The German city of the post-war meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt. Roosevelt tried to tame Stalin and called him “My friend. What happened at Stalin's meeting with the Iranian Shah

January 30, 1882 was born Franklin Delano Roosevelt - the 32nd President of the United States, the only one who was elected to this post four times. Roosevelt is rightly considered not only the greatest American politician, but the central figure in world history in the first half of the 20th century.

He proposed not only a "New Deal" in the economy, which helped America get out of the Great Depression, but also began to pursue a new course in foreign policy. It was under him that diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR were established in 1933, and during World War II, Roosevelt, unlike Churchill, became a sincere ally of the country of the Soviets, which he spoke about more than once in public and mentioned in his letters.

"RG" has collected the most interesting quotes from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, characterizing his attitude towards the USSR and the then leader of the country - Joseph Stalin.

About the German attack on the USSR

Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations in the early 1930s, close foreign policy cooperation between the USSR and the United States intensified only with the outbreak of war. After the German attack on the USSR, the American authorities faced the question of how to respond to this. Two days later, the President secured himself by declaring: "Officially, the Soviet government has not yet asked for anything, and England remains the main recipient of American aid." When, at a press conference on June 24, one of the journalists asked Roosevelt whether assistance would be provided to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt replied, "Ask me some other question," writes Soviet historian Anatoly Utkin in Franklin Roosevelt's Diplomacy.

About communism

However, then it became clear that America would actively support the country of the Soviets in this war. This met the geopolitical interests of the United States, and besides, they saw communism as a lesser evil than fascism. In a conversation with former US Ambassador to the USSR Joseph Davis, Roosevelt said: "I cannot accept communism. Neither can you. But in order to cross this bridge, I will shake hands with the devil."

About Stalin before we met ...

It is curious how Roosevelt's attitude towards Stalin changed. The American authorities knew about his social background and criminal past, so people from aristocratic families in the White House did not perceive the Soviet leader as an equal. Nevertheless, Roosevelt did not treat him sharply negatively, rather, condescendingly. The reaction of the President of the United States to the remark of one of the advisers, who believed that Stalin was a bandit, and you should not do business with him like a gentleman, is known: “No, we will just treat him like a gentleman, and he should gradually stop being a bandit.” ".

… and after

Everything was changed by a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin at a conference in Tehran at the end of 1943. "This man knows how to act. He always has a goal in front of his eyes. It's a pleasure to work with him. No roundabouts. He has a deep deep voice, he speaks slowly, seems very confident in himself, leisurely - in general, makes a strong impression," - Roosevelt's opinion is quoted by his son Elliot in the book "His Eyes".

A little later, in his speech on December 24, 1943, quoted in the book “Conversations by the Fireplace”, Roosevelt confirmed the first impression of meeting the Soviet leader: “In simple terms, I got along very well with Marshal Stalin. will and a healthy sense of humor; I think the soul and heart of Russia have their true representative in him. I believe that we will continue to get along well with him and with all the Russian people. "

On the contribution of the USSR to the victory over Germany

Roosevelt, unlike many followers, was well aware that it was the USSR that made a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazism. On April 28, 1942, he declared: "On the European front, the most important event The past year, no doubt, was the crushing counter-offensive of the great Russian army against the powerful German grouping. Russian troops have destroyed - and continue to destroy - more manpower, aircraft, tanks and guns of our common enemy than all the rest of the United Nations put together."

About the post-war world

Roosevelt was convinced that even after the victory over Germany, the Allies would be able to coexist peacefully in the post-war world. So, discussing with his son Elliot the forthcoming transfer of all forces to the war with Japan, he rejected doubts young man about the "trustworthiness of the Russians", stating: "We trust them now. What reason do we have not to trust them tomorrow?" And in a speech on July 28, 1943 ("Conversations by the Fireplace"), Roosevelt put it even more specifically: "Under the leadership of Marshal Joseph Stalin, the Russian people showed such an example of love for the motherland, firmness of spirit and self-sacrifice, which the world has not yet known. After the war, our the country will always be glad to maintain relations of good neighborliness and sincere friendship with Russia, whose people, saving themselves, help to save the whole world from the Nazi threat.

Alas, his hopes were not destined to come true. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and his followers drastically changed foreign policy in relation to the USSR, thereby starting the Cold War.

In January 1943, at a meeting in Casablanca (Morocco), US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill declared that they would wage war until the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. However, towards the end of the war, some politicians in the West began to cautiously speak out in the spirit that the demand for unconditional surrender spurred German resistance and dragged out the war. In addition, it would not be bad, they continued, not to bring matters to a complete defeat of Germany, but to partially preserve the military power of this country as a barrier against the growing Soviet Union. Moreover, if we assume that Soviet troops enter Germany, then the USSR will firmly settle in Central Europe.

For similar reasons, Stalin also doubted the practicality of demanding unconditional surrender and believed that a weakened but not completely defeated Germany, no longer able to threaten an aggressive war, was less dangerous for the USSR than the victorious Anglo-Saxon countries established in the center of Europe. After all, in 1922-1933 and 1939-1941. The USSR and Germany were on friendly terms.

At the Tehran Conference of the Heads of Government of the Three Allied Powers (November 28 - December 1, 1943), Stalin, in a private conversation at a dinner at Roosevelt's, proposed to put forward specific demands for surrender to Germany, as was the case at the end of the First World War. It was necessary to announce how much weapons Germany should give out, and what territories it should give up. The slogan of unconditional surrender, according to Stalin, makes the Germans rally and fight to the bitterness and helps Hitler to stay in power. Roosevelt remained silent and did not give an answer. On the part of Stalin, obviously, it was a “shooting point” in order to find out the reaction of the allies. In the future, he did not return to this topic. At the Tehran Conference, the USSR officially joined the declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.

In the same place, at the Tehran conference, the question of the post-war territorial structure of Germany was discussed. Roosevelt proposed dividing Germany into five states. The US President, in addition, believed that the Kiel Canal, the Ruhr Basin and the Saarland should be internationalized, and Hamburg made a "free city". Churchill considered it necessary to separate the southern lands (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden) from Germany and include them, together with Austria, and probably also Hungary, in the "Danube Confederation". The rest of Germany (minus the territories belonging to neighboring states), the British Prime Minister proposed to divide into two states. Stalin did not express his attitude to the plans for the division of Germany, but he obtained promises that East Prussia would be torn away from Germany and divided between the USSR and Poland. Poland, in addition, will receive significant increments at the expense of Germany in the west.

Plans for the post-war division of Germany into several independent states captured Soviet diplomacy for some time. In January 1944 former ambassador USSR in London, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs I.M. Maisky drew up a note in which he substantiated the need for the dismemberment of Germany. At the end of 1944, the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov also formulated a project in which he argued that Germany should be divided into at least three, maximum seven states. These plans were studied by Stalin and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov before the Yalta Conference of the Great Powers in February 1945.

Stalin, however, was in no hurry to take advantage of these recommendations, but intended to find out first the position of Britain and the United States. Back in September 1944, at a meeting in Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the plan of the American Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. According to it, it was supposed to deprive Germany of heavy industry in general and divide what was left of it (minus the lands ceded to Poland and France) into three states: northern, western and southern. Such a division of Germany into three was first envisaged as early as 1942 in the plan of US Deputy Secretary of State (Foreign Secretary) S. Wells.

However, by that time the mood of influential circles in the West had changed significantly. As already mentioned, the Soviet Union was perceived in the post-war perspective as a greater threat than a united Germany, which was defeated. Therefore, Roosevelt and Churchill were in no hurry to discuss at the Yalta Conference the post-war state structure of Germany, except for the zones of its occupation by the great powers. Stalin, therefore, also did not make such proposals. The projects of Maisky and Litvinov were shelved. Obviously, Stalin did not sympathize with them in advance. For the same reason as his Western partners, he did not want Germany to be excessively weakened and fragmented.

On May 9, 1945, speaking on the radio on the occasion of Victory Day, Stalin, rather unexpectedly for the Western allies, announced that the USSR did not aim to dismember Germany or deprive it of statehood. This was a definite position on the eve of the last meeting of the leaders of the three victorious powers, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945 in Potsdam. When the Allies raised the question of the internationalization of the Ruhr area at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin remarked that his views on this question "have now changed somewhat." “Germany remains a single state,” the Soviet leader firmly emphasized. This topic was not brought up again.

Although summits like the Big Three conferences were no longer held, several post-war meetings of the foreign ministers of the victorious powers agreed that the future Germany should become a single democratic federal state. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, proclaimed in the western zones of occupation on May 23, 1949, corresponded to these plans. The problem was that both the West and the USSR wanted to equip Germany in their own way. Ultimately, each side cold war” received the Germany that she aspired to - united and under her control, but not all, but only part of it.

Stalin and Roosevelt

Among the foreign statesmen whom I have closely observed, Franklin Delano Roosevelt left the greatest impression. In our country, he deservedly enjoys the reputation of a realistic-minded, far-sighted politician. One of the main avenues of Yalta is named after him. President Roosevelt took a prominent place in modern history United States and in the annals of the Second World War. I remember him as a charming person with a quick reaction, a sense of humor. Even in Yalta, when the deterioration of his health was especially noticeable, everyone present noted that the president's mind remained bright and sharp.

I consider it a great honor for myself to be commissioned to translate the conversations between Stalin and Roosevelt during their first meeting in Tehran in 1943. Everything that happened then is deeply ingrained in my memory.

The Soviet delegation, which included Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, left for the Iranian capital the day before my return to Moscow from Kyiv, where I tried in vain to find my parents. I had to chase her down. I flew out late at night to Baku and arrived there only in the evening. Early in the morning I went by plane to Tehran. As soon as I reached the Soviet embassy in the middle of the day, I found out that I now had to translate the first conversation between the two leaders. If my plane had arrived at least an hour late, I would have been late for this meeting, not to mention the fact that I would have displeased Stalin, who himself chose an interpreter for each conversation.

When I entered the room adjoining the hall plenary meetings, Stalin was already there in marshal uniform. He looked at me intently, and I hastened to apologize for the slight delay, explaining that I had come straight from the airfield. Stalin slightly nodded his head, slowly walked around the room, took a box with the inscription "Herzegovina Flor" from the side pocket of his tunic, took out a cigarette, and lit it. Squinting, he looked less sternly and asked:

Not very tired from the road? Ready to translate? The conversation will be responsible.

Ready, Comrade Stalin. I had a good rest during the night in Baku. I feel fine.

Stalin went up to the table, casually threw a box of cigarettes on it. He lit a match and lit an extinguished cigarette. Then, with a slow gesture, he put out the match, pointed it to the sofa and said:

Here, on the edge, I will sit. Roosevelt will be brought in a wheelchair, let him sit to the left of the chair where you will sit.

Sure, I replied.

I have had to translate Stalin more than once, but I have never heard him attach importance to such details. Perhaps he was nervous about meeting Roosevelt.

Stalin, of course, had no doubt that the president's attitude toward the system that had prevailed through his efforts in the Soviet Union was extremely negative. For Roosevelt, bloody crimes, arbitrariness, repressions and arrests in the Stalinist empire could not be a secret - the destruction of peasant farms, forced collectivization, which led to terrible famine and the death of millions, the persecution of highly qualified specialists, scientists, writers, declared "pests", the extermination of talented military leaders . The terrible consequences of Stalin's policy gave rise to an extremely negative image of the Soviet Union in the West. How will relations with Roosevelt develop? Will there be an insurmountable wall between them? Will they be able to overcome the alienation? Stalin could not help asking himself these questions.

I think that the president also understood how important it was in the situation that had developed at that time to find mutual language with the Kremlin dictator. And he managed to approach Stalin in such a way that this suspicious Eastern despot seems to have believed in the readiness of the democratic community to accept him into their midst. At his first meeting with the Soviet leader, Roosevelt tried to create an atmosphere of trust. There was no tension, no alertness, no awkward, long pauses.

Stalin also decided to use his charm - here he was a great master. Before the war, our leader rarely received foreign politicians and therefore could not have the relevant experience. But he quickly made up for lost time, showing his abilities already at a meeting with Ribbentrop in August 1939. After the Nazi invasion, Stalin was directly involved in the negotiations. Conversations with Hopkins, Harriman, Hull, intensive correspondence with Roosevelt gave him the opportunity to replenish his ideas about the Americans and work out a special manner of doing business with them. Still, it could be seen that before the first meeting with the President of the United States in the autumn of 1943, Stalin did not feel quite confident.

Was that why he was concerned about where to sit this time? He apparently didn't want his pock-marked face to be too bright. The marshal's tunic and trousers with red stripes were carefully ironed, soft Caucasian boots (he usually tucked his trousers into them) sparkled brightly. Inserted in the insole under the heel, the pads made him taller than he actually was. And he began his conversation with Roosevelt with typical Georgian courtesies. Does everything suit the president in his residence? Haven't missed something? How could it be useful and so on. Roosevelt supported this game and offered Stalin a cigarette. He replied that he was used to his own. The president also asked about the "famous Stalinist pipe."

Doctors forbid, - the almighty leader spread his hands.

Doctors must be obeyed, ”Roosevelt said instructively.

We inquired about each other's well-being, talked about the dangers of smoking, about the usefulness of being in the fresh air. In a word, everything looked as if bosom friends met.

Speaking at the request of the president about the situation at the front, Stalin did not hide the difficult situation that had developed in Ukraine after the capture by the Germans of Zhytomyr, an important railway junction, as a result of which the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, was again under threat.

In turn, Roosevelt demonstrated frankness. Describing the fierce battles in the Pacific, he raised the question of the fate of colonial empires.

I am talking about this in the absence of our fighting friend Churchill, the president stressed, because he does not like to touch on this topic. The United States and the Soviet Union are not colonial powers, it is easier for us to discuss such issues. I think that colonial empires will not last long after the end of the war ...

Roosevelt said he intended to talk more about the post-war status of the colonies in the future, but it would be better to do this without the participation of Churchill, who had no plans for India.

Stalin was clearly wary of being drawn into a discussion of such a delicate topic. He only limited himself to remarking that after the war the problem of colonial empires might turn out to be relevant, and agreed that it was easier for the USSR and the USA to discuss this issue than for countries that own colonies. I was struck by Roosevelt's initiative in connection with the fact that not so long ago I heard how Hitler, at negotiations with Molotov in Berlin in November 1940, proposed that the Soviet Union, together with Germany, Italy and Japan, divide the British colonial inheritance. Apparently, these territories attracted many ...

On the whole, I got the impression that Stalin and Roosevelt were satisfied with the first contact. But this, of course, could not change their fundamental attitudes.

The Roosevelt administration was guided by the formula set out in the statement of the US State Department on June 22, 1941, that is, on the day of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR: “We must consistently adhere to the line according to which the fact that the Soviet Union is fighting against Germany does not mean at all that he defends, fights or upholds principles in international relations which we adhere to.

During the war, Roosevelt spoke very friendly about the Soviet Union, about Stalin personally. But here, I think, he only paid tribute to allied relations within the framework of anti-Hitler coalition, to the heroism of the Red Army, which withstood the monstrous blows of the Nazi military machine. At the same time, the President drew appropriate conclusions from the course of the fighting on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet people, continuing to resist aggression, proved, as Roosevelt believed, the strength of the system. If it survives and survives after the war, then it makes no sense to try to destroy it again. It is better to work out a mechanism that would allow the capitalist countries to coexist with the Soviet Union. All this by no means signified Roosevelt's approval of Soviet reality.

Stalin also had his own reasons for distrust. Roosevelt's establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR after 16 years of non-recognition, his declaration of intention to support the struggle of the Soviet people against Nazi aggression, the president's readiness to organize the supply of military materials to the Soviet Union - all this could be written down as an asset of the Roosevelt administration. However, in the practice of the anti-Hitler coalition there were many facts that increased Stalin's suspicion of the United States. And in general, hostility to the capitalist system, deeply rooted in his mind, constantly nourished his wariness.

I often heard Stalin say to Molotov on various occasions:

Roosevelt refers to Congress. He thinks that I will believe that he is really afraid of him and therefore cannot yield to us. It's just that he doesn't want to, and hides behind the Congress. Nonsense! He is the military leader, the supreme commander in chief. Who dares to object to him? It is convenient for him to hide behind Parliament. But he won't take me...

Stalin also did not believe when Roosevelt and Churchill explained to his complaints about unfriendly publications towards the USSR in the American and British press that they could not control newspapers and magazines and that even the press sometimes did not favor them. Stalin considered all this a bourgeois ploy, a double game. But he saw that the Soviet side was at a disadvantage. When rather timid criticisms of the policies of the Western Allies appeared in our press (delay of the second front, disruption of the schedule of military deliveries, rumors of separate negotiations, etc.), Roosevelt and Churchill protested and made claims to Stalin, since it was about the materials of the official Soviet presses.

To balance the situation, Stalin decided in 1943 to create a new magazine, War and Working Class, portraying the matter as if it were published by the Soviet trade unions. In fact, the editor of this publication was Molotov, although on the title page there was the name of a fictitious editor - some kind of trade union leader. Molotov entrusted me with the technical side of preparing meetings of the editorial board of the journal, and I could see how carefully not only he, but sometimes even Stalin, dosed out critical articles. But now the complaints of the US and British leaders could be answered that the Soviet government was not responsible for these materials and that all claims should be addressed to the trade union organization. Stalin was sure that Roosevelt and Churchill were manipulating the press in exactly the same way.

Back in the mid-1930s, Stalin sought to establish contact with Roosevelt. AI Mikoyan told me about one of the episodes connected with this.

The case took place in the summer of 1935 at Molotov's dacha, shortly before Mikoyan's departure for the United States to purchase various equipment. At the dacha was an American citizen named Kon - a relative of Molotov's wife. Soon Stalin appeared. After supper he went out with Mikoyan into the garden and said:

This Cohn is a capitalist. When you're in America, see him. He will help us start a political dialogue with Roosevelt.

Arriving in Washington, Mikoyan established that the "capitalist" Cohn owns six gas stations and, of course, has no access to the White House. There was nothing to think about the mediation of Cohn. Meanwhile, during a meeting with Henry Ford, the latter, on his own initiative, suggested that Mikoyan introduce him to Roosevelt. The then Soviet ambassador to the United States A. Troyanovsky immediately informed Moscow about this. There was no answer, and Mikoyan did not meet with Roosevelt. I wondered why he did this, because Stalin sought a dialogue with Roosevelt.

You don't know Stalin well, Mikoyan explained. - He instructed to act through Cohn. If I had used Ford's services without his permission, he would have said: "That's where Mikoyan wants to be smarter than us, he embarked on big politics." He would never forgive me. I would definitely remember this someday and use it against me ...

This episode testifies to the dexterity of the cunning Armenian, confirming the saying that went around Moscow much later: “From Ilyich to Ilyich without a heart attack and paralysis,” referring to Mikoyan. He survived the turbulent period - from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. But the most curious thing here is how primitive Stalin had an idea about the American order. He believed that since Kon is a capitalist, it means that he can easily enter the president.

Stalin's proposal to Hopkins, and then to Harriman, even before America's entry into the war, to send American troops to the Ukraine to conduct military operations on the Soviet-German front, is connected with this peculiar idea of the United States. Naturally, he was refused, but, surprisingly, he was very offended by this.

However, Roosevelt's subsequent initiative was no less strange. On January 12, 1942, that is, after Pearl Harbor, he, in a conversation with the new Soviet ambassador Litvinov, who had just arrived in Washington, expressed the opinion that American troops could replace the Soviet units stationed in Iran, Transcaucasia and in the area of the polar port of Murmansk , and Soviet soldiers could be deployed for operations in active sectors of the front. The president accompanied his proposal with a kind of bait.

On the American side, he told the Soviet ambassador, there would be no objection to the acquisition by the Soviet Union of an ice-free port in the North, somewhere in Norway, like Narvik. To communicate with him, Roosevelt explained, it would be possible to carve out a corridor through the Norwegian and Finnish territories.

From the point of view of modern morality, such a proposal, made without the knowledge of the Norwegians and Finns, looks at least cynical. In addition, at that time Narvik, like the whole of Norway, was under German occupation.

The Soviet government rejected the American proposal. In a telegram from Molotov, sent on January 18, the Soviet ambassador was instructed to reply to Roosevelt that the Soviet Union "does not and did not have any territorial or other claims against Norway and therefore cannot accept the proposal for the occupation of Narvik by Soviet troops." As for the replacement Soviet units by Americans in the Caucasus and Murmansk, then this "has no practical significance now, since there are no hostilities there." The message went on to say: "We would gladly accept Roosevelt's assistance to American troops, who would have the purpose of fighting side by side with our troops against the troops of Hitler and his allies."

But for this, the United States did not have troops.

The whole story caused an unpleasant aftertaste in Moscow and gave rise to new suspicions in Stalin. He regarded Roosevelt's proposal as an encroachment on the territorial integrity of the USSR. He still well remembered the intervention against Soviet Russia after the revolution, when American troops occupied a number of regions of our country. At the same time, Washington's desire to save its forces at the expense of blood was visible here. Soviet people and to achieve the weakening of the two main participants in the conflict - Germany and the Soviet Union.

I would like to dwell on several key problems that, to one degree or another, influenced the relationship between Stalin and Roosevelt.

Although our Western allies did not respond to Moscow's repeated calls for a landing in France, the study of the possibility of such an operation in Washington began already in the autumn of 1941. By the spring of the following year, a version of the American plan for the invasion of Northern France was prepared. Reporting to President Roosevelt, General Marshall pointed out that a landing in this area would be the maximum support for the Russian front. However, the implementation of such an operation was made dependent on two conditions:

1. If the situation on the Russian front becomes desperate, that is, the success of the German arms will be so complete that there will be a threat of the inevitable collapse of the Russian resistance. In this case, the attack in the West should be seen as a sacrifice in the name of a common cause.

2. If the position of the Germans becomes critical.

This document sheds light on the American concept of a "second front": while Russia and Germany retained the ability to continue the fight, Washington preferred to stay on the sidelines. The main thing is that by the end of the war the USSR and Germany should be weakened.

By the beginning of 1942, the Nazis had mobilized huge forces for a new powerful offensive deep into the Soviet Union. And our Western allies still did nothing to alleviate the situation on the Soviet-German front. Observing their inaction, Ambassador Litvinov sent a request to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on January 31, 1942: “There are less than two months left before Hitler’s probable spring offensive, for which he is accumulating large forces, and if we want to receive help by that time from England and the United States, we must announce it now. We must either demand a landing on the continent, or else declare that we need as many aircraft and tanks as the enemy surpasses us in both.

On February 4, Litvinov was given the following answer: “We would welcome the creation of a second front in Europe by our allies. But you know that we have already received a refusal three times for our proposal to create a second front and do not want to run into a fourth refusal. Therefore, you should not raise the question of a second front with Roosevelt. Let us wait for the moment when, perhaps, the Allies themselves will raise this question before us.” In the not quite diplomatic turns of this message, the irritation of its authors is evident. Stalin made his displeasure felt.

Did it affect Roosevelt? It may have had some effect. In any case, soon there seemed to be a shift in the position of the Americans.

On April 12, 1942, President Roosevelt informed the head of the Soviet government that he considered it expedient to exchange views with an authoritative representative of the USSR on a number of important issues of waging war against a common enemy. He asked if the Soviet government was ready to send Molotov to Washington for such negotiations. The Soviet side immediately agreed. To maintain secrecy, this visit was codenamed "Mr. Brown's Mission."

After visiting London, where the Anglo-Soviet treaty was signed on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war, Molotov went to Washington. Here, in a conversation with President Roosevelt, it was mainly about the plans for the landing of the Western Allies in France and about the situation on the Soviet-German front.

If, - said Molotov, - the allies had pulled back at least 40 enemy divisions from our front in 1942, the balance of forces would have changed dramatically in our direction and Hitler's fate would have been sealed ...

After listening to this statement, made by Molotov with unusual emotionality, Roosevelt turned to General Marshall with a question:

Have the preparations advanced enough to inform Marshal Stalin of our readiness to open a second front?

The general answered in the affirmative. And then the President solemnly said:

Report to your government that it can expect the opening of a second front this year.

So the President, who was also joined by Churchill, formally undertook to carry out the landing. Moreover, a specific deadline was also set. The joint communiqué read: "Full agreement reached on the urgent tasks of establishing a second front in Europe in 1942."

Was it really planned in Washington and London at that stage to land in Western Europe? Was such a decision a miscalculation or simply frivolity, which, however, is unacceptable for mature politicians? It is unlikely that at that moment they believed that the Soviet ability to resist was running out and that the time had come to make a "sacrifice." And if they did, they very soon came to the conclusion that one should not hurry with the “sacrifice”.

When, some time later, Roosevelt and Churchill renounced their promises to Stalin, the president experienced a feeling of embarrassment. Indeed, in a conversation with Molotov in Washington, he justified the sharp reduction in military supplies urgently needed by the Soviet Union by redirecting them to the needs of the impending invasion of France. And when asked by Molotov whether it would turn out that deliveries would be reduced, and the second front would not be opened, Roosevelt once again assured the people's commissar that the landing in France in 1942 would definitely happen. Presumably, the President of the United States breathed a sigh of relief when Churchill volunteered to carry out such an unpleasant mission in Moscow - to inform Stalin that the invasion would not take place.

In connection with this whole story, it is worth recalling the passage contained in the book of the president's son - Elliot - "His Eyes". It illustrates Roosevelt's understanding of the US role in the war.

“Imagine,” the father explained to his son, “that this is a football match. And we are, say, reserve players sitting on the bench. At the moment, the main players are the Russians, the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the British. We are destined for the role of players who will enter the game at a decisive moment ... I think that the moment will be chosen correctly.

Roosevelt shared very intimate thoughts with his son.

The decisions taken by the Teheran Conference on this matter are usually regarded in our literature as a serious victory for Soviet diplomacy. Indeed, at last the Western allies have named the exact date of the invasion and, in general, withstood it. Real help came to the Red Army, which had been fighting almost one-on-one with the Nazi war machine for three years. But the question is, did the United States and Britain, in agreeing to open a second front in France, succumb to the insistent demands of Stalin, who even threatened to leave Tehran? Or were they primarily guided by their own interests? Did they not consider that the situation envisaged by the second point of the American plan, the imminent collapse of Germany, was approaching?

By the time of the Tehran conference, the decision had already been made. Crossing the Atlantic Ocean on a cruiser on his way to the Iranian capital, President Roosevelt called his closest aides in the wardroom and shared his views on the second front. “Soviet troops,” he said, “are only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they force the Dniester River, which can be done in the next two weeks, the Red Army will be on the threshold of Romania. The President concluded: it's time to act. “The Americans and the British,” he explained, “should occupy as much of Europe as possible. The British are given France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and also the southern part of Germany. The United States must move its ships and deliver American troops to the ports of Bremen and Hamburg, to Norway and Denmark. We must reach Berlin. Then let the Soviets occupy the territory to the east of it. But Berlin should be occupied by the United States." Around the same time, Roosevelt ordered the preparation of special airborne formations to capture the capital of the Third Reich.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the invasion could not be delayed any longer, otherwise the Soviet troops might advance too far to the West. But the matter was not without serious discrepancies. How to achieve the goal? The president believed that the shortest route to Berlin was through France. He insisted on landing in Normandy. The British Prime Minister proceeded from other considerations. He sought to prevent a significant advance of Soviet troops beyond the borders of the USSR. The most effective, in his opinion, way to achieve this is to advance through the Balkans in the direction of Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia.

As for Stalin, having unraveled Churchill's plans, he declared that he considered the opening of a second front in Western Europe to be the most radical help for the Red Army.

Based on the foregoing, it seems to me that the main thing in the decision of the Tehran conference on the second front was not to agree on the date of the invasion, but to determine the place of landing. The fact that in the end they settled on Normandy is the result of the identity of the positions of Roosevelt and Stalin, and this was highly appreciated by the Soviet leader.

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Theodore Roosevelt I Beers always remembered the danger that threatens all republics, and understood that an attempt could be made to establish a monarchy. Considering that in the US such an attempt could be extremely successful, he treated Theodore Roosevelt as a threat. He believed that Roosevelt,

21 December. Stalin was born (1879), Ivan Ilyin died (1954) Stalin, Ilyin and the brotherhood To tell the truth, the author of these lines does not favor the magic of numbers, calendars and birthdays. Brezhnev was born on December 19, Stalin and Saakashvili - on the 21st, the Cheka and I - on the 20th, and who am I after that? True, my big

CHAPTER THREE The Roosevelt Hotel One day in the spring of 1943, Zsa Zsa woke up to find Conrad not at her side. She went all over the house, but he was nowhere to be found. "Where is Mr. Hilton?" she asked Wilson, Conrad's butler. "Oh, ma'am, he's gone to New York." "But he didn't tell me that

Joseph Stalin first visited the United States.

At the memorial military complex in Bedford, Virginia, he met with his allies in World War II - Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Winston Churchill.

The meeting was also attended by British Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, the leader of the "Fighting France" Charles de Gaulle and Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. Of course, all these leaders died long ago, and we are talking about their busts.

However, such fierce disputes flared up around this initiative, as if it were not about the past, but about the most current events.

Many were outraged by the proposal to erect a monument to the Soviet leader in the heart of America. Ukrainian nationalists, the neo-conservatives from the Heritage Foundation, and the New York Daily News owned by Mort Zuckerman expressed their outrage.

The director of the memorial complex, William Mackintosh, said in response that the installation of the bust was simply recognition of the role that Stalin played in World War II.

It makes no sense to get involved in this age-old dispute - the hero Stalin or the villain. Let's move on to more interesting topics.

Let's talk, for example, about how Americans like to remember only one side of events and completely forget about the other.

For example, did the use of the defoliant "Agent Orange" in Vietnam help the Americans to deprive the Viet Cong of the opportunity to hide in the forests?

Of course! That's what defoliants are for! But due to the use of this drug, more than 500 thousand children in this region were born with pathologies. The US government argues that the existence of a causal relationship in this case not established, and many Americans agree.

Did the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ordered by Harry Truman, help end the war faster and avoid unnecessary casualties? May be. And even probably. But what about the fact that the dead were civilians?

Now back to Stalin.

The most interesting thing about the perception of Stalin by the Americans is the fact that the opinion of the people who knew him best is not taken into account. For example, the opinion of Franklin Roosevelt.

Franklin Roosevelt is regularly ranked among the top three most popular US presidents - along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.

He is loved for his wise policy, he is loved for helping the country overcome the most difficult crises in its history. Therefore, his opinion must be taken into account, is not it?

But it was not there.

The same Americans do not listen to the opinion of their best president in the 20th century regarding the man who unexpectedly became his ally.

Roosevelt and Stalin were leaders of their countries for so long that they were able to get to know each other quite well - although the first personal meeting did not take place until 1943.

Roosevelt's first bold move was to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in November 1933, despite loud protests from Congress.

In 1936, Roosevelt sent his close friend as ambassador to Soviet Russia. Joseph Davis and "Mission to Moscow" - a book that he wrote upon returning to his homeland. One of the most controversial political figures of the century and one of the most discussed books of its time. The essence of the book is that Stalinist repressions were directed against people who planned to depose Stalin. In other words, these were not innocent victims, but a fifth column. Numerous sources claim that Roosevelt read the book and liked it so much that he personally supported the idea of making a film based on it.

Of course, Roosevelt was not naive. “There is a dictatorship operating in the Soviet Union that is not inferior in rigidity to other existing dictatorships,” he declared in 1940.

However, at the same time, Roosevelt was so confident in Stalin that, even when the USSR was on the brink of the abyss, Roosevelt continued to firmly believe in his strength.

Six weeks after the German attack on Russia, Roosevelt sent his closest adviser, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow, instructing him to convey to the Soviet leadership that Roosevelt was confident in Stalin's ability to defeat Hitler, and that the United States would provide all possible assistance to the USSR in this war.

And this despite the fact that both in the State Department and in the military department everyone was sure that the Stalinist USSR was a colossus with feet of clay that would crumble under the onslaught of the Nazi troops.

“Dear Mr. Stalin! This letter will be given to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to lead our delegation in Moscow.” Thus began the message that the Soviet leader received in the fall of 1941, when his soldiers were fighting hard at the very walls of the capital.

Roosevelt was one of those thanks to whom the Soviet Union began to receive vital lend-lease assistance. The Red Army received tens of thousands of American trucks, planes and other equipment, which was so necessary in a deadly battle with Hitler.

When, in May 1942, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, who was the second most important person in the Soviet leadership and perceived as Stalin's future successor, was about to make his first visit to Washington, Roosevelt insisted in a letter to Stalin: “When Molotov arrives in Washington, he can stay with us at the White House, or if you like, we can prepare a separate house for him nearby.”

Stalin repaid Roosevelt in return. He dissolved the Comintern, an organization whose main task was to spread the communist revolution to the rest of the world. This event took place on the very day that Joseph Davis arrived in Moscow with a message from Roosevelt.

In February 1945, an ailing Roosevelt flew to Yalta to pay respect to the country that defeated the fascist armies, and, at the same time, to discuss the future of the world order.

In Yalta, Roosevelt obtained from Stalin consent to the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan. While hostilities were going on in Europe, a neutrality pact was in force between the Soviet Union and Japan, which allowed the Soviet Union to concentrate its resources on fighting Hitler, and also made it possible to carry out Lend-Lease deliveries through the Far East.

Stalin agreed to throw his battle-hardened troops against Japan. Roosevelt believed that the participation of the Soviet Union in the Pacific War would play an important role, since it would cement the alliance of the four great powers.

Roosevelt's death shocked Stalin. “President Roosevelt is dead, but his work must be continued. We will support President Truman with all our strength,” Stalin told Averell Harriman, who brought the sad news to Moscow.

Why is Roosevelt adored today and Stalin hated?

We are left with this quote from Ambassador Joseph Davis: “No state leader in history has faced such misperceptions and distortions as the people who led the Soviet state during those harsh years.”

But Joseph Vissarionovich himself understood his position better than anyone. One day he said: “My name will be blasphemed and vilified. I will be accused of the most heinous crimes.”

On November 28, 1943, the Tehran Conference began its work. It was the first meeting of the leaders of the countries participating in the Anti-Hitler coalition face to face during the entire war. It was on it that agreements were reached on the opening of a second front in Europe against Germany. This meeting traditionally attracts a lot of attention of researchers, not only because of its historical significance, but also because the Nazis allegedly intended to turn the tide of the war by assassinating three leaders at once. And only the actions of Soviet intelligence prevented this.

Over the past 74 years, history has become a legend and has taken on a life of its own. However, in reality there was no assassination attempt, most likely. This whole story with the averted assassination attempt was originally a cunning disinformation on the part of Stalin, which was supposed to serve the Soviet interests. With the help of this story, the leader of the USSR hoped to put additional pressure on the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition and gain an additional trump card in the difficult negotiations on the second front.

Training

After the outbreak of the war, the leaders of the countries that fought against Nazi Germany conducted quite lively diplomatic affairs. Conferences of representatives of the USA, the USSR and Britain were repeatedly held in various cities. But every time these were either meetings at the level of the heads of foreign affairs agencies, or in a truncated format. For example, in August 1942, the British leader Churchill came to a conference in Moscow, but the Americans were represented by Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's personal representative.

During the first two and a half years of the war, the leaders of the three leading powers never once met in full force. Meanwhile, after the Battle of Kursk in the war there was a final turning point. From that moment it became clear that the meeting of the three leaders was inevitable and would take place in the near future. Since it was necessary to discuss not only questions about the supply of Lend-Lease or the opening of a second front, but also to outline some contours of the post-war world.

However, choosing a venue for the meeting was much more difficult than agreeing to hold it. All countries were far enough from each other, and whichever option they chose, it would be quite inconvenient for at least one of the leaders to get there. In addition, war was raging in Europe, so the routes had to be designed with this in mind.

If the issue of holding the conference was agreed upon fairly quickly, back in early September 1943, then the choice of its venue dragged on for several months and was determined literally at the last moment. The conference would have been conveniently held in London, where at that time the governments-in-exile of a good half of the European countries were based. However, the path there was not safe for Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill suggested Cairo, where there were a large number of British soldiers, but it was inconvenient for Stalin to get there.

Roosevelt suggested organizing a meeting in Alaska, which would be the best option in terms of security. However, Stalin did not agree to this. Firstly, he was afraid to fly by plane, and secondly, the way there would take a very long time, and in the event of some unforeseen changes on the fronts, the Soviet leader would be cut off from Headquarters for a long time.

The meeting could have been arranged in Moscow, but that was not the best option from a diplomatic point of view. Then it turned out that Stalin looked down on his allies so much that he did not even want to leave Moscow for the sake of meeting with them.

As a result, it was decided to hold a meeting on neutral territory, so that no one would be offended. The choice fell on Iran. Stalin was not far away, Churchill was not too far from overseas British possessions. And Roosevelt - that Cairo, that Tehran - is approximately the same, since in any case they would have to get there and there by sea.

Iran's main advantage was its security. Formally, it was a neutral country. But in fact, back in 1941, Soviet and British troops, during a joint operation, preventively occupied the country in case the Germans tried to break through to the oil fields.

There were Soviet and British army units in Iran. Their special services were also active. So from a security point of view, Iran was the ideal option among the neutral countries. Because the country was an important transit point for the supply of Lend-Lease goods to the USSR, and in connection with this, all German agents in the country were cleared out long ago and thoroughly by both the British and Soviet special services.

Conference

On November 8, 1943, 20 days before the opening of the conference, Roosevelt agreed to the proposal to hold it in Tehran. Active preparations have begun. Each of the leaders of the coalition got to the appointed place by his own route. Stalin left for Baku on a specially guarded armored train. In the capital of the Azerbaijan SSR, he boarded a plane piloted by the chief Soviet pilot of civil aviation Viktor Grachev, who carried high nomenklatura ranks.

The American president traveled to Cairo on the largest American battleship, the Iowa, accompanied by a combat escort of ships. In Cairo, he met with Churchill, who was waiting for him, and together they flew to Tehran.

For three days, the allies discussed the opening of a second front, having decided on the timing. The front was scheduled to open in May 1944, later the dates were moved a few weeks. In addition, questions of the post-war structure of the world were discussed. The outlines of a new international body, the United Nations, were discussed. The post-war fate of Germany was also discussed.

Tehran, Iran, December 1943. Front row: Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill on the portico of the Russian Embassy; back row: General of the Army Arnold, Chief of the US Air Force; General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral Cunningham, Lord of the First Sea; Admiral William Leahy, President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff - during the Tehran Conference. Collage © L!FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org

Unprecedented security measures were taken during the conference. In addition to the fact that Soviet and British troops were already in the country, additional NKVD units were introduced into Tehran to guard especially important facilities. In addition, the whole country was entangled in a dense Soviet-British intelligence network. Soviet residencies were located in almost every more or less large settlement in the zone of Soviet occupation. Approximately similar situation was observed in the British zone of occupation. The buildings where the meetings of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition took place, as well as the routes of their movement, were cordoned off by three or four rings of armed guards. In addition, air defense units were stationed in the city. In a word, Tehran could withstand a real assault by an entire army, although it had nowhere to come from in the desert.

Nevertheless, Stalin immediately stunned the arriving Churchill and Roosevelt with the news that the Soviet secret services had just prevented an assassination attempt on them, frustrating the insidious plans of the Nazis. As if Soviet intelligence managed to capture several dozen German saboteurs who were planning a terrorist attack, but some may have managed to escape, so he cordially invites colleagues to stay in the Soviet embassy under reliable guard.

Churchill only smiled slyly, pretending to believe. Iran was literally flooded with British agents, besides, in the last half century, the country was in the British sphere of influence and the British felt as at ease there as at home. Even the German agents that existed in the country before the war have been purged in several steps over the past two years due to the importance of Iran for Lend-Lease routes.

But Roosevelt was much less aware of the situation in Iran. American intelligence in Iran was not as extensive as British or Soviet intelligence, so he listened more closely to Stalin's words. And when the Soviet leader offered to move everyone to the Soviet embassy under the pretext of security, Churchill flatly refused, saying that this was not necessary. But Roosevelt agreed and moved to live in the Soviet representation.

However, do not underestimate the credulity of the American president. This step was influenced by two other significant factors. First, unlike the British embassy, which was located next to the Soviet one, a few meters away, the American one was located in another part of the city. And Roosevelt would have to travel alone through the city every day, which was inconvenient for the guards.

Secondly, and most importantly, Stalin and Roosevelt had been looking for an opportunity to get closer for a long time, but it did not appear at all. Unlike the staunch anti-communist Churchill, Roosevelt was more sympathetic to Stalin. There was even some sympathy between the two leaders. For this reason, Stalin believed that by eliminating the influence of the British leader on Roosevelt, the American could be made much more accommodating. Having settled the American president in the Soviet embassy, the Soviet leader could be the master of the situation, feeling at home, had additional opportunities to "process" Roosevelt, and in addition, the president's conversations could be tapped by Soviet intelligence. Thus, Stalin killed three birds with one stone.

But the American president could not just take and settle in the Soviet embassy under the pretext that he had to travel far for meetings. Such a move would be hostile in the United States, where the country's leader would have to make excuses for a long time. That is why the trick with an imaginary attempt was needed. Thus, Stalin gave Roosevelt a legitimate opportunity to move to the Soviet embassy and not be booed for it. This whole story was designed not for Churchill (Stalin knew perfectly well that he would not believe), but for Roosevelt, who took advantage of a convenient pretext and later explained to the Americans that he had accepted the Soviet proposal, since the USSR special services had information about a possible assassination attempt and this was necessary with security point of view.

The fact that this whole story was nothing more than a diplomatic ploy is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet side did not even bother with a more or less plausible legend of the assassination attempt. When the British (perhaps on the initiative of the cunning Churchill, who figured out the maneuver) asked if it was possible to see the detained German saboteurs, they were told that this was by no means possible. Attempts to find out the details of the disclosed conspiracy through Molotov were also unsuccessful. The Soviet People's Commissar stated that he did not know any details of this case.

From left to right: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin sit together at a dinner in the Victorian drawing room of the British Mission in Tehran in Iran, celebrating Winston Churchill's 69th birthday on November 30, 1943. Collage © L!FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org

It is quite possible that on the eve of the meeting, the Soviet secret services really could have arrested several suspicious local residents, as they say, just in case. But do not think that these were selected saboteurs, armed to the teeth, sent personally by Hitler.

The legend of the assassination

The classic legend of the assassination attempt is full of inconsistencies, which is not surprising. It began to be developed many years after the end of the war by the efforts of Soviet publicists.

So, according to the classical version, in the spring and summer (the season differs in various sources) in 1943, the Soviet intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, under the name of Paul Siebert, who served in the German administration in Rovno, drunk the excessively talkative SS Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who told him that he will soon be involved in a responsible mission in Tehran, which will even surpass Skorzeny's operation to rescue Mussolini.

Kuznetsov immediately reported this to the right place. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1943, a group of German paratroopers-radio operators landed in Iran, who were supposed to prepare the base for the arrival of Skorzeny's main sabotage group. However, Soviet intelligence was well aware of this and all agents were soon captured. Upon learning of this, the Germans were forced to cancel the operation at the last moment. Regarding the specific method of assassination, the versions differ depending on the fantasy of publicists. Everything is like in the best spy novels: infiltrating under the guise of waiters and being shot at dinner, digging through a cemetery, a suicide-piloted plane with explosives, etc. stories from spy action movies.

It is quite obvious that even with the slightest attention to detail, the version looks extremely doubtful. Firstly, Kuznetsov, with all his desire, could not report on the operation conceived by the Germans in the summer of 1943, because then even the leaders of the countries themselves did not know when this conference would take place. Only at the beginning of September, an agreement was reached on the meeting, and only on November 8 was the venue chosen. However, recently this inconsistency has been noticed and now they are writing about the autumn of 1943, although in classical sources the extraction of valuable information dates back to spring and summer.

Secondly, Ortel could not brag to Kuznetsov that an operation more abruptly than the rescue of Mussolini was planned, since this operation took place only in September 1943, while most sources claim that Kuznetsov transmitted information about this no later than the summer of 1943. Thirdly, it is highly doubtful that some supernumerary SS man Ortel from Rovno could have been privy to the details of such a secret operation. Fourthly, the same Skorzeny, who is considered the leader of this operation, after the war claimed that no SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who allegedly belonged to his group, never existed (in various Soviet sources he is called Paul Ortel, then Oster in general).

In addition, the assertion that the first group of saboteurs was thrown into Iran in the summer of 1943 to prepare for an assassination looks very doubtful. How could the Germans know where the meeting would take place, when even its participants themselves, who had not yet agreed on it, did not know this.

But even if we imagine that someone just mixed up the dates and names, and the Germans were actually preparing this operation, how could they get to Iran? The pre-war agents were completely destroyed, which means that people would have to be transferred from Germany. But how to do that? For landing operations, the Germans, as a rule, used DFS 230 and Go 242 gliders, which were towed by Ju 52 or He-111 bombers. However, these bombers had a very limited flight range, and for such an operation, the Germans needed to have field airfields in the Middle East.

For obvious reasons, the Germans did not have such airfields in Iran itself. For the same reason, they did not have them in the USSR bordering Iran. Only Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia remain. Turkey adhered to neutrality and had no German airfields. Iraq and Arabia were in the British sphere of influence. The only airfields in the Middle East that the Germans had (Syrian airfields were used by agreement with Vichy France) were lost by them in the summer of 1941, when de Gaulle's "Fighting France" with the active participation of British troops took control of Syria.

The only aircraft that could do this was the Ju 290 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, capable of flying six thousand kilometers. However, the Germans had only a few of these aircraft and almost all of them were used to search for sea convoys off the British coast. And for such a landing operation, given the capacity of the aircraft, it would take at least 5-10 such aircraft, which were piece goods (only about 50 of them were built during the entire war). According to Skorzeny's memoirs, it was with great difficulty that they managed to get one such aircraft to send six agents to Iran in the summer of 1943. They were supposed to, in coordination with detachments of local rebels, organize sabotage on Lend-Lease routes. According to Skorzeny, the group was discovered almost immediately and did not achieve any success.

Actually, it is this attack that is often confused with the imaginary transfer of saboteurs to Iran to assassinate the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. In reality, she has nothing to do with her; after this unsuccessful attempt, the Germans no longer made such landings.

Finally, the Nazis simply did not have time to prepare it. The allies themselves only on November 8 (20 days before it began) agreed to hold a conference in Tehran. It must have taken some time for German intelligence to get this information. Thus, the Germans would have had no more than 7-15 days to prepare the most difficult operation in the most difficult conditions. And this is in the conditions of completely defeated local agents and the total domination of the Soviet-British intelligence services and the army in Iran, and unprecedented security measures. Obviously, under such conditions, the preparation of such a complex operation was simply impossible.

By the way, Skorzeny himself has always denied that such an operation was being developed. He did not deny that he met with Hitler and the heads of the German secret services after the information about the Tehran meeting became known to the Nazis. However, after Hitler asked if something could be done, he was briefly described the existing layouts, and they were so unfavorable that it immediately became clear that this mission was impossible, and the issue was closed without much discussion. It is for this reason that Skorzeny himself and his immediate superior Schellenberg ignored her in her memoirs, and no traces of planning this operation could be found in the captured German archives.

In reality, the whole story with the assassination attempt was a cunning diplomatic ploy by Stalin, aimed primarily at the American leader. If Roosevelt had believed in her, he would have been very grateful to his Soviet colleague for his concern and felt a sense of duty towards him, becoming more accommodating. But even if he did not believe, this story gave Roosevelt a "legal" opportunity to relocate to the Soviet embassy, which was in the hands of both. Ultimately, the ploy played into the hands of the Soviet side. At the Tehran Conference, Stalin and Roosevelt actually acted as a united front against Churchill. The American president basically agreed with Stalin and supported his initiatives, while Churchill was left alone.

In fact, during the conference, Roosevelt went against Churchill, who insisted on an attack on the Balkans through Italy, and spoke in favor of opening a second front in northern France. Roosevelt supported Stalin on the issue of the division of defeated Germany, as well as on the issue of organizing the UN. De facto, at the Tehran Conference, an internal Stalin-Roosevelt mini-coalition arose within the anti-Hitler coalition, since at that time there were no conflicts of interests between the USA and the USSR, while there were always between Britain and the USSR.

Evgeny Antonyuk