorized infantry companies (on trucks); 4) fire support company (field artillery platoon with three ZIS-3 guns; anti-tank artillery platoon with three 45 mm or 57 mm anti-tank guns; mortar platoon with three 82 mm mortars); 5) headquarters company (communications platoon, engineer platoon, chemical platoon, reconnaissance platoon, transport platoon, supply platoon, control department, medical department). The Barracks People's Police were installed military ranks and a military uniform was introduced, which differed from the uniform of the People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR (if the employees of the People's Police wore a dark blue uniform, then the employees of the barracks police received a more “militarized” uniform of khaki color). The military ranks in the Barracks People's Police were established as follows: 1) soldier, 2) corporal, 3) non-commissioned officer, 4) staff non-commissioned officer, 5) sergeant major, 6) chief sergeant major, 7) non-commissioned lieutenant, 8) lieutenant, 9) chief lieutenant, 10) captain, 11) major, 12) lieutenant colonel, 13) colonel, 14) major general, 15) lieutenant general. When the decision was made to create the National People's Army of the GDR, thousands of employees of the Barracks People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR expressed a desire to join the National People's Army and continue serving there. Moreover, in fact, it was within the Barracks People’s Police that the “skeleton” of the NPA was created - land, air and sea units, and the command staff of the Barracks People’s Police, including senior commanders, almost completely transferred to the NPA. The remaining employees of the Barracks People's Police continued to perform the functions of protecting public order and fighting crime, that is, they retained the functionality of the internal troops.

"Founding Fathers" of the GDR Army

On March 1, 1956, the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR began its work. It was headed by Colonel General Willi Stof (1914-1999), in 1952-1955. served as Minister of Internal Affairs. A communist with pre-war experience, Willy Stoff joined the German Communist Party at the age of 17. Being an underground worker, he, however, could not avoid serving in the Wehrmacht in 1935-1937. served in an artillery regiment. Then he was demobilized and worked as an engineer. During the Second World War, Willy Stoff was again called up for military service, participated in battles on the territory of the USSR, was wounded, and was awarded the Iron Cross for his valor. He went through the entire war and was captured in 1945. While in a Soviet prisoner of war camp, he completed a special training course at an anti-fascist prisoner of war school. The Soviet command trained future personnel from among prisoners of war to occupy administrative positions in the zone of Soviet occupation. Willi Stoff, who had not previously held prominent positions in the German communist movement, made a dizzying career in the several post-war years. After his release from captivity, he was appointed head of the industrial construction department, then headed the Department economic policy SED apparatus. In 1950-1952 Willi Stoff served as director of the economic department of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, and was then appointed Minister of the Interior of the GDR. Since 1950, he was also a member of the Central Committee of the SED - and this despite his young age - thirty-five years. In 1955, as Minister of the Interior of the GDR, Willi Stof received the military rank of Colonel General. Taking into account the experience of leading the power ministry, in 1956 it was decided to appoint Willy Stoff to the post of Minister of National Defense of the German Democratic Republic. In 1959, he received the following military rank: Army General. Lieutenant General Heinz Hoffmann, who held the position of head of the Barracks People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR, also moved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR.

Heinz Hoffmann (1910-1985) can be called the second "founding father" of the National People's Army of the GDR, besides Willi Stoff. Coming from a working-class family, Hoffmann joined the Communist Youth League of Germany at the age of sixteen, and at the age of twenty became a member Communist Party Germany. In 1935, underground fighter Heinz Hoffmann was forced to leave Germany and flee to the USSR. Here he was selected to receive an education - first political at the International Lenin School in Moscow, and then military. From November 1936 to February 1837 Hoffman took special courses in Ryazan at the Military Academy named after. M.V. Frunze. After completing the courses, he received the rank of lieutenant and on March 17, 1937 he was sent to Spain, where at that time the Civil War was going on between the Republicans and the Francoists. Lieutenant Hoffman was assigned to the position of instructor in handling Soviets in the training battalion of the 11th International Brigade. On May 27, 1937, he was appointed military commissar of the Hans Beimler battalion as part of the same 11th International Brigade, and on July 7 he took command of the battalion. The next day, Hoffmann was wounded in the face, and on July 24 - in the legs and stomach. In June 1938, Hoffmann, who had previously been treated in hospitals in Barcelona, ​​was taken from Spain - first to France and then to the USSR. After the start of the war, he worked as a translator in prisoner of war camps, then became the chief political instructor in the Spaso-Zavodsky prisoner of war camp on the territory of the Kazakh SSR. From April 1942 to April 1945 Hoffmann held the positions of political instructor and teacher at the Central Anti-Fascist School. From April to December 1945, he was an instructor and then head of the 12th Party School of the Communist Party of Germany in Skhodnya.

After returning to East Germany in January 1946, Hoffmann worked in various positions in the SED apparatus. On July 1, 1949, with the rank of inspector general, he became vice-president of the German Department of Internal Affairs, and from April 1950 to June 1952, Heinz Hoffmann served as head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR. On July 1, 1952, he was appointed head of the Barracks People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR and Deputy Minister of the Interior of the country. For obvious reasons, Heinz Hoffmann was chosen when he was included in the leadership of the emerging Ministry of National Defense of the GDR in 1956. This was also facilitated by the fact that from December 1955 to November 1957. Hoffman completed a course of study at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Returning to his homeland, on December 1, 1957, Hoffmann was appointed First Deputy Minister of National Defense of the GDR, and on March 1, 1958, also as Chief of the General Staff of the National People's Army of the GDR. Subsequently, on July 14, 1960, Colonel General Heinz Hoffmann replaced Willi Stoff as Minister of National Defense of the GDR. The military department of the German Democratic Republic was headed by Army General (since 1961) Heinz Hoffmann until his death in 1985 - twenty-five years.

Chief of the NPA General Staff from 1967 to 1985. Colonel General (since 1985 - Army General) Heinz Kessler (born 1920) remained. Coming from a family of communist workers, Kessler in his youth took part in the activities of the youth organization of the Communist Party of Germany, however, like the vast majority of his peers, he did not escape conscription into the Wehrmacht. As an assistant machine gunner he was sent to the Eastern Front and already on July 15, 1941 he defected to the Red Army. In 1941-1945. Kessler was in Soviet captivity. At the end of 1941, he enrolled in courses at the Anti-Fascist School, then engaged in propaganda activities among prisoners of war and composed appeals to soldiers of the active Wehrmacht armies. In 1943-1945. He was a member of the National Committee for Free Germany. After being released from captivity and returning to Germany, Kessler in 1946, at the age of 26, became a member of the Central Committee of the SED and in 1946-1948. headed the organization of Free German Youth in Berlin. In 1950, he was appointed head of the Main Directorate of the Air Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR with the rank of inspector general and remained in this post until 1952, when he was appointed head of the Air People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR (from 1953 - head of the Aero Clubs Directorate of the Barracks People's Police Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR). Kessler was awarded the rank of Major General in 1952 with his appointment to the post of Chief of the People's Air Police. From September 1955 to August 1956, he trained at the Air Force Military Academy in Moscow. After completing his studies, Kessler returned to Germany and on September 1, 1956, was appointed Deputy Minister of National Defense of the GDR - Commander of the NPA Air Force. On October 1, 1959, he was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. Kessler held this post for 11 years - until he was appointed chief of the NPA General Staff. On December 3, 1985, after the unexpected death of Army General Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, Colonel General Heinz Kessler was appointed Minister of National Defense of the GDR and held this post until 1989. After the collapse of Germany, on September 16, 1993, a Berlin court sentenced Heinz Kessler to seven years half years' imprisonment.

Under the leadership of Willi Stoff, Heinz Hoffmann, other generals and officers, with the most active participation of the Soviet military command, the construction and development of the National People's Army of the GDR began, which quickly turned into the most combat-ready armed forces after the Soviet ones among the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. Everyone who was involved in service in Eastern Europe in the 1960s - 1980s noted a significantly higher level of training, and most importantly, the fighting spirit of NPA military personnel compared to their colleagues from the armies of other socialist states. Although initially many Wehrmacht officers and even generals, who were the only military specialists in the country at that time, were initially recruited into the National People's Army of the GDR, the NPA officer corps was still significantly different from the Bundeswehr officer corps. Former Nazi generals were not so numerous in its composition and, most importantly, were not in key positions. A military education system was created, thanks to which it was possible to quickly train new officer cadres, up to 90% of whom came from working-class and peasant families.

The National People's Army of the GDR was assigned an important and difficult task in the event of an armed confrontation between the “Soviet Bloc” and Western countries. It was the NPA that had to directly enter into hostilities with the Bundeswehr formations and, together with units of the Soviet Army, ensure advancement into the territory of West Germany. It is no coincidence that NATO considered the NPA as one of the key and very dangerous opponents. Hatred towards the National People's Army of the GDR subsequently affected the attitude towards it former generals and officers already in a united Germany.

The most combat-ready army in Eastern Europe

The German Democratic Republic was divided into two military regions - the Southern Military District (MB-III) with headquarters in Leipzig, and the Northern Military District (MB-V) with headquarters in Neubrandenburg. In addition, the National People's Army of the GDR included one centrally subordinate artillery brigade. Each military district included two motorized divisions, one armored division and one missile brigade. The motorized division of the NNA of the GDR included: 3 motorized regiments, 1 armored tank regiment, 1 artillery regiment, 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment, 1 missile department, 1 engineering battalion, 1 logistics battalion, 1 sanitary battalion, 1 chemical defense battalion. The armored division included 3 armored regiments, 1 motorized regiment, 1 artillery regiment, 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment, 1 engineering battalion, 1 logistics battalion, 1 chemical defense battalion, 1 sanitary battalion, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 missile department. The missile brigade included 2-3 missile departments, 1 engineering company, 1 logistics company, 1 meteorological battery, 1 repair company. The artillery brigade included 4 artillery departments, 1 repair company and 1 logistics company. The NPA Air Force included 2 air divisions, each of which included 2-4 attack squadrons, 1 anti-aircraft missile brigade, 2 anti-aircraft missile regiments, 3-4 radio battalions.

The history of the GDR navy began in 1952, when units of the Maritime People's Police were created as part of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1956, the ships and personnel of the Maritime People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR entered the created National People's Army and until 1960 bore the name of the Naval Forces of the GDR. The first commander of the GDR Navy was Rear Admiral Felix Scheffler (1915-1986). A former merchant sailor, he served in the Wehrmacht from 1937, but almost immediately, in 1941, he was captured by the Soviets, where he remained until 1947. In captivity, he joined the National Committee of Free Germany. After returning from captivity, he worked as secretary to the rector of the Karl Marx Higher Party School, then joined the marine police, where he was appointed chief of staff of the Main Directorate of Marine Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR. On October 1, 1952, he was promoted to rear admiral, from 1955 to 1956. served as commander of the Maritime People's Police. After the creation of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR, on March 1, 1956, he took over the position of commander of the GDR Navy and held this post until December 31, 1956. Later, he held a number of important posts in the naval command, was responsible for combat training of personnel, then for equipment and weapons, and retired in 1975 from the post of deputy fleet commander for logistics. As commander of the GDR Navy, Felix Scheffler was replaced by Vice Admiral Waldemar Ferner (1914-1982), a former underground communist who left Nazi Germany back in 1935, and after returning to the GDR, headed the Main Directorate of the Marine Police. From 1952 to 1955 Ferner served as commander of the Maritime People's Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR, into which the Main Directorate of the Maritime Police was transformed. From January 1, 1957 to July 31, 1959, he commanded the GDR Navy, after which from 1959 to 1978. served as head of the Main Political Directorate of the National People's Army of the GDR. In 1961, it was Waldemar Ferner who was the first in the GDR to be awarded the rank of admiral - the highest rank in the country's naval forces. The longest-serving commander of the People's Navy of the GDR (as the GDR Navy was called since 1960) was Rear Admiral (then Vice Admiral and Admiral) Wilhelm Eim (1918-2009). A former prisoner of war who sided with the USSR, Eim returned to post-war Germany and quickly made a party career. In 1950, he began serving in the Main Directorate of the Marine Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR - first as a liaison officer, and then as deputy chief of staff and head of the organizational department. In 1958-1959 Wilhelm Eim led the logistics service of the GDR Navy. On August 1, 1959, he was appointed commander of the GDR Navy, but from 1961 to 1963. studied at the Naval Academy in the USSR. Upon his return from the Soviet Union, the acting commander, Rear Admiral Heinz Norkirchen, again gave way to Wilhelm Eym. Eim served as commander until 1987.

In 1960, a new name was adopted - People's Navy. The GDR Navy became the most combat-ready after the Soviet naval forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. They were created taking into account the complex Baltic hydrography - after all, the only sea to which the GDR had access was the Baltic Sea. The low suitability of large ships for operations was determined by the predominance in the People's Navy of the GDR of high-speed torpedo and missile boats, anti-submarine boats, small missile ships, anti-submarine and anti-mine ships, and landing ships. The GDR had a fairly strong naval aviation, equipped with airplanes and helicopters. The People's Navy had to solve, first of all, the tasks of defending the country's coast, fighting enemy submarines and mines, landing tactical troops, and supporting ground forces on the coast. The Volksmarine personnel numbered approximately 16,000 troops. The GDR Navy was armed with 110 combat and 69 auxiliary ships and vessels, 24 naval aviation helicopters (16 Mi-8 and 8 Mi-14), 20 Su-17 fighter-bombers. The command of the GDR Navy was located in Rostock. The following structural units of the Navy were subordinate to him: 1) flotilla in Peenemünde, 2) flotilla in Rostock - Warnemünde, 3) flotilla in Dransk, 4) naval school. Karl Liebknecht in Stralsund, 5) naval school named after. Walter Steffens in Stralsund, 6) coastal missile regiment "Waldemar Werner" in Gelbenzand, 7) naval combat helicopter squadron "Kurt Barthel" in Parow, 8) naval aviation squadron "Paul Wiszorek" in Laga, 9) communications regiment "Johann Wesolek" in Böhlendorf, 10) communications and flight support battalion in Lag, 11) a number of other units and service units.

Until 1962, the National People's Army of the GDR was recruited by hiring volunteers, the contract was concluded for a period of three years. Thus, for six years the NPA remained the only professional army among the armies of the socialist countries. It is noteworthy that conscription was introduced in the GDR five years later than in the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (where the army switched from contract to conscription in 1957). The number of the NPA was also inferior to the Bundeswehr - by 1990, 175,000 people served in the ranks of the NPA. The defense of the GDR was compensated by the presence on the territory of the country of a huge contingent of Soviet troops - ZGV / GSVG (Western Group of Forces / Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). The training of NPA officers was carried out at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy, the Wilhelm Pieck Higher Military-Political School, specialized military educational institutions branches of troops. The National People's Army of the GDR introduced an interesting system of military ranks, partly duplicating the old ranks of the Wehrmacht, but partly containing obvious borrowings from the military rank system of the Soviet Union. The hierarchy of military ranks in the GDR looked like this (analogs of ranks in the Volksmarine - People's Navy are given in parentheses): I. Generals (admirals): 1) Marshal of the GDR - the rank was never awarded in practice; 2) General of the Army (Admiral of the Fleet) - in the ground forces the rank was assigned to senior officials, in the navy the rank was never assigned due to the small number of the Volksmarine; 3) Colonel General (Admiral); 4) Lieutenant General (Vice Admiral); 5) Major General (Rear Admiral); II. Officers: 6) Colonel (Captain zur See); 7) Lieutenant Colonel (Frigate Captain); 8) Major (Corvette-Captain); 9) Captain (Lieutenant Captain); 10) Oberleutnant (Oberleutnant zur See); 11) Lieutenant (Leutenant zur See); 12) Non-Commissioned Lieutenant (Unterleutnant zur See); III. Fenrichs (similar to Russian warrant officers): 13) Ober-Stabs-Fenrich (Ober-Stabs-Fenrich); 14) Stabs-Fenrich (Stabs-Fenrich); 15) Ober-Fenrich (Ober-Fenrich); 16) Fenrich (Fenrich); IVSergeants: 17) Staff Sergeant Major (Staff Obermeister); 18) Ober-sergeant-major (Ober-meister); 19) Feldwebel (Meister); 20) Non-commissioned sergeant major (Obermat); 21) Non-commissioned officer (Mate); V. Soldiers/sailors: 22) Staff-corporal (Staff-sailor); 23) Corporal (Chief Sailor); 24) Soldier (Sailor). Each branch of the army also had its own specific color in the edging of the shoulder straps. For generals of all branches of the military it was scarlet, motorized infantry units - white, artillery, missile troops and air defense units - brick, armored forces - pink, airborne troops - orange, signal troops - yellow, military construction troops - olive, engineering troops, chemical troops, topographical and motor transport services - black, rear units, military justice and medicine - dark green; air force (aviation) - blue, air force anti-aircraft missile forces - light gray, navy - blue, border service - green.

The sad fate of the NPA and its military personnel

The German Democratic Republic can rightfully be called the most loyal ally of the USSR in Eastern Europe. The National People's Army of the GDR remained the most combat-ready after the Soviet army of the Warsaw Pact countries until the end of the 1980s. Unfortunately, the fate of both the GDR and its army turned out badly. East Germany ceased to exist as a result of the policy of “German unification” and the corresponding actions of the Soviet side. In fact, the GDR was simply given to the Federal Republic of Germany. The last Minister of National Defense of the GDR was Admiral Theodor Hofmann (born 1935). He already belongs to the new generation of GDR officers who received military education in military educational institutions of the republic. On May 12, 1952, Hofmann enlisted as a sailor in the Maritime People's Police of the GDR. In 1952-1955, he trained at the Naval People's Police Officer School in Stralsund, after which he was assigned to the position of combat training officer in the 7th Flotilla of the GDR Navy, then served as commander of a torpedo boat, and studied at the Naval Academy in the USSR. After returning from the Soviet Union, he held a number of command positions at Volksmarine: deputy commander and chief of staff of the 6th flotilla, commander of the 6th flotilla, deputy chief of the naval staff for operational work, deputy commander of the navy and chief of combat training. From 1985 to 1987 Rear Admiral Hofmann served as Chief of Staff of the GDR Navy, and in 1987-1989. - Commander of the GDR Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense of the GDR. In 1987, Hofmann was awarded the military rank of vice admiral, and in 1989, with appointment to the post of Minister of National Defense of the GDR - admiral. After the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR was abolished on April 18, 1990 and was replaced by the Ministry of Defense and Disarmament, headed by the democratic politician Rainer Eppelmann, Admiral Hofmann served as assistant minister and commander-in-chief of the National People's Army of the GDR until September 1990 . After the dissolution of the NPA he was dismissed from military service.

The Ministry of Defense and Disarmament was created after reforms began in the GDR, under pressure from the Soviet Union, where Mikhail Gorbachev had long been in power, affecting both military sphere. On March 18, 1990, the Minister of Defense and Disarmament was appointed - he became 47-year-old Rainer Eppelmann, a dissident and pastor in one of the evangelical parishes in Berlin. In his youth, Eppelman served 8 months in prison for refusing to serve in the National People's Army of the GDR, then received religious education and from 1975 to 1990. served as a pastor. In 1990, he became chairman of the Democratic Breakthrough Party and in this capacity was elected to the People's Chamber of the GDR, and was also appointed Minister of Defense and Disarmament.

October 3, 1990 occurred historical event- The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were reunited. However, in fact, this was not reunification, but simply the inclusion of the territories of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany, with the destruction of the administrative system that existed during the socialist period and its own armed forces. The National People's Army of the GDR, despite its high level of training, was not included in the Bundeswehr. The German authorities feared that the generals and officers of the NNA retained communist sentiments, so a decision was made to effectively disband the National People's Army of the GDR. Only privates and non-commissioned officers of conscript service were sent to serve in the Bundeswehr. Career servicemen were much less fortunate. All generals, admirals, officers, fennrichs and non-commissioned officers of the personnel were dismissed from military service. Total number dismissed - 23,155 officers and 22,549 non-commissioned officers. Almost none of them managed to be reinstated in service in the Bundeswehr; the vast majority were simply dismissed - and military service they did not count toward their military service record or even their civil service record. Only 2.7% of NNA officers and non-commissioned officers were able to continue serving in the Bundeswehr (mostly, these were technical specialists capable of maintaining Soviet equipment, which after the reunification of Germany went to the Federal Republic of Germany), but they received ranks lower than those they held in the National People's Army - Germany refused to recognize the military ranks of the NPA.

Veterans of the National People's Army of the GDR, left without pensions and without taking into account military experience, were forced to look for low-paid and low-skilled work. The right-wing parties of the Federal Republic of Germany also opposed their right to wear the military uniform of the National People's Army - the armed forces of a “totalitarian state,” as the GDR is assessed in modern Germany. As for military equipment, the vast majority were either disposed of or sold to third countries. Thus, Volksmarine combat boats and ships were sold to Indonesia and Poland, and some were transferred to Latvia, Estonia, Tunisia, Malta, and Guinea-Bissau. The reunification of Germany did not lead to its demilitarization. American troops are still stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Bundeswehr units now take part in armed conflicts around the world - ostensibly as peacekeeping forces, but in reality - defending US interests.

Currently, many former soldiers of the National People's Army of the GDR are part of public veterans' organizations involved in protecting the rights of former officers and non-commissioned officers of the NNA, as well as in the fight against discrediting and denigrating the history of the GDR and the National People's Army. In the spring of 2015, in honor of the seventieth anniversary of the Great Victory, over 100 generals, admirals and senior officers of the National People's Army of the GDR signed a letter - an appeal "Soldiers for Peace", in which they warned Western countries against the policy of escalating conflicts in modern world and confrontation with Russia. “We do not need military agitation against Russia, but mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. We do not need military dependence on the United States, but our own responsibility for peace,” the appeal says. Among the first signatures of the appeal are the last ministers of national defense of the GDR - Army General Heinz Kessler and Admiral Theodor Hofmann.

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An old photograph: November 1989, the Berlin Wall, literally saddled by a jubilant crowd of thousands. Only the group of people in the foreground - the GDR border guards - have sad and confused faces. Until recently, formidable to their enemies and rightly aware of themselves as the elite of the country, they overnight turned into extraneous extras at this holiday. But this was not the worst thing for them...

“Somehow I accidentally ended up in the house of a former captain of the National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR. He graduated from our higher education military school, a good programmer, but has been unemployed for three years now. And around the neck is a family: a wife, two children.

From him for the first time I heard what I was destined to hear many times.

You betrayed us... - the former captain will say. He will say it calmly, without strain, gathering his will into a fist.

No, he was not a “political commissar”, did not collaborate with the Stasi, and yet he lost everything.”

These are lines from the book by Colonel Mikhail Boltunov “ZGV: The Bitter Road Home.”

The problem, however, is much deeper: having abandoned the soldiers and officers of the army we created to the mercy of fate, have we not thereby betrayed ourselves? And was it possible to preserve the NNA, albeit under a different name and with a changed organizational structure, but as a loyal ally of Moscow?

Let’s try to figure it out, of course, as far as possible, within the framework of a short article, especially since these issues have not lost their relevance to this day, especially against the backdrop of NATO’s expansion to the east and the spread of US military-political influence in the post-Soviet space.

Disappointment and humiliation.

So, in 1990, the unification of Germany took place, causing euphoria on the part of both Western and East Germans. It's finished! The great nation regained its unity, and the much-hated Berlin Wall finally came down. However, as often happens, unbridled joy gave way to bitter disappointment. Of course, not for all residents of Germany, no. Most of them, as sociological surveys show, do not regret the unification of the country.

Disappointment affected mainly some of the residents of the GDR, which had sunk into oblivion. Quite quickly they realized: in essence, an Anschluss had occurred - the absorption of their homeland by its western neighbor.

The officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the former NPA suffered the most from this. He didn't integral part Bundeswehr, but was simply dissolved. The majority of former GDR soldiers, including generals and colonels, were dismissed. At the same time, their service in the NNA was not credited either for military or civilian work experience. Those who were lucky enough to wear the uniform of their recent opponents found themselves demoted in rank.

As a result, East German officers were forced to stand in line for hours at the labor exchange and hang around in search of work - often low-paid and unskilled.

And worse than that. In his book, Mikhail Boltunov quotes the words of the last Minister of Defense of the GDR, Admiral Theodor Hofmann: “With the unification of Germany, the NPA was dissolved. Many professional military personnel have been discriminated against."

Discrimination, in other words, humiliation. It couldn’t have been otherwise, for the famous Latin proverb says: “Woe to the vanquished!” And doubly woe if the army was not crushed in battle, but simply betrayed by both its own and the Soviet leadership.

The GDR army was one of the most professional in Europe.
And it is no coincidence that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany tried to liquidate it as quickly as possible.

However, many will consider the last statement controversial and will note the irreversibility and even spontaneity of the process of unification of the two Germanys. But the point is not that the FRG and the GDR inevitably had to unite, but how this could happen. And absorption by West Germany eastern neighbor was far from the only way.

What was the alternative that would allow the NPA officer corps to take a worthy position in the new Germany and remain loyal to the USSR? And what is more important for us: did the Soviet Union have real opportunities to maintain its military-political presence in Germany, preventing NATO expansion to the east? To answer these questions we need to take a short historical excursion.

In 1949, a new republic appeared on the map - the GDR. It was created as a response to education in the American, British and French occupation zones of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is interesting that Joseph Stalin did not seek to create the GDR, taking the initiative to unify Germany, but on the condition that it did not join NATO.

Heinz Hoffmann - Minister of Defense of the GDR until 1985.
During the Great Patriotic War- anti-fascist

However, the former allies refused. Proposals to build the Berlin Wall came to Stalin at the end of the 40s, but the Soviet leader abandoned this idea, considering it to discredit the USSR in the eyes of the world community.

Remembering the history of the birth of the GDR, one should also take into account the personality of the first chancellor of the West German state, Konrad Adenauer, who, according to the former Soviet ambassador to Germany Vladimir Semenov, “cannot be considered only a political opponent of Russia. He had an irrational hatred of Russians."

Konrad Adenauer is one of the key figures in the history of the Cold War.
First Federal Chancellor of Germany

Birth and formation of the NPA

Under these conditions and with the direct participation of the USSR, the NPA was created on January 18, 1956, which quickly turned into a powerful force. In turn, the GDR navy became the most combat-ready along with the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact.

This is not an exaggeration, because the GDR included Prussian and Saxon lands, which once represented the most militant German states with strong armies. This is especially true, of course, for the Prussians. It was the Prussians and Saxons who formed the basis of the officer corps of first the German Empire, then the Reichswehr, then the Wehrmacht and, finally, the NNA.

Traditional German discipline and love for military affairs, strong military traditions of Prussian officers, rich combat experience of previous generations, coupled with advanced military equipment and the achievements of Soviet military thought, made the GDR army an invincible force in Europe.

The GDR army really enjoyed popular love in its country.
At least at first.

It is noteworthy that in some way the dreams of the most far-sighted German and Russian statesmen came true in the NPA. turn of XIX-XX centuries, dreaming of a military alliance between the Russian and German empires.

The strength of the GDR army was in the combat training of its personnel, because the number of the NPA always remained relatively low: in 1987 it numbered 120 thousand soldiers and officers in its ranks, inferior to, say, to the People's Army Polish - the second largest army after the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact.

However, in the event of a military conflict with NATO, the Poles had to fight on secondary sectors of the front - in Austria and Denmark. In turn, the NPA was given more serious tasks: to fight in the main direction - against troops operating from the territory of Germany, where the first echelon of NATO ground forces was deployed, that is, the Bundeswehr itself, as well as the most combat-ready divisions of the Americans, British and French.

Tank driver of the GDR army under the state flag

East German Army during exercises

The Soviet leadership trusted its German brothers in arms. And not in vain. The commander of the 3rd West Germany Army in the GDR and later the deputy chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Valentin Varennikov, wrote in his memoirs: “The National People's Army of the GDR, in fact, before my eyes, grew in 10-15 years from zero to a formidable modern army, equipped with everything necessary and capable of acting no worse than Soviet troops.”

This point of view is essentially confirmed by Matvey Burlakov: “The peak of the Cold War was in the early 80s. All that was left was to give the signal and everything would rush forward. Everything is ready for combat, the shells are in the tanks, all you have to do is put them in the barrel - and off you go. They would have burned everything, destroyed everything there. I mean military installations - not cities. I often met with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann. He once asked me: “I saw the plans of the GDR army that you approved. Why didn’t you launch an offensive?” We tried to collect these plans, but someone hid them and made copies. And Naumann agreed with our calculation that we should be in the English Channel within a week. I say: “We are not aggressors, why are we going to attack you? We always expected you to be the first to start.” That’s how it was explained to them.”

Please note: Naumann saw the plans of the GDR army, whose tanks would be among the first to reach the English Channel and, as he admitted, no one could effectively stop them.

In the event of a NATO attack, this army would be on the English Channel in a week.
NATO strategists were sincerely perplexed why, with such force at hand,
we didn't hit. They just can’t wrap their heads around a simple thing,
that the Russians really didn't want war.

From point of view intellectual preparation NPA personnel also stood on high level: by the mid-80s, 95 percent of its officer corps had a higher or secondary specialized education, about 30 percent of officers graduated from military academies, 35 percent from higher military schools.

In a word, at the end of the 80s the army of the GDR was ready for any tests, but the country was not. Unfortunately, combat power armed forces could not compensate for the socio-economic problems that the GDR faced by the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century. Erich Honecker, who headed the country in 1971, was guided by the Soviet model of building socialism, which significantly distinguished him from many leaders of other countries in Eastern Europe.

Honecker's key goal in the socio-economic sphere is to improve the well-being of the people, in particular, through the development of housing construction and increasing pensions.

Alas, good initiatives in this area led to a decrease in the volume of investments in the development of production and the renewal of outdated equipment, the wear and tear of which was 50 percent in industry and 65 percent in agriculture. In general, the East German economy, like the Soviet one, developed along an extensive path.

Defeat without firing a shot

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 complicated relations between the two countries - Honecker, being a conservative, reacted negatively to perestroika. And this is against the backdrop of the fact that in the GDR the attitude towards Gorbachev as the initiator of reforms was enthusiastic. In addition, at the end of the 80s, a mass exodus of GDR citizens to Germany began. Gorbachev made it clear to his East German counterpart that Soviet assistance to the GDR directly depended on Berlin's implementation of reforms.

What happened next is well known: in 1989, Honecker was removed from all posts, a year later the GDR was absorbed by West Germany, and a year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian leadership hastened to withdraw from Germany a group of almost half a million, equipped with 12 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, which became an unconditional geopolitical and geostrategic defeat and accelerated the entry of yesterday’s allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact into NATO.

But all these are dry lines about relatively recently past events, behind which is the drama of thousands of NPA officers and their families. With sadness in their eyes and pain in their hearts, they looked at the last parade of Russian troops on August 31, 1994 in Berlin. Betrayed, humiliated, useless to anyone, they witnessed the departure of the once allied army, which lost the Cold War with them without firing a single shot.

M.S. Gorbachev lost Cold War without firing a single shot

And just five years earlier, Gorbachev promised not to abandon the GDR to its fate. Did the Soviet leader have grounds for such statements? On the one hand, it would seem not. As we have already noted, at the end of the 80s the flow of refugees from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany increased. After Honecker's dismissal, the leadership of the GDR demonstrated neither the will nor the determination to save the country and take truly effective measures for this that would allow the reunification of Germany on an equal basis. Declarative statements not supported by practical steps, in in this case doesn't count.

But there is another side to the coin. According to Boltunov, neither France nor Great Britain considered the issue of German reunification to be relevant. This is understandable: in Paris they were afraid of a strong and united Germany, which had twice crushed the military power of France in less than a century. And of course, it was not in the geopolitical interests of the Fifth Republic to see a united and strong Germany at its borders.

In turn, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adhered to a political line aimed at maintaining the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as compliance with the terms of the Final Act in Helsinki, the rights and responsibilities of the four states for post-war Germany.

Against this background, it does not seem accidental that London’s desire to develop cultural and economic ties with the GDR, and when it became obvious that the unification of Germany was inevitable, the British leadership proposed extending this process for 10-15 years.

And perhaps most importantly: in containing the processes aimed at the unification of Germany, the British leadership counted on the support of Moscow and Paris. And even more than that: German Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself was not initially the initiator of West Germany’s absorption of its eastern neighbor, but advocated the creation of a confederation, putting forward a ten-point program to implement his idea.

Thus, in 1990, the Kremlin and Berlin had every chance to realize the idea once proposed by Stalin: the creation of a united, but neutral and non-NATO Germany.

The preservation of a limited contingent of Soviet, American, British and French troops on the territory of a united Germany would become a guarantor of German neutrality, and the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany created on an equal basis would not allow the spread of pro-Western sentiments in the army and would not turn former NPA officers into outcasts.

Soviet and German brothers in arms. Photo from the 1950s
The day will come when the descendants of some will renounce both their country and their allies.
And the heirs of others will suddenly find themselves without a livelihood

Personality factor

All this was quite feasible in practice and met the foreign policy interests of both London and Paris, and Moscow and Berlin. So why did Gorbachev and his circle, who had the opportunity to rely on the support of France and England in defending the GDR, did not do this and easily went for the absorption of their eastern neighbor by West Germany, ultimately changing the balance of power in Europe in favor of NATO?

From Boltunov’s point of view, the determining role in this case was played by the personality factor: “...Events took an unexpected turn after the meeting of foreign ministers, at which E. A. Shevardnadze (USSR Foreign Minister) went into direct violation of Gorbachev’s directive.

The reunification of two independent German states is one thing, the Anschluss, that is, the absorption of the GDR into the Federal Republic, is another. It is one thing to overcome the division of Germany as a cardinal step towards eliminating the division of Europe. Another is the transfer of the leading edge of the continental split from the Elbe to the Oder or further to the east.

Shevardnadze gave a very simple explanation for his behavior - I learned this from the assistant to the President (USSR) Anatoly Chernyaev: “Genscher asked for this. And Genscher is a good person.”

"Good man" Eduard Shevardnadze - one of the main culprits of the GDR tragedy

Perhaps this explanation oversimplifies the picture associated with the unification of the country, but it is obvious that such a rapid absorption of the GDR by West Germany is a direct consequence of the short-sightedness and weakness of the Soviet political leadership, which, based on the logic of its decisions, was more focused on the positive image of the USSR in the West world rather than the interests of one’s own state.

Ultimately, the collapse of both the GDR and the socialist camp as a whole, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides a clear example of the fact that the determining factor in history is not some objective processes, but the role of the individual. The entire past of mankind indisputably testifies to this.

After all, there were no socio-economic prerequisites for the ancient Macedonians to enter the historical arena, if not for the outstanding personal qualities of kings Philip and Alexander.

The French would never have brought most of Europe to their knees if Napoleon had not been their emperor. And there would not have been an October revolution in Russia, the most shameful in the history of the country of the Brest Peace, just as the Bolsheviks would not have won in Civil War, if not for the personality of Vladimir Lenin.

All these are just the most striking examples, indisputably testifying to the decisive role of the individual in history.

There is no doubt that nothing similar to the events of the early 90s could have happened in Eastern Europe if Yuri Andropov had been at the head of the Soviet Union. A person with a strong will in the area foreign policy he invariably proceeded from the geopolitical interests of the country, and they required maintaining a military presence in Central Europe and comprehensively strengthening the combat power of the NPA, regardless of the attitude of the Americans and their allies to this.

Heinz Kessler - Minister of Defense of the GDR after 1985 - did everything that depended on him,
to keep the country from dying. But he could not do anything about the growing
lumpy social problems, nor with the betrayal of the Soviet elite.
Others had to solve these problems - but they lacked the will.

The scale of Gorbachev’s personality, as well as that of his immediate circle, objectively did not correspond to the complex of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that the Soviet Union faced.

The same can be said about Egon Krenz, who replaced Honecker as General Secretary of the SED and was not a strong and strong-willed person. This is the opinion of General Markus Wolf, who headed the foreign intelligence of the GDR, about Krenz.

One of the characteristics of weak politicians is inconsistency in following the chosen course. This happened with Gorbachev: in December 1989, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union would not abandon the GDR to its fate. A year later, the Kremlin allowed West Germany to carry out the Anschluss of its eastern neighbor.

Kohl also felt the political weakness of the Soviet leadership during his visit to Moscow in February 1990, since it was after this that he began to more energetically pursue a course towards the reunification of Germany and, most importantly, began to insist on maintaining its membership in NATO.

And as a result: in modern Germany the number of American troops exceeds 50 thousand soldiers and officers, stationed including on the territory of the former GDR, and the NATO military machine is deployed near the Russian borders. And in the event of a military conflict, the perfectly prepared and trained officers of the former NPA will no longer be able to help us. And they’re unlikely to want to...

As for England and France, their fears regarding the unification of Germany were not in vain: the latter quickly took leading positions in the European Union, strengthened its strategic and economic position in Central and Eastern Europe, gradually displacing British capital from there.

Hello dears.

Yesterday we had an introduction about a new topic: , but today we’ll start with specific examples.
And let's talk about the not very numerous, but one of the most combat-ready armies in the whole world in those years - about the GDR Volksarmee, aka the National People's Army (NPA) of the German Democratic Republic
The Volksarmee was created in 1956 from 0, and literally in 10-15 years it became a very formidable force.
It consisted of ground forces, air force and air defense troops, navy and border troops.

Issues of the country's defense were decided by the National Defense Council, subordinate to the People's Chamber and the State Council of the GDR.
The armed forces were led by the Minister of National Defense.

General of the Army Heinz Hoffmann 1960-1985 Minister of National Defense of the GDR

There was Main Headquarters NPA and the headquarters of the armed forces. The highest body is the Main Political Directorate of the NPA. When creating the NNA, the experience of building the Armed Forces of the USSR and other socialist countries was used.
The NNA is recruited in accordance with the Law on the Introduction of Universal Military Duty (Jan. 24, 1962) and on the principle of voluntariness. Conscription age - 18 years, duration of service - 18 months

Officer training is carried out in higher education institutions officer schools and in Military Academy named after F. Engels.
As I said above, the GDR army was not the most numerous. As of 1987, the Ground Forces of the NNA of the GDR numbered 120,000 military personnel.

The strength of the Air Force is about 58,000 people.

The number of personnel in the Navy is about 18 thousand people.

The border guards of the GDR were very numerous - up to 47,000 people.

The territory of East Germany was divided into two military districts - MB-III (Southern, headquartered in Leipzig) and MB-V (Northern, headquartered in Neubrandenburg) and one artillery brigade, not part of any of the military districts, in each of which each included two motorized rifle divisions (motorisierte Schützendivision, MSD), one armored division (Panzerdivision, PD) and one missile brigade (Raketenbrigade, RBr).

Each armored division consisted of 3 armored regiments (Panzerregiment), one artillery regiment (Artillerieregiment), 1 motorized rifle regiment (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketen-Regiment), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 logistics battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung), 1 chemical defense battalion (Bataillon chemischer Abwehr), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 reconnaissance battalion (Aufklärungsbataillon), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung).
The main tank of the GDR army was the T-55, which made up about 80% of the fleet. The remaining 20% ​​were T-72b slingshot and T-72G vehicles, mainly of Polish or Czechoslovak production. The share of new tanks has been steadily increasing.

Each motorized rifle division consisted of 3 motorized regiments (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 armored regiment (Panzerregiment), 1 artillery regiment (Artillerieregiment), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketenregiment), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 material support battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 chemical defense battalion (Bataillon chemischer Abwehr), 1 material support battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung).


Each missile brigade consisted of 2-3 missile departments (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineering company (Pionierkompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materieller Sicherstellung), 1 meteorological battery (meteorologische Batterie), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie).


The artillery brigade consisted of 4 divisions (Abteilung), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materieller Sicherstellung).

The air force (Luftstreitkräfte) consisted of 2 divisions (Luftverteidigungsdivision), each of which consisted of 2-4 attack squadrons (Jagdfliegergeschwader), 1 anti-aircraft missile brigade (Fla-Raketenbrigade), 2 anti-aircraft missile regiments (Fla-Raketenregiment) , 3-4 radio technical battalions (Funktechnisches Bataillon). There were also modern aircraft such as Mig-29.


The Air Force also included one of the most legendary and effective units of the Volksarmee - the 40th airborne battalion of the NNA "Willi Sanger" (German - 40. "Willi Sanger Fallschirmjager Bataillon"). The fighters of this unit took part in almost all foreign conflicts involving the Soviet military bloc - in particular, in Syria and Ethiopia. There is also a legend that the special forces of the airborne units of the NPA, as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops, participated in combat operations in Afghanistan.

The Navy (Volksmarine) was very good, and most importantly modern. It consisted of 110 warships of various classes and 69 auxiliary ships.


The naval aviation included 24 helicopters (16 Mi-8 type and 8 Mi-14 type), as well as 20 Su-17 fighter-bombers. The basis of the fleet is three patrol ships (SKR) of the Rostock type (Project 1159) and 16 small anti-submarine ships (MPC) of the Parchim type, Project 133.1

In total there were 6 divisions in the Volksarmey (11 at mobilization)
1719 tanks (2798 during mobilization, in peacetime on conservation)
2,792 infantry fighting vehicles (4,999 during mobilization, mothballed in peacetime)
887 artillery pieces over 100mm
(1746 during mobilization, in peacetime on conservation)
394 combat aircraft

64 combat helicopters

According to the Warsaw Pact, in the event of hostilities, the following NPA divisions were assigned to the armies of the Western Group of Forces:
19th Motorized Rifle Division NNA - Second Guards Tank Army.
17 Motorized Rifle NNA - Eighth Guards Army.
6 Motorized Rifle NPA - reserve of the Western Front.


It’s funny that despite the military doctrine, which was formulated as “the denial of all traditions of the Prussian-German military,” there were many borrowings from the 2nd and 3rd Reich in insignia, ranks and uniforms. Let's just say - a compilation of insignia of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army. So the rank insignia of the gefreiters moved from the sleeves to the shoulder straps and became similar to the sergeant stripes of the Soviet Army. The insignia of non-commissioned officers remained entirely Wehrmacht. Officer's and general's shoulder straps remained the same as in the Wehrmacht, but the number of stars on them began to correspond to the Soviet system.

The highest rank of the Volksarmee was called Marshal of the GDR, but in fact no one was awarded this title.
The uniform also had its differences. For example, the Tale-Hartz helmet, which was developed for the Wehrmacht, but was never accepted. Or the GDR version of the AK-47 called MPi-K (we mentioned it here.

National People's Army (NNA, Volksarmee, Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) - the armed forces of the GDR, which were created in 1956 and consisted of three types of control bodies:

• ground forces (Landstreitkräfte);
• navy (Volksmarine);
• air Force (English) Russian(Luftstreitkräfte), and military branches, special forces and services.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Nationale Volksarmee DDR 1956-1990 | National People's Army GDR 1956-1990

✪ Präsentiermarsch der Nationalen Volksarmee

Subtitles

Creation

On November 12, 1955, the German government announced the creation of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundeswehr).

Started work in 1959 Military Academy named after F. Engels.

In 1961, the first command and staff exercises of the NNA of the GDR and the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces were held.

Until 1962, it was recruited and NPA formations were not present in East Berlin.

In October 1962, the first NPA maneuvers took place in the territories of the GDR and Poland, in which Polish and Soviet troops.

On September 9-12, 1963, the international military exercise “Quartet” was held in the south of the GDR, in which the NNA of the GDR, Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak troops took part.

Despite its relatively small numbers, the National People's Army of the GDR was the most combat-ready army in Western Europe.

Doctrine

The official position of the leadership of the GDR on defense issues was formulated as “the denial of all traditions of the Prussian-German military,” and was based on further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist system of the GDR, as well as on close interaction with the armies of socialist countries. The NPA continued the traditions of the armed struggle of the German proletariat, as well as the liberation movement of the era Napoleonic wars. However, in fact, there was no complete break with the classical military tradition of Germany.

Correspondence of the colors of the edging of the shoulder straps to the branches of the military:

Land Forces (Landstreitkräfte)

Air Force (Luftstreitkräfte)

Navy (Volksmarine)

Border Troops (Grenztruppen)