The Munich Agreement of 1938 provided for. Munich agreement. Poland and partition of Czechoslovakia

Munich Agreement 1938(in Soviet historiography usually Munich agreement) is an agreement drawn up in Munich on September 29, 1938 and signed on September 30 of the same year by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini. The agreement concerned the transfer of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. The following day, a declaration of mutual non-aggression was signed between Great Britain and Germany; a similar declaration by Germany and France was signed slightly later.

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✪ The Munich Agreement of 1938: A Look After Eight Decades

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✪ Partition of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939)

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background

The situation in Central Europe by 1938

The government took a number of measures to ensure the representation of the Sudeten Germans in the National Assembly, local self-government, education in their native language, but the tension could not be removed. Based on these statements, Hitler in February 1938 appealed to the Reichstag with an appeal "to pay attention to the appalling living conditions of the German brethren in Czechoslovakia."

First Sudeten Crisis

Hitler moved on to negotiations. Negotiations were conducted between Henlein and the Czechoslovak government through the mediation of a special representative of Great Britain, Lord Runciman (see Mission of Runciman).

On May 21, Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador in Paris, assured US ambassador to France Bullitt that Poland would immediately declare war on the USSR if it tried to send troops through Polish territory to help Czechoslovakia.

On May 27, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet stated that "Goering's plan for the division of Czechoslovakia between Germany and Hungary with the transfer of Cieszyn Silesia to Poland is not a secret."

Second Sudeten Crisis

The agreement signed in Munich was the culminating point of the English "appeasement policy".

One part of historians considers this policy an attempt to rebuild the crisis-ridden Versailles system of international relations through diplomacy, through the agreements of the four great European powers, and to preserve peace at any cost. So Chamberlain, returning from Munich to London, at the gangway of the plane said: "I brought peace to our generation."

Another part of historians believes that the real reason for this policy is an attempt by capitalist countries to crush an alien system at their side - the USSR, which abandoned the idea of ​​a world revolution, which certainly affects the interests of the population of the whole world, but did not submit its plans for the purpose of making an agreed peaceful solution to discussion of the League of Nations, of which he was a member. Such assumptions were expressed by some Western politicians.

For example, British Deputy Foreign Secretary Cadogan wrote in his diary: “Prime Minister ( Chamberlain) declared that he would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets. The slogan of the Conservatives at the time was: "For Britain to live, Bolshevism must die."

Quotes

How terrible, fantastic and implausible is the very idea that we should here, at home, dig trenches and try on gas masks just because in one distant country people quarreled among themselves about whom we know nothing. It seems even more impossible that a quarrel already settled in principle can become the subject of war.

Original text (English)

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.

Consequences of the Sudeten Crisis

The rejection of the Sudetenland was only the beginning of the process of dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Germany's next steps after the resolution of the Sudeten crisis in Munich were not discussed. The parties did not object to Slovakia's exercise of the right to self-determination, and the preservation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia - the Czech Republic - was guaranteed by the Munich Agreement.

Poland and partition of Czechoslovakia

The policy of England led to the fact that Hitler could no longer stop in the implementation of his expansionist intentions. In this, Poland became his ally for a while.

Original text (German)

Der Führer und Reichskanzler hat heute in Gegenwart des Reichsministers des Auswärtigen von Ribbentrop den tschechoslowakischen Staatspräsidenten Dr. Hacha und den tschechoslowakischen Außenminister Dr. Chvalkovsky auf deren Wunsch in Berlin empfangen. Bei der Zusammenkunft ist die durch die Vorgänge der letzten Wochen auf dem bisherigen tschechoslowakischen Staatsgebiet entstandene ernste Lage in voller Offenheit einer Prüfung unterzogen worden. Auf beiden Seiten ist übereinstimmend zum Ausdruck gebracht worden, daß das Ziel aller Bemühungen die Sicherung von Ruhe, Ordnung und Frieden in diesem Teile Mitteleuropas sein müsse. Der tschechoslowakische Staatspräsident hat erklärt, daß er, um diesem Ziele zu dienen und um eine endgültige Befriedung zu erreichen, das Schicksal des tschechischen Volkes und Landes vertrauensvoll in die Hände des Führers des Deutschen Reiches legt. Der Führer hat diese Erklärung angenommen und seinem Entschluß Ausdruck gegeben, daß er das tschechische Volk unter den Schutz des Deutschen Reiches nehmen und ihm eine seiner Eigenart gemäße autonome Entwicklung seines Lebens gewährleisten wird.

On the same day at Prague Castle, Hitler declared: "I am not boasting, but I must say that I did it really elegantly." England and France accepted what had happened as a fait accompli, since they set themselves the task of delaying the war as long as possible. Hitler, on the other hand, received a new ally (Slovakia) and significantly increased his raw material and industrial potential.

Germany received significant stocks of weapons from the former Czechoslovak army, which made it possible to equip 9 infantry divisions, and Czech military factories. Before the attack on the USSR, out of 21 Wehrmacht tank divisions, 5 were equipped with Czechoslovak-made tanks.

Danzig problem

Now it's Poland's turn.

On January 5, Hitler gave the Polish Foreign Minister Beck an honorary reception at Berchtesgaden, declaring the complete coincidence of interests of both countries in relation to the USSR, and noted that in view of the obvious danger of an attack from the USSR, the existence of a militarily strong Poland was vital to Germany. According to Hitler, each Polish division saves one division for Germany. To this, Beck replied that Poland, although it was anti-communist, would nevertheless not take part in any measures directed against the USSR, and would reject Germany's demands, since it did not have any guarantees from England and France in this matter. Thus, the war between Poland and Germany became inevitable.

On March 21, Hitler offers Poland, in exchange for recognizing the western borders of Poland, the Danzig corridor, the free harbor in Danzig and claims to Ukraine, to agree to the resettlement of the German population in the free city of Danzig and enjoying the right of extraterritoriality of the strip along the roads to East Prussia. The Polish government did not agree.

Chamberlain finally realized his mistake: the "policy of appeasement" pursued by him since 1937 did not justify itself. Hitler used England to strengthen Germany and began to threaten Eastern Europe.

On March 31, 1939, in his speech in the House of Commons, Chamberlain declared that in the event that the independence of Poland was threatened, the Government of England intended to guarantee this independence by all means at its disposal.

England and France accelerated the process of their armament. In France, the law on two-year compulsory military service, adopted back in 1935, came into full force.

In the same years, the United States violated its traditional non-interference in European affairs (the Monroe Doctrine). On April 14, 1939, after the entry of Italian troops into Albania, President Roosevelt addressed Mussolini and Hitler with a proposal in the form of an ultimatum, urging them to promise to refrain from attacking the states listed in his address for ten years, in which he directly asked: “We are ready can you give a guarantee that your armed forces will not be used against the next independent states? .. ”And then followed a list of names of 31 countries, including Poland, Finland, the Baltic countries, Yugoslavia and the USSR

The Munich Agreement (Munich Agreement) on the annexation of the border lands of Czechoslovakia, inhabited by Germans, to Nazi Germany, was signed on September 30, 1938 by representatives of Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain), France (Edouard Daladier), Germany (Adolf Hitler) and Italy (Benito Mussolini). It was the result of Hitler's aggressive policy, which proclaimed a revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 with the aim of restoring the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Anglo-French policy of "appeasement" supported by the United States, on the other.

The British and French leadership was interested in maintaining the status quo that had developed in Europe as a result of the First World War of 1914-1918, and considered the policy of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement as the main danger to their countries. The leaders of Great Britain and France sought to satisfy the expansionist claims of Germany and Italy through political and territorial concessions at the expense of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, to reach a "broad" agreement with them and thereby ensure their own security, pushing German-Italian aggression in an easterly direction.

(Military Encyclopedia. Military Publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)

The Sudetenland belonged to the most industrialized regions of Czechoslovakia. In the region, 3.3 million people were densely residing ethnic, the so-called Sudeten Germans. From the very beginning of his political activity, Hitler demanded their reunification with Germany, and repeatedly made attempts to fulfill this demand.

In March 1938, without any opposition from the Western powers, Germany carried out the forcible seizure (Anschluss) of Austria. After that, German pressure on Czechoslovakia intensified sharply. On April 24, 1938, the fascist Sudeto German Party (SNP) of Konrad Henlein, at the direction of Hitler, put forward a demand for autonomy for the Sudetenland.

The government of the USSR declared its readiness to fulfill its obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1935, which provided for the provision of assistance by the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression against it, subject to the simultaneous provision of such assistance by France.

On September 13, the Nazi leadership inspired a revolt of the Sudeten fascists, and after it was suppressed by the Czechoslovak government, they began to openly threaten Czechoslovakia with an armed invasion. On September 15, at a meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden, British Prime Minister Chamberlain agreed to Germany's demand to transfer part of Czechoslovak territory to her. Two days later, the British government approved the "principle of self-determination," as the German annexation of the Sudetenland was called.

On September 19, 1938, the Czechoslovak government transmitted to the Soviet government a request to give an answer as soon as possible to the following questions: a) will the USSR, according to the treaty, provide immediate real assistance if France remains loyal and also provides assistance; b) whether the USSR will help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations.

Having discussed this request on September 20, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered it possible to give positive answers to both of these questions. On September 21, the Soviet ambassador in Prague confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide such assistance. However, submitting to Anglo-French pressure, the Czechoslovak government capitulated, agreeing to satisfy Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands.

On September 22-23, Chamberlain again met with Hitler, who further tightened the requirements for Czechoslovakia and the deadlines for their implementation.

Taking advantage of the moment, Poland and Hungary expressed their territorial claims. This allowed Hitler to justify the annexation of the Sudetenland by the "international" nature of the demands on Czechoslovakia. In this situation, on the initiative of Mussolini, on September 29-30, 1938, a meeting of representatives of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, at which the Munich Agreement was signed on September 30 without the participation of representatives of Czechoslovakia (dated September 29).

According to this agreement, Czechoslovakia was supposed to clear the Sudetenland from October 1 to October 10 with all fortifications, structures, communication routes, factories, stocks of weapons, etc. Prague also pledged to satisfy the territorial claims of Hungary and Poland within three months. Additionally, a declaration was adopted in which Great Britain and France gave guarantees to the new borders of Czechoslovakia.

The government of Czechoslovakia obeyed the agreement adopted in Munich, and on October 1, 1938, units of the Wehrmacht occupied the Sudetenland. As a result, Czechoslovakia lost about 1/5 of its territory, about 5 million people (including 1.25 million Czechs and Slovaks), as well as 33% of industrial enterprises. The accession of the Sudetenland was a decisive step towards the final liquidation of the state independence of Czechoslovakia, which followed in March 1939, when Germany seized the entire territory of the country.

The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak state were restored as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. According to the Treaty on Mutual Relations of 1973, Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany recognized the Munich Agreement, "meaning their mutual relations in accordance with this Treaty, void".

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources.

The Munich Agreement is an agreement concluded in 1938 by the ruling elite of England, France, Italy, Germany and Czechoslovakia to please the wishes of the Nazi leader and German Fuhrer Adolf Hitler. The treaty destroyed the integrity of Czechoslovakia, transferring its resources and industrial potential to the possession of Nazi Germany, for which it entered the history of the USSR as the Munich Agreement.

Prerequisites for the capture of Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia was very attracted to the Fuhrer of Germany, Adolf Hitler. The reasons for her attraction were simple:

• accommodation in the center of Europe;
• natural resources of the country;
• developed industry;
• the prospect of capturing Hungary and Romania.

Therefore, after, the Nazi leader did not postpone the attack on Czechoslovakia for a long time. On April 21, 1938, he discussed Operation Grün, adjusted in March. The plan was to annex the Sudetenland to the Reich, and later to capture all of Czechoslovakia.

However, some points could prevent German aggression:

• the Czechs had a good army;
• Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

For this reason, Hitler decided to rely on the Sudeten German party and German intelligence in the state apparatus. He emphasized the problem of the Sudetenland, where 3.25 million Germans lived. With the support of the Fuhrer and under the leadership of physical education teacher Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten German Party operated here. The activities of Henlein's Free Corps included:

• financing - the German Foreign Ministry allocated 15,000 marks every month for the work of party members);
• collecting weapons and supplies;
• disorganization of the Czechoslovak army, destruction of communication centers, bridges, etc. (with the support of sabotage and terrorist Einsatz groups and 4 SS battalions "Dead Head") deployed from Germany.

Sudeten Crisis of 1938

In the spring of 1938, a political crisis erupted in the Sudetenland. It was caused by a number of factors:

1. Activities of the Sudeten German Party

In order to obtain concessions from the President of Czechoslovakia, Eduard (Edward) Benes, the Sudeten German Party constantly put pressure on the Anglo-French representatives, describing to them the atrocities of the Czechs against the Germans. In addition, Hitler believed that if the attack on the Czechs across the unfortified border with the former Austria was lightning fast, then Britain and France would not have time to defend it.

1. German military intelligence

Having infiltrated the state apparatus and government institutions, she worked so successfully that the intelligence chief, Nicolai, assured Hitler that there were no secrets in Czechoslovakia at all.

1. Support from fascists in other countries

Active assistance in the implementation of the plans of the Fuhrer was provided by the Polish fascists, who dreamed of the lands of Cieszyn Silesia. In January 1938, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozef Beck, visited Berlin to negotiate on this issue. During the conversation, the Fuhrer emphasized the need to combat the "threat of communism", and assured the minister that Poland's circle of interests would not be violated.

In May 1938, the Poles concentrated troops near the Czech border in the Teszyn region. They were ready to fight with the Soviet Union if his aid to Czechoslovakia would pass through their lands.

Anti-government activities in Czechoslovakia were also carried out by fascists from other countries, incl. Hungary and Ukraine. The German secret services kept in touch with them and encouraged them in every possible way, eventually uniting them into a single bloc with the Sudeten German party at the head.

Feeling supported, Hitler tried to put pressure on the Czechoslovak president, as was the case with the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg. Thus, Ward-Price (correspondent for the British newspaper The Daily Mail), while in Prague in March 1938, "confidentially" informed the employees of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry about the essence of Hitler's claims to her government. At the same time, the granting of autonomy to the German minority was the most insignificant among them. Otherwise, Czechoslovakia was waiting for destruction. At the same time, the correspondent hinted that the best way out for Edvard Benes would be a personal audience with the Fuhrer.

Henlein's Free Corps Demands: The Beginning of the Crisis

Hitler instructed the leader of the Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein, to provoke a political crisis in Czechoslovakia by making demands unacceptable to the government. If they were fulfilled, the party had to put forward new claims.

Henlein's party was instructed to:

• Establish full control of fascist agents over the border region of Czechoslovakia. For this, rumors were spread in the Czechoslovak army that German resistance was pointless.
• Hold a referendum. The municipal elections to be held on 22 May were called by a plebiscite. It was supposed to raise the question of joining the Sudetenland to the Reich.

The work of the Henleinites did not take place in isolation: the Nazi troops had already begun to concentrate on the borders of Czechoslovakia.

Upon learning of the presence of Nazi troops in Saxony, Edvard Benes:

• announced partial mobilization, conscripting about 180 thousand people into the army;
• enlisted the support of the Western powers and the USSR.

This situation forced Hitler to retreat: the Czech ambassador was informed that Germany had no plans for Czechoslovakia.

The attitude of the leading powers to the crisis in the Sudetenland

Britain believed that nothing could save Czechoslovakia from Germany and that her fate was sealed.

On May 10, 1938, Kirkpatrick (adviser to the British Embassy) in a conversation with Bismarck (an employee of the German Foreign Ministry) emphasized that their countries could cooperate in solving the Czechoslovak problem and reach an agreement regarding the future of all of Europe.

Hitler skillfully played on Britain's desire to avoid war at all costs: he assured the British leadership that he would negotiate only after the settlement of the Sudetenland problem. To this, London replied that he wanted to see the Fuhrer next to the King of Britain on the balcony of Buckingham Palace.

The USA was in solidarity with England. The American Ambassador Bullitt reported that his country considered it impossible to prevent the annexation of the border regions of Czechoslovakia to the Reich.

France, led by Edouard Daladier, who came to power in April 1938, declared that she would be faithful to all the pacts and treaties concluded. With this, she confirmed her obligations in Franco-Czechoslovak:

• friendship treaty of 1924;
• Mutual Assistance Pact 1925

In fact, the French government really wanted to get rid of these obligations. Therefore, Daladier assured London of its determination to fulfill the treaties. It was a tricky move, because if France entered into a conflict with the Reich, then Britain would also be involved in the war.

The plans of Neville Chamberlain (Prime Minister of Great Britain) did not include a conflict with Germany, which means that Czechoslovakia had to part with part of its territory.

• demanded to satisfy the claims of the Sudeten Germans;
• put before the fact that in an armed conflict that may arise due to "intransigence", Czechoslovakia will not be assisted.

In addition, assistance to Czechoslovakia was denied by:

• Hungary and Poland, which were interested in the border lands - Slovakia and Transcarpathia;
• Romania and Yugoslavia, who emphasized that their military obligations did not apply to a possible conflict with the Reich.

Moscow's attempt to establish interaction between its army and the French and Czechoslovak ones failed. On this occasion, M. I. Kalinin (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) stated that the Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty does not prohibit providing assistance alone, without France.

Ultimatum to Benes: the position of England, France and the USSR

The Fuhrer considered the retreat from the intended goal in the spring of 1938 to be temporary, so he ordered that military preparations for the capture of Czechoslovakia be completed no later than November 1938.

The situation on the eve of the Sudeten revolt

In the summer of 1938, Hitler signed a number of directives regarding the preparation of the attack. He wanted the Western powers not to interfere with the invasion and destruction of Czechoslovakia as a state.

Great importance was given to the Siegfried line (western rampart). According to the project, it was supposed to stretch for 35 km and have 17 thousand structures placed in 3-4 rows. Behind them, an air defense zone was provided.

This building also had an ideological significance. So, on June 30, 1938, General Karl Heinrich Bodenschatz (adjutant of Hermann Goering) “confidentially” shared with Stelen (French air force attaché) that Germany needed the shaft so that its southern flank was safe when the “Soviet threat” was eliminated. At the same time, he hinted that the powers of the West should not worry about him.

At this time, disagreements arose within the government of Czechoslovakia about:

• concessions to Germany;
• rupture of relations with the USSR;
• reorientation towards Western powers.

They were supplemented by constant clashes between Czechs and Germans.

Edvard Benes clearly understood that Czechoslovakia was at the epicenter of the war between Bolshevism and Nazism.

Revolt in the Sudetenland

On September 12, the Fuhrer ordered that all negotiations between Henlein and Benes be interrupted and demanded that the Sudeten Germans be allowed to decide their own fate. After that, a real uprising of the Germans began in the Sudetenland.

The Czechoslovak government tried to suppress the rebellion with the help of troops and the declaration of martial law in the Sudetenland.

In turn, the Henleinites demanded:

• withdraw Czechoslovak troops from the Sudetenland within 6 hours;
• cancel the martial law order;
• Entrust law enforcement to local authorities.

Hitler's meeting with Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden

To prevent a war, England, represented by the British leader Neville Chamberlain, and France, represented by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, tried to find a way out of this situation.

Hitler agreed to the meeting, fixing the date and place of September 15 at his mountain villa in Berchtesgaden. Chamberlain flew there for 7 hours, which was already a sign of the humiliation of the West. The hope of the British leader was a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The Fuhrer, referring to a fictitious report that clashes in the Sudetenland led to the death of 300 people (hundreds were injured), demanded an immediate solution to the Czechoslovak problem. At the same time, he stressed that further cooperation between their countries would depend on this decision.

Chamberlain agreed to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich, subject to approval of this:

• your office;
• France;
• Lord Runciman (head of the unofficial mission of the British government in Czechoslovakia)

Chamberlain did not even mention Prague. This meant that England provided Germany with both the coveted "freedom of hands" in the East and the Sudetenland.

• transfer the border areas to the Reich for the security and interests of the country;
• cancel the mutual assistance treaties with the Soviet Union and France.

Thus, Britain and France did all the “dirty work” for Germany on the way to its goals (in fact, the ultimatum was supposed to come from the Reich).

Beneš understood that giving in to the ultimatum meant completely subordinating Czechoslovakia to Germany. Therefore, through Kamil Kroft, the country's foreign minister, the Czechoslovak government:

• refused to comply with the terms of the Anglo-French ultimatum;
• proposed to resolve issues based on the German-Czechoslovak arbitration agreement of 1925.

The refusal to comply with the ultimatum, in fact, was a fiction - after all, even 2 days before it was presented, the Minister of Czechoslovakia Necas visited Paris. On behalf of Edvard Benes, he proposed to the French prime minister to resolve the Sudeten problem by transferring three border regions to Germany. Nechas suggested the same to the British.

Czechoslovakia's refusal to help the USSR

On the night of September 21, envoys from France and Britain arrived at Benes, declaring that in the event of war they would not take part in it, and their proposals were the only way to prevent a German attack. Prague "with bitterness and regret" agreed to the terms of the ultimatum and refused to fight.

At this time, the Fuhrer's 5 armies were already on alert, and the Czech border towns of Ash and Cheb were captured by the Sudeten Volunteer Corps (with the support of the German SS units).

S.S. Aleksandrovsky (Soviet plenipotentiary in Prague) suggested declaring the threat of aggression from the Republic to the League of Nations.

Based on the provisions of the Charter, the League of Nations could help Czechoslovakia in:

• article 16 - the application of sanctions to a state that resorted to war (if it was a member of the League of Nations);
• article 17 - the application of sanctions to a state that resorted to war (if it was not a member of the League of Nations).

However, Benes refused any help - both from the USSR and through the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union warned Germany (more than once) that it was ready to defend Czechoslovakia. So, on August 22, 1938, Schulenburg (the German ambassador in Moscow) during a conversation with People's Commissar Litvinov assured that in Czechoslovakia the Reich was only interested in the Sudeten Germans. Litvinov, on the other hand, made it clear that he saw in Germany's actions a desire to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a whole.

The USSR understood that only a warning from Britain and France (with the support of the United States) could stop Hitler's foreign policy aggression.

Reasons for Czechoslovakia's refusal of Soviet aid:

• The USSR was viewed as an undesirable ally: relations with it depended on France and Britain - if they rejected Russia, then Czechoslovakia was also uninteresting;
• In Czechoslovakia, it was believed that the Red Army had lost its combat effectiveness due to the repressions of the commanding staff;
• The country's government was afraid that the USSR would not come to the rescue at a decisive moment, referring to the "impossibility of transit passage" of its army.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia: stages, results, significance

The Munich Agreement was the first link from which the Nazi leader began the seizure of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler's meeting with Chamberlain in Godesberg

On September 22, 1938, in Godesberg, at a second meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain agreed to transfer the Sudetenland to the Reich even without a plebiscite. But instead of gratitude to the Fuhrer:

• already put forward claims to areas where the Germans were a minority of the population;
• demanded the immediate entry of German troops into the Sudetenland;
• insisted on satisfying the territorial claims of Poland and Hungary.

Hitler agreed to wait only until October 1, the date scheduled for the attack. The British Prime Minister assured that the Fuhrer would get everything he wanted, without war and immediately. Adolf Hitler thanked him for his contribution to "saving the world", assuring him of his desire for friendship with Britain.

After these negotiations, it became clear that it would not be possible to resolve the problem peacefully. The leading powers struggled to avoid war:

• Neville Chamberlain turned to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini for help;
• The Duce asked Hitler to delay the mobilization of the German army;
• the US president urged Hitler to continue negotiations and "peacefully, fairly and constructively resolve all issues."

The Fuhrer responded to requests, proposing that the heads of Britain, France and Italy meet in Munich. It was they who would later become participants in the conspiracy that destroyed Czechoslovakia, and known as the Munich Pact.

Munich Conference 1938

The conference was held in secret. Only prime ministers and foreign ministers took part in it:

• Germany was represented by Adolf Hitler;
• Italy - Benito Mussolini;
• Great Britain - Neville Chamberlain;
• France - Edouard Daladier.

Representatives of the USSR were not invited to the meeting.

Hitler allowed the representatives of Czechoslovakia to wait in the next room.

The negotiations on September 29-30, 1938 were chaotic: there was no procedure, no agenda (only unofficial notes were kept). All participants understood that the outcome of the conference was already a foregone conclusion.

"For the sake of European peace" Hitler demanded the immediate transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. He stressed that on October 1 he would send troops to the border areas, that the Reich had no other claims in Europe.

According to the Fuhrer's plan, the Reich troops were to enter Czechoslovakia legally, without the use of weapons.

The proposals voiced by Mussolini were drawn up the day before in Berlin. On their basis, a "compromise draft" of the agreement was drawn up. Chamberlain tried to discuss the "solution of the Russian question" with Hitler, but the Fuhrer remained silent. Nor did he listen to the proposals of the British on the future joint exploitation of the natural resources of the USSR.

The result of the conference was the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany.

The fatal document was signed on September 30, 1938. Hitler was the first to put his flourish, followed by Chamberlain, Mussolini and, finally, Daladier.

The representatives of Czechoslovakia were briefed on the content of the agreement only after Hitler and Mussolini had left the meeting.

In Great Britain, in response to Chamberlain's joyful words: "I have brought you peace!", only (the future Prime Minister of Great Britain) replied: "We have suffered a complete defeat."

Munich Treaty: results and significance

The results of the agreement concluded in Munich were colorful:

1. Germany

• • received the vast territory of the Sudetenland with all military fortifications, industrial enterprises, means of communication and means of communication;
  • Sudeten Germans previously convicted of Nazi activities were subject to amnesty.

1. Czechoslovakia

• received "guarantees" from Germany, Italy, Britain and France against unprovoked aggression;
• ceded 20% of its territory to Germany, losing one of its most industrial areas. Here was 66% of its reserves of hard and 80% of brown coal, production of 80% of cement and textile products, 72% of electricity;
• lost a very powerful line of fortifications.

1. Poland

• received the desired Teshin area.

1. Hungary

• received only a part of Southern Slovakia (instead of all of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine), as it caused the Fuhrer's displeasure by not supporting him during the days of the crisis.

Hitler was shocked to find out what kind of booty he got: military equipment, skillfully placed bunkers, etc. Their capture, in the event of a military clash, would cost Germany a lot of "blood".

However, the occupation of Czechoslovakia was not completed. This caused Hitler's dissatisfaction with the treaty, despite all the trophies received. The Fuhrer sought to carry out the complete capture of Czechoslovakia, but he did not dare to unleash a war in 1938.

Czechoslovakia's mutual assistance agreements with the USSR and France ceased to operate, and the "Carpathian Ukrainian Republic" (with an autonomous government) appeared as part of the country. German propaganda immediately inflated the myth about the emergence of a "new Ukrainian state in the Carpathians", which will become the center of the "Ukrainian liberation movement." This action was directed against the USSR.

For the European powers, the Munich Agreement of 1938 became:

• for England - the guarantor of Germany's non-aggression;
• for France - a disaster: its military significance has now begun to be reduced to zero.

At the same time, each of the powers perfectly understood how the Munich Agreement affected the idea of ​​​​creating a collective security system.

The agreement in Munich meant complete collapse:

• Versailles system;
• the prestige of the League of Nations,
• the course of the USSR towards the creation of collective security in Europe.

On the real balance of forces in the autumn of 1938: if Czechoslovakia had acted with the support of even one of the USSR (whose troops stood at the western border until 10/25/1938). Hitler could not unleash a big war. According to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel of Germany (at the Nuremberg Trials) in Germany:

• there were no forces to cross the Czechoslovak line of fortifications;
• there were no troops on the western frontier.

The balance of forces of Germany and Czechoslovakia on September 30, 1938 (before the conclusion of the Munich Agreement)

The occupation of Czechoslovakia began in Munich. But even Hitler's partial capture of Czechoslovakia meant:

• liquidation of the Czechoslovak state;
• destruction of the French security system;
• removal of the Soviet Union from the settlement of important issues in Europe;
• the isolation of Poland.

There are many opinions about the “correctness” and “forcedness” of concluding the Munich deal, but any of them is subjective and in many respects comes down to the version favorable to the authors.

Some researchers (Professor of North Texas University K. Eubank and British historian L. Thompson) justify the Munich Agreement, find "positive moments" in it and prove that England and Czechoslovakia did not have enough military-technical means to wage war.

However, most historians understand what the essence of the Munich Agreements was: it was they that led to the collapse of the policy of "appeasement" and the capture of all of Czechoslovakia by Hitler.

For France and England, the agreement was an occasion to expose the Soviet Union and the "threat of Bolshevism" under the blow of Germany. And for the USSR, which was aware of how the Munich Agreement affected the idea of ​​​​creating a collective security system, "the conspiracy in Munich was a shameful manifestation of the insidious design of the imperialists."

Hitler's victory over Czechoslovakia was accomplished thanks to:

• propaganda of fascist ideology and the work of German intelligence;
• subtle game on the interests of the governments of Britain and France;
• the desire of Britain and France to avoid war at all costs and direct Nazi aggression towards the East;
• fears of American diplomacy that the war would lead to the "Bolshevization" of Europe;
• desires of Poland and Hungary to acquire new territories.

The Czechoslovak government of Benes betrayed its people, refusing to resist and help the USSR.

Final occupation of Czechoslovakia

The Munich Agreement, concluded on September 29, 1938, gave the Sudetenland to Germany in exchange for an end to its aggression against Czechoslovakia.

But already on October 11, 1938, the Fuhrer ordered Ribbentrop to plan the political isolation of Czechoslovakia in its unoccupied part. Started working here from day one.

• German intelligence;
• "Free Corps" Henlein;
• terrorists and saboteurs.

The Center for German Culture, which became the source of Nazi propaganda, was headed by Henlein's deputy, Kundt. As a result, Hitler's agents occupied all the important posts in the state apparatus of Czechoslovakia.

In October 1938, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Frantisek Chvalkovsky expressed his desire to cooperate with Germany, promising Hitler that his government would not cooperate with the USSR and France.

The Czechoslovak economy was part of the Fuhrer's plans, so in November 1938 (in Berlin) the countries signed:

• Protocol on the construction of the Danube-Oder Canal;
• agreement on the construction of the Wroclaw-Brno-Vienna motorway (passing through Czechoslovakia).

The German monopolies actively absorbed the enterprises of Czechoslovakia, and by the end of 1938 the trade balance with Germany became passive.

On October 21, 1938, Adolf Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht) signed a directive to prepare for the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia. It was assumed that the troops of the Reich would not meet resistance from the weakened Czechs, who, moreover, once again (October 9, 1938) refused to support the USSR. Therefore, on December 17, 1938, an addition appeared to the aforementioned directive, according to which the capture of the Czech Republic was planned to be carried out by the forces of the Wehrmacht in peacetime.

Britain, which signed a non-aggression declaration with Germany on September 30, 1938, offered Germany economic cooperation and a number of large loans.

The British government was aware of the situation in Czechoslovakia. The British Foreign Minister Halifax (Edward Frederick Lindley Wood), although he referred to ignorance, recommended Czechoslovakia not to appeal to the help of European powers, but to resolve all issues through direct negotiations with the Reich. This position suited Hitler perfectly.

The French government also wanted to get closer to Germany. In October 1938, François-Poncet (the French ambassador in Berlin) asked if it was possible to get financial advice in Germany and conclude a non-aggression declaration similar to the British one. The Fuhrer was ready to approach.

On December 6, 1938, Ribbentrop arrived in Paris, where he signed a non-aggression pact with France. At the same time, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1935 was automatically annulled.

The political lull in Europe after Munich was short-lived.

March 14, 1939 Slovakia was proclaimed "an independent state under the protection of the Reich." On the night of March 15, 1939 Hitler demanded that the President of Czechoslovakia, Emil Hach, give up resistance. Under fear of the threat of war, Emil Hacha and Frantisek Chvalkovsky signed a document transferring the Czech Republic to Germany.

On the morning of March 15, the Nazi troops entered the Czech land, and in the evening of the same day, the Fuhrer himself arrived in Zlata Prague. He solemnly announced the creation of the protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia (led by Neurath).

The partition of the occupied territories of the Czech Republic into protectorates was confirmed by Hitler's decree of March 16, 1939.

Britain reacted calmly to another act of aggression by Hitler - after all, on March 13, its Foreign Ministry issued a memorandum for diplomats that the government would not interfere with Germany's aggression against Czechoslovakia.

The liquidation of Czechoslovakia had a peculiarity - the Third Reich annexed the lands where mostly Slavs lived, not Germans.

The capture of Czechoslovakia meant that Nazi Germany:

• went beyond their ethnic boundaries;
• tore up the Munich Agreement;
• discredited the policy of appeasement.

Chamberlain explained the cessation of the existence of Czechoslovakia by its "internal disintegration" and announced his intention to continue the political course. At the same time, he advised the British bank to stop paying the post-Munich loan to Czechoslovakia.

The government of France was in solidarity with England; The USSR considered Germany's actions criminal and contrary to international law.

As a result of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Germany began to dominate the Danube. She "loomed like a shadow over the Balkans", having taken 40 allied Czech divisions from France, and arming 40 of her divisions with captured Czech weapons.

Hitler's further aggression gave him important strategic positions in the Baltic and the Baltic Sea.

Rubtsova Elena Viktorovna, Candidate of Philology, Associate Professor of the Department of the Russian Language and Culture of Speech, SBEE HPE "Kursk State Medical University" of the Ministry of Health of Russia, Kursk [email protected]

Lendich Violetta Vitalievna, 1st year student of the Faculty of International Journalism, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow [email protected]

Prokopova Elena Alekseevna, 2nd year student of the Faculty of Medicine, SBEI HPE "Kursk State Medical University" of the Ministry of Health of Russia, Kursk

The Munich Agreement of 1938 and its aftermath

Annotation. The subject of research in this article is

The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, as well as other documents directly related to it, characterizing the international relations of the pre-war period, in order to clarify the role of this event in the history of Europe and the world. to the growth of Germany's aggressiveness and became one of the prerequisites for the outbreak of World War II. The precedent gave the German leadership (and Hitler personally) serious reasons to hope that England and France would not react to Germany's aggressive actions in the future. This agreement, concluded without the participation of the leadership of Czechoslovakia, actually led to its division between Germany, Hungary and Poland. The Munich agreement clearly infringed on the interests of the state that did not participate in the negotiations. According to some military historians, the Czechoslovak army could well alone resist the Wehrmacht with its weapons time. Key words: Munich Agreement, World War II, politics, agreement, aggressive actions.

The Munich Agreement of 1938, called “conspiracy” by Soviet historians, is one of the key events that preceded World War II. signed on September 30, 1938 at a conference in Munich by representatives of Great Britain (N. Chamberlain), France (E. Daladier), Germany (A. Hitler) and Italy (B. Mussolini). It was the result of Hitler's aggressive policy, which proclaimed a revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty with the aim of restoring the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Anglo-French policy of "appeasement" supported by the United States, on the other.

The Munich Agreement is a written agreement concluded by representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy "regarding the cession of the German Sudeton region" by Czechoslovakia (this country did not take part either in the discussion of the agreement or in its signing) to Germany. One additional agreement and three additional declarations were added to the main text of the agreement (they were signed consecutively during the night from September 29 to September 30, 1938). Each of the documents that supplemented the agreement was signed by representatives of the countries separately. In this regard, the term "Munich Agreement" in the literature is often given in the plural - "Munich Agreements". Both terms have the same meaning and are equal in rights. The historical events associated with the Second World War, including the events that served as the starting points for its start, have recently become the subject of discussion among historians, politicians and public figures. Every year in the media and on Internet forums in late September - early October, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the signing of the Munich Agreement, the opinions of politicians and scientists are published on such issues as: "Munich conspiracy" or the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, became the "point of no return" in the outbreak of World War II? Are Britain and France to blame for the tragedy that followed this "collusion"? What are the current lessons of the "Munich Pact"?.

The purpose of the study was to clarify the role of the Munich Agreement in the history of Europe and the world. To achieve the goal, the following tasks were solved: 1. reveal the essence of the Munich Agreement; 2. to trace its origins and consequences; 3. to consider the interpretation of the Munich Agreement in domestic and foreign historiography. Soviet historical science interpreted the Munich Agreements as a "prelude to war", as a "conspiracy", as an attempt to direct Nazi Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union. Even after the collapse of the Soviet system and the disappearance of ideological pressure, the Soviet concept of the "Munich Agreement of 1938" remained the main one for domestic historical research and remains relevant up to the present time. Among the changes in Russian historiography is the idea that the Munich Agreement should be considered not only from the position of the USSR, Germany and Western European powers, but also from the position of the “small” states of Central Europe - Poland, Hungary, the countries of the Balkan Peninsula.

In Western historiography, on the issue of the essence and consequences of the conclusion of the Munich Agreements, the concept of compulsion of these agreements dominates - they were concluded in order to prevent the outbreak of war, to "pacify" Germany. Most of the authors of American and English history textbooks prefer not to analyze the consequences of the Munich agreements.

In English historiography, since the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, its assessment by English historians has changed several times. The agreement at one time caused a sharp division in the British political camp. The outbreak of war in September 1939 convincingly proved that Britain's foreign policy had failed. The Munich agreement was deemed a "mistake". However, this was not followed by a serious analysis of the causes of this "mistake". English historians have tried to present the Munich agreement as the work of one N. Chamberlain and a small group of his advisers. Professor of the University of London, author of the two-volume "Economic blockade", which was included in the official English "History of the Second World War", W. Medlicott in his works blamed Chamberlain for "lack of initiative, foresight and quick reaction." The concept of the Munich conspiracy as the result of Chamberlain's personal error proved to be tenacious, in various versions it was repeated in English literature for a long time. One of the references is contained in the book of the famous English professional historian L. Namier "Diplomatic Prelude". According to Namier, N. Chamberlain was an amateur in diplomacy, did not have the knowledge and experience necessary to manage the foreign policy of England in the extremely difficult situation of those years; he simply did not fully understand what was happening, did not realize the consequences of his steps. The point of view of Chamberlain's personal oversight looks very dubious. In the report of the head of the British mission in Czechoslovakia, W. Runciman (the purpose of the mission, which lasted from August 3 to September 16, 1938, was mediation during negotiations between the government of Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German Party, founded by K. Henlein and collaborating with Hitler) of the events in Czechoslovakia, a witness which Lord Runciman became are described in terms that testify to the prevalence of National Socialist ideas among the representatives of the English elite: sympathizing with the Sudeten Germans, Runciman repeatedly expresses the idea that it is “hard for the Germans to be ruled by an alien race” (Czechs). It is noteworthy that the English lord did not hesitate to use the provisions of racial theory in an official document. In modern English historical science, the opinion of the inevitability of the Munich agreement was established. The approaches of leading French historians to the policy of the Third Republic during the Munich period diverge to some extent. However, all French researchers (J.B. Durozelle, F. Bedarida and others) are more or less inclined to place the responsibility for the conclusion of the Munich agreements on England, recognizing the fact that French diplomacy followed in the pre-war period and in line with English. The moral and political characterization of the Munich Agreements as a “symbol of shame” (M. Beaumont) in French historiography is unambiguous.

A feature of German historiography was the fact that, firstly, until the 1970s–80s. neither in the FRG nor in the GDR was practically a single study devoted specifically to the Munich Agreement written. The historiography of the GDR during this period completely followed the Soviet concept. There were no differences and contradictions in the assessments of the Munich Agreement by Soviet and East German authors. In West German studies, the "Munich problem" was covered without focusing on the components of the conflict. All the researchers' attention was directed exclusively to the Munich Conference. The agreement was seen as a fatal decision by Britain and France. At the turn of the 1970–80s. in the historiography of Germany there was a certain breakthrough. By 1988, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Munich Agreement, the collection “Munich 1938. End of old Europe. The authors of the collection came to the conclusion that discrimination against the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia took place and A. Hitler's claims were theoretically substantiated. At the same time, none of the authors tried to justify the German policy towards the neighbor. Thus, we can state the presence of conflicting approaches (both in historical science and in politics) in the interpretation of the Munich Agreement and related events. In the 30s of the twentieth century, public opinion Western Europe was set up very peacefully. The mood of the people was greatly influenced by the memory of the hardships caused by the recently ended World War and the economic crisis. The governments of the Western European countries, elected on the basis of a democratic procedure and therefore dependent on public opinion, did everything they could to ensure that Germany, where the fascists came to power, would by no means unleash a war in Europe. As follows from the documents, British diplomacy (England at that time was considered the strongest world power) recognized Germany's territorial claims to Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia and did not object to Germany gaining control over these territories. British Foreign Secretary Lord E. Halifax only expressed interest in the fact that the entry of new territories into Germany "was carried out peacefully." In March 1938. Anschluss (attachment) of Austria to Germany. There was no opposition from the international community. For Austria, it was the turn of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, the population of Czechoslovakia was 14 million. people, including 3.5 million ethnic Germans who compactly lived in the Sudetenland, as well as in Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Germans). The industry of Czechoslovakia was one of the most developed in Europe. From the moment of occupation by Germany until the start of the war with Poland, the Skoda factories produced almost as much military products as the entire military industry of Great Britain produced during the same time. Czechoslovakia was one of the world's leading exporters of weapons, its army was superbly armed and relied on powerful fortifications in the Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia was linked with France by a mutual assistance treaty. Back in February 1938, Hitler appealed to the German Reichstag with an appeal to “pay attention to the horrific living conditions of German brethren in Czechoslovakia.” The Sudeten Germans, relying on the support of Germany, began to demand autonomy. This demand was supported by Germany. Since September 1938, Hitler put forward a demand for the annexation of the territories of Czechoslovakia with a dominant German population to Germany. The Sudeten Germans, led by the national separatist Sudeten German Party of K. Henlein, supported by Hitler, under the influence of pro-German propaganda, switched to civil disobedience and clashes with the police. Henlein and his supporters put forward a demand for a referendum on the accession of the Sudetenland to Germany. In the summer of 1938. anti-Czechoslovak sentiments began to appear and intensify in the French and English press and in French political circles. Czechoslovakia, in fact, was recognized as an obstacle to peace. France, which had an allied treaty with Czechoslovakia, leaned towards supporting the course of England. This was due to the fear of entering the war with Germany without the support of England, while France did not believe in Moscow's ability to provide military assistance. Hitler, increasing political pressure on Czechoslovakia (in diplomatic circles, information was circulated about the impending German attack on Czechoslovakia if the latter refused to accept German conditions - envoys of Czechoslovakia reported to their homeland from different countries, the Czechoslovak government did not doubt the imminent outbreak of war), proceeded to negotiations with the Czechoslovak government through the special representative of Great Britain, Lord Runciman. On September 12, 1938, mass demonstrations began again in the Sudetenland. The government of Czechoslovakia sent troops into the German-populated areas and declared martial law there. On September 15, 1938, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain met with Hitler in Berchtesgaden (in the Bavarian Alps). During this meeting, Hitler announced that he wanted peace, but was ready for war because of the Czechoslovak problem. However, war can be avoided if Britain agrees to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. Chamberlain agreed. Hitler promised that "the Czechoslovak question ... is the last big problem that must be solved" and that "after that there will be no other territorial demands that could give rise to conflicts between Germany and other countries." On September 18, Anglo-French consultations were held in London . The parties agreed that the territories inhabited by more than 50% of Germans should go to Germany, and that Great Britain and France would guarantee the new borders of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, the British and French envoys in Czechoslovakia told the Czechoslovak government that if it accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "under these circumstances will not be able to enter the war," that is, France refused to fulfill the agreement on military assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of war. The government of Czechoslovakia accepted the ultimatum and agreed to seize part of the country's territory in favor of Germany. In response, 25 September 27, 1938 the British government conveyed to the representatives of Czechoslovakia and France specific proposals regarding the transfer of a number of areas of Czechoslovakia under German control. Events developed rapidly. Probably the most accurate definition for the Munich Agreement is a “deal”, this term was used by Russian historians. The leading powers of Western Europe exchanged one of independent European countries to Germany's promises of peace. September 2930, 1938 in Munich, in the residence of Hitler, a meeting of the heads of government of England, France, Germany and Italy (Germany initiated the meeting). The purpose of the meeting was to determine the future fate of Czechoslovakia, the territory of which Germany claimed. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the representatives of Czechoslovakia were denied participation in this meeting - Hitler and Mussolini insisted on this. The Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Munich only a few hours after the start of the conference. Upon arrival, at the airfield, the diplomats of the Czech Republic were given "a reception intended for persons suspicious from the point of view of the police." At one in the morning on September 30, 1938. Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. Only after that the Czechoslovak delegation was allowed into the hall where the conference was held. She was given the text of the agreement to read. To the ensuing objections to the representatives of the CSR, it was "explained in a rather rude way and, moreover, by a Frenchman, that this is a verdict without the right of appeal and without the possibility of making corrections to it." The leadership of Great Britain and France put pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia, and President Benes, without the consent of the National Assembly, accepted the Munich Agreement for execution. On October 1, 1938, German troops began to occupy the border areas of Czechoslovakia transferred to Germany under the Munich Agreement. After that, the troops of Poland and Hungary occupied the areas inhabited by the Polish and Hungarian national minorities. Czechoslovakia lost "/z of its territory with a population of about 5 million people. It lost 40% of its industry, regions rich in fuel and raw materials and became completely dependent on Hitler's Germany. At Hitler's insistence, President of Czechoslovakia Beneš resigned on October 5, 1938 and left the country. The political elite of Czechoslovakia lost the support of citizens. The population was demoralized. In Czechoslovakia, a serious conflict arose between the Slovak nationalists and the Prague government. It was this conflict that Hitler used as a pretext for the annexation of the "remainder of the Czech Republic." On October 21, 1938, Hitler issued a secret a directive in which he announced his desire to resolve the issue with the "remaining part of the Czech Republic" in the near future. On March 14, 1939, the parliament of the autonomy of Slovakia decided on the withdrawal of Slovakia from the Czechoslovakia and the formation of the Slovak Republic. Summoned to Berlin, Czech President Hacha was on the night from March 14 to March 15, 1939 familiarized with the prepared by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ge Ribbentrop signed a treaty in Germany, which stated: "The President of Czechoslovakia ... confidently places the fate of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Fuhrer of Germany." On March 15, Germany brought its troops into the territory of the lands remaining in the Czech Republic: Bohemia and Moravia and declared a protectorate over them (Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). The Czech army did not put up any noticeable resistance to the invaders. England and France accepted what had happened as a fait accompli. Germany received a new ally - Slovakia and significantly increased its raw materials and industrial potential. Until September 1, 1939, Germany's aggressive actions did not meet with serious resistance from London and Paris, who did not dare to start a war and tried, from their point of view, to save the system with reasonable concessions Treaty of Versailles. The consequences of the so-called "appeasement policy" were disastrous. The Munich Agreement is considered a classic example of the manifestation of the policy of appeasement of the aggressor. In the late 30s of the twentieth century, the policy of appeasement led to an increase in the aggressiveness of Germany and became one of the prerequisites for the outbreak of World War II. The precedent set by the signing of the Munich Agreement gave the leadership of Germany (and Hitler personally) good reason to hope that England and France would turn a blind eye to Germany's aggressive actions in the future. This agreement, concluded without the participation of the leadership of Czechoslovakia, actually led to its division between Germany, Hungary and Poland. At the end of September 1938 in Munich, with the signing of an agreement between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, the collective security system was destroyed, the redistribution of borders in Europe became a pattern (the beginning of the division of Europe was laid in March 1938, when Germany annexed Austria). Probably in autumn 1938. in Munich, one of the key moments of pre-war history was passed, until which it was possible to prevent a major war. According to some military historians, the Czechoslovak army alone could have resisted the Wehrmacht with its then weapons. The Munich Agreement clearly infringed upon the interests of the state that did not participate in the negotiations. December 11, 1973 in Prague, an agreement was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia. In accordance with it, the Munich Agreement was declared "knowingly contrary to the interests of law and order and morality, not in accordance with the law and legally invalid from the moment of its conclusion." Thus, despite the fact that the purpose of the Munich Agreement, signed on the night of September 29-30, 1938, was the prevention of the Second World War, it, on the contrary, became one of the important factors that provoked the war.

Ed.6e, rev. and add.–Tambov, 2015.2. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. November 1937 - Dec. 1938 / Mvo foreign. affairs of the USSR; Editorial: Zemskov I. N. and others - M .: Politizdat, 1981. -S. 237239.3. For example: Who helped Hitler unleash World War II // Segodnya.Ru. Information and analytical online edition. 10/11/2011 [Electronic resource]. – Moscow, 2011. – Access mode: free. URL: http://www.segodnia.ru/content/11746.4. More details: Kurenkov V.Yu. The Munich Agreement of 1938 in the Works of Russian and German Researchers: A Brief Historiographic Review // Bulletin of the Dagestan Scientific Center. 2013. -№48. -FROM. 6570.5. Kurenkov V.Yu. Decree. op. -FROM. 6869.6.Kovrigin V.V. Reflection of the history of the Second World War in the content of domestic and foreign school history education. Abstract of diss ... candidate of pedagogical sciences. -Yelets, 2008. -S. 12, 15.7. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 190195.8. Malafeev K.A. European policy and diplomacy of France in 1933-1939 Abstract of the thesis ... doctor of historical sciences. -Moscow, 1998. -S. 5.9. Kurenkov V.Yu. Decree. op. -FROM. 6667.10. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 47.11. Kolesnichenko V. Munich conspiracy, or how the Second World War began // Russian People's Line Information and Analytical Service. 01.10.2011 [Electronic resource]. – [?], 2011. – Access mode: free. URL: http://ruskline.ru/monitoring_smi/2011/oktyabr/01/myunhenskij_sgovor_ili_kak_nachinalas_vtoraya_mirovaya_vojna.12. Documents and materials on the eve of World War II. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 125.13. Maryina V.V. Once again about Munich (new documents of the Czech archives). // Perspectives. Online edition of the Center for Research and Analytics of the Historical Perspective Foundation. 09/07/2009. [Electronic resource]. – Moscow, 2009. – Access mode: free. URL: http://www.perspektivy.info/history/munkhen_i_konec_pervoj_chehoslovackoj_respubliki_po_dokumentam_cheshskih_arkhivov_20090907.htm.14. Documents and materials on the eve of World War II. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 141142, 154, 155.15. Ibid. -FROM. 160, 161.16. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 187, 188.17. Ibid. -FROM. 195, 211.18. Ibid. -FROM. 215217; 227229.19. Mogilesky S.A., Pritzker D.P., Revunenkov V.G. etc. Modern history of foreign countries. T. 1. Europe and America. -M.: Enlightenment, 1967. -S. 97.20. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 233.21. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 234.22. Ibid. – P.236.23. Mogileskiy S.A., Pritzker D.P., Revunenkov V.G. etc. Modern history of foreign countries. T. 1… -S.220221.24. Documents and materials on the eve of World War II. 19371939. In 2 vols. T. 1 ... -S. 251.25.KrysinM. The Munich Agreement of 1938 provoked the Second World War // Information agency "PenzaNews". 09/30/2013 [Electronic resource]. – Penza, 2013. – Access mode: free. URL: http://penzanews.ru/opinion/731412013.26.Cit. Quoted from: Khristoforov V.S. The Munich Agreement - the prologue of the Second World War (based on archival materials of the FSB) // Modern and Contemporary History. 2009. No. 11. –p.23.

“Future historians, after a thousand years, will try in vain to comprehend the secrets of our politics. They will never be able to understand how it happened that a people that won a victory, having something for its soul, stooped to such a fall, let go to the wind everything that it won as a result of immeasurable sacrifices and decisive triumph over the enemy. They will not understand why the victors were defeated, and those who lay down on the battlefield and prayed for a truce are now going to dominate the world.
from Churchill's speech in the English Parliament on March 24, 1937.

During the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Ciano

From the very beginning of his political activity, Hitler conducted active propaganda among the German population about the suffering and terrible living conditions of several million Germans living in Czechoslovakia in the Sudetes (about 90% of the population of the region), Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Germans) and under the yoke of the Slavic population countries. The reasons for the appearance of the Germans in this area go back to the 13th century, when the Czech kings invited settlers to deserted areas on the borders of the Czech kingdom. The situation began to worsen when Germany openly began to support fascist-type parties in the Sudetenland. One of them, the National Separatist Party of Konrad Henlein, won the elections in 1935. Provocations and riots organized by this gang of Hitler's henchmen heated the atmosphere in the Sudetenland, and the government of Czechoslovakia had to take a number of retaliatory measures (representation of the Germans in the National Assembly, local self-government, education in the native language) designed to reduce tensions in the region. But in April, Henlein's completely insolent party threateningly put forward demands for the autonomy of the region. At the same time, German military units began to move, located near the Czechoslovak border. In response, with the support of the USSR and France, the Czechoslovak troops occupy the Sudetenland. Frightened, Hitler sends Henlein to negotiations with the Czechoslovak government, which, however, lead to nothing and end on September 7 after a series of provoked riots and clashes between the Sudeten Germans and regular troops. Hitler publicly declares that he sincerely wants peace, but if the government of Czechoslovakia does not withdraw troops from the Sudetenland, he will be forced to start a war. On a mission to "save the whole world," Chamberlain meets him on September 15 in the Bavarian Alps. On it, the Führer convincingly proves that territories inhabited by more than 50 percent of Germans are obliged to pass to Germany, allegedly on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. Chamberlain agrees, and Great Britain, and later France, act as guarantors of the new borders of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, the envoys of these great powers announce an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government, which was limply accepted by President Edvard Beneš. After that, a general strike was declared in the country, protest demonstrations and a change of government took place, and a general mobilization was announced. The flight of Jews, Czechs and German anti-fascists begins from the Sudetenland. Even without the support of France, the USSR declares its readiness to fulfill its obligations to defend Czechoslovakia. There are official documents that Moscow has offered Prague very specific plans for assistance in the use of ground forces and the transfer of fighters in order to strengthen the capabilities of the Czechoslovak military aviation. On the southwestern and western borders, rifle divisions, tank units, aviation and air defense forces of our country were put on alert. But then Poland announced that it would not let the Red Army through its territory, warning of a blow to the flank in the event of the advancement of Soviet troops and the destruction of any aircraft flying over its airspace. The decisive factor was the refusal to help Czechoslovakia itself, which, obviously, Stalin inspired no less fear than Hitler.

It is also known that England and France put pressure on Czechoslovakia: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stand aside.”

Seeing the mobilization of the Czechoslovak military, Hitler informs the ambassadors of England and France that he is being forced to start a war. Continuous columns of soldiers, armed from head to toe, grimly march through the streets of Berlin.

Chamberlain (left) and Hitler meeting in Bad Godesberg, September 23, 1938. In the middle is the chief translator Dr. Paul Schmidt

On September 26, at the Berlin Sports Palace, the Fuhrer declared: "If by October 1, the Sudetenland is not transferred to Germany, I, Hitler, myself will go, as the first soldier, against Czechoslovakia."
Here he proclaimed: "After the Sudeten-German question is settled, we will not have any further territorial claims in Europe ... We do not need the Czechs."

Chamberlain immediately assures Hitler that everything will work out "without war and without delay." To resolve this issue on September 29, 1938, the heads of governments of Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France (Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier, respectively) gathered in Hitler's Munich residence "Fuhrerbau".

On September 28, an emergency meeting of the English House of Commons was held. Chamberlain addressed the House: “I must make an additional message to the House. Herr Hitler announces that he invites me to meet him tomorrow morning in Munich. Members of Parliament, dreaming of an agreement with Hitler, greeted this statement with thunderous applause.

At 12:45 p.m., a conference of plenipotentiaries opened in the Brown House. Contrary to Chamberlain's promise, Czechoslovak envoys were not admitted, and the USSR was denied participation altogether. During the two-day negotiations, the fate of Czechoslovakia was finally decided. Its representatives were invited and announced in a "recommendatory" form a verdict - to transfer to Germany the Sudetenland and areas bordering the former Austria, with all property, including weapons and fortifications. Czechoslovakia was supposed to clear the transferred territories from 1 to 10 October. The agreement also prescribed to settle the issue of the Polish and Hungarian national minorities in the country, which meant the rejection of other parts of its territory from Czechoslovakia in favor of Poland and Hungary. The Munich Agreement was signed at one in the morning on September 30, 1938 by Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini. Vojtech Mastny and Hubert Masaryk also signed the treaty on behalf of the Czechoslovak people. In case of non-fulfilment, France disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of Czechoslovakia from German aggression.

Returning from Munich to London, Chamberlain at the gangway said: "I brought peace to our generation."
Daladier was already met at the airport by a huge crowd shouting: “Long live Daladier! Long live the world!
Churchill assessed the results of Munich in a completely different way: “England had to choose between war and disgrace. Its ministers have chosen disgrace in order to get war.”
Welcoming Chamberlain in the House of Commons, Churchill sullenly said: “Do not think that this is the end. This is just the beginning of the payoff. This is the first sip. The first foretaste of that bitter cup that will be offered to us year after year.

Édouard Daladier (center) with Joachim von Ribbentrop at a meeting in Munich in 1938

The Munich Agreement became an exemplary example of a betrayal committed on a national scale, and the culminating point of the English "policy of appeasement". The French could easily mobilize an army in order to throw the German units out of the Rhine zone within a few hours, but they did not. Everyone wanted Germany to move east, finally attacking our country.

The French ambassador in Moscow, Robert Coulondre, noted: “The Munich agreement is a particularly strong threat to the Soviet Union. After the neutralization of Czechoslovakia, Germany opened the way to the southeast. This is also stated in the diplomatic documents of France, Germany, Italy, the USA, Poland and a number of other countries.
The slogan of the British Conservatives at the time was: "For Britain to live, Bolshevism must die."

On the territory of the Sudetes, after October 1, 1938, Czech parties, the Czech language, books, newspapers and much more were banned. Under pressure from Germany, the Czechoslovak government on October 7 recognized the autonomy of Slovakia, and on October 8 a conclusion was made on granting autonomy to Transcarpathian Ukraine. Even earlier, on October 1, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with ultimatum demands, supported by the Nazis, for the transfer of the Teszyn region to it. Thus, the split, devoid of border fortifications and economically drained of blood, the country turned out to be defenseless against the Nazi invaders. In March 1939, the Nazis began the final liquidation of Czechoslovakia as a state. On the night of March 14-15, the President of the Czech Republic Hacha, summoned to Berlin, signed Hitler's statement on the inadmissibility of any resistance to the invasion of German troops.

On the same day, Hitler declared: "I am not boasting, but I must say that I did it really elegantly."

On March 15, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which remained from the once united Czechoslovakia, declaring a protectorate over them. The Germans took no steps to keep their actions secret, but there was no protest from the Western powers.

To all questions, Chamberlain only answered: "Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a result of internal disintegration."
Daladier demanded to suppress the protest of the Communist Party. The Plenipotentiary of the USSR in France wrote: “The majority of the chamber answered this demand with a thunderous ovation. A more shameful spectacle could hardly be imagined ... ".

The Soviet Union was the only country willing to help the Czechoslovak Republic. But the ruling circles of that country did not accept our support this time either.

The Soviet government declared: "We cannot recognize the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the German Empire, and in one form or another also Slovakia, lawful and in accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination of peoples."

As a result of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, one of the forces that could potentially serve the cause of defeating the Nazis disappeared in the center of Europe. When Hitler visited this "new territory of the Reich", he expressed his joy that the Wehrmacht did not have to storm the lines of the Czechoslovak defenses, for which the Germans would have to pay dearly. From a military point of view, Germany's gain was enormous. The Wehrmacht acquired excellent army weapons and factories that produced these weapons, and in fact the industry of Czechoslovakia was at that time one of the most developed in Europe. Before the attack on the USSR, out of 21 Wehrmacht tank divisions, 5 were equipped with Czechoslovak-made tanks. Germany also received all the trump cards for an attack on Poland from several directions, which until the very end fancied itself an ally of Germany and, together with it, merrily dismembered Czechoslovakia. But after a few months, Poland was gone, and Slovak soldiers were photographed against the backdrop of burnt houses and Polish prisoners of war.

The Munich model did not work. The war began in the West, culminating in the shameful capitulation of France, a change of cabinet in England, and the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition according to the scheme proposed by the Soviet Union back in 1935. England came to its senses, a little later the United States, and then France under the leadership of de Gaulle jumped on the bandwagon of the departing train. In 1942, Great Britain and France, in 1944 Italy, in 1950 the GDR and in 1973 the FRG declared the Munich Agreement initially invalid.