Planned mobilization of the working population. Labor soldiers. Tasks performed by labor armies

By the end of 1941, over 800 thousand Soviet Germans were resettled to Siberia and Kazakhstan from the European part of the USSR. They all eked out a miserable existence and were on the verge of life and death. Despair could push them to any step. According to the central leadership of the NKVD, based on reports from the field, the situation with the German settlers had reached such a degree of severity and tension, had become so explosive, that the situation could not be saved by ordinary preventive arrests; radical measures were necessary. This measure was the conscription of the entire working-age German population into the so-called “Labor Army”. The mobilization of Soviet Germans to the “labor front” solved two problems at once. Social tension was eliminated in places where deported Germans were concentrated and the contingent of the forced labor system was replenished.

The term “Labor Army” itself was borrowed from the labor armies that actually existed during the Civil War (“revolutionary armies of labor”). It is not found in any official document of the war years, official correspondence, or reports of state and economic bodies. Those who were mobilized and called upon by military registration and enlistment offices to perform forced labor service as part of work detachments and columns with a strict centralized army structure, who lived in barracks at NKVD camps or at enterprises and construction sites of other people's commissariats in fenced and guarded "zones" began to call themselves laborers. "with military internal regulations. By calling themselves labor army workers, these people thereby wanted to somehow increase their social status, which had been lowered by the official authorities to the level of prisoners.

The “Trudarmia” was staffed, first of all, from representatives of the “guilty” peoples, that is, Soviet citizens ethnically related to the population of the countries at war with the USSR: Germans, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians, although some other peoples were also represented in it. However, if the Germans found themselves in the “Trud Army” already from the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942, then work detachments and columns of citizens of other nationalities noted above began to form only at the end of 1942.

In the history of the existence of the “Labor Army” (1941-1946), several stages can be distinguished. The first stage is from September 1941 to January 1942. The process of creating labor army formations began with the closed resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 31, 1941 “On Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.” On its basis, labor mobilization of German men aged 16 to 60 takes place in Ukraine. It has already been noted that due to the rapid advance of German troops, this resolution was largely not implemented, however, it was still possible to form 13 construction battalions, total number 18,600 people. At the same time, in September, the withdrawal of military personnel of German nationality from the Red Army begins, from which construction battalions are also formed. All these construction battalions are sent to 4 NKVD sites: Ivdellag, Solikambumstroy, Kimpersailag and Bogoslovstroy. Since the end of September, the first of the formed battalions have already begun work.

Soon, by decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the construction battalions were disbanded, and military personnel were removed from the quartermaster supply and received the status of construction workers. Work columns of 1 thousand people each are created from them. Several columns were united into working detachments. This position of the Germans was short-lived. Already in November they were again transferred to barracks status and the military regulations extended to them.

As of January 1, 1942, 20,800 mobilized Germans were working on construction sites and in NKVD camps. Several thousand more Germans worked in labor columns and detachments assigned to other people's commissariats. Thus, from the very beginning, according to departmental affiliation, labor army labor columns and detachments were divided into two types. Formations of the same type were created and located at the camps and construction sites of the NKVD Gulag, subordinate to the camp authorities, guarded and provided for according to the standards established for prisoners. Formations of another type were formed under civilian people's commissariats and departments, subordinate to their leadership, but controlled by local NKVD bodies. The administrative regime for maintaining these formations was somewhat less strict than the columns and detachments that functioned within the NKVD itself.

The second stage of the functioning of the “Labor Army” is from January to October 1942. At this stage, there is a massive conscription of German men aged 17 to 50 into work detachments and columns.

• On the procedure for using German settlers of military age from 17 to 50 years. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1123 ss of January 10, 1942

The second stage began with the resolution State Committee Defense No. 1123 ss dated January 10, 1942 “On the procedure for using German settlers of military age from 17 to 50 years old.” German men deported from the European part of the USSR who were fit for physical labor in the amount of 120 thousand people “for the entire duration of the war” were subject to mobilization. The mobilization was entrusted to the People's Commissariats of Defense, Internal Affairs and Transport until January 30, 1942. The decree prescribed the following distribution of mobilized Germans:

45 thousand people for logging at the disposal of the NKVD of the USSR;

35 thousand people for the construction of the Bakalsky and Bogoslovsky factories in the Urals;

40 thousand people for the construction of railways: Stalinsk - Abakan, Magnitogorsk - Sara, Stalinsk - Barnaul, Akmolinsk - Kartaly, Akmolinsk - Pavlodar, Sosva - Alapaevsk, Orsk - Kandagach at the disposal of the People's Commissar of Railways.

The need for mobilization was explained by the needs of the front and motivated by the interests of “rational labor use of German settlers.” For failure to appear for mobilization to be sent to work columns, criminal liability was provided for with the application of capital punishment “to the most malicious”.

On January 12, 1942, in development of the USSR State Defense Committee Resolution No. 1123 ss, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria signed order No. 0083 “On the organization of detachments of mobilized Germans at the NKVD camps.” In the order, 80 thousand mobilized, who were to be at the disposal of the People's Commissariat, were distributed among 8 objects: Ivdellag - 12 thousand; Sevurallag - 12 thousand; Usollag - 5 thousand; Vyatlag - 7 thousand; Ust-Vymlag - 4 thousand; Kraslag - 5 thousand; Bacallag - 30 thousand; Bogoslovlag - 5 thousand. The last two camps were formed specifically for mobilized Germans.

All those mobilized were required to report to the assembly points of the People's Commissariat of Defense in serviceable winter clothing, with a supply of linen, bedding, a mug, a spoon and a 10-day supply of food. Of course, many of these demands were difficult to meet, since as a result of the resettlement the Germans had lost their property, many of them were essentially unemployed and all of them, as noted earlier, were eking out a miserable existence.

The Military Communications Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Railways were obliged to ensure the transportation of those mobilized during the remaining days of January 1942 with delivery to their places of work no later than February 10. These deadlines turned out to be unrealistic, just as it was not possible to mobilize 120 thousand people.

How the mobilization of German settlers took place and why the requirements of the USSR State Defense Committee were not fully fulfilled can be judged by the example of the Novosibirsk region. The report of the local NKVD department indicated that, according to the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Novosibirsk region was supposed to mobilize 15,300 deported Germans out of 18,102 registered for dispatch into work columns. 16,748 people were summoned by personal summons to the military registration and enlistment offices to undergo a medical examination, of which 16,120 people appeared, 10,986 people were mobilized and sent, that is, the order was not completed for 4,314 people. It was not possible to mobilize persons who managed to obtain exemption from mobilization due to their “indispensability” in agriculture, coal and forestry industries. In addition, 2,389 people who were sick and did not have warm clothes arrived at the recruiting stations. Persons with higher education. 628 people did not appear on summons.

The mobilization of Germans in the Novosibirsk region took place over 8 days from January 21 to 28, 1942. The mobilized were not announced that they would be sent to the “Trudarmia”, as a result of which various rumors circulated about the reasons and goals of the mobilization. During the conscription, 12 people were prosecuted for evasion and 11 for “anti-Soviet agitation.”

In other territories and regions, the mobilization of the Germans took place under similar conditions. As a result, instead of 120 thousand, only about 93 thousand people were recruited into the "Trudarmia", of which 25 thousand people were transferred to the People's Commissar of Railways, the rest were received by the NKVD.

Due to the fact that the plan defined by the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1123 SS was underfulfilled by more than 27 thousand people, and the needs of the military economy for labor were growing, the leadership of the USSR decided to mobilize those Soviet German men who were not subject to deportation. On February 19, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued Resolution No. 1281 ss “On the mobilization of German men of military age from 17 to 50 years, permanently residing in regions, territories, autonomous and union republics.”

• On the mobilization of German men of military age from 17 to 50 years old, permanently residing in regions, territories, autonomous and union republics. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1281 ss of February 14, 1942

Unlike the first, the second mass mobilization of Germans was prepared by the NKVD more carefully, taking into account the mistakes and miscalculations made in January 1942 and had a number of features. Its duration was no longer 20 days, as during the first mobilization, but extended to almost several months. Preparatory work district military registration and enlistment offices was carried out until March 10. During this time, those being mobilized were notified, underwent a medical examination and were enrolled in work columns. From March 10 to March 5, working detachments and columns were formed and they set off to their destinations. Reports on the progress of the operation were received by the center every 5 days.

This time, those being mobilized were informed that they were being drafted into work columns and would be sent to work, and not to the active army, which was not the case during the first mobilization. The Germans were warned that for failure to appear at conscription and assembly points they would be arrested and imprisoned in forced labor camps. As with the first mobilization, those mobilized had to arrive in serviceable winter clothing with a supply of linen, bedding, a mug, a spoon and a supply of food for 10 days. Since those who were conscripted were not subject to deportation, their provision of clothing and food was somewhat better than that of those mobilized in the first mass conscription.

During the second mass mobilization, the question of releasing any specialists from it was raised very harshly. It was decided only personally, with emergency the head of the local NKVD department together with the military commissar. At the same time, each region, territory, and republic sent lists of those exempted from mobilization indicating the reasons for the release to the central office of the NKVD.

At the assembly points and along the route, the NKVD authorities carried out operational work, which was aimed at suppressing any attempts at “counter-revolutionary” actions, at immediately bringing to justice everyone who evaded reporting to the assembly points. All intelligence materials available in the authorities on the mobilized Germans were sent through the heads of echelons to the operational departments of the camps at their destination. The heads of local NKVD departments were personally responsible for the mobilized, right up to their transfer to GULAG facilities.

The geographical aspect of the second mass mobilization of the Germans deserves attention. In addition to the territories and regions affected by the first mobilization, the second mobilization also captured the Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Chkalov, Kuibyshev, Yaroslavl regions, Mordovian, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Mobilized Germans from these regions and republics were sent to build the Sviyazhsk-Ulyanovsk railway. The construction of the road was carried out by order of the State Defense Committee and was entrusted to the NKVD. In Kazan, a directorate was organized for the construction of a new railway and a camp, called the Volga forced labor camp of the NKVD (Volzhlag). During March - April 1942, it was planned to send 20 thousand mobilized Germans and 15 thousand prisoners to the camp.

The Germans living in the Tajik, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Kazakh SSR, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and Chelyabinsk region were mobilized for the construction of the South Ural Railway. They were sent to the Chelyabinsk station. Germans from the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Ivanovo regions were supposed to work in the timber transport farms of Sevzheldorlag and therefore were delivered to the Kotlas station. Those mobilized from the Sverdlovsk and Molotov regions ended up in Tagilstroy, Solikamskstroy, and Vyatlag. Kraslag received Germans from the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Irkutsk and Chita regions. Germans from the Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories arrived at Umaltstroy, at the Urgal station of the Far Eastern Railway. In total, during the second mass conscription of Germans into the “Labor Army”, about 40.9 thousand people were mobilized.

The bulk of the mobilized Germans (according to the resolutions of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1123 ss and 1281 ss) were sent to construction sites and to NKVD camps. Only the 25 thousand people from the first mobilization that we have already noted were at the disposal of the People’s Commissariat of Railways and worked on the construction of railways. However, they too were transferred to the NKVD in October 1942.

In June 1942, following additional mobilization, about 4.5 thousand more mobilized Germans were sent to the work column of the Volga camp of the NKVD for the construction of the Sviyazhsk-Ulyanovsk railway.

The third stage of the functioning of the “Labor Army” - from October 1942 to December 1943. It is characterized by the largest mobilization of Soviet Germans, carried out on the basis of the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 2383 ss of October 7, 1942 “On the additional mobilization of Germans for the national economy of the USSR " Compared to the two previous mass mobilizations, the third one had its own significant characteristics.

• On the additional mobilization of Germans for the national economy of the USSR. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR 2383 of October 7, 1942.

First of all, the range of conscription ages expanded: men aged 15 to 55 were conscripted. In addition, German women aged 16 to 45 years were also mobilized, except for pregnant women and those who had children under three years of age. Children three years old and older were to be raised by the rest of the family members, and in their absence, by their closest relatives or collective farms. The duties of local councils were to take measures to accommodate mobilized children left without parents.

Male labor soldiers, mostly teenagers and elderly people, were sent to the enterprises of the Chelyabinskugol, Karagandaugol, Bogoslovskugol, Chkalovskugol trusts of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry. In total, it was planned to send 20.5 thousand people to the mines. Women made up the main contingent mobilized for the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry - 45.6 thousand people. 5 thousand men were mobilized there. All of them ended up at the enterprises of Glavneftestroy, Glavneftegaz, oil engineering factories, and such large oil refineries as Kuibyshevsky, Molotovsky, Bashkirsky. Labor members of the third mass conscription were also sent to the enterprises of some other people's commissariats and departments. In total, as part of this mobilization, 123.5 thousand people were sent to the “Trudarmia”, including 70.8 thousand men and 52.7 thousand women.

Mobilization took place over about a month. During the mobilization, military registration and enlistment offices were faced with a “shortage of workers,” since the entire capable part of the German population was practically exhausted. That is why among those called up, people were subsequently found to have serious illnesses, disabled people of groups 2 and 3, pregnant women, teenagers 14 years old and people over 55 years old.

And yet, the mobilization of Soviet Germans continued in 1943. By resolutions of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 3095 of April 26, No. 3857 of August 2 and No. 3860 of August 19, 1943, over 30 thousand more Germans, both men and women, were drafted into the Labor Army. They were sent to the NKVD Gulag facilities, to civilian departments for the extraction of coal, oil, gold, rare metals, to the timber and pulp and paper industries, for road repairs, etc.

As before, the majority of Germans were at NKVD facilities. Only seven of them by the beginning of 1944 employed over 50% of all mobilized (Bakalstroy - over 20 thousand, Bogoslovlag - about 9 thousand, Usollag - 8.8 thousand, Vorkutalag - 6.8 thousand, Solikambumstroy - 6 ,2 thousand, Ivdellag - 5.6 thousand, Vosturallag - 5.2 thousand. In 22 camps, the labor of 21.5 thousand German women was used (as of January 1, 1944). Work columns at such camps as Ukhtoizhemlag almost entirely consisted of mobilized German women (3.7 thousand), Unjlag (3.3 thousand), Usollag (2.8 thousand), Dzhidastroy (1.5 thousand), Ponyshlag (0.3 thousand).

Outside the NKVD, 84% of the Germans mobilized into civilian departments were concentrated in four people's commissariats: the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry (56.4 thousand), the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry (29 thousand); People's Commissariat of Ammunition (8 thousand); People's Commissariat of Construction (over 7 thousand). Small groups of Germans worked in the People's Commissariat Food Industry(106), building materials (271), blanks (35), etc. In total - in 22 people's commissariats (at the beginning of 1944).

By mid-1944, the number of regions, territories and republics in which working columns of mobilized Soviet Germans were stationed almost doubled compared to August 1943 - from 14 to 27. The columns were scattered over a vast territory from Moscow and Tula regions in the west to the Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories in the east, from Arkhangelsk region in the north to the Tajik SSR in the south.

As of January 1, 1944, the largest number of German labor army workers were employed at the enterprises of Kemerovo (15.7 thousand), Molotov (14.8 thousand), Chelyabinsk (13.9 thousand), Kuibyshev (11.2 thousand). ), Sverdlovsk (11 thousand), Tula (9.6 thousand), Moscow (7.1 thousand), Chkalovsk (4.7 thousand) regions, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (5.5 thousand).

• Deployment of working detachments and columns of Soviet Germans

The fourth - last - stage of the functioning of the “Labor Army” lasted from January 1944 until its liquidation (mainly in 1946). At this final stage, there were no longer any significant conscriptions of Germans, and the replenishment of work detachments and columns came mainly from Germans - Soviet citizens “discovered” in the territories of the USSR liberated from occupation, and repatriated from the countries of Eastern Europe and Germany.

According to rough estimates, for the period from 1941 to 1945, over 316 thousand Soviet Germans were mobilized into labor columns, excluding those repatriated, whose mobilization mainly took place after the end of the war.

Of all the people's commissariats that used the labor of mobilized Germans, the NKVD firmly held the lead in the number of labor army soldiers throughout the war years. This is confirmed by Table 8.4.1

Table 8.4.1

The number of German labor army soldiers at NKVD facilities

and other people's commissariats in 1942 - 1945.

The data presented indicate that the NKVD working columns included more than half of the Germans mobilized during the war years into the “Trud Army” (49 thousand more than all other people’s commissariats). However, as shown in the table, almost all the time the number of labor army members in the NKVD was somewhat less than in all the people's commissariats combined. This is explained mainly by the high mortality rate of labor army soldiers at NKVD facilities in 1942.

As of April 1945, the entire labor contingent of the NKVD amounted to 1063.8 thousand people, including 669.8 thousand prisoners, 297.4 thousand civilians and 96.6 thousand German labor army workers. That is, the Germans at the end of the war made up only 9% of the total labor potential of the NKVD. The proportion of mobilized Soviet Germans was small in relation to the entire labor contingent in other people's commissariats. In the coal mining industry it was 6.6%, in the oil industry - 10.7% (almost all women), in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition - 1.7%, in the People's Commissariat of Construction - 1.5%, in the People's Commissariat of the Forestry Industry - 0.6%, in others departments and even less.

From the above data it is clearly seen that in the overall labor potential of the country, Soviet Germans mobilized into labor army formations with a camp regime made up a very small part and therefore could not have any decisive influence on the implementation of production tasks by the relevant people's commissariats and departments. Therefore, we can talk about the absence of an urgent economic need to use the forced labor of Soviet Germans precisely in the form of prison labor. However, the camp form of organizing forced labor for USSR citizens of German nationality made it possible to keep them under strict control and use them in the most difficult situations. physical work, spend a minimum of money on their maintenance.

Labor soldiers who found themselves at NKVD facilities were housed separately from prisoners in camp centers specially created for them. From them, work teams were formed according to the production principle, numbering 1.5 - 2 thousand people. The detachments were divided into columns of 300 - 500 people, columns - into brigades of 35 - 100 people each. In the people's commissariats of the coal, oil industry, etc., working (mine) detachments, local columns, shift departments and brigades were formed on a production principle.

	In the Labor Army. Rice. M. Disterhefta

The organizational structure of the detachments at the NKVD camps in general terms copied the structure of the camp units. The detachments were headed by NKVD workers - “chekists - camp soldiers”; civilian specialists were appointed as foremen and foremen. However, as an exception, a German labor soldier could also become a foreman if he was an appropriate specialist and was not on the “black lists” of his superiors as unreliable. A political instructor was appointed to each detachment to carry out political and educational work.

At Narkomugol enterprises, mine managers were placed at the head of the detachment. In production, mobilized Germans were obliged to unquestioningly carry out all orders of the chief engineer, site manager, and foreman. The use of Germans from among the “most trained and tested” was allowed as column commanders, mining foremen and foremen. To ensure the labor regime and maintenance of work columns, the established daily routine, discipline at work and at home, a deputy mine manager was appointed to each mine - the head of a detachment of NKVD workers. The manager of the mine - the head of the detachment and his deputy were obliged to organize continuous monitoring of the behavior of the mobilized Germans, to prevent and stop “at the root all kinds of manifestations of mass resistance to the established regime, sabotage, sabotage and other anti-Soviet actions, to identify and expose pro-fascist elements, refuseniks, quitters and disruptors of production." A similar system of managing labor army members was used in other civilian commissariats.

Orders and instructions of the NKVD, the people's commissariats of the coal and oil industry, and other people's commissariats established strict military order in work detachments and columns. Strict requirements were also imposed on the implementation of production standards and orders. They had to be completed strictly on time and with “one hundred percent” quality.

• Documents on the procedure for the maintenance, labor use and protection of mobilized Germans

The instructions required that labor army soldiers be housed in barracks in columns. Moreover, all the columns were located in one place - a “zone” fenced with a fence or barbed wire. Along the entire perimeter of the “zone” it was prescribed to post paramilitary security posts, checkpoints of guard dogs and patrols around the clock. The guard shooters were tasked with stopping escape attempts, carrying out a “local search” and detaining deserters, and preventing Germans from communicating with local residents and prisoners. In addition to protecting the cantonment places (“zones”), the movement routes and places of work of the mobilized were protected. Nemtsev. The use of weapons was allowed against Labor Army members who violated the security regime.

The most complete and consistent requirements of the instructions for the placement and protection of working columns of German citizens of the USSR were carried out in the NKVD system. The management of the camps and construction sites consisted of workers from the camp administration and had extensive experience in implementing the camp regime for keeping prisoners. Several in better position According to the detention regime, there were work columns at enterprises of other people's commissariats. There, sometimes there was a violation of instructions, which was expressed in the fact that “zones” were not created and the Labor Army soldiers could live more freely (sometimes even in apartments near local population). The order of the People's Commissar of the Coal Industry dated April 29, 1943 is interesting. It notes violations of the maintenance regime at a number of mines in Kuzbass. “So, at the mine named after Voroshilov and named after Kalinin, the barracks in which the Germans are settled are not fenced, armed security in the zones is not organized, at the Babaevskaya mine of the Kuibyshevugol trust, more than 40 people are settled in private apartments.” As noted further in the order, in the vast majority of mines, the Germans went, accompanied by employees of the special detachment management, only to work, and returned back without escort or security. Reception and transfer of Labor Army soldiers against receipt were not carried out. The order required trust managers and mine managers to fence off all dormitories and barracks housing mobilized Germans by May 5, 1943, install armed guards, stop issuing leave cards, and move all those living in private apartments to “zones.”

And yet, despite the demands of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry, even by the end of 1943, not all mines complied with the instructions to create “zones” and their armed protection. A similar situation occurred in some other civilian People's Commissariats.

To prevent possible escapes of Labor Army members, the authorities tightened the regime of detention, and searches were widely practiced. Camp commanders were ordered to conduct a thorough inspection of all camp premises where mobilized Germans were kept at least twice a month. At the same time, an inspection and check of personal belongings was carried out, during which items prohibited for use were confiscated. It was prohibited to store bladed weapons and firearms, all types of alcoholic beverages, narcotic substances, playing cards, identity documents, military topographical maps, terrain plans, maps of districts and regions, photographic and radio equipment, binoculars, and compasses. Those found guilty of possessing prohibited items were brought to justice. From October 1942, the frequency of checks and personal searches of Germans was increased to once a month. But now, when prohibited things were discovered in a barracks, tent or barracks, in addition to the perpetrators, orderlies and commanders of the units in whose premises these things were found were also held accountable.

For violation of internal regulations, production discipline, failure to comply with instructions or orders of the administration and engineering workers, failure to comply with production standards and tasks through the fault of the worker, violation of safety rules, damage to equipment, tools and property, disciplinary sanctions were imposed on labor army workers. For minor offenses, a personal reprimand, a warning, a reprimand before the formation and in the order were announced, a fine was applied, assignment to more difficult work for up to 1 month, and arrest. In the NKVD camps, arrest was divided into simple (up to 20 days) and strict (up to 10 days). Strict arrest differed from simple arrest in that the arrested person was kept in solitary confinement without being taken to work, hot food was given out every other day, and he was taken out for a walk once a day for 30 minutes under the guard of an armed shooter.

The most “hardcore” violators were sent to penal shafts and penal columns for up to three months or were put on trial. Order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 0083 of January 12, 1942 warned mobilized Germans that for violation of discipline, refusal to work and desertion they were subject to criminal liability “with capital punishment applied to the most malicious.”

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. The regime for keeping Germans mobilized in work columns was somewhat relaxed. New orders issued by the People's Commissariats: coal industry; pulp and paper industry; instructions from the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy and Construction allowed the removal of armed guards from the “zones” and replacing them with guard posts at checkpoints and mobile posts in the interior. VOKhR riflemen from civilian personnel were replaced by mobilized ones from among the Komsomol members and members of the CPSU (b). Departure to work began to be carried out without security under the command of the head of the column or foreman.

According to new governing documents of late 1943 - early 1944. Column chiefs received the right to grant labor army workers leave from the “zone” during their free time from work based on their dismissal notes, with a mandatory return by 10 p.m. On the territory of the “zone” it was allowed to organize covered stalls for the sale of dairy and vegetable products by the local civilian population, who entered the camp using passes issued to the officers on duty in the “zone”. Workers were allowed to move freely within the territory, receive and send all types of correspondence, receive food and clothing parcels, use books, newspapers and magazines, play checkers, chess, dominoes and billiards, engage in physical education and sports, and amateur art activities.

After the end of the war, the gradual liquidation of all “zones” began and the transfer of labor army members to the position of special settlers, securing them in the enterprises where they worked as free-hire workers. The Germans were still prohibited from leaving enterprises on their own and leaving their place of residence without permission from the NKVD.

By order of the People's Commissar of the Coal Industry No. 305 of July 23, 1945, all labor army workers were allowed to call their families. The exception was those who worked in the mines of the Moscow, Tula and Leningrad regions. At NKVD facilities, “zones” and paramilitary guards for mobilized Germans were eliminated by directive of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 8 of January 8, 1946. In the same month, “zones” for mobilized Germans were also eliminated in other people’s commissariats. The Germans were allowed to live in apartments and dormitories and transfer their families to their place of work for permanent residence.

During the entire period of the war, the forced labor of mobilized Germans was used by enterprises and construction sites of 24 People's Commissariats. As already noted, the largest number of German work columns (25) functioned at NKVD camps and construction sites. On January 1, 1945, over 95 thousand mobilized Germans worked there. The distribution of this number of Labor Army soldiers by main departments is presented in Table 8.4.2.

Table 8.4.2

Distribution of Labor Army soldiers among the main departments of the NKVD

The data presented show that the bulk of the mobilized Germans were used in construction industrial facilities and in logging, where they constituted, respectively, a fifth and a seventh of the total workforce in these industries.

During the war years, possessing a huge army of cheap labor, the NKVD built many industrial facilities. Work columns of Germans worked on the construction of the Bakal metallurgical and coke plants and on the creation of the ore base of these enterprises. The lead times of the first five electric furnaces of this plant were record-breakingly short. Their launch was scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1942, and two blast furnaces were put into operation in the second quarter of 1943. The tasks were completed on time, which was largely due to the German labor army workers who worked there.

Labor members took part in the construction of the Novotagil metallurgical and coke-chemical plants, plant No. 166 in Omsk, the Altai bromine plant, the Bogoslovsky aluminum plant, the Molotov shipbuilding plant, etc., erected hydroelectric dams on the rivers of the Urals: Ponyshskaya on the Chusovaya River, Shirokovskaya on the Kosva River, Vilukhinskaya on the Usva River, and many other national economic facilities.

The Soviet Germans conscripted into labor columns were mostly peasants and therefore had almost no working specialties or qualifications. On January 1, 1944, out of 111.9 thousand mobilized Germans who worked in camps and construction sites, only 33.1 thousand were qualified specialists (29%). But even these specialists were not always used for their intended purpose. 28% of them were on general works, including engineers - 9.2%, technicians - 21.8%, medical workers - 14.2%, electricians, radio and communications specialists - 11.6%, agricultural machine operators (tractor drivers, combine operators, drivers) - 68 .7%. And this despite the acute shortage of such specialists in camps and construction sites, in general national economy countries!

The country's leadership divided the labor force at its disposal into 4 groups: group “A” - the most able-bodied and physically healthy people used in basic production and construction work; group “B” - service personnel; group “B” - outpatients and inpatients exempt from work, teams of the weak, pregnant women and disabled people; group “G” - new arrivals and departures, those under investigation and in penal units without being sent to work, those refusing to work, as well as people who did not have clothes and shoes. The average ratio of labor army personnel for the considered groups for 1943 is given in Table 8.4.3.

Table 8.4.3

The ratio of labor army soldiers who worked in the NKVD system

by groups “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” on average for 1943

From the data presented in the table it is clear that the labor of the bulk of the mobilized Germans was used in production (77.1%) and only a small part (5.8%) was part of the service personnel. A significant number of Labor Army members (15%) did not go to work due to illness. This was due primarily to poor nutrition and difficult working conditions.

A small number of absences from work due to bad weather conditions did not at all mean that the weather was favorable to the work of those mobilized. Most of the NKVD camps were located in areas with harsh climatic conditions in the North, Siberia and the Urals, but the camp authorities, as a rule, neglected this fact in the pursuit of fulfilling planned targets, fearing that the commissioning of facilities under construction would be missed.

At the NKVD camps there were work columns not only from mobilized Germans, but also from representatives of Central Asian peoples. For them, unlike the Germans, the working day was shortened in bad weather. Thus, the duration of the working day at temperatures below -20° in calm weather and below -15° in windy weather was reduced to 4 hours 30 minutes, at temperatures below -15° in calm weather and below -10° in windy weather - to 6 hours 30 minutes. For the Germans, in any weather conditions, the working day was at least 8 hours.

Adverse weather conditions, hard work, poor nutrition, lack of clothing, especially in winter, lack of heating places, long working days, often over 12 hours, or even 2-3 shifts in a row - all this led to a deterioration in the physical condition of labor army workers and significant labor losses. . The dynamics of labor losses at NKVD facilities can be traced by changes in the percentage composition of group “B” (sick, weak, disabled) to the entire contingent of labor army soldiers:

1.7. 1942 - 11,5 % 1.7. 1943 - 15,0 % 1.6. 1944 - 10,6 %

1.1. 1943 - 25,9 % 1.1. 1944 - 11,6 %

The data presented once again show that the most difficult period in the existence of work columns was the winter of 1942 - 1943, during which the percentage of labor losses was the highest. First of all, we are talking about the sick and infirm. During the same period, the strictest regime of detention, interruptions in food and the provision of uniforms, warm clothes and shoes, and the unsettled life of the Labor Army soldiers occurred. Since the summer of 1943, there has been a tendency towards improvement in the physical condition of people; the indicator for group “B” has been steadily decreasing.

One of the significant reasons for the failure of many labor army workers to meet production standards was the lack of skills in production for most of them. Thus, at the Aktobe plant of the NKVD, the bulk of the labor army consisted of former collective farmers from the southern regions of Ukraine, who did not even have a clue about working in mining. As a result, in the fourth quarter of 1942, the average percentage of fulfillment of production standards decreased from month to month, and only from January 1943 there was an increase in labor productivity. This was facilitated not only by the acquisition of certain production skills, but also by improved nutrition. In addition, the camp organized on-the-job training courses for qualified personnel, where about 140 people were trained monthly in the specialties required by the plant: excavator operators, drivers, plumbers, stove makers, etc.

A similar situation occurred in logging camps. In the Vyatka camp of the NKVD, mobilized Germans were used in logging, timber-laying and timber-loading work. Lacking work skills, they could not meet production standards as experienced workers. The situation was complicated by the intensive supply of wagons for shipment of timber to defense enterprises. Brigades of labor army workers were at work for 20 or more hours a day. As a result, group “B” in Vyatlag, which in March 1942 made up 23% of the total payroll of the Labor Army, reached 40.3% by December of the same year.

And yet, despite the difficult working conditions, the production standards and labor productivity of mobilized Germans were quite high level and exceeded the same indicators for prisoners working under the same conditions. Thus, at Chelyabmetallurgstroy NKVD, 5.6% of prisoners and 3.7% of Labor Army soldiers did not fulfill the norm. 17% of prisoners and 24.5% of Labor Army soldiers fulfilled the norm by 200%. None of the prisoners fulfilled the norm by 300%, and 0.3% of the Labor Army soldiers worked with such indicators.

In general, in the majority of working detachments and columns, production standards were not only met, but also exceeded. For example, in the second quarter of 1943, the development of standards by the labor army was: for the construction of the theological aluminum plant - 125.7%; in Solikamsklag - 115%; in Umaltlag - 132%. During the third quarter of the same year, the Vosturallag labor army workers fulfilled the timber harvesting standards by 120% and timber removal by 118%. The work columns of the Inta NKVD camp for the same quarter fulfilled the norm by 135%.

A certain difference from those discussed above was the nature and working conditions at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry. As already noted, this was the second People’s Commissariat, after the NKVD, where the use of forced labor of Soviet Germans was widespread. The instruction on the employment of mobilized Germans at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Coal Mining established the length of the working day and the number of days off on a common basis with civilian employees, and required mandatory technical training for workers, mining foremen, foremen and foremen from among those mobilized for at least four hours a week. Production standards, due to the lack of skills to work in the mines, in the first month decreased to 60%, in the second month - to 80%, and from the third month they amounted to 100% of the standards established for civilian workers.

In June 1943, the People's Commissar of the Coal Industry issued an order in which he demanded that all mobilized Germans, no later than August 1, be concentrated to work in mines and construction sites specially designated for this purpose, taking into account “their group placement near production.” The allocated mines and construction sites were to be fully staffed by labor army workers, headed by civilian managers and engineering and technical personnel. It was allowed to use civilian workers in the main units in these mines in professions that were missing among the Germans.

The first “special sections” of mobilized Germans were created at the mines of the Leningugol and Molotovugol trusts. They successfully completed planned tasks. Thus, at the Molotovugol trust at the Kapitalnaya mine, special section No. 9 fulfilled the plan of February 1944 by 130%, at mine No. 10, special section No. 8 - by 112%. But there were few such areas. Even by April 1944, the concentration of Germans in individual mines was not completed.

A significant part of the Labor Army members admitted to underground work did not undergo special training (“technical minimum”). Lack of knowledge in the specialty and safety precautions led to accidents, frequent injuries, and, consequently, loss of ability to work. For the Kaganovichugol trust, in March 1944 alone, a loss of 765 man-days was recorded due to injuries received at work. At the mine. Stalin at the Kuzbassugol plant in the first quarter of 1944 there were 27 accidents, of which 3 were fatal, 7 with severe injuries leading to disability and 17 with moderate injuries.

On February 16, 1944, an explosion occurred at the Vozhdaevka mine of the Kuibyshevugol trust, which killed 80 people, including 13 Germans, and one Labor Army soldier went missing. According to the mine management, the causes of the accident were non-compliance with safety rules by some workers, cluttered passages, untimely shutdown of furnaces, failure to analyze the causes of previous incidents, staff turnover, and violations of labor discipline.

In general, as was constantly noted in the documents of the heads of mines, plants, and trusts, despite shortcomings in the organization of labor and poor skills in working in the mine, the overwhelming majority of labor army members worked conscientiously, achieving high results. Thus, for the Anzherougol trust, the fulfillment of standards by labor army workers was characterized by the following average indicators: miners - 134%; bulk breakers - 144%; installers - 182%; timber suppliers - 208%.

At the enterprises of the People's Commissariat for Coal Coal there was widespread use in the mines of the labor of teenage Germans, mobilized in the fall of 1942 as a result of the third mass conscription of Germans. For example, at the Northern mine of the Kemerovougol trust, in a work column of 107 people, 31 teenagers aged 16 years and younger worked, including 12 15-year-olds, 1 14-year-old. They worked in all areas of the mine on an equal basis with adults , and no one tried to make their work easier.

In most mines of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry, the instruction's requirement to provide labor army workers with at least three days off per month was not observed. The management of the enterprises demanded that every labor-mobilized worker take the so-called “New Year’s oath to Comrade Stalin,” in which the labor army members committed to increase coal production through days off.

In the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry, work columns from mobilized Germans were used mainly in the construction of roads, oil pipelines, in quarries, logging, timber removal, road clearing, etc. In the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, the Germans worked in auxiliary production and in subsidiary farms of enterprises, their were not allowed to work in the main and especially defense workshops. A similar nature of the labor use of Germans took place in other people's commissariats where they worked.

The living conditions of the Labor Army soldiers, although they differed from each other at the various sites where the mobilized Germans worked, were, on the whole, extremely difficult.

Housing conditions were characterized by cramped conditions and the use of premises that were poorly suited or completely unsuitable for habitation. Work columns at NKVD camps were located, as a rule, in former camp centers, and often out of nowhere in hastily dug dugout barracks. Inside the barracks, two- and sometimes three-tier wooden bunks were equipped for sleeping, which could not provide normal rest due to the large crowding of people living in one room. Per person, as a rule, there was a little more than 1 sq. meters of usable area.

In civilian people's commissariats, there were cases of labor army workers living in private apartments. However, during 1943, all mobilized Germans were moved to barracks built similar to the barracks described above in the NKVD work columns.

Since 1944, there has been a general trend towards some improvement in the living conditions of the labor army soldiers, mainly due to the labor of the workers themselves. Baths, laundries, dining rooms, and living quarters were built, but no major changes for the better occurred. There continued to be facts of blatant disregard from the administration of camps, construction sites, and enterprises towards basic human needs. So, in June 1944, 295 families (768 men, women, children) of German special settlers were delivered to plant No. 179 and plant No. 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition from the Narym District. All able-bodied people were mobilized into work columns. The management of the plant was not prepared for the meeting of the new batch of Labor Army members. Due to the lack of housing and lack of fuel, 2-3 people slept on one trestle bed.

The housing difficulties of the mobilized were aggravated by the lack of bedding, poor supply of warm clothes, uniforms and special clothing. Thus, in the Volga camp of the NKVD, only 70% of the labor army had blankets, and 80% of the labor army had pillowcases and sheets. In the Inta forced labor camp, there were only 10 sheets for 142 labor army soldiers. Mattresses, as a rule, were stuffed with straw, but this was often not done. At a number of enterprises of the Kuzbassugol and Kemerovougol trusts, due to the lack of straw, conscripts slept directly on bare bunks.

The problem of providing labor army soldiers with clothing and bedding could not be solved until the end of the war. For example, in the spring of 1945, at the Polunochnoe manganese mine in the Sverdlovsk region, out of 2,534 labor army workers, only 797 people were fully dressed, 990 people did not have any clothes, 537 people had no shoes, 84 people had no clothes or shoes at all .

The situation with food supplies for the personnel of working columns and detachments was no less dramatic. Supply of the mobilized Germans was carried out almost as a last resort, which caused difficulties with food in the work columns.

A particularly acute food shortage was observed in the winter of 1942 - 1943. On October 25, 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Kruglov instructed the heads of forced labor camps to prohibit the issuance of more than 800 grams of bread per person per day to mobilized Germans, regardless of the percentage of completion of the production task. This was done “in order to save on the consumption of food and bread.” The supply standards for other products were also reduced: fish - up to 50 g, meat - up to 20 g, fat - up to 10 g, vegetables and potatoes - up to 400 g per day. But even the reduced food standards were almost never fully communicated to the workers for various reasons: from lack of food to abuse by officials who organized food.

Depending on the fulfillment of the planned task, food norms were divided into three types (“boilers”). Norm No. 1 - reduced - was intended for those who did not fulfill production tasks. Standard No. 2 was received by those who completed these tasks 100 - 150%. Those who exceeded production targets by more than 150% ate according to norm No. 3 - increased. The number of products according to the standards differed significantly from each other. Thus, norm No. 1 was 2 times lower than norm No. 3 for potatoes and vegetables, more than 2 times for meat and fish, and 3 times for cereals and pasta. In fact, eating according to the first norm, a person was on the verge of exhaustion and could only maintain his strength so as not to die of starvation.

The Labor Army soldiers ate food in rooms that were mostly not suitable for canteens. The low capacity of these premises and a significant shortage of utensils aggravated the situation. For example, in the Northern and Southern mines of the Kemerovougol combine, labor army workers were forced to stand in line for three hours to get their meager portion of food, and all because in the canteen of the Northern mine there were only 8 tables and 12 bowls, in South mine dining room only 8 bowls.

Difficulties in organizing food forced the leadership of the People's Commissariats to resort to extraordinary measures. On April 7, 1943, the same Kruglov issued a directive, which noted the fact of massive deterioration in the physical condition of the “special contingent” of the NKVD camps and construction sites. It was proposed to take emergency measures to “recover” the situation. As one of these measures, it was ordered to “organize the collection of sorrel, nettles, and other wild plants that can be immediately used as vegetable substitutes.” The collection of grass was prescribed to the weak and disabled.

Of course, all these measures taken could not radically solve the food problems of the Labor Army.

Difficult working conditions, poor nutrition, clothing supplies and lack of basic living conditions brought thousands of mobilized Germans to the brink of survival. The lack of complete statistics makes it difficult precise definition the number of labor army soldiers who died from hunger, cold, disease and inhuman working conditions during the entire existence of labor columns during the war. But fragmentary information allows us to conclude that the mortality rate is quite high.

Table 8.4.4

The number of Labor Army members who died in 1942 - 1944.

As can be seen from Table 8.4.4, it was especially high in work detachments and columns at NKVD camps and construction sites. In 1942, out of 115 thousand labor army members, 11,874 people died there, or 10.6%. Subsequently, this People's Commissariat observed a decrease in the mortality rate of mobilized Germans and by 1945 it amounted to 2.5%. In all other people's commissariats that used German labor, the absolute number of deaths was less than in the NKVD, but there the mortality rate increased from year to year.

In individual work columns at NKVD facilities, the mortality rate in 1942 was significantly higher than the average for the People's Commissariat. 4 NKVD camps especially “distinguished themselves”: Sevzheldorlag - 20.8%; Solikamlag - 19%; Tavdinlag - 17.9%; Bogoslovlag - 17.2%. The lowest mortality rate was in Volzlag - 1.1%, Kraslag - 1.2%, Vosturallag and Umaltlag - 1.6% each.

The main causes of high mortality were poor nutrition, difficult living conditions, overexertion at work, lack of medicines and qualified medical care. On average, there was one doctor and two paramedical workers per thousand mobilized Germans, not counting prisoners and civilian workers. The report of the head of the Vyatlag NKVD noted the increased mortality of labor army soldiers: from 5 cases in March 1942 to 229 in August of the same year, the main types of diseases that led to deaths were named. These were mainly diseases associated with hard physical labor and insufficient nutrition - pelagra, severe exhaustion, heart disease and tuberculosis.

Towards the end of the war, a gradual demobilization of large German women from labor columns began. According to the report of the head of the special resettlement department of the NKVD, Colonel Kuznetsov, there were 53 thousand German women in the work columns. Of these, 6,436 still had children in their places of mobilization. 4,304 women had one child under 12 years of age, 1,739 had 2, 357 had 3, and 36 German women had 4.

At some enterprises, management was forced to create their own boarding schools for German children. For example, such a boarding school existed at plant No. 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. It housed 114 children aged 3 to 5 years. The children had no winter clothing or shoes and therefore were deprived of the opportunity to walk in the fresh air. Many children, completely barefoot and naked, spent whole days in bed under blankets. Almost all had signs of rickets. There was no isolation ward for sick children in the boarding school, and those sick with infectious diseases - measles, mumps, scarlet fever, scabies - were kept together with healthy ones. In the dining room of the boarding school there were only three mugs and the children drank tea from the plates in which they ate the first and second courses.

The position of the Labor Army workers also largely depended on the attitude of the management of the facilities where they worked towards them. It was not the same. Somewhere benevolent, somewhere indifferent, and somewhere hostile and cruel, even to the point of physical abuse.

14-year-old Rosa Stecklein, who worked at Plant No. 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, dressed only in a shabby, torn dress and a torn quilted jacket, with bare knees, without underwear, walked 5 km back and forth to the plant in the freezing cold every day. She systematically exceeded the standards, however, in 4 months she received only 90 rubles for her work. The head of the workshop responded to her request to help with coupons for additional bread with a rude shout: “Go to your Hitler for bread.” At the same plant, there were cases of abuse of bread in the shops, when foremen illegally kept bread cards in order to force people to come to work, and then issued not cards, but coupons for additional bread, the rate for which was significantly lower than for cards .

The order for the state coal plant “Kuzbassugol” dated February 5, 1944 noted that some mine managers and site managers allowed “a hooliganly rude attitude towards the Germans, up to and including inflicting all kinds of insults and even beatings.”

At the Kemerovougol plant, the head of the Butovka mine Kharitonov, holding a general meeting of mine workers on January 23, 1944, which was attended by mobilized Germans, in his speech indiscriminately scolded all German workers, declaring that they “are enemies of the Russian people” and that their they must be forced to work even without special clothing: “We’ll force them to work naked.”

Despite the above facts, many leaders, civilian workers, and the majority of the local population not only treated the mobilized Germans kindly, but often even helped them by sharing bread and other products. Many plant directors and construction supervisors willingly hired specialist workers from the work columns.

According to the testimony of many former Labor Army members, the attitude towards the Germans on the part of the local population was kept under the close attention of the NKVD authorities. Everyone who at least once put in a good word for them or helped in anything was summoned to the party committees and the NKVD, where they were told that they were not patriots of their Motherland, since they were associated with the enemies of the people. Particularly strong pressure was put on men and women of any nationality if they married a German man or woman. For such people, movement up the career ladder was closed. And yet, many mixed marriages, in which one of the spouses was German, took place during the war years.

In Tagillag NKVD in 1942 - 1945, an old chapel surrounded by barbed wire was adapted into a punishment cell. The Labor Army soldiers gave it the name Tamara - after the name of a Russian girl, on a date with whom a young Labor Army soldier went, for which he was given the “honor” of being the first to occupy this punishment cell.

Many former German labor army members kind words they remember Major General Tsarevsky, who was appointed head of the Tagilstroy NKVD at the beginning of 1943. At the same time, both his high demands and humane attitude towards people are noted. It was he who saved the mobilized Germans who survived the unbearably difficult winter of 1942-1943 from hunger and exhaustion.

At the same time, the labor army members of Chelyabmetallurgstroi were horrified by its chief, Major General Komarovsky. By his evil will, executions of labor army soldiers for the slightest offenses became a common occurrence in the camp.

The Labor Army members themselves assessed their position differently. The older generation perceived the “Trud Army” as another link in a long chain of various kinds of repressive anti-German campaigns carried out under Soviet power. Younger people, brought up on socialist ideology, were most offended by the fact that they, Soviet citizens, communists and Komsomol members, were deprived of the opportunity to defend their homeland with arms in hand, undeservedly identified with the Germans of Germany and accused of aiding the aggressor. These people, with all their actions, behavior, and active work, tried to convince the authorities of their loyalty, hoping that the mistake would be corrected and justice would be restored.

On the initiative of the party and Komsomol activists, funds were collected to help the Red Army. During the construction of the Bogoslovsky Aluminum Plant, for each holiday, labor army members gave away 200 g of bread from their meager daily quota, so that they could then bake cookies from high-quality flour and send them to the front as a gift to the soldiers. There, German workers collected over two million rubles for the armament of the Red Army. This initiative did not go unnoticed by the country's top leadership. The telegram sent to the labor army workers of Bogoslovstroy and signed by Stalin himself said: “Please convey to the workers, engineering and technical workers and employees of German nationality working at BAZstroy, who collected 353,783 rubles for the construction of tanks and 1 million 820 thousand rubles for the construction of a squadron of my aircraft fraternal greetings and gratitude to the Red Army." The telegram was evidence of the involuntary recognition by the country's leadership, including I. Stalin, of the high patriotic spirit of a significant part of the workers of German nationality who worked in work detachments and columns. This spirit was preserved despite the humiliation and insults to human and civil dignity inflicted by the official authorities.

Many Germans throughout the years of the “Trudarmy” were leaders in production and participated in the Stakhanov movement. So, for example, only in the Kemerovougol trust, according to the results of the socialist competition among Labor Army members in March 1944, there were 60 Stakhanovites and 167 shock workers. There have been repeated cases of conferring the title “Best in the Profession” on Labor Army members. In particular, the Anzhero-Sudzhensky city party, Soviet, trade union and economic bodies in March 1944 awarded the title of best timber supplier of the Anzherougol trust to the German Schleicher, who fulfilled the norm by 163%.

If one, significant in number, part of the Labor Army members with active work and high performance in production tried to prove to the authorities their loyalty and patriotism, hoping that as a result the authorities would change their negative attitude towards the Soviet Germans, then the other, also not small, tried to prove their resentment and protest against the injustice committed, the difficult, humiliating working and living conditions were expressed by actions of the opposite nature: desertion, refusal to work, open resistance to violence, etc.

• Directive from the operational department of the Gulag NKVD to the heads of the operational security departments of the NKVD forced labor camps. 08/06/1942.

The desertion of Labor Army members from labor columns was quite widespread. According to the NKVD, in 1942, 160 group escapes were made from the camps and construction sites of this department alone. In particular, in August 1942, a group of 4 Germans deserted from the Usolsky NKVD camp. Preparations for the escape took place over several months. “The organizer of the escape, Like, purchased fictitious documents with which he provided the group members.” In October 1942, 6 mobilized Germans deserted in a car from the repair and mechanical plant of the Tagil NKVD camp. Before escaping, deserters collected donations from their fellow workers for their escape, mainly money.

Most of the fugitives were caught and returned to the camps, transferring their cases to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which, as a rule, entailed capital punishment. And yet, in 1942, 462 deserted Labor Army members were never caught.

When deserting groups of Labor Army soldiers were captured, there were isolated cases of them providing armed resistance to the units of the internal troops who detained them. Thus, during the detention of a group of Labor Army soldiers who had escaped from Bogoslovlag, “they turned out to be armed with Finnish knives and homemade daggers and, resisting... tried to kill the assistant. platoon commander of the operational division."

The fact that in a number of work columns the Germans were seriously preparing to escape and, if necessary, were ready to resist, is evidenced by the things that were found during searches. Knives, daggers, sharpening points, axes, crowbars and similar items were confiscated en masse, and in one of the NKVD camps a Nagan system pistol with seven rounds of ammunition was even found in possession of a Labor Army soldier. They also found maps, compasses, binoculars, etc.

In 1943, the desertion of Labor Army soldiers acquired even greater proportions.

Unlike the camps and construction sites of the NKVD, at the sites of all other people's commissariats the dependence of desertion on the working and living conditions of labor army soldiers is very clearly visible. In 1943, almost every fourth Labor Army soldier deserted from the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. It has already been noted that at plant No. 179 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, located in the Novosibirsk region, the working detachment was located in the former Siblag camp of the NKVD, columns of labor army soldiers were guarded while moving to the plant and back. However, in 1943, 931 people fled from there - more than half of the total number of Germans who worked at this plant. A similar situation occurred at factories No. 65 and 556, where, according to the results of an inspection of the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, “completely unsatisfactory living conditions and poor organization of labor use” were noted at the three enterprises we noted. At the same time, at factories No. 62, 63, 68, 76, 260, with more or less tolerable living conditions for the labor army workers, there was no desertion.

The expansion of the scale of desertion was facilitated by the facts that occurred when the heads of enterprises, collective farms, and MTS hired deserters from work detachments and convoys of mobilized Germans without asking them for documents.

The authorities skillfully countered “negative manifestations” on the part of the Labor Army members, applying severe penalties, fabricating “counter-revolutionary” cases against them, forming and using a wide agent and informant network in the Labor Army environment.

The following example eloquently demonstrates the far-fetchedness and fabrication of cases. In the Bakalsky camp of the NKVD, valiant security officers liquidated the “rebel organization that called itself “Combat Detachment.” Foreman Dizer, a former sea captain, foreman of mechanical workshops Vaingush, a former instructor of the Union of Viticulture Farms, Frank, a former agronomist, and others were arrested. “Members of the organization were preparing an armed escape from the camp with the aim of going over to the side of the German occupation forces. On the way to the front, the organization was preparing to blow up bridges on railway lines in order to slow down the supply of supplies for the Red Army.”

The “rebel organization” was also discovered in the Volzhlag NKVD. “To obtain weapons, the members of this organization intended to establish contact with the German occupation forces. For this purpose, preparations were being made for an escape from the camp of 2-3 group members, who were supposed to make their way across the front line to the Nazis.”

“Rebel” and “sabotage” groups of Labor Army members were also “discovered” and “liquidated” in Ivdellag, Tagillag, Vyatlag, at other NKVD facilities, as well as at a number of mines and enterprises of civilian People’s Commissariats. Thus, the Novosibirsk security officers, relying on a network of agents, concocted a bunch of cases: “The Huns” - about a “pro-fascist rebel organization”; "Thermists" - about espionage for Germany; “Fritz” - about “fascist agitation”, as well as “Hans”, “Altaians”, “Gerrick”, “Crous” and many others.

Former front-line soldiers who allowed themselves to tell people the truth about the real situation on the fronts in the initial period of the war were also brought to justice. A show trial was held against the Labor Army member of the 2nd working detachment of Chelyabmetallurgstroy NKVD Kremer in the summer of 1942 for telling his comrades about the bloody battles and heavy losses during the retreat of our army in the summer of 1941, that the enemy was armed to the teeth, and our soldiers didn’t even have ammunition. Kremer was accused of spreading false information about the progress of the war, sabotage and was sentenced to death.

In general, the number and nature of the “crimes” committed by the Labor Army can be judged by the example of the Germans brought to criminal liability in the NKVD camps. So, only in the fourth quarter of 1942 in Vyatlag 121 Germans were brought to criminal responsibility, including for “counter-revolutionary crimes” - 35, theft - 13, “counter-revolutionary sabotage” (refusal of work, self-harm, deliberately bringing oneself to the point of exhaustion) - 32, desertion - 8 Labor Army soldiers.

As we see, the Labor Army members were very different and dissimilar people in their views and beliefs, in relation to the situation in which they found themselves. And this, it seems, is not surprising. Indeed, in work detachments and columns, people met and worked side by side who had in common a nationality, language, a sense of resentment and bitterness for their humiliating position, but before the war they lived in different regions, belonged to different social, professional and demographic groups, they professed different religions, or were atheists, had different attitudes towards Soviet power, and had ambivalent assessments of the regime in Germany. Trying to find what seemed to everyone the only correct way out of the unbearably difficult situation in which they found themselves, and thus determining their fate, they all lived in the hope of luck, that fate would be favorable to them, that nightmare of war, camp slavery life will end sooner or later.

Political and legal recognition of the “Trud Army”, as a form of participation of Soviet citizens in ensuring victory over the aggressor, occurred only at the turn of 1980 - 1990, that is, more than four decades after the end of the war. Many Labor Army members did not live to see this time.

Labor mobilization has become another form of attracting citizens to socially productive labor. Its implementation was regulated by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942 “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during wartime”, Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 “On the procedure mobilization of cities for agricultural work of the working population and rural areas” and other acts.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942, it was recognized as necessary to mobilize the able-bodied urban population for the wartime period to work in production and construction. Men aged 16 to 55 years were subject to mobilization, and women aged 16 to 45 years old who did not work in government agencies and enterprises were subject to mobilization. Exempt from mobilization were male and female persons aged 16 to 18 years, who were subject to conscription to factory training schools, vocational and railway schools, according to the contingents established by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as women who had infants or children under the age of 8 years, in the absence of other family members providing care for them; students of higher and secondary educational institutions.

Workers and employees of the military industry, workers and employees of railway transport working near the front were declared mobilized. Townspeople were sent to agricultural work. During the four years of war, city residents worked 1 billion workdays in agriculture. This allows us to say that the practical significance of labor mobilization was enormous. Minors and disabled people of group III were involved in labor. As one of the features of wartime, one can note the use of military personnel in industrial enterprises, transport, and even in agriculture. Transfers of employees to work at other enterprises and in other localities were also widely practiced. During the war years, an additional system for training and retraining of personnel was carried out. The age of male youth conscripted into FZO schools was lowered, and girls aged 16-18 were allowed to enter them.

The duration of training in FZO schools was reduced to 3-4 months. Bakhov A.S. Book 3. The Soviet state and law on the eve and during the years of the Great Patriotic War(1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 pp. Labor law in wartime is characterized by a number of new provisions: wages in workdays for workers and employees seconded to collective farms in the order of labor mobilization; variety of types of bonuses, guarantee and compensation payments for various reasons (evacuation, assignment to agricultural work, provision of retraining, etc.). In wartime, the institution of labor discipline also develops, the responsibility of workers for violation of order in production and the severity of penalties increases. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 26, 1941 “On the responsibility of workers and employees of military industry enterprises for unauthorized departure from enterprises” decided:

• 1. All male and female workers and employees of military industry enterprises (aviation, tank, weapons, ammunition, military shipbuilding, military chemistry), including evacuated enterprises, as well as enterprises of other industries serving the military industry on the principle of cooperation, shall be counted for the time being war mobilized and assigned for permanent work to the enterprises in which they work.
• 2. Unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises of the specified industries, including evacuees, shall be considered as desertion and persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years.
• 3. Establish that cases of persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) from enterprises of the specified industries are considered by a military tribunal. Strengthening labor discipline and improving labor organization is also taking place on collective farms. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 increases the minimum workday for able-bodied collective farmers and collective farm women.

In addition to establishing a general annual minimum, periods of agricultural work are also established. If collective farmers did not produce the obligatory minimum of workdays during the year, they were expelled from the collective farm and were deprived of their rights as collective farmers and personal plots. Collective farmers who did not work the mandatory minimum of workdays during periods of agricultural work without good reason were subject to criminal liability and were subjected to corrective labor on the collective farm for up to 6 months, with up to 25% of the workdays withheld from payment in favor of the collective farm.

However, such harsh measures were used quite rarely, since the majority of collective farmers worked selflessly for the good of the Fatherland. Despite all the severity of wartime, the party and government still showed great concern for improving the wages of collective farmers and increasing their material interest in its results. By the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 9, 1942, starting in 1942, collective farms were recommended to introduce additional payment in kind or money for MTS tractor drivers, foremen of tractor brigades and some other categories of machine operators.

An additional form of encouragement for the labor of collective farmers was also provided for in the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, establishing bonuses for collective farmers for exceeding production output, etc. During the Great Patriotic War, the primary task of Soviet finance was the constant financing of military expenses, as well as the technical equipment of the army. During the war, a significant reduction in the cost of industrial products was achieved - by 5 billion rubles. or 17.2%. Tamarchenko M.L. Soviet finances during the Great Patriotic War. M.: Finance, 1967, p. 69.

Prices in the defense industry have fallen especially sharply. This ensured an even greater reduction in prices for ammunition, equipment and weapons. The production of consumer goods expanded. All this together allowed income to increase state budget from socialist enterprises. The structure of budget expenditures during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945) was characterized by the following data: Finance of the USSR, 1956, No. 5, p. 24

The country's normal budget revenues fell sharply due to the decline in civilian production and the enemy's occupation of part of the country's territory. In connection with this, emergency financial measures were taken to ensure additional income funds to the budget in the amount of about 40 billion rubles. Before this, funds came from turnover taxes, deductions from profits, income taxes on cooperatives and collective farms, and regular tax payments of the population (agricultural and income).

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 3, 1941, a temporary surcharge was introduced to agricultural and personal income taxes. Its collection was stopped due to the introduction of a special war tax on January 1, 1942. Bakhov A.S. Book 3. The Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p. Gazette of the Verkhov. Soviet of the USSR, 1942, No. 2

The authorities expanded the circle of taxpayers and increased taxes for industrial enterprises. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated April 10, 1942 determined the list of local taxes and fees, fixed rates and deadlines for collecting taxes, as well as the rights of local Councils in the field of providing benefits. Gazette of the Verkhov. Soviet of the USSR, 1942, No. 13

As for financing during the war years, it can be noted that government loans were a major source of financing. It is also worth noting the dedication and patriotism of Soviet citizens. The population willingly participated in financing the needs of the front. Soviet citizens donated about 1.6 billion rubles, a lot of jewelry, agricultural products, government bonds to the defense fund and the Red Army fund. An important form of accumulating funds and improving the supply of food to the population was the organization of commercial trade at increased prices while maintaining a rationed supply of food as the main form of providing workers at that time. Bakhov A.S. Book 3. The Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p.

The advantages of the socialist economy in the field of finance were clearly manifested in the fact that even in the conditions of extremely difficult wartime, the main and decisive source of budget revenue continued to be the accumulations of the socialist economy, and above all the turnover tax and deductions from profits. The cessation of the issue of money to cover the budget deficit since 1944 strengthened money circulation. Strong finances during the war were one of the important prerequisites for victory Soviet Union over the Nazi invaders. Bakhov A.S. Book 3. The Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War came at a very high price for all our people: sacrifices at the fronts, in the rear, and countless hardships. And - a lot of work. Including Soviet Germans evicted from their pre-war places of residence to remote areas of the country.

The leadership of the USSR, as is known, proceeded “from the interests of defense capability” and took “radical measures.” Among these measures was the decision to evict the Volga Germans to Akmola, North Kazakhstan, Kustanai, Pavlodar, Dzhambul and other regions.

The Germans living in Voronezh and neighboring regions were not “ignored.” In the fall of 1941, Lavrentiy Beria issued a direct order to deport five thousand Voronezh Germans. Among them were, for example, the entire family of the engineer of the Michurinsky locomotive repair plant Engelgart, a worker of the Voronezh plant named after Telman Guley... They were sent to the Urals after the Germans of the Volga region. But the Germans of Voronezh and the Volga region are citizens of our country.

A significant part of the Germans appeared in Ivdel, the northernmost taiga city of the Sverdlovsk region. Here they were busy with logging, timber removal, carried out warehouse and loading tasks, built timber export roads, engaged in sawmilling, rafting, exported aircraft boards, deck decks, aircraft bars, gun blanks, boat lumber...

In those years, the population of the Ivdel region was comparable to the number of the entire working contingent: on December 5, 1942 - 18,988 people.

The Germans were organized into construction battalions, and soon they became known as the "Labor Army". The regime was strict; those mobilized into this army were liable for military service and could not leave their columns voluntarily. Accommodation is barracks. Internal order was established by local leadership; wages and supplies through the trade network are the same as for civilian employees.

But it was not always so. The day came when the Germans were removed from the quartermaster's allowance, and then social and living conditions sharply deteriorated, which gave rise to the appearance of denunciations - one more terrible than the other.

For example, Ivan Andreevich Gessen was accused of being involved in anti-Soviet agitation. He was quoted as saying: “...We’ve had enough of drinking blood and mocking people... We all need to, as one, not go to work, then we would achieve an improvement in food and food supplies.” Should we expect something good after such a denunciation? December 21, 1942, the judicial board for criminal cases of Sverdlovsky regional court sentenced I. Hessen to capital punishment. On March 26, 1943, the sentence was carried out.

The most massive mobilization of Russian Germans into the “labor army” took place in the first months of 1942. In total, until August 1944, about 400 thousand men and women were drafted, of whom about 180 thousand were placed under the “vigilant control of the internal affairs bodies.” Most of them were located in the Sverdlovsk region. Many were “demobilized” for health reasons.

The living conditions and moral situation of the German Labor Army soldiers were very difficult. Accused of aiding the enemy, deprived of all property and food supplies, settled mainly in rural areas where there was no rationing system, German population found himself in a terrible financial situation.

In the country, as a result of military operations and moral and psychological pressure, mortality and disability among those engaged in forced labor have increased significantly. For example, one of the leaders in Ivdel, Budenkov, officially reported: “...The situation with the uniform of the mobilized, who are forced to walk, for lack of shoes, at high temperatures in felt boots or completely barefoot,” officially reported. He also pointed out the presence of facts of “rudeness and insults on the part of some commanders of detachments and columns towards the mobilized... which negatively affects the political and moral state.”

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Labor Army members were humble about their fate and worked conscientiously, an atmosphere of alienation and suspicion remained around them.

Some Germans saw their salvation in submitting a report asking to be sent to the front. Thus, the secretary of the party bureau, Valento, wrote in a letter to Comrade Stalin that, instead of being at the front, he actually found himself in a concentration camp behind barbed wire, behind towers with sentries, that the labor army is no different from imprisonment. He showed dissatisfaction with the food, but added that “you can’t go far on water alone.”

Those dissatisfied with their position were placed on special register. During the year 1942 alone, 1,313 people were sentenced to multi-year terms or executed in the Sverdlovsk region.

And in Ivdel in 1945, an “anti-Soviet rebel organization” of 20 people was discovered, which was allegedly active among mobilized Germans since 1942. Its main organizer was identified as Adolf Adolfovich Dening, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1938-1944, and until 1941 he was the chairman of the Mariental cantipulative committee (district executive committee) of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Volga Germans. By the decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on November 17, 1945, he received a long term in forced labor camps, and on June 20, 1956 he was rehabilitated.

Based on the GKO Decree of October 7, 1942, German women were drafted through military registration and enlistment offices. By the end of the war, there were 53 thousand of them in work columns, while 6,436 women still had children in their places of mobilization. Left without parents, they became beggars, became homeless, and often died. From March 1944 to October 1945 alone, over 2,900 street children from the families of German labor army soldiers were identified and placed in orphanages.

During 1946-1947, the working columns of the labor army were disbanded, and the Germans employed there were transferred to permanent cadres with the right to call their families to join them. At the same time, all of them were registered by special commandant's offices. The process of reuniting broken families dragged on for many years - enterprises did not want to let go of qualified labor, they drew the attention of higher authorities to the fact that mobilized Germans should be detained for “systematic absenteeism, for refusing difficult tasks,” and so on.

The judicial authorities were right there: everyone who deserved punishment was “given” 4-5 months of forced labor. After everything we had experienced, such a “short term” of punishment was a mere trifle.

The final resolution of the problem of “family reunification” occurred after the liquidation of the special settlement regime in December 1955.

Labor units of Ukraine. In the Ukrainian SSR, the labor army departments were disbanded in September-December 1921. In the European part of the RSFSR, the disbandment of the labor armies began in December 1920 and ended on February 2, 1922, when the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army, created first, was disbanded. On the basis of the former labor armies, state workers' artels are formed, designed to maintain the leading role of the state in the use of mass labor. In the Urals, the economic and administrative structure of the labor army became the basis of the Ural region that emerged in 1923.

History of origin and stages of existence

• V. Labor Army
• 28. As one of the transitional forms to the implementation of universal labor conscription and the widest use of socialized labor, military units released from combat missions, up to large army formations, should be used for labor purposes. This is the meaning of turning the 3rd Army into the 1st Army of Labor and transferring this experience to other armies.
• 29. Necessary conditions labor use of military units and entire armies are:
  • a) Strict and precise limitation of the tasks assigned to the labor army to the simplest types of labor and, first of all, to the collection and concentration of food supplies.
  • b) Establishing such organizational relationships with the relevant economic bodies so as to exclude the possibility of violating economic plans and introducing disorganization into centralized economic apparatuses.
  • c) Establishment of close ties, if possible, equal food supply and comradely relations with the workers of the same area.
  • d) An ideological struggle against petty-bourgeois intellectual and trade unionist prejudices, which see Arakcheevism in the militarization of labor or in the widespread use of military units for labor, etc. Clarification of the inevitability and progressiveness of military coercion in raising the economy on the basis of universal labor service. Clarification of the inevitability and progressiveness of an ever-increasing rapprochement between the organization of labor and the organization of defense in a socialist society.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of January 17-18, 1920, L. D. Trotsky was appointed Chairman of the Council of the 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor. At the same meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made - “to begin preparing projects for the formation of the Kuban-Grozny, Ukrainian, Kazan and Petrograd labor armies.”

At the beginning of February 1920, Trotsky arrived in the Urals and began to transform the 3rd Army into the 1st Labor Army, establishing, in particular, the specialization of the use of different types of troops - so the cavalry division was involved in food appropriation, and the rifle units in cutting and loading firewood. At the same time, work in the Urals forced Trotsky to reconsider a lot, and at the end of February 1920 he returned to Moscow with a proposal to change economic policy, in essence - to abandon “war communism”. However, the Central Committee rejected his proposals by a majority vote (11 to 4).

The theses of the Central Committee “On the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, labor conscription, militarization of the economy and the use of military units for economic needs” in March 1920 were approved by the IX Congress of the RCP (b).

The complicated situation on the Western Front required the transfer of all the most combat-ready formations there - the 1st Labor Army was again transformed into the 3rd Army of the Red Army. By mid-March, only control and engineering units remained at the disposal of the armies.

Theses of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) “The Polish Front and Our Tasks” appeared in May 1920, according to which the military authorities, together with economic institutions, were ordered to “revise the list of military units located on the labor front, immediately release most of them from labor tasks and bring into a combat-ready state for speedy transfer to the Western Front,” they rather stated a long-ago accomplished fact. By the beginning of May, the main units of the labor armies and until the end of their existence were labor brigades, regiments, battalions, work companies, and engineering and technical units.

Labor Army in 1920-1921

• The first revolutionary army of labor, the first labor army. On January 10, 1920, its commander M. S. Matiyasevich and RVS member P. I. Gaevsky sent a telegram to V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky, which spoke about the difficult situation of the economy of the Urals and proposed “... to reverse everything forces and means of the 3rd Red Army to restore transport and organize the economy... Rename the Red Army of the Eastern Front to the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army of the RSFSR" Transformed from the 3rd Army eastern front January 15, 1920. By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of January 17-18, 1920, L. D. Trotsky was appointed Chairman of the Council of the 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor, and G. L. Pyatakov was appointed as his deputy. By the beginning of March, the rifle and cavalry divisions that were part of the army were transferred to the disposal of the Priural Military District (MD) and sent to the Western Front. By the summer of 1920, it consisted mainly of engineering and construction units.

• Ukrainian Labor Army. On January 21, 1920, the position of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee on the Ukrainian Council of the Labor Army was approved (the original name proposed by J.V. Stalin was the Military Labor Council for Ukraine). It is headed by the specially authorized representative of the Defense Council, J.V. Stalin (later on - the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, Kh. G. Rakovsky). R. I. Berzin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, is appointed Commander of the Army. In view of the extremely unfavorable situation on the fronts, its formation actually began only in May 1920 from units of low combat readiness. On June 1, 1920, it consisted of 20,705 people - three labor brigades, including eight labor regiments. Parts of brigades and small auxiliary units were concentrated in the Donbass, and also scattered across the territory of Poltava, Kyiv, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa provinces

• Caucasian Labor Army (since August the Labor Army of South-East Russia). On January 20, 1920, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Project for organizing the Caucasian-Kuban Labor Army was discussed. On January 23, 1920, the Regulations on the Council of the Caucasian Army of Labor were approved, the head of the Political Directorate of the Russian Military Socialist Republic, I. T. Smilga, was appointed chairman. But only on March 20, 1920, by order No. 274 of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, the 8th Army was allocated to the formation of the Caucasian Labor Army. I.V. Kosior, assistant commander of the 8th Army, becomes the commander of the labor army. But even by the summer of 1920 its formation was not completed. As of June 20, it numbered 15 thousand (of which 8.5 thousand were army administration, hospitals and various rear institutions, 6 thousand were combat working units). With the creation in August 1920 of the Revolutionary Council of the Army of Labor of the South-East of Russia, the army was subordinate to this council in operational and labor terms, and in the military-administrative sense - to the Revolutionary Military Council of the front.

• On January 23, 1920, a resolution of the Defense Council was adopted “on the use of the Reserve Army to improve the work of the Moscow-Kazan Railway,” as well as the speedy organization of normal through communication between Moscow and Yekaterinburg. But from total number more than an army numbering different time from 100 to 250 thousand people, about 36 thousand people were involved in restoration work

• Labor Railway Army (later 2nd Special Railway Labor Army). By the time the order for formation was received, it consisted mainly of headquarters and various auxiliary units scattered around the railway stations between Orel, Tsaritsyn and Kharkov: army administration, commandant command, warehouse and guard battalions, mortar division, working company. By April 1, the 2nd Special Army had 6 labor brigades with a total number of 1,656 people (with a staff of more than 18 thousand people). The most numerous was the 6th Brigade, staffed with prisoners of war, numbering 1,002 people. On July 12, its number was about 12 thousand.

• Petrograd Labor Army - formed by a resolution of the Defense Council of February 10, 1920 on the basis of the 7th Army (Chairman of the Council of Labor Armed Forces G. E. Zinoviev, commander - S. I. Odintsov). But all of its divisions were almost immediately sent to the Western Front, and the remaining two were deployed to guard the borders. As a result, by order of the RVSR dated February 25, 1920 No. 299/52, the Council of the Petrograd Labor Army is invited to “widely use rear, technical units, attracting specialists to work in their specialty, and also to form workers’ squads from prisoners of war for this purpose.” Its number as of March 15, 1920 was 65,073 people, having decreased to 39,271 people by the fall.

• 2nd Revolutionary Army of Labor - formed by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 21, 1920 from the troops of the 4th Army (and partly of the 1st Army of the Turkestan Front). At the same time, the Trans-Volga Military District was organized, which actually had a joint administration with the labor army. On April 7, 1920, V. A. Radus-Zenkovich, chairman of the Saratov provincial executive committee, member of the provincial committee of the RCP (b), Military Council of the Saratov fortified region, was appointed chairman of the 2nd Council of Labor Armed Forces on April 7, 1920, his deputy was K. A. Avksentyevsky (who is also the commander of the Trans-Volga Military District ). But soon most of the most numerous combat units were sent to the Western Front and the army itself was liquidated. By decision of the STO of July 7, 1920, by order of the RVSR No. 1482/261 of August 8, 1920, the Revolutionary Council of the Army was abolished, its functions were transferred to the commission created under the Administration of the Trans-Volga Military District for the use of military forces for labor purposes and the committee for conducting a general labor service (Komtrud), the personnel of the Directorate transferred to the Trans-Volga Military District were sent to form the Directorate of the 6th Army of the Southern Front

• Donetsk Labor Army - In pursuance of the resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army (Ukrsovtrudarma) No. 3 of February 20, 1920 on the militarization of the coal industry of Ukraine, at a meeting of the Ukrsovtrudarma on March 31, 1920, it was decided to create a field headquarters of the Ukrainian Labor Army in the Donbass. The field headquarters, by order of the Ukrainian Labor Army No. 386 dated December 13, 1920, was renamed the headquarters of the Donetsk Labor Army with operational and labor subordination to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in administrative and economic terms - to the commander of all armed forces in Ukraine.

• Siberian Labor Army - formed by order to the troops of Siberia No. 70 dated January 15, 1921 from all military working units of Siberia, consolidated into five labor brigades.

The Reserve Army (Volga region) was actually in a labor position. In addition, to economic activity Rear units of military districts and fronts were involved.

By the Decree of the STO of March 30, 1921, labor armies and units were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Labor of the RSFSR. In the Ukrainian SSR, from June 1921, they became subordinate to the authorized representative of the Main Committee of Labor in Ukraine under the commander of the labor units of Ukraine. In the Ukrainian SSR, the labor army departments were disbanded in September-December 1921. In the European part of the RSFSR, the disbandment of the labor armies began in December 1920 and ended on February 2, 1922, when the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army, created first, was disbanded.

Management system, recruitment and authority

The 1st, 2nd, Petrograd, Caucasian, Ukrainian labor armies were subordinate to the Councils of Labor Armies (sovtrudarms), which were created as interdepartmental bodies that included representatives of the army command, STO, Supreme Economic Council, and a number of people's commissariats The Revolutionary Council of the Army, it included authorized representatives of the STO, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Food, Agriculture, Communications, Labor, Internal Affairs, Chusosnabarm, and the military command. In military and administrative terms, the revolutionary councils were subordinated through the command of the corresponding fronts and military districts to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and in operational and labor terms - to the Council of Labor and Defense. Local economic bodies were subordinate to the councils of labor armies, while at the same time maintaining subordination to the corresponding central departments. The army headquarters served as the administrative apparatus of the Council.

Labor armies, as part of the armed forces, were under the authority of the RVSR in matters of recruitment, supply, and combat training. Management carried out through the headquarters of labor armies or military districts, the headquarters of individual units and their structural units in practice there was no single scheme. Production tasks were distributed by labor service committees (komtrud), military registration and enlistment offices, district military labor commissions, or directly by the command of units in agreement with economic institutions. The disposal of the labor force of the Labor Army was within the competence of the management of enterprises and organizations.

Since August 1920, the powers of the Revolutionary Councils of the labor armies remote from the center (1st Revolutionary, Caucasian and Ukrainian) were expanded, they were transformed into regional bodies of the STO and united the activities of all economic, food, industrial, transport and military institutions.

For the direct management of labor armies and units, by order of the RVSR No. 771 of May 9, 1920, at the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, the Central Commission for the Labor Application of the Red Army and Navy of the Republic (Central Military Labor Commission) was created from representatives of the Main Command, the All-Russian Main Staff and the Main Committee for General Labor Service (Chief Labor Committee).

By the Decree of the STO of March 30, 1921, labor armies and units in the RSFSR were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Labor of the RSFSR. In this regard, the Central Commission was abolished, and the Main Directorate of Labor Units of the Republic was created under the People's Commissariat of Labor to manage the activities of the labor armies.

Tasks performed by labor armies

Labor armies were intended to use the mass organized labor force of military personnel and the civilian population mobilized for labor service. In addition, depending on the time of creation and place of deployment, tasks were identified that were priorities for individual labor armies: organizing the production and export of petroleum products (Caucasus), coal (Donbass), peat (North-West Russia), logging (Ural), restoration of transport infrastructure (Volga region, region of the South-Eastern Railways), surplus appropriation (Ukraine, Caucasus, Urals). In the initial period of existence, labor armies were involved in labor mobilizations.

Performance results

In 1920, labor armies and parts of rear districts provided approximately a fifth of exports and 4% of oil production in the country, and about a fifth of food supplies. Units of the Ukrainian Labor Army loaded more than 12% of the coal mined in Donbass. The share of labor armies in loading wagons was about 8%, in collecting firewood about 15%, and in hauling about 7.8%. Thanks to labor connections, the transport crisis in the newly liberated white territories was alleviated. Military personnel of the Reserve Army and the 2nd Special Army provided up to 10% of the production of certain types of military uniforms. Thanks to the efforts of the Reserve Army, the production of rifles at the Izhevsk factories more than doubled.

Efficiency mark

The issue of labor armies was considered at the IX Congress of the RCP(b) (March-April 1920). The transfer of entire armies to labor status from the very beginning was due to the need to preserve them for military needs - practice has confirmed the ineffectiveness of using large combat formations that had a complex command structure, big number special and auxiliary units that cannot be involved in economic work. The congress approved the resolution proposed by Trotsky “On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Development,” which stated regarding the labor armies: “Involving larger military formations in the work inevitably results in a higher percentage of Red Army soldiers not directly employed in production. Therefore, the use of entire labor armies, while preserving the army apparatus, can be justified only insofar as it is necessary to preserve the army as a whole for military tasks. As soon as there is no need for this, it is necessary to disband the cumbersome headquarters and departments, using the best elements of skilled workers as small shock labor detachments at the most important industrial enterprises.”

The transition to a new economic policy, on the one hand, and the end of the civil war and the gradual demobilization of the army, on the other, removed the issue of using military units for labor tasks from the agenda.

see also

Notes

Links

• L. Trotsky On the path to socialism. Economic development of the Soviet Republic.

Labor mobilizations, forced attracting the population to work in the interests of the state. M. t. began to be widely used in the years Civil War both opposing sides. acc. with the resolution of May 6, 1919 Russian production could attract government service of persons of “intellectual professions” in the order of labor. duties. This measure was carried out in relation to doctors, lawyers, and production workers. After the restoration of the owls. authorities in Siberia, M. t. were widely used in various industries. Labor was created. armies, which were used to restore industry. objects and transport. communications, logging. Location the population was widely involved in clearing communication routes, building roads, performing horse-drawn duties, and Red Army soldiers were used to clean fields. M. t. became widespread due to the need to combat epidemics and the fuel crisis.

In Jan. 1920 due to completion of large scale. military campaigns to the east front and the need to restore people. households transformed the Third Army into the First Labor Army. Places were called into its composition. population of the Urals, the Urals and Siberia. The M. t. system was finally established after its adoption on January 29. 1920 Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on universal labor service. Unlike Europe. Russia, replenishment of industries by people. The economy was carried out by workers through the mobilization of not three, but five ages (born 1892–96). M. t. covered not only peasants and mountains. ordinary people, but also qualified ones. workers, scientific and technical intelligentsia. In key sectors of the economy, workers were treated like military personnel (mobilized) and held accountable for failure to meet production standards. Militarization covered workers and employees in 14 industrial sectors, including mining, chemicals, metallurgy, metalworking, fuel, as well as higher education workers. and Wed textbook establishments.

In the Urals from the autumn of 1919 to April. 1920 mobilized 714 thousand people. and attracted 460 thousand supplies, ch. arr. for logging. City enterprises of Siberia (without Novonikolaevsk And Irkutsk) in these years 454 thousand workers were required. Labor Department Sibrevkom was able to send 145.5 thousand people to work on mobilization, or 32% of the need. Total for permanent and temporary. work in industry, transport and logging in Sibirsk. region in 1920, 322 thousand people were mobilized. Overcome the labor shortage. power failed. For the 1st half of 1921 there was a shortage of qualified personnel. workers amounted to 99.4 thousand, employees - 73 thousand. In total, 262 thousand workers were required in the cities of Siberia during this period, the Sibtrud authorities were able to mobilize 47 thousand, or 17.8%. But ch. the problem was the quality of work execution; specialists were often involved in the execution of unqualified workers. labor. In relation to the intelligentsia, etc. mountains For the bourgeoisie, this policy was carried out consciously and bore the character of “class retribution.” The labor productivity of labor army soldiers and conscripts was extremely low, and the level of desertion from work was high.

Forcer. economic growth in the end 1920s caused an acute shortage of qualified personnel. personnel, especially specialists. In the beginning. 1930s people. The economy of Siberia required an additional 5.5 thousand engineers and approx. 10 thousand technicians. Under these conditions, forms and methods of mobilizing intellectual workers were recreated. labor to provide them with leading industries and “impact” construction projects. Objects of mobilization campaigns that took on a permanent character became qualified groups. specialists, and the goal was, first of all, the “voluntary-forced” return of the latter to their core field of activity. Work on accounting, mobilization, transfer of “specialists” and control over their use was concentrated in the union and republic. People's Commissariats of Labor and their region. organs In the Center and locally at the institutions of the People's Commissariat of Labor there were special workers. interdepartmental commission, which included representatives of various departments and bodies, including trade unions. Those who took part in the con. 1920s The 1st campaign was carried out by hidden mobilization. char-r and consisted of moving specialists from management. devices for production, first on a voluntary basis (through trade unions), then through “allocation”, and from November 9. 1929 (permanent Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) - already in a directive order. As a result of the campaign, by May 1930, out of the planned 10 thousand specialists, 6,150 people were transferred to production. In Siberia, out of the planned 150 technical personnel, 104 people were transferred. (69%). acc. from post Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated July 1, 1930 on the construction of new metallurgists in the East. factories (Magnitka and Kuznetskstroy) it was planned to transfer 110 construction specialists to these regions (the campaign provided about 90 people). The mobilization of specialists from beyond the Urals did not radically solve the personnel problem. Required within the region. redistribution of specialists and mobilization of personnel according to internal trade union regulations. lines. Announced in con. In 1930, under the leadership of the All-Union Intersectional Bureau of Engineering and Technical Section, the mobilization of mining specialists for Kuzbass in Moscow and Leningrad actually failed.

To carry out orders, various types were used. methods of influencing specialists, up to and including holding “public show trials” (in Moscow in February 1931 - under the slogan “Thirty-three deserters of Kuzbass”) and transferring cases to the courts. institutions and bodies of the OGPU. Despite strict regulation and adoption in 1930–31 Siberian Regional Executive Committee (Zapsibkraiexecutive committee) more than 10 resolutions on the identification and mobilization of specialists to work in specialized sectors of the people. households (logging, transport, industry, finance, etc.), mobilization. movements were of low efficiency. To fully ensure timber rafting in the USSR in 1931, approx. 60 thousand qualified personnel, including workers. In reality, approximately 24 thousand people worked on the rafting. (40%). Forest industry mobilization gave approx. 9 thousand people, which was considered successful. Mobilization of specialists in 1931 water transport on a Western scale. Siberia made it possible to attract 75% of the number of transport specialists identified into the industry.

In connection with the creation of a system of compulsory labor, a network of special settlements was also formed, which required social cult. and production mobilization infrastructure dep. groups of intellectuals - doctors, teachers, cultural and educational workers. According to the post. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated April 20. 1933 schools and medical. institutions were provided with personnel through mobilization from the regions of expulsion. To staff schools with teachers. personnel acc. from post Central Committee of the Komsomol dated October 5. 1931 the Komsomol was involved. org-tions. However, directives did not guarantee a full staffing of specialists. IN special settlements in the end 1931 ped. personnel was compiled even taking into account the emergency measures carried out. measures no more than 1/3 of the required quantity. By 1933 in the beginning. schools of the commandant's office of the Narym district. out of 447 civilian teachers, there were 247 people, the rest - special settlers, who have completed short-term ped. courses.

In 1930–33, work in special settlements was carried out annually. mobilization of doctors, etc. medical staff both from the center. parts of the country, and from Sib. region. However, according to data as of Nov. 1931, in the commandant's offices West Siberian region state med. institutions were only 60% staffed. Among honey Approximately 1/3 of the workers were civilian employees, the rest of the specialists were exiles, prisoners sent by SibLAG. The situation stabilized due to the mobilization of almost 70 medical workers in 1932–33 for 2 years. workers from Europe parts of the country. After their departure in 1935, a shortage of qualified personnel again arose in the commandant's offices. medical staff.

In 1941–45 mobilization. forms of redistribution of labor potential throughout the country received a new impetus. From the beginning The Great Patriotic War in connection with the large scale. military mobilizations The Siberian economy has entered a period of acute shortage of workers. strength, especially in the village. X. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, trying to solve the personnel problem through the utmost intensification of labor, on June 26, 1941, adopted a decree “On the working hours of workers and employees in wartime,” according to which obligations were established. overtime work, and regular and additional work. vacations were cancelled. 13 Apr 1942 post published. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On increasing the mandatory minimum of workdays for collective farmers” from 100 to 150 per year. Teenagers aged 12 to 16 years were required to work at least 50 workdays. Failure to comply with established standards was considered corners. crime and was severely punished.

But to solve the problem of labor shortage. hands through extreme intensification of labor was impossible. Therefore, the emphasis was on mobilization. the principle of formation and use of labor. 26 Dec The 1941 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the responsibility of workers and employees of the military industry for unauthorized departure from enterprises” proclaimed the right of the state to assign workers to enterprises. From now on, all persons employed in the military industry or in industries serving the military industry were considered mobilized for the period of the war. Later military the provision was introduced on the railway, speech. and pestilence transport.

13 Feb In 1942, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was issued “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during wartime.” After that, they were called up for production in the same way as for the army. Mobilization The principle also applied when recruiting students to schools of factory training (FZO) and crafts. and railway schools. M. t. were subject to men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old. Women who had children under 8 years of age and who were studying on Wed were exempt from M.T. and higher textbook establishments. Subsequently, the conscription age for women was increased to 50 years, and the age of children, which gives the mother the right to a deferment from labor, was reduced to 4 years.

In 1942 post. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the procedure for attracting labor service in wartime" mobilization. principle of recruitment strength was expanded. M. t. as a form of labor recruitment and the relationship between the state and employees extended to the time. and seasonal work. Those mobilized worked in harvesting, in sugar beet warehouses, sugar factories and glass factories, and repaired roads and bridges. In 1942–43, on the basis of a number of decrees of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, into slavery. columns and detachments with strict centralization. The army structure mobilized the adult population of Germans, Finns, Romanians, and Hungarians. and Bulgarians. nationalities. Only owls. Germans (men and women) in the so-called. During the war years, the Labor Army was mobilized by St. 300 thousand people Most of those mobilized worked at NKVD facilities.

In total in Siberia for the period from February 13. From 1942 to July 1945, 264 thousand people were mobilized for permanent work in industry, construction and transport, in schools of federal educational institutions, crafts. and railway schools - 333 thousand, in agriculture. and temporary work – 506 thousand people.

Evasion from M. t. and escapes of mobilized persons were regarded as desertion and were punishable by Ch. arr. by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated December 26. 1941 “On the responsibility of workers and employees of the military industry for unauthorized departure from enterprises,” which provided for imprisonment for a period of 5 to 8 years. After the end of the Great Fatherland. war, the org system was restored. recruitment of workers forces were also practiced by societies. calls for youth to go to construction sites. households and development of virgin and fallow lands.

Lit.: Proshin V.A. On the issue of implementing universal labor conscription in Siberia during the period of military communism (late 1919–1921) // Questions of the history of Siberia. Tomsk, 1980; German A.A., Kurochkin A.N. Germans of the USSR in the labor army (1941–1945). M., 1998; Pystina L.I. Mobilization as a form of solution for specialist personnel for industry in the late 1920s - early 1930s. // Culture and intelligentsia of the Siberian province during the years of the “Great Turning Point”. Novosibirsk, 2000; Isupov V.A. Human resources of Western Siberia during the Great Patriotic War: problems of formation and use // Economic development of Siberia in the context of domestic and world history. Novosibirsk, 2005.

V.A. Isupov, S.A. Krasilnikov, V.A. Proshin, V.M. Markets