Infantry of the Russian Empire: history, form, weapons. Russian infantry in the Balkans: fire and control

The history of the Russian army is an integral part of the national culture, which everyone who considers himself a worthy son of the great Russian land needs to know. Despite the fact that Russia (subsequently Russia) waged wars throughout its existence, the specific division of the army, the assignment of each of its components to a separate role, as well as the introduction of appropriate distinctive signs began to occur only at the time of the emperors. The infantry regiments, the indestructible backbone of the empire, deserved special attention. This type of troops has a rich history, as each era (and each new war) made tremendous changes to them.

Regiments of the new order (17th century)

The infantry of the Russian Empire, like the cavalry, dates back to 1698 and is a consequence of the army reform of Peter 1. Until that time, archery regiments prevailed. However, the desire of the emperor not to differ from Europe took its toll. The number of infantry was more than 60% of all troops (not counting the Cossack regiments). War with Sweden was predicted, and in addition to the existing soldiers, 25,000 recruits undergoing military training were selected. The officer corps was formed exclusively from foreign military and people of noble origin.

The Russian military was divided into three categories:

1. Infantry (ground forces).
2. Landmilitia and garrison (local forces).
3. Cossacks (irregular army).

In general, the new formation amounted to about 200 thousand people. Moreover, the infantry stood out as the main type of troops. Closer to 1720 introduced new system ranks.

Changes in weapons and uniforms

Uniforms and weapons have also been changed. Now the Russian soldier is fully consistent with the image of the European military. In addition to the main weapon - a gun, the infantrymen had bayonets, swords and grenades. The mold material was of the best quality. Great importance was attached to its tailoring. From this time until late XIX centuries, significant changes in the Russian army did not occur. Except for the formation of elite regiments - grenadiers, rangers, etc.

Infantry in the War of 1812

In view of the upcoming events (Napoleon Bonaparte's attack on Russia), which became known for sure from intelligence reports, the new Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, recently appointed to this post, found it necessary to make massive changes in the Russian army. This was especially true of the infantry regiments. In history, this process is known as the military reforms of 1810.

The infantry of the Russian Empire at that time was in a deplorable state. And not because there was a shortage of personnel. The problem was organization. It was to this moment that the attention of the new Minister of War was devoted.

Army training in 1812

The preparatory work for the war with France was presented in a memorandum entitled "On the protection of the western borders of Russia." It was also approved by Alexander 1 in 1810. All ideas presented in this document began to become reality.

The army's central command system was also reorganized. The new organization was based on two points:

1. Department of War Establishment.
2. Administration of a large active army.

The Russian army of 1812, its condition and readiness for military operations were the result of 2 years of work.

Structure of the infantry in 1812

The infantry made up the majority of the army and included:

1. Garrison units.
2. Light infantry.
3. Heavy infantry (grenadiers).

As for the garrison component, it was nothing more than a reserve of the ground unit and was responsible for the timely replenishment of the ranks. Marines were also included, although the command of these units was carried out by the Ministry

Replenishment of the Lithuanian and Finnish regiments organized the Life Guards. Otherwise, it was called the elite infantry.

Composition of heavy infantry:

• 4 guards regiments;
• 14 regiments of grenadiers;
• 96 regiments of foot troops;
• 4 regiments of marines;
• 1 battalion of the Caspian fleet.

Light infantry:

• 2 guards regiments;
• 50 regiments of rangers;
• 1 naval crew;

Garrison troops:

• 1 garrison battalion of the Life Guards;
• 12 garrison regiments;
• 20 garrison battalions;
• 20 internal guard battalions.

In addition to the above, the Russian army included cavalry, artillery, Cossack regiments. Militia formations were recruited in every part of the country.

Military regulations of 1811

A year before the outbreak of hostilities, a document appeared showing the correct actions of officers and soldiers in the process of preparing for battle and during it. The name of this paper is the military charter on infantry service. It included the following points:

• features of officer training;
• soldier training;
• the location of each combat unit;
• a set of recruits;
• rules of conduct for soldiers and officers;
• rules for building, marching, saluting, etc.;
• firing;
• hand-to-hand combat techniques.

As well as many other components of the military service. The infantry of the Russian Empire became not only protection, but also the face of the state.

War of 1812

The Russian army of 1812 was 622 thousand people. However, only a third of the entire army was withdrawn to the western border. The reason for this was the disbandment of individual parts. The southern Russian army was still in Wallachia and Moldavia, since the war with Turkey had just ended, and it was necessary to control the territory.

The Finnish corps, under the command of Steingel, was about 15 thousand people, but its location was in Sveaborg, since it was intended to be a landing group that would land on the Baltic coast. Thus, the command planned to break Napoleon's rear.

Most of the troops were garrisoned in various parts of the country. A large number of soldiers were located in Georgia and other regions of the Caucasus. This was due to the conduct of the war with the Persians, which ended only in 1813. A considerable number of troops were concentrated in the fortresses of the Urals and Siberia, thereby ensuring the safety of the borders of the Russian Empire. The same applies to the Cossack regiments concentrated in the Urals, Siberia and Kyrgyzstan.

In general, the Russian military was ready for a French attack. This applied to the quantity, and uniforms, and weapons. But for the reasons listed above, by the time the invaders invaded, only a third of them went to repel the attack.

Armament and uniform of 1812

Despite the fact that the command adhered to the use of guns of one caliber (17.78 mm) by the troops, in fact, more than 20 different calibers of guns were in service. The greatest preference was given to the rifle of the 1808 model with a trihedral bayonet. The advantage of the weapon was a smooth barrel, a well-coordinated percussion mechanism and a convenient butt.

Melee infantry weapons are sabers and broadswords. Many officers had As a rule, it was a melee weapon, the hilt of which consisted of gold or silver. The most common type was the saber engraved "For Courage".

As for the armor, it practically came out of the infantry uniforms. Only in the cavalry could one find a semblance of armor - shells. For example, cuirasses, which were intended to protect the body of a cuirassier. Such armor was able to withstand the impact of a cold weapon, but not a firearm bullet.

The uniforms of Russian soldiers and officers were uniforms, exquisitely sewn and fitted to the owner of the vestments. The main task of this form was to provide its owner with freedom of movement, while not restricting him at all. Unfortunately, the same could not be said about dress uniforms, which cause serious inconvenience to officers and generals at dinner parties.

Elite regiments - huntsmen

Observing how the special military formations of the Prussians, called "huntsmen", allow the enemy to achieve their goals, one of the domestic commanders-in-chief decided to form a similar unit in the Russian army. Initially, only 500 people with experience in hunting became candidates. Jaeger regiments of the Russian Empire are a kind of partisans of the late 18th century. They were recruited exclusively from the best warriors who served in the musketeers and

The outfit of the huntsmen was simple and did not differ in bright colors of the uniform. Dark colors predominated, allowing them to merge with environment(bushes, stones, etc.).

The armament of the rangers is the best weapon that could be in the ranks of the Russian army. Instead of sabers, they carried bayonets. And the bags were intended only for gunpowder, grenades and provisions, which could last for three days.

Although they played a key role in many battles and were an indispensable support for light infantry and cavalry, they were disbanded in 1834.

grenadiers

The name of the military formation came from the word "Grenada", i.e. "grenade". In fact, it was infantry, armed not only with guns, but also with a large number of grenades, which were used to storm fortresses and other strategically important objects. Because Since the standard grenada weighed a lot, in order to hit the target, it was necessary to get closer to it. Only warriors distinguished by courage and great experience were capable of this.

Russian grenadiers were recruited exclusively from the best soldiers of conventional infantry. The main task of this type of troops is to undermine the fortified positions of the enemy. Naturally, the grenadier had to be distinguished by hefty physical strength in order to carry a large number of grenades in his bag. Initially (under Peter 1), the first representatives of this type of troops were formed into separate units. Closer to 1812, divisions of grenadiers were already being created. This type of troops existed until the October Revolution.

Russian involvement in World War I

The prevailing economic rivalry between England and Germany caused the clash of more than 30 powers to begin. The Russian Empire had its place in the First World War. Being the owner of a powerful army, she became the guardian of the interests of the Entente. Like other powers, Russia had its own views and counted on land and resources that could be appropriated by intervening in the world battle.

Russian army in World War I

Despite the lack of aviation and armored vehicles, the Russian Empire did not need soldiers in the First World War, since their number exceeded 1 million people. There were enough guns and ammunition. The main problem was with the shells. In history, this phenomenon is known as the “shell crisis”. After five months of war, the warehouses of the Russian army were empty, which led to the need to buy shells from the allies.

The uniform of the soldiers consisted of a cloth shirt, trousers and a dark green khaki cap. Boots and a belt were also indispensable soldier attributes. In winter, an overcoat and hat were issued. During the war years, the infantry of the Russian Empire did not suffer changes in uniform. Unless the cloth was changed to moleskin - a new material.

They were armed with Mosin rifles (or three-ruler), as well as bayonets. In addition, the soldiers were given pouches and gun cleaning kits.

Mosin rifle

Also known as a trilinear. Why is it called so - the question is relevant to this day. It is known that the Mosin rifle is a weapon that has been in demand since 1881. It was used even during the Second World War, as it combined three main characteristics - ease of operation, accuracy and range.

Why is it called a three line? The fact is that before the caliber was calculated based on the length. Special lines were used. At that time, one line was 2.54 mm. The cartridge of the Mosin rifle was 7.62 mm, which was suitable for 3 lines.

The grenadiers were considered the striking force of the infantry, and therefore the tallest and most physically strong recruits were traditionally selected for the grenadier units. And total number grenadiers united in large units in the Russian army was relatively small: only the Life Grenadier Regiment had 3 grenadier battalions, the rest of the grenadier regiments consisted of 1 grenadier and 2 musketeer battalions. In addition, to reinforce conventional infantry units in each musketeer regiment (following the French model), one grenadier company per battalion was introduced. At the same time, the grenadier companies of the reserve battalions that did not participate in the campaigns were reduced to grenadier battalions and brigades and followed the troops, being the combat reserve of infantry divisions and corps.
Grenadiers wore general army infantry uniforms; the insignia of this elite branch of the military were the metal emblems of the “Grenada with three lights” on the shako and red shoulder straps. Among themselves, the grenadier regiments differed in the initial letters of the name of the regiment, embroidered on shoulder straps.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment in dress uniform and grenadier - non-commissioned officer of the Chasseur regiment in marching uniform

Medium Infantry - MUSKETERS

Musketeers in the Russian army were called soldiers of rifle units; Musketeers were the main type of Russian infantry. True, in 1811 the musketeer regiments were renamed infantry, but the companies retained the name of the musketeers, and throughout the war of 1812 in the Russian army, out of habit, infantrymen continued to be called musketeers.
The musketeers wore a general army uniform, outwardly differing from other infantry branches only in a badge on a shako - “grenada about one fire”. At parades, the musketeers fastened tall black sultans to their shakos, but on the march the sultans were removed so as not to interfere in battle. Among themselves, infantry regiments differed in multi-colored shoulder straps according to seniority in the division: red, white, yellow, green, blue and flat; on all shoulder straps the number of the division, which included the regiment, was embroidered.


Odessa musketeer and non-commissioned officer of the Simbirsk infantry regiment in summer uniform, musketeer of the Butyrsky infantry regiment in winter uniform

Light Infantry - JAGER

Jaegers were a type of light infantry that often operated in loose formation and fought firefights at maximum distances. That is why some of the rangers were supplied with rare and expensive rifled weapons (fittings) for that time. Small stature, very mobile, good shooters were usually selected for chasseur companies: one of the most important tasks of chasseurs in battles was to “knock out” officers of enemy units with sniper fire. It was also welcomed if the recruit was familiar with life in the forest, since the huntsmen often had to go on reconnaissance, forward patrols, and attack enemy guard pickets.
The jaeger uniform was like the general army infantry uniform of the musketeers; the difference was in the color of the pantaloons: unlike all other infantrymen who wore white pantaloons, the huntsmen wore green pantaloons both in battle and at the parade. In addition, the pack belts and bandages of the rangers were not whitewashed, as was done in other types of infantry, but were black.

Private of the 20th and non-commissioned officer of the 21st Jaeger regiments

Engineering Troops - PIONEERS

Often overlooked when it comes to the heroism of the infantry, this "low-key" type of troops played an extremely important role in the war. It was the pioneers who built (often under enemy fire) defensive fortifications, destroyed enemy fortresses, erected bridges and crossings, without which it was impossible to move the army forward. Pioneers and sappers provided both defense and offensive troops; without them, the conduct of the war was virtually impossible. And with all that, the glory of victory has always belonged to the infantry or cavalry, but not to the pioneer units ...
With the general army uniform, the pioneers of the Russian army wore not white, but gray pantaloons and a black instrument color with a red piping. Grenades on shakos and harnesses on epaulettes were not gilded, but silver (tin).

private and staff captain of the 1st Pioneer Regiment

Irregular Infantry - MILF

This type of troops at that time was not provided for by the charter of any of the armies of Europe. Militias appeared only in Russia, when the invasion brought a threat to the very existence of the state, when the entire Russian people rose to defend the Fatherland. The militias often did not have normal weapons at all, they armed themselves with carpenter's axes taken from home, obsolete sabers and captured guns. And, nevertheless, it was the militias that played the most important role in the Patriotic War, only they managed to raise the size of the Russian army in a short time to the level that could “crush” the large Napoleonic army of a new type. This came at a very high price: only 1 out of 10 militias who went to defend the Fatherland returned home ...
The uniform of the militias was very diverse; in fact, in each county, the organizer of the militia developed his own model of uniform, unlike the uniform of the militia of the neighboring county. However, often all these types of uniforms were based on the traditional Cossack caftan, which received different colors in different districts; common to the form of the militias was the so-called "militia cross" with the motto "For Faith and Fatherland", attached to the caps of the militias.


Ordinary militias and officers of the Petersburg and Moscow militia

PARTISANS

Russian partisan detachments Patriotic War 1812 were of two types. Some were formed from army (mainly cavalry) units, obeyed the high command, carried out its tasks and wore their regimental uniform, used regular weapons. Other partisan detachments were created spontaneously from peasants - residents of the occupied regions. The fighters of these detachments walked in their peasant clothes, and used carpenter's axes, pitchforks, sickles and scythes, kitchen knives and clubs as weapons. Firearms in such detachments were at first very rare (mostly hunting rifles), but over time, the partisans armed themselves with captured French rifles, pistols, sabers and broadswords; some especially strong units sometimes managed to get and use 1-2 guns in battle ...

Traditional military history tends to operate on a large scale - the commanders-in-chief give orders, the troops conduct operations that end in success or failure. The historian's gaze is rarely distracted from the map of the theater of operations and descends "down", to individual parts. In this article, we will look at the typical actions of Russian infantry companies and battalions in the Balkans in 1877-1878 and the problems faced by soldiers and officers.

In the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 with Russian side more than a hundred infantry regiments and rifle battalions participated. They were the main participants in such outstanding events as the crossing of the Danube at Sistovo, the first Trans-Balkan campaign of the Advance Detachment of General I.V. Gurko, the defense of Shipka, the capture of Lovcha and three assaults on Plevna. We will not analyze specific battles, but will try to give examples illustrating typical actions and problems of Russian infantry in field battles in 1877-1878.

The beginning of the battle

The battle began long before contact and even eye contact with the enemy. Troops were reorganized from marching formation to combat formation at a distance of effective artillery fire (usually about 3,000 paces). The regiment advanced with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in reserve, or vice versa - with one battalion in front. The second option made it possible to save more reserves, which means that the commander expanded his ability to fend off unexpected blows. It was more profitable for the commanders to be located along with the reserves so as not to lose control of the battle, but this was not always observed. So, Colonel I.M. Kleinhaus, the hero of the first assault on Plevna on July 8, 1877, died while in the advanced units of his Kostroma regiment. General M.D. Skobelev, before the assault on the Green Mountains on the outskirts of Plevna, asked his subordinate Major General V.A. Tebekin, who commanded the Kazan regiment, was in reserve, but he could not resist the temptation to personally lead his regiment on the attack and was struck down by a grenade.

Here it is worth making a digression, which will serve as a "guiding thread" in our story. Contrary to popular belief, by the 1870s, the Russian military was already well aware that rifled rifles and new artillery systems were capable of creating a formidable curtain of fire. In this regard, tactical changes became necessary - for example, the transition to rarer formations. No less clear was the question of how to protect people from fire without losing control of the battle.

The Russian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. Each battalion was divided into five companies, one of which was called rifle. Usually it was this company that formed the rifle chain in front of the battalion formation - the fighters scattered forward at a distance of 2-5 steps from each other. The rest of the companies formed in close columns behind the skirmish line.

Ordinary formation of a battalion. Author's scheme

As a rule, four closed companies lined up in a checkerboard pattern, with a firing line in front. Thus, three battle lines were obtained - a chain, the first two companies (1st battle line) and the second two companies (2nd battle line). The intervals between columns in one battle line rarely exceeded the length of the columns along the front, and the distance between the chain and the 1st battle line was clearly specified by the charter - exactly 300 steps. Such severity was due to the concern that the 1st battle line had time to come to the aid of the chain in the event of a threat, but practice has shown that the distance was chosen unsuccessfully. Firstly, the proximity of the 1st line to the chain led to unnecessary losses; secondly, the 1st line gravitated towards the chain, which led to the concentration of the latter and the premature consumption of reserves. Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin noted this error in the Kazan regiment during the battle for Lovcha on August 20–22, 1877.

After the war in the Balkans, some Russian military leaders proposed increasing the authorized distance to 500-600 steps, but at the insistence of the then military authorities, the new instruction stated that the chain, 1st and 2nd lines should determine the distance themselves. In general, the construction of the battalion was distinguished by excessive density, and the three battle lines often "crawled" on top of each other.

Management difficulties

Specialists, including a participant in the Russian-Turkish war, Major General L.L. Zeddeler, Soviet theorist A.A. Svechin and modern American researcher B.U. Manning, criticized the scattering of just one company into a chain. From their point of view, in this case the battalion used only 1/5 of its firepower, however, in practice, even one company did not always develop its fire in full force, since long-range shooting in the Russian army was not welcome. “Good infantry is stingy with fire, - General M.I. Dragomirov, a prominent French theorist, Marshal T.-R. Bujo, - Frequent shooting is a means by which cowards try to drown out the feeling of fear in themselves..

Managing the infantry chain and its fire was not an easy task, so they tried to appoint the most intelligent and competent officers to the rifle company - however, their capabilities were limited. The officer could more or less control what was happening within a radius of 20 steps, the rest of the space was not covered by his voice and was often hidden from his eyes. The horns, once a symbol of the light infantry, which specialized in operations in loose formation, were declared unusable by the 1870s. On maneuvers, they tried to use whistles to give signals, but they apparently were not used in battle - commands were usually given by voice, and private bosses, ensigns and non-commissioned officers repeated it and passed it on. The difficulties of management are clearly visible from the description of the battle on Shipka on August 11, 1877, which was fought by companies of the Oryol Infantry Regiment:

“[...] a handful of those who fought every hour decreased and decreased; in some places the chain became so thin that one person occupied a space of 20 or more steps. Entire columns threatened to bypass the right flank, and therefore by six o'clock this flank began to move back, and the center behind it. It was positively impossible to control the chain on such rough terrain as the real one: the voice was muffled by the thunder of shots, and even a tenth of the chain, hidden by bushes, did not notice the given signs. Thus, an involuntary retreat began, albeit step by step.”

A lot depended on the company commander in battle - usually much more than on the battalion commander, who, after entering his battalion into the battle line, usually lost the opportunity to influence events and joined one of the companies. The commander had to manage his chain, take a lot of independent decisions, adapt to the terrain, maintain contact with other companies, take care of their flanks - all this was hindered by a lot of circumstances inevitable in any battle.

First of all, company commanders often died and were injured, so they were advised to familiarize their subordinates with combat missions and appoint several deputies in advance. If the company commander was out of order, the company faced a serious problem, characteristic of the entire Russian army. The fact is that it was its commander who ordered everything in the company (often through the heads of platoon and squad commanders). Thus, junior commanders (ensigns and staff captains) lost their initiative, authority and command skills. In different parts, this problem was dealt with in different ways - for example, in the 14th division, which became famous for crossing the Danube and defending Shipka, a strict transmission of orders throughout the chain of command and the initiative of junior officers were cultivated, and the replacement of retired chiefs was practiced. As a result, the companies of this division continued to clearly fulfill their tasks even in the event of injury or death of commanders.

Russian troops near Plevna, contemporary drawing.
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The second circumstance that added difficulties to the company commander was the problem of reinforcements. Even during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, it was noted that the injection of reinforcements into the chain often leads to mixing units and a complete loss of control over them. The best minds of the Russian army undertook to solve this problem, but the disputes did not subside either before the campaign in the Balkans or after it. On the one hand, the decision was to form a strong chain immediately, on the other hand, in this case, its density increased, and hence the losses from fire. In addition, the military, who, after many years of peaceful service, came under fire, was in for an unpleasant discovery - a real battle is much more chaotic and incomprehensible than slender lines in textbooks and on a parade ground. The injection of adrenaline into the blood, the whistle of bullets and the rumble of nuclei, the sight of falling comrades completely changed the perception of the battle.

For years, the military has tried to streamline and structure the chaos of combat. This approach can be conditionally called the “Jomini way” (G. Jomini was a Swiss theorist of the 1810s–1830s, who did not lose his authority in the 1870s). K. von Clausewitz, on the contrary, emphasized that war is an area of ​​danger, physical stress, uncertainty and chance, which is useless to fight. Russian military theorist General G.A. Leer, relying on the works of Jomini, suggested replenishing the chain strictly from the "native" part. In turn, Dragomirov, one of the most attentive Russian readers of Clausewitz, offered to put up with the mixing of units and accustom soldiers to it while still on maneuvers.

Chain actions

The chain was supposed to perform the following tasks:

• engage in a firefight;
• force the enemy to reveal their forces;
• to protect the companies following her from a surprise attack;
• if possible, prepare their attack.

In order to successfully complete these tasks, the chain had to advance as systematically as possible, observing the statutory 300 steps of the distance from the 1st battle line. At the same time, under fire, the movement of the chain slowed down, and the speed of the rear mouths, on the contrary, increased - hence the very “pressure” from the side of the 1st battle line, which Kuropatkin criticized.

A chain attack was usually carried out in sections: one section of the chain (for example, a squad) advanced, and the other supported it with fire. To conduct such an offensive, coordination and mutual support were required, the chiefs of the sections had to have a good eye so as not to fall under the fire of their neighbors and correctly calculate the run (it should not have been too tiring for the fighters, the recommended distance was no more than 100 steps). The slightest obstacle or uneven terrain served as a shelter for the chain, but the relief had to be able to use. Kuropatkin describes such an incident that occurred in the battle for Lovcha:

“It was necessary to run 500-600 steps through the valley completely openly. The first closure from enemy bullets on the way of the offensive of the regiment was a mill with several dozen trees surrounding it. Some of the people ran across the valley, as they say, in one spirit; others, using small ridges of pebbles formed by the flow of water [of the Osma River], lay down behind them, the rear ones joined the former ones, and in places dense ranks of the lying ones formed. But these closures did not protect well from enemy fire directed from two thousand paces and therefore striking at a large angle. […] Meanwhile, there was no need to run through this space. It was worth moving further through the gardens, then going through the outskirts of the city and, finally, going out to the same mill, which was mentioned above. The difference was that instead of a chord, you would have to describe an arc.”

Attack of the Pskov regiment on the Gyuldiz-Tabia redoubt in the battle on Shandornik on November 17, 1877.
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Fire could only be opened at the command of an officer. He usually ordered the best shooters to take trial shots to determine the height of the sight, then the height was reported to the soldiers, and the command was given to open fire. The officer had to make sure that no futile shots were fired, the soldiers correctly set the sights on their rifles, and he changed in time and correctly. To do this, it was necessary to know who could be trusted with trial shots, be able to determine the distance to the target, and finally, correctly choose the target itself.

In addition, the officer decided what type of fire to apply. At a distance of 300-800 steps, single shots were fired and quite rarely. It was recommended to open fire from a distance of 800 steps, since it was believed that from this distance there was a chance to hit a single person. Sometimes, if a suitable target was presented (for example, an artillery battery or a dense formation of enemy infantry), a volley was fired on command. If it was necessary to carry out intensive shelling, but did not want to spend a lot of rounds, they gave the command “frequent fire” and added the number of rounds to be fired. This technique was criticized, since the officer could not control the actual number of cartridges used by the soldiers. Finally, the officer could give the command to lie down. In general, one who controlled his unit even under heavy fire was considered an executive commander.

It was not easy to pick up the soldiers who lay down behind the shelter and move forward. In addition, the requirement to protect people from fire conflicted with the need to control the troops. Kuropatkin continues his story about the battle for Lovcha:

“In vain one young officer shouted in a hoarse voice “forward”, “hurray”, and waved his saber, the crowd [hidden behind the mill] was not yet disposed to follow him, and the young man, running forward with several soldiers, did not have time to run a few steps, as has already been killed."

Save ammo

Dragomirov not in vain cited Bugeaud's aphorism about the connection between shooting and cowardice. He and other military authorities believed that the desire of soldiers to open fire from a long distance must be restrained. The standard ammunition load was a rather meager 60 shots, and the sight on the Krnk rifle could be set at a distance of no more than 600 steps (for non-commissioned officers and rifle battalion soldiers - 1200 steps). The soldier risked firing his entire ammunition before part of it reached the so-called decisive distances (800-300 steps), not to mention the fact that firing served as a convenient excuse not to move forward. Shooting training ended at a distance of 1500 steps - from this distance it was already difficult to distinguish a single person, and in battle the fire was usually directed at the haze from enemy shots. Nevertheless, the temptation of long-range shooting was great, especially since the Turks actively used fire from long distances (from a range of 2000 steps it became sensitive).

There were also apologists for long-range fire in the Russian army. One of them, Baron Zeddeler, called for the introduction of long-range shooting into the charters as a special and effective type of combat fire. In his opinion, long-range shooting should have been carried out in areas, relying not on accuracy, but on the mass of lead released at a time. This type of shooting was occasionally used by the Russian troops, like another type of long-range fire - flip shots. Bullets, fired in a long arc, fell behind the earthen fortifications that the Turks loved so much. "Flipping, distant and, moreover, concentrated fire, perhaps, will again besiege the shovel in its proper place", - Colonel V.F. Argamakov. After the war, most military authorities recognized long-range fire as a legitimate weapon in the hands of commanders, but called for caution in its use. The instructions for training the company and battalion, published immediately after the war, required the use of "with extreme caution" and claimed that the passing fire was still "belongs to the main value in battle".

The experience of the war of 1877-1878 rather confirmed this conclusion. In the Vanguard Detachment, which successfully operated beyond the Balkans in the initial period of the war, General I.V. Gurko forbade the infantry to shoot from long distances, so as not to waste time. Colonel D.S. Naglovsky, who participated in Gurko's raids, enthusiastically described the actions of the 4th Infantry Brigade, which used to attack, "without releasing a single cartridge until they approach the Turks at half the distance of their rifle shot", that is, 600 steps. The Orlovsky regiment, which captured Mount Bedek near Shipka just at the time when Gurko's detachment was operating on the other side of the ridge, did not fire for a more prosaic reason - “they spared the cartridges, and there was little hope for their delivery due to the remoteness of Gabrov, where the cartridge boxes were located”.

Was the lack of ammo really a serious problem? Statistics compiled by the artillery department show that in the campaign of 1877-1878, the regiment rarely fired more than 30 rounds per gun in one battle. However, this is only the “average temperature in the hospital”: one company of the regiment could stand in reserve for the entire battle and not fire a single shot, while the other could be in chains, conduct intense firefight and experience an acute shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless, the statistics allow some interesting observations to be made. For example, it is striking that rifle battalions usually expended much more ammunition than infantry regiments. This is explained both by their specialization in firing, and by the fact that rifle battalions most often went ahead of infantry regiments, started a fight, and therefore remained under fire longer. A kind of record was set by the 13th rifle battalion of the 4th rifle brigade, which spent 122 shots per rifle in the battle of Shipka-Sheinov (December 27-28) - twice the standard ammunition load.

General M.D. Skobelev in the battle on August 30, 1877 near Plevna.
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Among the infantry regiments, the Vladimir regiment had the highest consumption of cartridges in one case during the third assault on Plevna on August 30-31 - 91 shots per rifle (however, this is an exceptional case). For example, such an intense battle as the battle for Gorny Dubnyak on October 12 required the Guards regiments to spend 25–30 rounds of ammunition per rifle. The Life Guards Jaeger Regiment, which attacked the neighboring Telish on the same day, fired 61 shots on the barrel, which significantly exceeded " normal level". During the first assault on Plevna on July 8, the Kostroma regiment was very short of ammunition (the consumption was more than 56 rounds per person), which was the reason for Colonel I.F. Tutolmin write in the report:

“The Kostroma regiment retreated, firstly because there were no cartridges, and secondly because there was no reserve”.

Getting closer to the enemy

Moving in dashes and hiding behind the folds of the terrain, the chain approached the enemy at close range, and the bulk of the battalion advanced behind it. Oddly enough, at a distance of 800-300 paces, the fire, as a rule, was felt less - many bullets were already flying over heads. This meant that the Turks felt the proximity of the enemy, they forgot to rearrange the sights on their rifles, they fired without aiming or even sticking out from behind shelters. Shooting from a rifle raised above his head was not uncommon for the Turkish infantry. The attackers, on the contrary, increased the fire, bringing it to the limit. According to peacetime calculations, from a distance of 400 steps, about half of the bullets should have hit the target.

Although the excitement also affected the attackers, a distance of 400–200 paces was considered decisive. At this stage of the battle, the "game of nerves" began, which most often determined the winner. It was possible to increase your chances of success by covering the flank of enemy positions, and this technique was actively used. Thus, the 4th Infantry Brigade carried out a partial coverage of the Turkish position in the battle near the village of Uflani at the southern foot of Shipka on July 4, 1877. Having fallen under the crossfire, the Turks faltered and began to randomly retreat - the battle did not have to be brought to a bayonet fight.

The coverage of the flank had its own characteristics. Getting the chain involved in the shooting to change front was not easy. Therefore, more often coverage was carried out by approaching reinforcements, which were attached to the flank of the chain and occupied a covering position. The enemy could do the same - in this case, the tactics textbooks recommended not to pull the front of the chain back, but to send reinforcements, which should not be attached to the side of the threatened units, but stand in a ledge behind them. Then already the enemy units, covering the Russian flank, fell under indirect or even longitudinal fire - as General Leer said, "he who bypasses is bypassed".

Receiving coverage and countering it by turning the front and sending reinforcements.
Dragomirov M.I. Tactics textbook. SPb., 1879

It was when the chain approached the enemy at 400–200 steps that the 1st and 2nd lines had the legal right to catch up with it, pour into the chain and increase its fire, preparing, if necessary, to strike with bayonets. In practice, this often happened by itself, against the will of the superiors. The chain stopped, and the 1st and 2nd battle lines approached it, forming one or two dense masses of fighters (the second - if it was possible to observe the offensive order).

In the 1870s, it was believed that fire alone could not force a staunch enemy to retreat. However, the Turks were not classified as stubborn opponents - indeed, they often retreated during the shelling, and it did not come to a bayonet fight. For example, General Skobelev, when crossing the Imitli pass in December 1877, used a rifle company armed with captured Peabody-Martini rifles, and she forced the Turks to leave their positions. Of course, the Russian troops also had to retreat - in such cases they suffered the heaviest losses. The soldiers lost their self-control and rushed back headlong, the officers could no longer stop the confusion, and sometimes they themselves fled. During the unsuccessful second assault on Plevna on July 18, 1877, the Serpukhov regiment suffered terrible losses - the regiment commander, two of the three battalion commanders, many officers and lower ranks were killed or wounded. Only a handful of several dozen soldiers, two officers and one banner remained in the ranks - apparently, the Serpukhovites suffered most of the losses during the retreat.

Putting it all together, it is worth noting that the basis of successful infantry combat tactics was a reasonable balance between keeping the fighters from fire and controlling the unit. Company commanders and other commanders were required to have good tactical training, initiative, and the ability to make decisions in extreme situations and personal authority over the soldiers.

Sources and literature:

1. "Military collection", 1878-1900
2. Dragomirov M. I. Textbook of tactics. SPb., 1879
3. Collection of military stories. T. I-VI. SPb., 1879
4. Svechin A. A. The evolution of military art. M.-Zhukovsky, 2002
5. Collection of materials on the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Issue. 5, 10, 88, 93
6. Argamakov V. F. Memories of the war 1877-1878. // Journal of IRVIO. - Book 6, 7. - 1911
7. Prisnenko, lieutenant colonel. The First Plevna and the 19th Kostroma Infantry Regiment in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. SPb., 1900
8. Sobolev L.N. The last battle for Shipka. Regarding the memoirs of VV Vereshchagin. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 5
9. Vereshchagin VV Memoirs of the artist. Crossing the Balkans. Skobelev. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 3

INFANTRY TACTICS

Russian military doctrine at the beginning of the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna was based on the Petrine Charter of 1716. It, in turn, was largely a transcription of the “Institutions for Battle at the Present Time” of 1708 - a tactical manual that combined the experience of the first half of the Northern War.

Following the example of the Anglo-Dutch troops, the infantry battalions were deployed in a line in four ranks, and the soldiers were trained to fire in rows or platoons, according to the modern Prussian system. In 1831, Prussian military advisers appeared in the army, who were supposed to help implement the latest Prussian infantry regulations of 1726. The battalions were divided into four divisions, each of which, in turn, was divided into two platoons. The soldiers were still built in four lines, but the last one did not fire, but was used to fill the gaps in the formation. If grenadiers remained with the battalion (they were often taken to form consolidated grenadier regiments), they took place on the right flank of the battalion line. A new Prussian invention - "cadent" marching (with beating the step with the whole foot) - did not appear in the Russian army until 1755.

General Pyotr Semenovich Saltykov, who commanded the main forces of the Russian army in the battles of Palzig and Kunersdorf. This popular and talented commander was retired in the winter of 1759-1760. because of illness. (Suvorov Museum, St. Petersburg)

During Minich's campaigns against the Turks, much attention was paid to firefighting, and the Russian infantry was trained to shoot in the "karakol" offensive. This method was canceled in General Fermor's "Dispositions for military preparations and advances in the general battle against the Turks" published in 1736, which provided for a combination of offensive and defensive tactics. Fermor understood that the firing of ranks of entire companies or battalions ceased of itself after a short time due to the thick smoke caused by the use of black powder. The "Disposition" recommended firing by platoons under the command of knowledgeable officers; only in this case, firing on the battlefield could continue for as long as desired.

After the accession to the throne in 1740 of Empress Elisabeth, Prussian tactics were largely abandoned - the empress demanded a return to the tactical doctrines introduced by Peter the Great. This next episode of the fight against German dominance in the army led to the appearance in 1746 of a new infantry charter, written by Field Marshal Lassi: "The Combat Charter of an Infantry Regiment for the Russian Imperial Army." Although many of Peter's ideas were retained in the charter, the document retained a new look at firefighting, with the addition of the requirement that bayonets be attached during battles in deployed lines. This was a consequence of the experience gained in battles against the Turkish light cavalry, when the bayonet was considered a good defense against the cavalry.

The next and most significant change in the Russian infantry regulations took place in 1755, during the Shuvalov reform of the army. "Description of the infantry regimental formation" was a revision of the new and advanced infantry regulations of the Prussian army. Shuvalov consulted with both Russian and Austrian tactical experts, but the resulting document became one of the most complex infantry regulations in the Russian army, and appeared just before the start of the Seven Years' War. As a result, at least until 1759, due to insufficient experience, infantry commanders were not able to apply the provisions of the new regulations in the troops.

Battle of Palzig, July 23, 1759. The Russian army in dense defensive formations in two lines, artillery covering the only possible approach to its positions, as shown on the plan. The Russians won the victory mainly due to careful positioning and the use of reserves from the Observation Corps. (From the author's collection)

The main formation of the battalion was still four-line, but it was complicated by the fact that when approaching the enemy up to 70 steps, it was advised to reorganize in three lines. With a four-rank formation, the first two ranks fell when firing on the knee; when building in three lines, only the first of them knelt down. The Prussian system of dividing the battalion into four divisions, eight half divisions and 16 platoons was considered convenient for increasing control over soldiers on the battlefield. The battalion grenadiers were placed on both flanks, and a reserve of three platoons was located at a distance of 25 fathoms (about 50 meters) behind the battalion line. The reserve was assigned the same role as the fourth rank, which did not engage in firing, according to the charter of 1731; in the period from 1740 to 1755, no reserve was allocated.

In practice, the Shuvalov charters revealed a number of shortcomings, including quick stops in the firing of platoons - a problem that the Prussians also faced. “Our muskets and cannon responded, but, of course, not with a volley, but to tell the truth, in great disorder, but the shooting was carried out much more often than by the enemy,” a contemporary wrote. This rate of fire, presumably three Russian shots for every two Prussian shots, was a direct consequence of the old Petrine doctrine revived by Munnich and Fermor. Firepower and close ranks under enemy fire throughout the Seven Years' War remained the cornerstones of Russian military practice, and not at all the bayonet strike, as historians of the later period believed.

The experience gained in the first battles of the war was the basis of Fermor's second manual of 1758 - "General disposition for fighting the enemy." In this document, it was required “to open fire by platoon at the command of officers, aiming at half the height of the enemy. When the Prussians come closer, open fire with divisions and continue to fight with bayonets until, with the help of God and through the courage of the Russian army, the enemy is defeated and expelled from the battlefield.

The Prussian charter required shooting without aiming at the middle of the enemy's formation, but Fermor's instructions were more practical; in this case, a much higher percentage of bullets should have hit the target. Higher shooting accuracy, coupled with a higher rate of fire, gave Russian soldiers a significant advantage in firefights, which were usually fought at a distance of 50-70 paces.

Emperor Peter III, husband of Catherine II, is depicted in this engraving in the uniform of a commander of a cavalry guard company. After the death of Empress Elizabeth, Peter III intended to make an alliance with Frederick the Great - this decision cost him his throne and life: Peter was killed as a result of a conspiracy led by his wife, Empress Catherine. (From the collection of Walter Yarborough, Jr.)

The weakness of the Russian army was something else, and this weakness largely nullified the advantages. A British observer reported that "Russian troops ... under no circumstances can act hastily." The tediously prescribed methods of rebuilding and maneuvering almost in a state of lethargic led to the fact that Russian troops barely moved on the battlefield. A Russian eyewitness noted that at Gross-Jegersdorf "our army stood in line throughout the entire battle, with the first rank sitting on its knee." The Prussians noted that "... although they [the Russians] have adopted a linear formation, an infantry regiment is hardly able to level the line in less than an hour, and even then there is always a big mess." By 1759 the situation had improved somewhat, and with the adoption of Fermor's charter, the deployment of the column in line was facilitated.

The advance of troops in large divisional columns was adopted by the Russian infantry during Minich's campaigns against the Turks, and this practice was continued during the early years of the Seven Years' War. Such a formation was unusual for approaching the enemy, but the close battlefield near Zorndorf (1758) forced the troops to stray into columns, so that Prussian artillery shots punched huge gaps in the ranks. Although Shuvalov's instructions recommended the use of battalion columns as an offensive formation, Russian commanders on the battlefield continued to deploy their units in line, since in this formation the entire battalion could fire. After reaching the position, the entire line opened salvo fire, and then continued the attack, trying to drive the enemy from the battlefield with bayonets. In 1761, during the campaign at Kolberg, a brigade formation was adopted, in which two battalions moved in columns, forming a mobile square, and the soldiers had to either deploy a front square when danger appeared, or, if necessary, turn around in a line. This provided greater mobility on the battlefield compared to the early years of the Seven Years' War.

The principles of building an army on the battlefield during the war also changed. At the beginning of the century, it was customary to deploy infantry in two lines, and the third line remained behind them, forming a reserve. The cavalry covered the infantry from the flanks. If we do not take into account the huge columns formed during the war with the Turks, then the first improvement can be considered the construction in two main lines with the allocation of a small intermediate line of regimental reserves. The cavalry still remained on the flanks, the infantry relied on fire fighting and mobile field fortifications (slingshots) to prevent a frontal cavalry attack. Near Palzig (1759), the Russian army preferred to erect field fortifications in order to disrupt the enemy's formation, and the second line of mixed reserves was ready to support the troops in the event of an enemy breakthrough.

Empress Catherine II the Great (reigned 1762-1796). After the overthrow of her husband Peter III, Catherine reigned as an absolute monarch and continued to strengthen her army. Almost immediately after the end of the Seven Years' War, her troops were involved in a long war with Turkey (1768–1774). (From the collection of Walter Yarborough, Jr.)

Another important innovation during the war was the experience of using light infantry in the Russian army. During the siege of Kolberg (1761), two battalions of five companies were formed. They had to provide cover, operating independently in small groups, relying mainly on marksmanship. During the reign of Catherine the Great, the idea will be supported and light infantry will develop into a special branch of the army, but in 1761 their units were intended only for confrontation with the Prussian riflemen in the Kolberg area.